Archive for category Strategy

Publications: Selective Privatization Of Security: Why American Strategic Leaders Choose To Substitute PSC’s For National Military Forces, By Bruce Stanley

This study argues that when political leaders chose to reduce their nation’s military force structure, they may face conflicts beyond their anticipated scope and duration. Such decision- makers are left with no choice but to legalize and legitimize the use of PMCs resulting in the increased use of PMCs as a deliberate tool of foreign policy.

A big hat tip to David Isenberg for finding this paper and posting his commentary about it. What makes this so significant is that the author of the paper is actually using qualitative and quantitative analysis to prove exactly what the reason is for the rise of the use of private security contractors. It is this kind of analysis that can be pointed to as ‘empirical’ evidence for what is really going on with this industry. Here is what David had to say about the paper:

Considering how many times over years I have critiqued the private military and security (PMSC) industry for making claims without providing evidence to back it up, it is always noteworthy to find that rare person who tries to fill that empirical evidence gap.

Absolutely. This is important stuff, and especially for those that are policy makers in government. It is also important information that companies can use for strategic business planning.

I also really enjoyed the use of economic theory in this paper. In essence, this model of dissertation is pretty close to what I would use for something like Offense Industry.  It is also interesting to point out that the author did come across some speed bumps when it came to incomplete data.

To be accurate in analysis, you need good data. Because the US government didn’t record as well as they could of, all of the contractors involved with this war and what they did, that studies like this one can suffer a little. The author pointed this out, but he was able to come to some interesting conclusions.

Summary
This dissertation was framed around the question of why there has been a rapid growth in the reliance on the private security industry in US foreign policy in the past two decades. More importantly this dissertation sought to demonstrate: first, that the use of private security contractors by the United States is not a new phenomenon; second, that the recent increased use of private security as an instrument of military policy or foreign policy may in fact be a consequence of deliberate policy decisions of successive presidential administrations; and third, that the security environment in the target state of an intervention is a factor that results in an increase of private security contractors. The goal of this dissertation was to move beyond most of the extant literature which describes the phenomenon, and develop theory that helps explains why there has been a rapid growth in the reliance on the private security industry.
This study argues that when political leaders chose to reduce their nation’s military force structure, they may face conflicts beyond their anticipated scope and duration. Such decision- makers are left with no choice but to legalize and legitimize the use of PMCs resulting in the increased use of PMCs as a deliberate tool of foreign policy. Using “supply-demand” theory as the theoretical approach, this dissertation built upon the three key influences emphasized first by Singer (2003) and then by others: the decreasing supply of national troops, decreasing national defense budgets, and the rising demand from global conflicts and humanitarian emergencies.
As the previous chapters demonstrate the basic theory and thus insights from the descriptive literature have value, however they failed to provide a fully exhaustive explanation of this important phenomenon. The additional elements added to the relatively spare theory resulted in a more convincing explanation of the increased use of PMCs. In sum, this study added precision to our understanding of the causes of the increased use of PMCs.
This chapter examines the findings of my dissertation, a few methodological problems, and suggests some areas for further research. The next section presents the theoretical discussion and empirical findings and conclusions from the qualitative and quantitative section. The section that follows provides a few suggestions on how to improve the research design. The final section offers a few policy prescriptions and areas for further research.
Findings
This study asserted that the private security industry fills vacuums created when the US government does not have the means or the will to fully provide domestic and international security. To understand the broader context of the private security industry’s relationship to mature democracies this dissertation focused initially on five hypotheses:
H1: When military outlays decrease there is an increase in the use of private security.
H2: When the size of a national military decreases there is an increase in the use of private military security.
H3: When the number of a military disputes, military engagements and militarized conflicts increases there is an increase in the use of private security internationally.
H4: When the duration of a military conflict increases there is an increase in the use of private security.
H5: When there is a decrease in bureaucratic controls and regulations there is an increase in the use of private security.
Three additional hypotheses were added to this study upon completion of the case studies. They are:
H6: When there is a force cap placed on the size of the military force there is an increase in the use of private security.
H7: When there is no host nation supporting the intervention there is an increase in the use of private security.
H8: When the security environment is non-permissive there is an increase in private security.
Using a mixed methods approach, the hypotheses were tested using both a qualitative and quantitative approach. The qualitative approached relied on the case method, using a series of structure focused questions to compare the outcome of three historical cases where the US used private contractors. As a result, the controlled comparison helped identify the outcome of the dependent variable, private contractors, and provided a historical explanation of private contractors in relation to a set of independent variables. In this instance, structured, focused comparison helped to tease out exactly how supply, demand and other pressures help to stimulate the rise of PMCs.
The quantitative approach relied on a statistical method, using interrupted time series to examine the use of private contractors by the US from 1950 to 2010. The quantitative component analyzed a larger time period and increased the generalizability of the findings. It also provided insight on the relative explanatory weight of different causal influences.
The findings of this research demonstrates that the three key influences asserted in the extant literature the decreasing supply of national troops, decreasing national defense budgets, and the rising demand from global conflicts and humanitarian emergencies are very important to understanding the rise of the private security industry in the past two decades. Yet as this dissertation shows the nature of the security environment in the target state and the reduction (or elimination) of bureaucratic controls in the acting state are also important to explaining the increased reliance of the private security industry. Two other variables that were prevalent in the case studies that may be a factor in the increased reliance on private contractors: limitations on the number of troops committed to an intervention, and the duration of the intervention.

