Archive for category Industry Talk

Industry Talk: Congress Takes Important Step To Stop Afghan Taxation Of US Aid Dollars

This is good news and I sincerely hope that Congress has taken care of this. I know Doug Brooks and the ISOA have been working hard to overturn this practice, and it is amazing to me that we have allowed Afghanistan to do this. How much money has been lost to this corrupt practice? And what an insult?

Here is a quote from ISOA’s website on what exactly the Afghan government has been doing all of these years.

The Afghanistan Ministry of Finance (MoF) has adopted the practice of taxing foreign organizations hired by the U.S. government to support reconstruction and development in Afghanistan. Despite tax exemptions negotiated by the U.S. Department of State (DoS) and the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) that are applicable to U.S. government (USG) contracts, “tax exempt” companies and organizations continue to receive tax bills from the Afghan government.  Given that the Afghan government can withhold necessary work permits in the absence of tax payments, companies and organizations have little recourse but to attempt direct negotiations with Afghan officials or to pay the tax bills.

Yeah, so that is one of the methods used to harass companies and it is pathetic. If you don’t pay the tax, you don’t get the permit. And really what is being requested by the ISOA and others, is to have Afghanistan live up to their agreements. I mean it is US taxpayer dollars that are going towards aid to help stabilize this country–and this is how Afghanistan honors that?  Here is the ISOA position on this deal.

This tax situation undermines international efforts to stabilize Afghanistan, creates barriers to effective implementation of much-needed aid programs, creates significant new opportunities for corruption within the host government and among companies, and unnecessarily penalizes American taxpayers – costing them millions of dollars – for offering assistance to a foreign nation.
USG contractors in Afghanistan are caught between USG regulations that require valid business licenses and the demands of the Afghan MoF that disputed taxes be paid in order to receive these permits.  Because DoS discourages companies and organizations from negotiating the tax issue with the Afghan government directly, USG assistance is critical. There is an urgent need for clear direction from the U.S. Congress in opposing this unacceptable tax situation.
So after all of this pressure, finally Congress does the right thing. We will see if it works. A big thanks to the ISOA for bringing attention to this matter and keeping up the pressure over the years. -Matt

Congress Takes Important Step to Stop?? Afghan Taxation of U.S. Aid Dollars
07 May 2012
The International Stability Operations Association is pleased to note that the House Armed Services Committee Chairman’s Mark for the Fiscal Year 2013 National Defense Authorization Act contains a provision that aims to end unlawful  taxation of U.S. foreign assistance by the Afghan Ministry of Finance (MOF).  The provision requires the Secretary of Defense to determine that the MOF is not violating bilateral agreements with the U.S. before the Department may use a contracting preference for Afghan goods and services, as required under the “Afghan First” policy. ISOA has worked the Afghan Tax issue as an advocacy priority and is committed to ending this inappropriate taxation.

Read the rest of this entry »

Tags: , , , , , ,

Leadership: Fast Company– Design, Teamwork And Leadership Lessons From General Stanley McChrystal

This is an excellent video presentation on McChrystal’s ideas on organizations and leadership (‘It Takes A Network‘), as applied to businesses today. He really dives into the complexities of today’s wars and market place, and talks about his lessons learned at JSOC and with special operations. Of course our industry should pay attention, because we are the ultimate combination of business and war.

One theme that you see with many books on special operations/leadership is how much of an impact Operation Eagle Claw had on the spec ops community. That failure was a hard lesson to swallow, and the leaders of that community at the time had to really dig into what went wrong and how to fix it. This is a starting point with McChrystal’s talk, and it sets the tone perfectly.

McChrystal also delves into the second reshaping of the JSOC organizational structure, and that is modern terrorism and 9/11.  That the problem was very complex, and that there were so many pieces (agencies, units, foreign partners, etc.) to put together in order to be effective, and that they were fighting networks.  The traditional top down management structure was not working, and could not effectively use or control all of these pieces. It couldn’t keep up either, and that is not a good position to be in.

So what happened was a rethinking on how to make this machine called JSOC into a network that could compete with terrorist/enemy networks. Nothing new if you have been following the blog or reading McChrystal’s stuff. Very cool, and watch the video if you want a better picture of what I am talking about.

As to today’s PMSC’s and their organizational structures? Good question, and I have never really dived into that.  It would make for a fantastic thesis or chapter in someone’s book, and authors/researchers might have already touched this issue. Who knows, and maybe some of the readers can present some examples?

With my limited exposure to companies and their organizational structures, most follow a traditional top down approach.  Although what is interesting is that corporate usually has no idea what is going on at the ground level with contracts, and they are highly dependent on the Project Manager to find that out with the leadership out in the field. PM’s are the ones that should be keeping a track of that leadership out in the field as well–but sadly, many companies operate with the PM at the home country office and they lead through emails or video conferencing. They might visit out in the field now and then, but that costs money in the eyes of corporate, so it is one of those deals where some PMs do it more than others based on what corporate will allow.

So companies do put a lot of trust into those leaders out in the field. If anything, companies forget about those leaders or could care less about properly supporting them or listening to their concerns. These leaders out in the field have to interpret emails and policies and directives, while at the same time making sure the troops and the client they are providing a service too is happy.  These guys are where the rubber meets the road with contracts, and they have a lot of impact.

These mid-level field managers might have several site managers under them. Under those site managers, there might be a day shift, mids, and night shift supervisors.  They might have team leaders in charge of PSD details, and PSD teams might be permanently assembled or piecemeal depending on how the organization and man power is set up.  Rotations of folks coming in and out of that country/war zone has an impact on how things are done as well. There are so many organizational models and types of operations that contractors create, that it would be very interesting to try to tap into that and see what works and what doesn’t. Even PMSC’s from Europe and elsewhere bring their own brand of organization structure to the table, and it is fascinating to see that stuff in action.