So that is is pretty interesting. A company can literally look at the current situation and say that if their country decreases the size of their military force, the size of that military’s budget decreases, and there is a dramatic increase in conflict/emergencies, that the demand for force will more than likely point towards the use of PMSC’s. And you can see that going on throughout the world as we speak.

But the thing that I look at is the strategic uses of PMSC’s. I have always argued that this industry is a strategic asset, and not a liability–regardless of the few hiccups this industry has had over the years. We are what made the concept of an ‘All Volunteer Force’ work. Here is the quote that grabbed my attention.

Policy Implications
State policy makers may be able to use the results of this study to inform decisions on military budgeting, structure, or civil-military relations. As the worldwide economic crisis continues, policy makers faced with budget choices will look to reduce their military expenditures and possibly their military force structure. However, if they are faced with foreign policy problems requiring military intervention, then it should not be surprising if they substitute national military forces for private security forces. It is likely that more state policy makers may move towards the legalization of private security companies. Thus, the trend towards legalization leads toward further legitimization of the use of private security contractors. The US has certainly set the example in the past twenty years for other nations to follow.

This legalization process is the one thing that I am always on the look out.  The Letter of Marque is probably the most significant legal mechanism out there for authorizing companies to wage war in the name of the state.

As to current legalization processes, I would have to say that it has been slow and tedious. But we are seeing movement, and the Commission on Wartime Contracting is a prime example of that effort. I point to the recent legislation that members of this commission put forth–which helps to further legitimize this industry.

As the industry is further legitimized by lawmakers seeking better controls over it, then the comfort in using such a force for foreign policy increases.  Most of all, it allows this nation to enjoy their ‘peace dividend’ at the end of wars, but at the same time have a mechanism in place that can support a call up of force for whatever emergency or conflict that may come up.

The use of the ICoC and the standardization process that is currently going on throughout the world is another example. Efforts like this will further legitimize the use of private security and will help to increase it’s use. Even with the current grey areas of legal use, we are seeing the maritime security industry grow at an incredible pace. Armed guards on boats is definitely another example of this increased use of private security.

As for actual strategy, sometimes private force is the better option. It gives politicians the ability to quietly buildup or draw down for a conflict. Private forces fill in the gaps as the use of force is debated, depending on the current political environment. Meaning one day, a President might have a specific strategy for a conflict that a nation is involved with, and then within a month when that President is voted out of office by a President with a different strategy, then that military must be able to flex with that.  Private security is what allows for that flexibility.  Likewise, PMSC’s have been used by two Presidents of different parties, both with different strategies, and in multiple wars over the last ten years. Obviously someone likes us. lol

In fact, we have actually reached a point in the war where there were more contractors than military force in places like Afghanistan. Or that contractors became the primary force representing US interest in places like Iraq.

In closing, it is amazing to me that we have this massive officer corps for the military, numerous think tanks, and plenty of military colleges that all focus on the use of ‘military force’.  And yet, private force is making this much of an impact on the way we do business? Does anyone else see the imbalance here? Where are the think tanks dedicated to the use of PMSC’s?  Where are the PMSC colleges and universities? What institutions other than the military or business schools produce the future leadership of ‘private security and military companies’?

It is also odd to me that there are so few voices talking about this.  I can count on my hand, the number of blogs or journalists that purely focus on PMSC’s. It is nice to enjoy a niche like this as a blogger. But for how significant this industry is, and how fast it has grown, I would have thought that more folks would have come into the mix to analyze and synthesize about this industry. Interesting stuff, and it really makes you think. A big hat tip to Bruce Stanley for the work he put into this! -Matt

Link to paper here.

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Afghanistan: New Pact–US Ready To Defend Afghanistan For At Least A Decade After 2014 Drawdown

“If the Taliban are back in the political process, being imposed on us, the Afghan people will definitely resist, paving the way for another war to happen,” Zia Massoud told Reuters in an interview at his home in Kabul.

“If the Taliban want peace, we are ready to make peace, but if they want to fight, there will be a fight. That’s it. If you coddle them, give them a political address and other gains, they will never be ready for any talks,” he said. -Daily Outlook Afghanistan, January 21 2012

There are two deals with this that are of importance. Afghanistan is a strategic position for the US to keep tabs on Al Qaeda/Taliban in Pakistan. So having some type of presence in Afghanistan helps in that goal.

The second deal is that as troops pull out, the Taliban will increase their attacks and you will begin to see the strengths and weaknesses of the Afghan government rear their ugly head. Not that we haven’t seen this already, but when the Afghans are up against an enemy that has been fighting a professional military like the west, I tend to think that the Afghan army and police will have some issues. So having some kind of presence in Afghanistan as this new dynamic unfolds will be crucial.

With that last part, my attention is on the latest formation of Afghans whom have come together to show solidarity against the Taliban and an Afghan government that shows weakness in the face of the Taliban. This group is called The National Front, or what is basically the new Northern Alliance. One of the members of this new Northern Alliance crew is Ahmad Zia Massoud, the brother of the late Afghan ‘Lion of Panjshir’– Ahmad Sha Massoud.

Why is this important?  Because I think in a world where the Taliban are surging and causing a lot of pain, the weak leaders will crumble, and the strong leaders will rise to the top and meet the challenge of opposing the Taliban. My hopes are that Karzai crumbles, and goes back into his hole where he belongs, and the National Front grows a leader that can stick it to the Taliban and get Afghanistan on the right path.  Here is what the Asia Times had to say about the National Front.

“This is the first time that the leadership of the Tajik, Uzbek and Hazara communities [of Afghanistan] has come to a common line of thinking … In essence, the Northern Alliance is being resuscitated as a political entity. … As the Northern Alliance groups see it, Pakistani strategy is to wait out the period between now and 2014 – the date set for the US troop withdrawal – and then regroup the Taliban and make a bid to capture power in Kabul. Their strong show of unity in Berlin suggests that they will not roll over and give way to an exclusive US-Taliban-Pakistan settlement being imposed on their nation.”

So in my view, having some troops/contractors on hand to help train Afghan forces, and bide our time until ‘real’ Afghan leadership surfaces, could make for a good little alternate plan, on top of dealing with threats in Pakistan.

Kind of a repeat of 2001 where SF units were able to help the Northern Alliance deliver crushing blows to the Taliban.  In that case, Afghans truly feared and hated the Taliban, and were fighting them with a sense of purpose. I mean look at what the Taliban did to the Hazaras back in 1998?

On August 8, 1998 the Taliban launched an attack on Mazar-i Sharif. Of 1500 defenders only 100 survived the engagement. Once in control the Taliban began to kill people indiscriminately. At first shooting people in the street, they soon began to target Hazaras. Women were raped, and thousands of people were locked in containers and left to suffocate. This ethnic cleansing left an estimated 5,000 to 6,000 dead.

Now of course the Hazaras have done all they can to get back at the Taliban, but my point here is that there is some bad blood between the members of the National Front and the Taliban. These guys do not plan on living under Taliban rule–or under a government that appeases the Taliban.

I also think that common Afghans, many of whom are Pashtun, might have no problem with the Taliban. That is a nice attitude to have, seeing how the west has kept the Taliban from imposing their rule on the people. But if the Taliban do take over, look out. The people can kiss goodbye what little freedoms they enjoyed, and the Taliban will take them back into medieval times.  Pulling out the majority of troops and letting Afghans deal with this new potential reality might be a good thing. It would force people to re-evaluate what they really want–oppression or freedom?

There are other reasons to being in Afghanistan, like having an eye on Iran. But dealing with Al Qaeda/Taliban in Pakistan and being in position to support (if they need it) a new National Front as it forms are the ones that stand out to me.

As to the contracts in the future? One thing is for sure. If you sell Afghanistan military hardware, then you need the support/mentors/trainers to help them with that stuff. Also, all of those reconstruction contracts and investors looking to do business in Afghanistan will still need protection or advisers to help them navigate that place. (especially as the APPF falters) Also, diplomatic missions will continue to be important, hence WPS will still be in place. Then of course getting all of that equipment out of Afghanistan will be crucial as well. Here is a quote about how much money will be spent there in the future.

The U.S. pledged in the agreement to continue to fund Afghan security forces after 2014. It does not say how much money this will involve, but says it should be enough to support the force. U.S. officials have said they expect to pay about $4 billion a year to fund Afghan forces, but the funding would have to be approved by Congress.

On a side note with the equipment in theater, I am wondering how much we will leave versus how much will be taken out?  It is extremely expensive to get stuff into and out of Afghanistan, and perhaps we might see a lot more equipment just handed over to the Afghans? Compare that to Iraq and the massive operation to get equipment out of there.  Who knows, but I do know that contractors will be crucial to that effort.

In essence, what you are seeing in Iraq now, will probably repeat itself in Afghanistan.  So contractors will have utility in one shape or another in Afghanistan to make the transition go smoothly and support the continuing efforts. -Matt

 

Ahmad Zia MassoudAfghanistan: New Pact  US Ready To Defend Afghanistan For At Least A Decade After 2014 Drawdown

Ahmad Zia Massoud.

 

Afghan-US pact: US ready to defend Afghanistan for at least a decade after 2014 drawdown
April 23, 2012
Washington has pledged in a newly agreed strategic pact to help defend Afghanistan militarily for at least a decade after the country formally takes control of its own security, an Afghan official said Monday.
The draft agreement signed on Sunday also says the U.S. will only take such actions with Afghan agreement. The United States also pledged it will not launch attacks on other countries from Afghan soil, according to sections of the accord read out in parliament by Afghan National Security Adviser Rangin Dadfar Spanta.
Afghan officials had previously said that they would not allow their country to be used to launch drone attacks into Pakistan or other neighboring countries after the deadline for most foreign forces to withdraw by the end of 2014.
“Considering that stability in Afghanistan would be stability for Central Asia and South Asia, the United States emphasizes that any kind of interference in Afghan affairs would be a matter of concern for the United States,” he said, quoting from the Dari language version of the agreement.