Companies also lack the proper policies and incentives to grow leaders into those positions. This is a big problem out there, and it is something I have covered before. You will see managers in the field, hand pick whomever they want, and PM’s usually just go with that choice–partly because they really don’t have any guidance or support from corporate. Which is great if that manager knows how to do that, but absolutely sucks when they create really poor teams of leaders that the rest of us have to put up with.

With that said, the really poor teams of leaders are usually defined by guys that are extremely loyal to that manager, and pose no threat to that manager’s position.  Much like how dictators operate. It is how you get teams of yes men that do not question that manager, and it is also how you get group think scenarios.  PM’s would be very wise to pay attention to how and why mid-level managers pick the folks they pick.  Was it based on merit, experience and good leadership skills, or were they chosen based on ‘what’?

Also, if the company has poorly set up the pay and incentives with the idea of hanging on to good people, then growing leaders is damn near impossible. Or if they do not offer a way to advance in the organization that is fair and makes sense, then folks will have no interest in participating in that. We default back to how mid-level managers assemble crap teams, because either they are more concerned with loyalty or they just don’t have a lot to choose from–because the company really doesn’t care about ‘growing leaders’ or seeking good leaders during recruitment.

So why am I adding this to McChrystal’s deal on organizational structures and networks?  Hopefully companies will look at Crosslead and other ideas on how best to manage their folks and organize their companies for success. In a way, incidents that are extremely embarrassing to the industry and companies, are like mini-Operation Eagle Claws, and all companies should be striving to learn from their mistakes/embarrassments and continuously improve (Kaizen). Perhaps there is a better way of structuring your organization, and maybe you can do things that will create the necessary leaders to manage that? -Matt

 

 

Design, Teamwork, And Leadership Lessons From Gen. Stanley McChrystal: Must Watch
By Austin Carr
05-02-2012
McChrystal shared the lessons he learned as leader of the Joint Special Operations Command and talked about how they translate to business at Fast Company’s recent Innovation Uncensored conference.
For five years, retired General Stanley McChrystal led the Joint Special Operations Command, or JSOC, the branch of the military charged with special operations planning that was responsible for the death of Osama bin Laden one year ago. The successful raid on bin Laden’s compound took place after McChrystal’s tenure, but the crucial lessons he learned during his years commanding JSOC have applications in all industries.

Read the rest of this entry »

Tags: , , , ,

Industry Talk: BIMCO And ISO Join Forces To Establish PMSC Standards

Compliance with the new ISO Standard will provide a number of advantages and assurances for Shipowners as well as PMSCs. Together with BIMCO’s GUARDCON the Shipowner will have a solid foundation on which to base the choice of armed security providers. Furthermore, for the PMSC, compliance with the new ISO Standard together with the use of BIMCO GUARDCON will constitute a hallmark of professionalism.

Great news and having an association like BIMCO behind this is a big push.  BIMCO is the largest international shipping association in the world. Here is a blurb from their website about how big.

BIMCO is the largest of the international shipping associations representing ship-owners controlling around 65 percent of the world’s tonnage and with members in more than 120 countries drawn from a broad range of stakeholders having a vested interest in the shipping industry, including managers, brokers and agents.

So when you have that kind of power to back something like an ISO standard for PMSC’s, I think that is significant. Couple this with the efforts of other groups like ASIS getting an ANSI rating for a code of conduct, and the efforts of the ICoC and you can see that momentum is gathering for making PMSC’s a legitimate market of force.  Not to mention all of the input and hard work that industry associations have put into these standards.

The end result will be internationally recognized standards for what is a quality PMSC–or an ‘ISO Standard‘.

On the other hand, I certainly hope that the ISO is truly universal and not biased towards one country or another. It should be a standard that any country that has PMSC’s can achieve and participate in, with reasonable investment. Because this is the thing with standards–you just don’t get those for free.

I am also wary of those who wish to turn the standardization process into a over regulated money making scheme. Sure we want standards, but who wants a set of rules that makes business unprofitable because of all of the extra costs? Or basically creating an industry that profits from regulating another industry. I certainly hope this regulation and accreditation industry does not get out of hand. So this is something to watch as we get closer to an ISO standard for this industry.

I say this, because if you look at what is going on with the maritime security market, you see the companies continue to tack on training requirements that are just overkill it seems. For example, in my last maritime security job post, Control Risks listed these requirements for work.

Essential:
-Minimum of 5 years military experience
-Prior experience of mobile or static maritime security
-Fluent English
-FPOS I as a minimum
-ISPS SSO Qualification
-STCW 95
-ENG 1 Medical (or recognised equivalent)
-Criminal Record Check
-Seaman’s Book
-Yellow Fever inoculation certificate

lol. I mean look at all of that crap that contractors have to have as requirements to be ‘armed guards on boats’?  And I have seen this with other companies that have flown these jobs as well. The catch is that many of them do ‘training’ on top of providing security teams, so having these requirements only helps them to make money off of that side business called training and certification. So where does it end and will an ISO give these companies even more angles to overburden contractors with cost and hoops to jump through?