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Crime: Politics And The Drug War In Latin America

In South America, the balloon effect has coincided with another phenomenon: The rise of a generation of populist leaders who view U.S. antidrug efforts as a version of the “Yankee imperialism” they disdain.
Both Venezuela’s Mr. Chavez and Bolivia’s Mr. Morales built support among mostly poor populations as staunchly anti-U.S. leaders. They describe the drug war as a facade for a strategy to control the region’s politics and natural resources, especially oil.
Mr. Chavez and other leaders say they are fighting drug trafficking. But in Venezuela, thwarting U.S. drug efforts appears to be a cause for promotion. In 2008, the U.S. declared Venezuelan Gen. Henry Rangel Silva a drug “kingpin.” This month, Mr. Chavez named Gen. Rangel defense minister.

Imagine this. Several large coca producing countries have leaders that were elected based on their ‘support for coca farming’, and one country elects leaders that were financed and influenced by drug cartels. And then you have multiple countries that dislike the US and try to interpret the drug war to their people as some form of ‘Yankee Imperialism’.  That to me is like the perfect alignment of events to create not just Narco States, but Narco Coalitions. The combining of states that produce the drugs with states that distribute them, all with the intent of pushing those drugs into the US and world and lining the pockets of politicians and cartels. It sounds like a premise in some crazy far out crime/war movie, all wrapped up with ‘world domination’. lol

Except in this case, it is a very plausible scenario and parts of it have already come true. In the articles below, they discuss how vulnerable Mexico’s political process is to cartel influence. The second one talks about how both Peru and Bolivia have seen a huge increase in coca production, all because they have leaders who were elected based on their pro-coca farming views. Ecuador and Venezuela gets a mention because they are all about supporting the drug trade as well. So chalk those countries as lost to the narcos….

As for Mexico, who knows if Calderon can keep his presidency? The cartels are doing all they can to work against him and his party at the local levels, and they are easily using the rules of insurgency to do so. From assassination, to bribes, to kidnapping, to voter intimidation, etc. The cartels are also using media and any other angle to get the public to reject Calderon’s war against the cartels.

Finally, the thing that I am most interested in is how will the US and the rest of the world react to such a Narco Coalition, if Mexico falls? What is the strategy to counter these narco insurgencies, and what does victory or defeat look like in the context of a drug war like this? -Matt

 

OB RJ666 cocain G 20120113200502Crime: Politics And The Drug War In Latin America

Bolivian President Evo Morales, holding coca leaves in 2009, built a political movement by demonstrating against the drug police. He has named coca growers to law-enforcement posts -- including drug czar.

Mexico’s 2012 vote is vulnerable to narco threat
12/21/2011
“We cannot allow organized crime to decide at the ballot box,” said Josefina Vazquez Mota, a leading contender to be the 2012 presidential candidate of the National Action Party (PAN), which ended 71 years of PRI-party rule with Vicente Fox’s election in 2000.
Mexican presidents are limited to one six-year term, and the PAN held on to power in 2006 with Calderon’s narrow win over leftist challenger Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador, who will top the ticket for the Democratic Revolutionary Party, or PRD, again in 2012.
This time around, analysts expect PAN candidates to be hobbled by public dissatisfaction with Calderon’s military offensive against the drug cartels. At least 50,000 people have been killed since he took office in December 2006, and gangland violence has spread misery to parts of the country that were previously considered safe.
Outdated election laws
Calderon has angered rival lawmakers by suggesting that a presidential victory by PRI candidate Enrique Pena Nieto would represent a capitulation to the criminals. But many Mexicans seem nostalgic for the relative tranquility of life under the PRI, whose network of patronage and corruption once kept organized crime in check.

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Strategy: Mexico Implements Fortified Town Or ‘Burgward’ Strategy In Tamaulipas

Grand Strategic Analysis: In essence, fortified towns (garrison towns) are being established by means of recolonizing (and stabilizing existing populations) in a region of Mexico lost to the de facto rule of the criminal insurgents. This is pretty much an unheard of development with regard to mature, stable, and modern states. Rather, it is characteristic of centralized states expanding into frontier areas (those expanding territorially) and such states losing control over expanses of their lands (those being overrun by raiders and barbarians). This is very much reminiscent of Roman, and later Holy Roman, Empire frontier towns (burgwards et.al.) in Europe during the late imperial and post-Western empire eras. The raiders of those eras, however, were early on based on the Germanic tribes and Huns (Magyars) as opposed to today’s cartel (2nd/3rd phase) and gang (3GEN) groupings [6]. Modern parallels to US firebases in Vietnam may be made but the context and type of insurgency (criminal vs Maoist-inspired) make such contentions highly problematic. The historical parallels to the criminal-soldier threats of the late Roman Empire and Dark Ages appear even more viable in light of the multitude of atrocities committed (torture, mutilations, and beheadings), although in this instance with a post-modern contextual overlay.

Thanks to Dr. Bunker for pointing this one out in his Strategic Note #10. This is very cool stuff and reminiscent of a sort of ink blot counter-insurgency strategy. But Dr. Bunker classified it as Burgward Strategy based off of the Roman method of setting up frontier posts to deal with raiders and barbarians. To basically take back and bring under control the land within the empire.

It is also shocking to know that towns like the one described exist. Here is the quote that perked me up:

In late 2010, nearly all of the town’s 6,300 inhabitants fled to neighboring municipalities and across the border into the United States due to fear of drug-related violence.
Many of them had relocated to a shelter in the nearby city of Ciudad Miguel Aleman.

This is crazy. That would make the illegal immigrants that cross into the US into more of a class of war refugee. So yes, any strategy that includes taking back these towns is mutually beneficial to Mexico and the US.

The other thing I was wondering is how many other towns are like this one? And, for setting up these mobile military bases, I wonder who they are contracting with if any, to help support these operations?  I imagine if there are quite a few of these towns that need to be taken back, then I could see the potential for a Mexican type LOGCAP program emerging to support those operations. Although I have not heard of anything like that yet, and I will keep an eye out as Mexico continues to implement this strategy. (I do not know if the Merida Initiative is helping to support this or not?). Interesting stuff. -Matt

 

Mexico Inaugurates Military Barracks in Violence-Plagued Town
December 10, 2011
Mexican President Felipe Calderon formally inaugurated a military barracks in the violence-racked northeastern town of Ciudad Mier, where he reiterated that the deployment of army soldiers to battle drug-trafficking gangs is a necessary but temporary measure.
He said the new army base will allow time for authorities to recruit and form their own police forces in that town and other areas of Tamaulipas state, saying that the weakness, vulnerability and, in some cases, complicity, of law enforcement had put people “at the mercy of criminals.”
Calderon said Ciudad Mier, a colonial community in Tamaulipas state near the U.S.-Mexico border that was once known as the “Magic Town,” should be a tourist destination but instead was abandoned by its citizens last year because of the presence of criminal gangs.
In late 2010, nearly all of the town’s 6,300 inhabitants fled to neighboring municipalities and across the border into the United States due to fear of drug-related violence.
Many of them had relocated to a shelter in the nearby city of Ciudad Miguel Aleman.
Ciudad Mier, which is located in the “Frontera Chica” region of Tamaulipas, and many other towns in northeastern Mexico found themselves caught up in the war sparked by the March 2010 rupture of the alliance between the Gulf drug cartel and Los Zetas, the cartel’s former armed wing.

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Mexico: Has Mérida Evolved? Part One: The Evolution Of Drug Cartels And The Threat to Mexico’s Governance

“I never thought we would contemplate the day when ‘true believers’ from a Mexican cartel would start looking a lot like jihadists fighting for Al Qaeda—instead representing a perverted form of Christianity—but such a day appears very close at hand.” -Dr. Robert Bunker, House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere

This is a fascinating testimony about the strategy, or lack there of, for the war in Mexico. That quote up top came from Dr. Bunker and his assessment of what is going on down there, and it does make you pause. The cartels are just as awful as jihadists, and sometimes worse. The violence going on down there is truly hellish and horrific. This is also on the US border and not in Iraq or Afghanistan! Dr. Bunker also mentioned that the drug war and cartels/gangs in the Western Hemisphere are a larger threat to the US than islamic extremists. (Very bold statement.)

I would also add one little thing to Dr. Bunker’s testimony, and that is he forgot to mention an area of study that will help to understand the cartels a little better. That would be the market of force or privatized force in war. Or to even delve into the new area of study that I have mentioned in the past called Offense Industry. States and non-state actors alike, all use Offense Industry to achieve their goals. The Sicarios and how they are bough/sold/used are a prime example.  And especially the similarities between the early Condottieri /free companies in 14th Century Italy and these current cartels. Or the history of pirates and how their business and war fighting has evolved, or remained the same. Money and how it guides the actions of these combatants, must be understood so we can develop strategies for stopping them.

The other thing I would like to hear in these testimonies is the manpower issue. If this is viewed as a narco insurgency, then a realistic assessment must be made to find out how many and what type of forces would be needed to counter such a thing? The same type of deal was applied to Iraq and Afghanistan, and we need to know how short the Mexican’s really are with ‘trusted’ and capable security forces. We also must look at the utility of all and any available sources of manpower–to include private industry and/or the Mexican people. (like promoting and assisting a Mexican Spring?) Hat tip to Small Wars Journal for this one. -Matt

 

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Leadership: A Command Culture And Philosophy Called ‘Auftragstaktik’

A command and control procedure within which the subordinate is given extensive latitude, within the framework of the intention of the individual giving the order, in carrying out his mission. The missions are to include only those restraints which are indispensable for being able to interact with others, and it must be possible to accomplish them by making use of the subordinate’s forces, resources, and the authority delegated to him. Mission-oriented command and control requires uniformity in the way of thinking, sound judgment and initiative, as well as responsible actions at all levels.- German army regulations describe Auftragstaktik, from Parameters.