Not only that, but check out the £220 cost for an SIA license as an example? Or all of the hoops you need to go through just to get that SIA license? So I appreciate an ISO Standard, but I certainly hope we don’t go down the path of over regulation. Or maybe an ISO will put a stop to over regulation, just because if everyone meets the ISO standard, what is the point of going beyond that standard? Interesting stuff and we will see how it goes. -Matt

 

BIMCO – ISO join forces to establish PMSC standards
ISO standard will be available in 2012 as a Publicly Available Specification
05/08/2012
In a joint submission to the 90th session of IMO’s Maritime Safety Committee, BIMCO and ISO explain that work is underway to establish an ISO standard for the accreditation and certification of PMSCs (private maritime security companies) providing contracted armed security personnel (PCASP) on board ships.
The new ISO standard will be available in 2012 as a Publicly Available Specification. Because the reputation and recognition of the organisations involved provide essential legitimacy, BIMCO firmly believes that this is the best and swiftest methodology to develop the process through which to audit with the necessary thoroughness. In IMO precedent has been set before with endorsement of ISO standards and it is hoped that IMO will also endorse this new ISO standard and thereby help speedily resolve this complex issue.

Read the rest of this entry »

Tags: , , , , ,

Industry Talk: KBR In Bidding To Privatize British Police Forces

This is an interesting one, just because of the shock that the British press is having about KBR getting involved with the bidding. But of course, this is the British office of KBR bidding on this, and that is why they are able to participate. But check out this title of an article written in the Guardian.

Guantánamo Bay contractor on shortlist to run UK police services

US firm KBR, which helped build detention camp, among consortiums bidding to run police services in West Midlands and Surrey

Now that is funny.  Really emphasize the fact that KBR built that prison…Dorks. From the same article, here is a statement from KBR.

“KBR is not involved in policing, our objective in the privatisation of the police force is to get more police doing actual police work while KBR brings operational efficiencies to the back office with the objective of achieving an overall lower cost of service while improving service levels,” said a spokesman. “We are an operational support company whose capabilities are transferable to critical, uniformed, command-led environments such as the police.”

Not only that, but I don’t see the US press having a fit when Aegis (the US branch) bids and gets US contracts. Hell, they won a massive contract in the early days of Iraq, funded by US tax dollars, and that is what put Aegis on the map.lol Or how about the Embassy in Afghanistan contract (KESF contract, and check out news about it at SOCNET), which is currently in the process of transitioning from AGNA to Aegis. Aegis of course is owned by Tim Spicer of Sandline fame, and that company had history too–just like KBR.

So with that said, I wish KBR luck and I certainly hope the bidding process and following contracts give these British police forces a good service. I also wish Aegis good luck with the US embassy contract. -Matt

 

US military-industrial giant KBR in bidding to privatize British police forces
May 02, 2012
Giant US military-industrial company Kellogg Brown & Root (KBR) is in the running to win a slice of a controversial £1.5 billion (US$2.43 billion) contract to transform the West Midlands and Surrey police forces in Britain, The (London) Times reported.

Hailed as the largest police privatization scheme in the UK, it has been suggested the private companies who win the contract will be tasked to perform several police functions — including patrols, detention and criminal investigation.

KBR, a former subsidiary of the Halliburton group, has attracted its share of criticism over the large contracts it won with the US government during the recent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. The corporation also helped to build the Guantanamo Bay detention facility.

The Times reported that it was among four groups shortlisted to win the British police contract, a number whittled down from more than 200.

A KBR spokesman said its bid was the first time the corporation had attempted to get involved in regular policing.

Read the rest of this entry »

Tags: , , , , ,

Afghanistan: Taliban To Target Contractors In This Year’s Spring Offensive

You know, this makes a lot of sense strategically speaking. With the introduction of the APPF, that is the weak spot of the west. That clients are being protected by weak and poorly trained security forces forced upon them by the government, and the chance of success against such weakly guarded compounds is much higher than against other harder targets.

But there are still professional security contractors guarding a few of these outposts, and all of these guys will definitely be on alert and looking to stop attacks.

As for recent attacks, it seems like the Taliban are still using the suicide assaulter method. This is where they seek to breach a compound by blowing up the entry control point, or some portion of the wall with high explosives (VBIED or other), and then armed assaulters wearing explosives pour through that breach and fight their way to concentrations of humans to detonate. It is very violent, and fast, and it takes a well planned defense to counter such a thing.

As to the methods of breach, they are using everything from VBIEDs to guys dressed in Burqas and carrying explosives and blowing up the front gate. They are even infiltrating compounds as workers or visitors, with pistols in their shoes. Here is an example of the most recent attack on the Green Village (filled with international contractors)

The violence began around 6 a.m. in eastern Kabul with a series of explosions and gunfire ringing out from the privately guarded compound known as Green Village that houses hundreds of international contractors.

Shooting and blasts shook the city for hours as militants who had stormed into the compound held out against security forces, according to an official who spoke on condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to release the information.

A local witness said the attackers were disguised in burqas — the head-to-toe robes worn by conservative Afghan women.

“A vehicle stopped here and six people wearing burqas entered the alley carrying black bags in their hands. When they entered the alley, there was an explosion,” said Abdul Manan.

At least seven people were killed, according to the Interior Ministry. It also said 17 were wounded, most Afghan children on their way to school.

The area appeared to have calmed down by about 10 a.m. and NATO said all the attackers had been killed. The gate at the entrance of the Green Village was destroyed, with the wreckage of the suicide bomber’s car sitting in front. The road running past the compound was littered with shoes, books, school supplies and the bloody ID card of a student from a nearby school.

Notice the timing?  6 AM was probably the guard shift time or when many of the workers started coming in. After the explosion, the assaulters came in wearing burqas.  You are probably thinking why wear burqas at that point?  Well it causes those guards with guns who are dazed and confused after the explosion to momentarily pause when they see women coming near that breach.  That momentary pause could be just enough for those assaulters to get into a position where they can maneuver and have a higher chance of killing folks once in the compound. This works very well if the area has a lot of women that walk around wearing burqas.

The thing I suggest to guards and commanders in charge of the defense, is to apply Kaizen to your defense, and constantly look for ways of improving the defense. Be wary of your patterns, because the enemy is studying them and will use them to their advantage. Also, go through as many scenarios as possible, and try to imagine how you would attack your facility. Think like the Taliban and identify the weaknesses in your defense. Be prepared and make sure that there is plenty of ammunition and your weapons are all good to go.  Be prepared for night attacks and day attacks, and drill for both. Drill, drill and do more drills, and turn your compound into a hard target.

Probably the biggest factor in a good defense is having good leadership. If you have poor leadership who could care less about these things I listed above, then the Taliban will pick up on that one and use it to their advantage. Poor leaders are usually the guys that shut out everyone when planning the defense, and could care less about seeking input or improving the defense. They could care less about the preparedness of the guard force or the condition of their weapons/equipment. Their ego or comfort or pay is much more important than actually doing their job.

And those with better ideas are not looked at as assets, but as threats to that leader and his position. (read the Dictator’s Handbook if you want a good idea on how poor leaders operate) To me, it is absolutely idiotic not to seek out feedback from your guards who actually stand post for long hours every day. These folks have lots of time to evaluate the defense, and leaders would be wise to seek out their input. Unfortunately, poor leaders are out there doing their damage and they are a reality. In those cases, I feel for the guard force and I truly hope that you are not tested by the enemy.

Another deal to remember is to definitely include your client in the planning for the defense. Make sure they understand what they need to do in an incident.  And whatever those actions are, should only help the defenders in doing what they have to do and not hinder. Meaning if the defense is split between folks having to hold the hand of the clients, and fighting the enemy, then that is half of your force taken away because your client did not know what to do. Of course there will always be folks who forget or are in shock and need help, but a little planning and drilling, and that will go a long ways towards increasing the success of the defense in these extremely violent and fast paced swarming attacks. Don’t let poor planning or poor leadership lower your chances of success.

For more scoop on this Green Village attack, Tim over at Free Range International wrote up a post about it. Check it out here.

Good luck out there, and I say let’s shut down every one of these attacks with authority. I say let’s make this decision to attack contractors a very bad and costly idea for the Taliban!….. -Matt

 

image 0Afghanistan: Taliban To Target Contractors In This Years Spring Offensive

Security contractors inspecting the damage at the Green Village, Afghanistan.

Taliban announce ‘spring offensive’ across Afghanistan
May 2, 2012
Code-named Al-Farouq, primary targets of offensive will be “foreign invaders, their advisors, their contractors”.
The Taliban militia announced they would launch their annual “spring offensive” across Afghanistan on Thursday, threatening to target US-led NATO troops and their allies with renewed vigour.
Code-named Al-Farouq, the primary targets of the offensive would be “foreign invaders, their advisors, their contractors, all those who help them militarily and in intelligence,” the militants said on their website.
“Al-Farouq spring offensive will be launched on May 3 all over Afghanistan,” the militant group said.
The militia said the code name came from Islam’s second caliph, Omar Al-Farouq known for his military advances in Asia and the Arab world during the 7th century.
The announcement came hours after Taliban insurgents armed with guns, suicide vests and a bomb-laden car attacked a heavily fortified compound used by Westerners in Kabul, killing seven people and wounding more than a dozen others.

Read the rest of this entry »

Tags: , , , ,

Afghanistan: So Will Contractors Be Thrown Under The Bus With The New SOFA?

This is a very important deal, because with these Status of Forces Agreements contractors can get left behind and disregarded–even though they are a vital part of the post war mission. We saw this with the quick and highly political exodus from Iraq, and I would hate for us to experience the same thing in Afghanistan. We have so many lessons to learn from past SOFA mistakes, and to ‘not’ create a fair and comprehensive SOFA with Afghanistan that actually covers contractors would be profoundly idiotic.

So what I would like to do here is get folks talking about this future SOFA, and let DoS and our law makers know that contractors in Afghanistan must be taken care of in this agreement. That our lives are just as important as soldiers and our services will be crucial to our long term strategic goals in Afghanistan. From reconstruction to training Afghanistan’s military, contractors will be there doing good work.  They need protections in order to be effective and continue that work.

I would also like to see law makers and diplomats confront Karzai on this idiotic scheme called the APPF. Even the SIGAR has identified that this program is deficient. Are we going to wait until an incident happens–like a rogue APPF guard killing clients?  Or watch as guards that are poorly trained and equipped, do a horrible job of protection–and then insurgents easily kill or kidnap clients? pffft…

The latest quarterly report from the Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction (or SIGAR) released on Monday also chronicles how corruption in the country shows no signs of having let up.

The report’s most urgent warning concerns the “imminent transition” from private security contractors (PSC) to the state-owned Afghan Public Protection Force.

Steven J. Trent, the acting special inspector general, expressed concerns that as many as 29 major USAID projects costing nearly $1.5 billion are at risk of full or partial termination “if the APPF cannot provide the needed security.” About half that amount has already been spent.

And whether it can is very much an open question, Trent wrote. The U.S. embassy, the Afghan government and the U.S.-led military forces agreed a year ago to check the progress of the Afghan Public Protection Force at the 6-, 9-, and 12-month marks.

“The 6-month assessment, completed in September 2011, found that the APPF was not ready to assume any of the essential PSC responsibilities to meet contract requirements — such as training, equipping, and deploying guard forces,” the report pointed out. “[T]he December assessment, which would have been at the 9-month mark, has not yet been made public” and “the deadline for the 12-month assessment has passed.”….

Yep, that inspires confidence….