Part of what makes this blog so fun and interesting is the hunt for the great idea. I don’t care where it comes from, or who came up with it–to me, it is all about logic and reason. Either the idea is sound, or it is not. It should also be able to withstand the furnace of debate and scrutiny. Hence why I post such things.

But this is a simple concept to wrap your brain around, and yet so difficult to implement in institutions like the US military or various companies. To put this much freedom of operations into the hands of a leader is pretty tough for some CEO’s or Generals to handle. And as the author presented below, the German Army during WW 2 was the victim of a officer corps that was poorly constructed. But at the tactical level, the German Army was amazing, and this concept of Auftragstaktik is a big part of that.

Anyways, I will let the reader make their own determinations based on the articles below. The first is the most modern article on the concept and a big hat tip to Jorg Muth and Thomas Ricks for getting it out there. The second article is an old one, written by a German soldier and veteran of WW 2 named Gerhard Muhm. He went into detail on how Auftragstaktik was used in the German Army at the time. The final article is a snippet from Wikipedia, which will help to simplify and focus the reader on the core concepts.

It is also important to note that Intent is a very important theme in today’s military’s. It is the idea that everyone in the unit knows the intent or the mission and what must be accomplished. Commander’s intent is another way of putting that. There is a whole study on intent at wikipedia, and it is definitely worth your while to go through it to get a feel on how important it is to the various military units of the world.

Intent is a key capability in 21st century military operations and is a vital element to facilitate subordinates initiative (U.S Army 2003, para.1-69), self-synchronisation (Alberts et al. 1999, pp.175-180) and collaboration and cooperation (Alberts and Hayes 2007,pp.109-114) amongst team members in joint operations.

Now how does this apply to private industry or even offense industry?  Well interestingly enough, there is a a lot of auftragstaktik going on already with private industry. No one tells companies how they are supposed to perform static security, convoy operations, or PSD. Even within companies, you see differences in mission accomplishment between the various contracts. So that is a very positive aspect of today’s PMC’s and PSC’s. Personally, I have seen the same missions accomplished differently in a multitude of companies that I have worked for. It is what makes the industry interesting to observe and be a part of. But as a result of these variations, private industry is able to evolve and develop SOP’s that are unique and effective. We also have some cross breeding going on with SOP’s/ideas, just because contractors are taking what they learned from prior contracts and bringing that with them to the next job for mission accomplishment.

On the flip side, our Defense Industry is purely focused on the ‘defense’. Which is fine, but it does not eliminate the enemy or reduce their numbers. For that, you need to create a Offense Industry, and concepts like Auftragstaktik or company intent will be very important to the accomplishment of a contract in this type of industry. It is also important to set up an offense industry that supports the intent of the principal or the country firing up such a machine. In other words, a country that constructs a offense industry should not be involved in telling companies ‘how’ they are to accomplish the task.

A great example is Executive Outcome’s contract in Sierra Leone. Would they have been successful if SL told the company how they were to accomplish the task?  I don’t think so, and that would defeat the reason for hiring such a company in the first place. You give them the intent, and let them figure out the ‘how’.

Now of course this concept is not a strategic concept as the articles have mentioned below. Which is very important to remember if a offense industry is to be created. Countries must first have a sound strategy in place, and the offense industry must be assembled in such a way to support that strategy.  That is a whole different post, but I guess where I am going with this is that what makes offense industry such a powerful concept is the idea of allowing companies the freedom to innovate and figure out how to accomplish the task.

Not only that, but they also have ‘incentive’ to do well. The goal should be to give them the intent, establish rules and boundaries that insure they do not hinder the overall strategy or harm other friendly units, provide adequate incentive, and set the industry free to accomplish the task. Then adjust and modify as necessary–all based on Kaizen and having a sound learning organization. -Matt

 

Jörg Muth on Command Culture and Auftragstaktik In The German Military
(posted at Best Defense)
Friday, September 9, 2011
By Jörg Muth
Auftragstaktik. The word sounds cool even when mangled by an American tongue. What it means, however, has always been elusive to Americans. The problematic translation of that core German military word into “mission type orders” completely distorts its meaning. Auftragstaktik does not denote a certain style of giving orders or a certain way of phrasing them; it is a whole command philosophy.
The idea originates with Frederick the Great, who complained after more than one battle that his highly experienced regimental commanders would not dare take action on their own but too often ask back for orders and thus waste precious time.
Nearly one hundred years later the military genius Helmuth Karl Bernhard Graf von Moltke was the first to formulate the concept of Auftragstaktik. Moltke was a diligent student of Frederick’s campaigns, of military history in general and philosophy. At a time when he was not yet famous and, not yet the victor of three wars, he observed the annual General Staff war games in 1858. The paperwork and the detailed orders appalled him because he knew that in war there was no time for such nonsense. During the war game critique he decreed that “as a rule an order should contain only what the subordinate for the achievement of his goals cannot determine on his own.” Everything else was to be left to the commander on the spot.

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Industry Talk: Pentagon Business Goes To The Small Fry

Nice little article about the defense industry and where it is at today. It asks a really compelling question–will the larger defense firms eventually try to compete in the services industry as the big program defense contracts decrease? Could we see a Boeing or Lockheed Martin participating in TWISS or some other security contractor related ‘services’ contract? lol You never know?….