Either way, the SOFA must include provisions that allow security contractors to continue offering their services without being hassled or imprisoned by Afghanistan–like what is going on in Iraq.  Or these reconstruction programs will just have to pack up and leave….because obviously the APPF is such a horrible option and Afghanistan could care less about this aid. So what do you think, and what would you like to see in this new SOFA, or are contractors destined to be ‘thrown under the bus’? -Matt

 

U.S. – Afghan agreement short on specifics
By Mike Mount
05/01/2012
President Barack Obama and Afghanistan President Hamid Karzai on Tuesday signed a Strategic Partnership Agreement that outlines cooperation between their countries after the withdrawal of U.S.-led international forces in 2014.
With little detail and few specifics in the document, U.S. officials say it paints a broad stroke of what the U.S.-Afghanistan relationship will look like from 2014 through 2024.
Officials said the document highlights military, diplomatic and economic relationships between the two countries without offering specifics on troops levels, economic assistance and the status of diplomatic relations.
With some 88,000 U.S. troops operating inside Afghanistan, the document does state that there will be no permanent U.S. bases in the country after the 2014 withdrawal, officials said. The agreement also allows for the possibility of U.S. troops staying in Afghanistan beyond 2014 to train and conduct counterterrorism operations to go after what a White House fact sheet described as “targeting the remnants of al Qaeda.”??The U.S. and Afghanistan will begin negotiating a new Status of Forces Agreement. The United States will also designate Afghanistan a “Major Non-NATO Ally” to provide a long-term framework for security and defense cooperation,” according to the White House statement.

Read the rest of this entry »

Tags: , , , ,

Industry Talk: PSC That Handled The White House’s ‘Burn Bag’, Files For Bankruptcy

This isn’t good. lol I mean a lot of attention is put on overseas security contracts, but what about stuff like this? I am not familiar with TW & Co. but it is odd to me that they would owe this much in taxes and no one, to include the Secret Service, did not know about this? Or they knew what was going on, and they just looked the other way. Who knows?

Which also begs the question, why is a company like this even allowed to ‘sell off’ it’s contracts, and especially after showing such irresponsibility? How about kicking them off the contract, and re-bid the thing using ‘best value’ as a tool to get the best deal for the White House?

The 617-worker company said it would use the bankruptcy case to shut down its operations and sell off its 22 contracts for the best price it can find.

And if the Secret Service is in charge of this stuff, that maybe they should keep a little closer tabs on the companies that operate this close to the Presidency? (although they have been busy with their own problems recently….)

In my view, every company that works there, should be the best and most squeaky clean companies out there.  Hopefully, whomever they sell these 22 contracts too will be responsible folks that actually pay their taxes. -Matt

 

Security Firm Handled White House’s ‘Burn Bag’
By Katy Stech
April 30, 2012
The government contractor that disposed of the White House’s secrets kept one of its own: It hasn’t paid its taxes in full since 2008.
That admission came spilling out into bankruptcy court less than a week after Maryland-based security-guard provider TW & Co. filed for Chapter 11 protection owing nearly $3 million on its federal tax bill. The 617-worker company said it would use the bankruptcy case to shut down its operations and sell off its 22 contracts for the best price it can find.
“The end game is an orderly liquidation,” bankruptcy attorney James Greenan told Bankruptcy Beat.
So far, a bankruptcy judge has allowed the company to transfer management of its biggest contracts to a subcontractor, ensuring that the federal institutions like the historic Winder Building, some Smithsonian buildings and several Air Force bases don’t go unwatched as the company searches for a buyer to take on the work permanently.

Read the rest of this entry »

Tags: , , , , ,

Somalia: South African Contractor Killed In Puntland

Rest in peace to the fallen and my heart goes out to the friends and family of Lodewyk Pietersen. As to the particulars of this incident, the article states that he was killed by his bodyguard after an argument. A Somali version of a green and blue incident, and these type of incidents are not exclusive to Afghanistan.

I thought it was interesting that reports mentioned that these contractors might be going out on missions with the PMPF. Here is a quote from Garowe online. (on a side note, if the PMPF is doing land operations, then why are they wearing bright blue uniforms?-camouflage anyone? lol)

Although reports are still unclear instructor Pietersen accompanied the PMPF in the operation and was killed shortly after entering Hul-Anod district.
Puntland forces have encountered resistance in Hul-Anod before in March 2011 pirates holding a Danish family hostage attacked Puntland forces that were stationed in the district, 5 soldiers were killed.
The Puntland government approved Friday’s operation by the PMPF and it is unclear what exactly occurred in Hul-Anod Friday afternoon but Puntland authorities have already set up an investigation into the killing of Mr. Pietersen.

And the report below said.

The statement said the trainer was killed while accompanying Puntland’s maritime forces on a government-approved mission targeting pirates near Hul-Anod, a coastal area favored by pirates who use it as a base to hijack ships for ransom.

So perhaps Saracen Int. are accompanying these guys on missions and it would make sense. Contractor mentors have been used in other wars, like in Afghanistan with the Afghan Border Patrol mission. Mentors can watch how these guys do business, and help correct training deficiencies and assist in management efforts so future missions have higher success rates.

Hopefully Puntland or Saracen will do some vetting of all of their bodyguards contracted to protect trainers, and make sure that they have folks that they can trust. If they catch the killer, we will see what this guy was all about. Was he mentally ill or an enemy combatant of some type? Perhaps the killer was sympathetic to the pirates, or working for the pirates in Hul-Anod? -Matt

Edit: 04/28/2012- I was given a heads up in an email about a few corrections. Somalia Report is reporting this bit of information, and it sounds like Lodewyk had a full blown mutiny on his hands, and not some rogue body guard. Here is a quote from the website below. Also, I was told that this was not a Saracen International contractor, but some other company that took over when their contract was suspended.