The other thing I wanted to mention is that this is a prime example of small companies or small forces attacking the weakness of a large company or force. What works for guerrilla warfare, can have similar application to the business world. These smaller services companies are geared towards their niches, they are able to flex and roll with the contracting tempo, and they know what the client wants. Not only that, but because this is their primary focus, they can provide a better service than the big guys.  The larger defense companies are more concerned with and tooled for the big contracts, just because they have such a massive organization to support.  Smaller companies can certainly be more nimble in these smaller defense markets.

That’s not to say that a Lockheed Martin couldn’t enter the services market and rock and roll. It’s just they would have to compete with these well established niche companies. It will be interesting to see how this goes, and I am sure all defense companies are retooling and looking to the future as to what’s next.  Because on the one hand, you have congress getting pressure to reduce costs and balance the budge, but on the other hand we have all this chaos and war going on around the world. So this is a very difficult market to plan for, and I do not envy these companies in this endeavor. -Matt

 

Pentagon Business Goes to the Small Fry
Foreign wars create opportunities for small and nimble contractors
By Nick Taborek
September 01, 2011
Real-life army grunts have more important things to do on the modern battlefield, goes the thinking at the Pentagon these days. The scut work—and a good deal more—is outsourced to companies that can swoop in with people, basic resources, and technical know-how.
CACI International (CACI) and ManTech International (MANT) have become two of the most successful providers of technical services to the U.S. armed forces as spending on contractors soared because of wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Together they raked in $3.9 billion last year from the military for providing everything from security services to radar data analysis. “When DOD outsources work, it can surge and purge,” says Todd Harrison, a defense analyst at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments in Washington. “It can tell a contractor, ‘I want you to bring on hundreds or thousands of people quickly,’ and they’ll do it.” And when the job is done, “they’re gone,” he adds.

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Maritime Security: Pirates Using Wolfpack Tactics–Attacked Bulk Carrier With 12 Skiffs!

That’s 12 skiffs with 5-8 armed pirates per vessel, and all equipped with boarding ladders!  First off, bravo to the armed security team that was able to hold off such an attack! I would give every security contractor on that boat a bonus and a medal.

This kind of swarming attack was discussed earlier on this blog when we were talking about the New Rules of War. It is an interesting evolution of tactics, but one that is not surprising. Wolfpack also comes from the famous U-boat naval tactic.

But this incident also brings up some serious questions about the state of armed security teams currently in operation out there. This particular company was able to repel the attack, probably because they had a sufficient defensive plan, an organized force and the proper weapons. But what about those companies out there that do not have their operations squared away or are poorly manned, equipped and armed? Right now, armed guards on boats have a pretty good track record, but with tactics like these, I could actually see pirates successfully defeating an armed team.

Now what is a sufficient plan and/or weapons?  That is a great question, and I believe companies would be wise to consult those who are specialists when it comes to defending vessels.  One individual in particular that I would recommend contacting, would be Fredrik C. Jonsson, the author of Maritime Sniper Manual. You can find him on Facebook, and he has set up a Maritime Sniper Manual Facebook page.

What is really cool about Fredrik is that he can advise companies on the most cost effective and accurate weapons they would need, in order to deal with threats like ’12 skiffs swarming a vessel’.  I would imagine that most of the Russian type weapons would be adequate because of cost and availability. But definitely pick Fredrik’s brain on this if you are looking for ideas.

All in all though, it will be each team on each boat that has to pool their resources and thought power together, and figure out the best way to defend their client. I certainly hope that the companies that employ these brave souls are doing all they can to support them and give them the tools they need to be successful. From weapons to NVG’s, to solid admin and pay.  All of this is important, if you want your teams to be successful out there. And what is really important, is to have solid leadership managing those teams.

Strategically speaking, I believe the defense has the advantage out there. They have the height, they have the fields of fire, and they have the size of the vessel to work with. Any pirate up against an aggressive defense coming from such a platform, will have a tough time.  But that is why pirates are experimenting with wolf pack tactics. They can apply strength or combat power to one point on a vessel, and get the breach. Especially if they can occupy the rest of the defense of the vessel with the swarm and harassing fires. So to me, this is why it is so important that everyone gets the word about this potential threat, and really takes an honest look at their strategies and tactics for dealing with such a thing.

It is the same song and dance that I promote with the suicide assaulter tactic that enemies are using on land. You must study these attacks, and be honest with yourself about the effectiveness of your security plan. If you have a good learning organization within your team/company, and you apply Kaizen to the whole thing, you should do well. And never underestimate the enemy–know yourself, know your enemy. -Matt

 

wolfpackMaritime Security: Pirates Using Wolfpack Tactics  Attacked Bulk Carrier With 12 Skiffs!

John Hamilton's painting of a wolf pack attack on merchant vessels.