The South African national was monitoring a troop of Somali anti-piracy police ordered into Timirishe village in a move against pirates of the ali Salabeen clan.  When ordered to proceed with the mission, the troops began firing their guns into the air and into the ground, apparently in an effort to warn the pirates.
Sources at the scene told Somalia Report that the mentor then approached the group to encourage them forward and was shot and killed. There is still confusion over the exact motive and exactly who the killers were. PMPF sources told Somalia Report that an investigation is underway.

Edit: 04/29/2012 The name of the company was Sterling Corporate services. Here is a quote from Lloyds back in February of this year.

It is understood that the force currently stands at around 300 officers and  more will be added in time, with UAE-registered private security firm named Sterling Corporate Services having been retained to train the troops

PMPF 1Somalia: South African Contractor Killed In Puntland

Puntland Maritime Police Force(PMPF)Photo-Garowe Online

 

South African security trainer killed in Somalia
April 28, 2012
A South African security trainer was killed by his bodyguard in Somalia’s semiautonomous region of Puntland, officials said Saturday.
Puntland’s government said in a statement Saturday that it had launched an investigation into Friday’s killing. The statement identified the man as Lodewyk Pietersen, and said he worked for Saracen International, a security firm that trains anti-piracy forces in Puntland. The statement said the South African was 55 and married with children.
South African foreign ministry spokesman Clayson Monyela said Saturday no official word has been received from consular staff handling South African interests in Somalia.
“We have not yet been alerted to such an incident,” he said.

Read the rest of this entry »

Tags: , , , , ,

Publications: Selective Privatization Of Security: Why American Strategic Leaders Choose To Substitute PSC’s For National Military Forces, By Bruce Stanley

This study argues that when political leaders chose to reduce their nation’s military force structure, they may face conflicts beyond their anticipated scope and duration. Such decision- makers are left with no choice but to legalize and legitimize the use of PMCs resulting in the increased use of PMCs as a deliberate tool of foreign policy.

A big hat tip to David Isenberg for finding this paper and posting his commentary about it. What makes this so significant is that the author of the paper is actually using qualitative and quantitative analysis to prove exactly what the reason is for the rise of the use of private security contractors. It is this kind of analysis that can be pointed to as ‘empirical’ evidence for what is really going on with this industry. Here is what David had to say about the paper:

Considering how many times over years I have critiqued the private military and security (PMSC) industry for making claims without providing evidence to back it up, it is always noteworthy to find that rare person who tries to fill that empirical evidence gap.

Absolutely. This is important stuff, and especially for those that are policy makers in government. It is also important information that companies can use for strategic business planning.

I also really enjoyed the use of economic theory in this paper. In essence, this model of dissertation is pretty close to what I would use for something like Offense Industry.  It is also interesting to point out that the author did come across some speed bumps when it came to incomplete data.

To be accurate in analysis, you need good data. Because the US government didn’t record as well as they could of, all of the contractors involved with this war and what they did, that studies like this one can suffer a little. The author pointed this out, but he was able to come to some interesting conclusions.

Summary
This dissertation was framed around the question of why there has been a rapid growth in the reliance on the private security industry in US foreign policy in the past two decades. More importantly this dissertation sought to demonstrate: first, that the use of private security contractors by the United States is not a new phenomenon; second, that the recent increased use of private security as an instrument of military policy or foreign policy may in fact be a consequence of deliberate policy decisions of successive presidential administrations; and third, that the security environment in the target state of an intervention is a factor that results in an increase of private security contractors. The goal of this dissertation was to move beyond most of the extant literature which describes the phenomenon, and develop theory that helps explains why there has been a rapid growth in the reliance on the private security industry.
This study argues that when political leaders chose to reduce their nation’s military force structure, they may face conflicts beyond their anticipated scope and duration. Such decision- makers are left with no choice but to legalize and legitimize the use of PMCs resulting in the increased use of PMCs as a deliberate tool of foreign policy. Using “supply-demand” theory as the theoretical approach, this dissertation built upon the three key influences emphasized first by Singer (2003) and then by others: the decreasing supply of national troops, decreasing national defense budgets, and the rising demand from global conflicts and humanitarian emergencies.
As the previous chapters demonstrate the basic theory and thus insights from the descriptive literature have value, however they failed to provide a fully exhaustive explanation of this important phenomenon. The additional elements added to the relatively spare theory resulted in a more convincing explanation of the increased use of PMCs. In sum, this study added precision to our understanding of the causes of the increased use of PMCs.
This chapter examines the findings of my dissertation, a few methodological problems, and suggests some areas for further research. The next section presents the theoretical discussion and empirical findings and conclusions from the qualitative and quantitative section. The section that follows provides a few suggestions on how to improve the research design. The final section offers a few policy prescriptions and areas for further research.
Findings
This study asserted that the private security industry fills vacuums created when the US government does not have the means or the will to fully provide domestic and international security. To understand the broader context of the private security industry’s relationship to mature democracies this dissertation focused initially on five hypotheses:
H1: When military outlays decrease there is an increase in the use of private security.
H2: When the size of a national military decreases there is an increase in the use of private military security.
H3: When the number of a military disputes, military engagements and militarized conflicts increases there is an increase in the use of private security internationally.
H4: When the duration of a military conflict increases there is an increase in the use of private security.
H5: When there is a decrease in bureaucratic controls and regulations there is an increase in the use of private security.
Three additional hypotheses were added to this study upon completion of the case studies. They are:
H6: When there is a force cap placed on the size of the military force there is an increase in the use of private security.
H7: When there is no host nation supporting the intervention there is an increase in the use of private security.
H8: When the security environment is non-permissive there is an increase in private security.
Using a mixed methods approach, the hypotheses were tested using both a qualitative and quantitative approach. The qualitative approached relied on the case method, using a series of structure focused questions to compare the outcome of three historical cases where the US used private contractors. As a result, the controlled comparison helped identify the outcome of the dependent variable, private contractors, and provided a historical explanation of private contractors in relation to a set of independent variables. In this instance, structured, focused comparison helped to tease out exactly how supply, demand and other pressures help to stimulate the rise of PMCs.
The quantitative approach relied on a statistical method, using interrupted time series to examine the use of private contractors by the US from 1950 to 2010. The quantitative component analyzed a larger time period and increased the generalizability of the findings. It also provided insight on the relative explanatory weight of different causal influences.
The findings of this research demonstrates that the three key influences asserted in the extant literature the decreasing supply of national troops, decreasing national defense budgets, and the rising demand from global conflicts and humanitarian emergencies are very important to understanding the rise of the private security industry in the past two decades. Yet as this dissertation shows the nature of the security environment in the target state and the reduction (or elimination) of bureaucratic controls in the acting state are also important to explaining the increased reliance of the private security industry. Two other variables that were prevalent in the case studies that may be a factor in the increased reliance on private contractors: limitations on the number of troops committed to an intervention, and the duration of the intervention.

So that is is pretty interesting. A company can literally look at the current situation and say that if their country decreases the size of their military force, the size of that military’s budget decreases, and there is a dramatic increase in conflict/emergencies, that the demand for force will more than likely point towards the use of PMSC’s. And you can see that going on throughout the world as we speak.

But the thing that I look at is the strategic uses of PMSC’s. I have always argued that this industry is a strategic asset, and not a liability–regardless of the few hiccups this industry has had over the years. We are what made the concept of an ‘All Volunteer Force’ work. Here is the quote that grabbed my attention.

Policy Implications
State policy makers may be able to use the results of this study to inform decisions on military budgeting, structure, or civil-military relations. As the worldwide economic crisis continues, policy makers faced with budget choices will look to reduce their military expenditures and possibly their military force structure. However, if they are faced with foreign policy problems requiring military intervention, then it should not be surprising if they substitute national military forces for private security forces. It is likely that more state policy makers may move towards the legalization of private security companies. Thus, the trend towards legalization leads toward further legitimization of the use of private security contractors. The US has certainly set the example in the past twenty years for other nations to follow.

This legalization process is the one thing that I am always on the look out.  The Letter of Marque is probably the most significant legal mechanism out there for authorizing companies to wage war in the name of the state.

As to current legalization processes, I would have to say that it has been slow and tedious. But we are seeing movement, and the Commission on Wartime Contracting is a prime example of that effort. I point to the recent legislation that members of this commission put forth–which helps to further legitimize this industry.

As the industry is further legitimized by lawmakers seeking better controls over it, then the comfort in using such a force for foreign policy increases.  Most of all, it allows this nation to enjoy their ‘peace dividend’ at the end of wars, but at the same time have a mechanism in place that can support a call up of force for whatever emergency or conflict that may come up.

The use of the ICoC and the standardization process that is currently going on throughout the world is another example. Efforts like this will further legitimize the use of private security and will help to increase it’s use. Even with the current grey areas of legal use, we are seeing the maritime security industry grow at an incredible pace. Armed guards on boats is definitely another example of this increased use of private security.

As for actual strategy, sometimes private force is the better option. It gives politicians the ability to quietly buildup or draw down for a conflict. Private forces fill in the gaps as the use of force is debated, depending on the current political environment. Meaning one day, a President might have a specific strategy for a conflict that a nation is involved with, and then within a month when that President is voted out of office by a President with a different strategy, then that military must be able to flex with that.  Private security is what allows for that flexibility.  Likewise, PMSC’s have been used by two Presidents of different parties, both with different strategies, and in multiple wars over the last ten years. Obviously someone likes us. lol

In fact, we have actually reached a point in the war where there were more contractors than military force in places like Afghanistan. Or that contractors became the primary force representing US interest in places like Iraq.

In closing, it is amazing to me that we have this massive officer corps for the military, numerous think tanks, and plenty of military colleges that all focus on the use of ‘military force’.  And yet, private force is making this much of an impact on the way we do business? Does anyone else see the imbalance here? Where are the think tanks dedicated to the use of PMSC’s?  Where are the PMSC colleges and universities? What institutions other than the military or business schools produce the future leadership of ‘private security and military companies’?

It is also odd to me that there are so few voices talking about this.  I can count on my hand, the number of blogs or journalists that purely focus on PMSC’s. It is nice to enjoy a niche like this as a blogger. But for how significant this industry is, and how fast it has grown, I would have thought that more folks would have come into the mix to analyze and synthesize about this industry. Interesting stuff, and it really makes you think. A big hat tip to Bruce Stanley for the work he put into this! -Matt

Link to paper here.

Tags: , , , , ,

Afghanistan: New Pact–US Ready To Defend Afghanistan For At Least A Decade After 2014 Drawdown

“If the Taliban are back in the political process, being imposed on us, the Afghan people will definitely resist, paving the way for another war to happen,” Zia Massoud told Reuters in an interview at his home in Kabul.

“If the Taliban want peace, we are ready to make peace, but if they want to fight, there will be a fight. That’s it. If you coddle them, give them a political address and other gains, they will never be ready for any talks,” he said. -Daily Outlook Afghanistan, January 21 2012

There are two deals with this that are of importance. Afghanistan is a strategic position for the US to keep tabs on Al Qaeda/Taliban in Pakistan. So having some type of presence in Afghanistan helps in that goal.

The second deal is that as troops pull out, the Taliban will increase their attacks and you will begin to see the strengths and weaknesses of the Afghan government rear their ugly head. Not that we haven’t seen this already, but when the Afghans are up against an enemy that has been fighting a professional military like the west, I tend to think that the Afghan army and police will have some issues. So having some kind of presence in Afghanistan as this new dynamic unfolds will be crucial.

With that last part, my attention is on the latest formation of Afghans whom have come together to show solidarity against the Taliban and an Afghan government that shows weakness in the face of the Taliban. This group is called The National Front, or what is basically the new Northern Alliance. One of the members of this new Northern Alliance crew is Ahmad Zia Massoud, the brother of the late Afghan ‘Lion of Panjshir’– Ahmad Sha Massoud.

Why is this important?  Because I think in a world where the Taliban are surging and causing a lot of pain, the weak leaders will crumble, and the strong leaders will rise to the top and meet the challenge of opposing the Taliban. My hopes are that Karzai crumbles, and goes back into his hole where he belongs, and the National Front grows a leader that can stick it to the Taliban and get Afghanistan on the right path.  Here is what the Asia Times had to say about the National Front.

“This is the first time that the leadership of the Tajik, Uzbek and Hazara communities [of Afghanistan] has come to a common line of thinking … In essence, the Northern Alliance is being resuscitated as a political entity. … As the Northern Alliance groups see it, Pakistani strategy is to wait out the period between now and 2014 – the date set for the US troop withdrawal – and then regroup the Taliban and make a bid to capture power in Kabul. Their strong show of unity in Berlin suggests that they will not roll over and give way to an exclusive US-Taliban-Pakistan settlement being imposed on their nation.”

So in my view, having some troops/contractors on hand to help train Afghan forces, and bide our time until ‘real’ Afghan leadership surfaces, could make for a good little alternate plan, on top of dealing with threats in Pakistan.

Kind of a repeat of 2001 where SF units were able to help the Northern Alliance deliver crushing blows to the Taliban.  In that case, Afghans truly feared and hated the Taliban, and were fighting them with a sense of purpose. I mean look at what the Taliban did to the Hazaras back in 1998?

On August 8, 1998 the Taliban launched an attack on Mazar-i Sharif. Of 1500 defenders only 100 survived the engagement. Once in control the Taliban began to kill people indiscriminately. At first shooting people in the street, they soon began to target Hazaras. Women were raped, and thousands of people were locked in containers and left to suffocate. This ethnic cleansing left an estimated 5,000 to 6,000 dead.

Now of course the Hazaras have done all they can to get back at the Taliban, but my point here is that there is some bad blood between the members of the National Front and the Taliban. These guys do not plan on living under Taliban rule–or under a government that appeases the Taliban.

I also think that common Afghans, many of whom are Pashtun, might have no problem with the Taliban. That is a nice attitude to have, seeing how the west has kept the Taliban from imposing their rule on the people. But if the Taliban do take over, look out. The people can kiss goodbye what little freedoms they enjoyed, and the Taliban will take them back into medieval times.  Pulling out the majority of troops and letting Afghans deal with this new potential reality might be a good thing. It would force people to re-evaluate what they really want–oppression or freedom?

There are other reasons to being in Afghanistan, like having an eye on Iran. But dealing with Al Qaeda/Taliban in Pakistan and being in position to support (if they need it) a new National Front as it forms are the ones that stand out to me.

As to the contracts in the future? One thing is for sure. If you sell Afghanistan military hardware, then you need the support/mentors/trainers to help them with that stuff. Also, all of those reconstruction contracts and investors looking to do business in Afghanistan will still need protection or advisers to help them navigate that place. (especially as the APPF falters) Also, diplomatic missions will continue to be important, hence WPS will still be in place. Then of course getting all of that equipment out of Afghanistan will be crucial as well. Here is a quote about how much money will be spent there in the future.

The U.S. pledged in the agreement to continue to fund Afghan security forces after 2014. It does not say how much money this will involve, but says it should be enough to support the force. U.S. officials have said they expect to pay about $4 billion a year to fund Afghan forces, but the funding would have to be approved by Congress.

On a side note with the equipment in theater, I am wondering how much we will leave versus how much will be taken out?  It is extremely expensive to get stuff into and out of Afghanistan, and perhaps we might see a lot more equipment just handed over to the Afghans? Compare that to Iraq and the massive operation to get equipment out of there.  Who knows, but I do know that contractors will be crucial to that effort.

In essence, what you are seeing in Iraq now, will probably repeat itself in Afghanistan.  So contractors will have utility in one shape or another in Afghanistan to make the transition go smoothly and support the continuing efforts. -Matt

 

Ahmad Zia MassoudAfghanistan: New Pact  US Ready To Defend Afghanistan For At Least A Decade After 2014 Drawdown

Ahmad Zia Massoud.

 

Afghan-US pact: US ready to defend Afghanistan for at least a decade after 2014 drawdown
April 23, 2012
Washington has pledged in a newly agreed strategic pact to help defend Afghanistan militarily for at least a decade after the country formally takes control of its own security, an Afghan official said Monday.
The draft agreement signed on Sunday also says the U.S. will only take such actions with Afghan agreement. The United States also pledged it will not launch attacks on other countries from Afghan soil, according to sections of the accord read out in parliament by Afghan National Security Adviser Rangin Dadfar Spanta.
Afghan officials had previously said that they would not allow their country to be used to launch drone attacks into Pakistan or other neighboring countries after the deadline for most foreign forces to withdraw by the end of 2014.
“Considering that stability in Afghanistan would be stability for Central Asia and South Asia, the United States emphasizes that any kind of interference in Afghan affairs would be a matter of concern for the United States,” he said, quoting from the Dari language version of the agreement.

Read the rest of this entry »

Tags: , ,