IMB Piracy Report

Attack Number: 303-11

Date: Sat Aug 06 2011

Type of Vessel : Bulk Carrier

Location detail: Around 20nm ENE of Assab, Eritrea

Attack Type: Fired_Upon

Narrations: 06.08.2011: 1505 UTC: Posn: 13:07.2N – 043:04.9E, Around 20nm ENE of Assab, Eritrea, Red Sea.

Twelve skiffs with five to eight pirates in each skiff approached a bulk carrier underway. As the skiff closed guns and ladders were noticed. Warning flares were deployed by te onboard security team. the skiffs continued to approach the vessel at 17 knots. At a distance of around 300 meters, on th ecommand of the Master, the onboard security team fired warning shots resulting in most of the skiffs falling back and circling the vessel. Two skiffs continued to chase the vessel and returned fire. The skiffs and the security team exchanged fire and after 30minutes and numerous approaches the skiffs aborted and moved away.
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Attempted Pirate Attack in Red Sea Suggests Pirates Hunting in Packs?
Monday, August 8, 2011
According to a report filed Sunday August 7th by the IMB Live Piracy Reporting Centre*, pirates attacked a vessel approximately 20 nm off the coast of Eritrea in the Red Sea. What marks this attack out for special attention, and the reason it should be of particular concern to all shipping companies and members of the maritime community is that in this instance, it would appear the pirates attacked in large numbers, en masse.

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Publications: Claire Lee Chennault–Theorist And Campaign Planner, By Major John M Kelley

I wanted to post this as a resource for anyone studying private military forces and their uses by nations. Claire Lee Chennault led the company called the American Volunteer Group or AVG in China against the Japanese after the bombing of Pearl Harbor, all with US blessing. His small force of mercenary pilots fought for 600 dollars a month (which was two to three times more than their military pay) and 500 dollars per Japanese aircraft they shot down.(offense industry)

What makes Claire significant is his theory of war, and the US military’s desire not to heed his theories. Matter of fact, it was this clash that led to Claire leaving the military, and later going to China with the blessings of the US to advise China’s fledgling air force. Claire in essence had an outlet to apply his theories of war, and not only did he advise the Chinese, but raised a mercenary army to assist.

This small mercenary army of aviators took on the entire Japanese air force at that time, and it was Claire’s planning and strategic thinking that evened the odds against the Japanese. He was certainly able to prove his theories of air power as soon as Japan bombed Pearl Harbor and brought the US into outright war with Japan. AVG was the only asset of the US that could strike back at the Japanese immediately after that attack.

And boy did they stick it to the Japanese. Their private war lasted about 6 months, and they did some damage:

The AVG was officially credited with 297 enemy aircraft destroyed, including 229 in the air. However, a researcher who surveyed Japanese accounts concluded that the number was much lower: 115. Fourteen AVG pilots were killed in action, captured, or disappeared on combat missions. Two died of wounds sustained in bombing raids, and six were killed in accidents during the Flying Tigers’ existence as a combat force.

The fight was also very uneven, and this was a PMC versus the air force and resources of a nation. Here is a statistic of how many folks we are talking about. Which further emphasizes how the AVG had to really depend upon the support of the people and really effective use of aerial strategy.

By November 1941, when the pilots were trained and most of the P-40s had arrived in Asia, the Flying Tigers were divided into three squadrons: 1st Squadron (“Adam & Eves”); 2nd Squadron (“Panda Bears”) and 3rd Squadron (“Hell’s Angels”).They were assigned to opposite ends of the Burma Road to protect this vital line of communications. Two squadrons were based at Kunming in China and a third at Mingaladon Airport near Rangoon. When the United States officially entered the war, the AVG had 82 pilots and 79 aircraft, although not all were combat-ready.

The paper below goes into detail about the theory, and pay particular attention to how similar the thinking is to Sun Tzu. Yet there is not one mention of him studying Sun Tzu?  You see concepts like attacking weakness with strength, using deception, the effective use of lookouts and networks, and the whole ‘know yourself, know your enemy’ theme.  He really focused on the strengths of the Chinese people and bringing them into the strategy.  The people are the ones that called in enemy fighter positions through an organized system of observers, helped build up the 100 bases that were crucial to Claire’s mobility strategy, and helped rescue downed pilots. This was an aerial version of guerrilla warfare.

There is a lot of good stuff in this paper, and the point I want folks to think about for the grand picture of this story, is that private force can be a strategic asset of a nation.  Claire and his AVG ‘airmen of fortune’ were celebrated in the US and world as they prosecuted the war in Asia in the post Pearl Harbor days. It would be like DynCorp waging war in Pakistan in the days right after 9/11, and everyone cheering them on as they decimate terrorist hideouts.

The AVG or the Flying Tigers also remind me of Stirling’s Private Army in Yemen. I wouldn’t be surprised if AVG is what inspired Stirling, because AVG’s private war in Asia was big news around the world.  You could also classify this as a case for the successful use of a PMC in offensive operations, or actually fighting a war. (much like with Executive Outcomes) And of course, it is another case study of offense industry, with the use of bounties as an incentive. So for all of those reasons, I think it is important to give some attention and credit to this man and what he and his company was able to accomplish. -Matt

General Claire Chennault

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Cool Stuff: The Children’s Illustrated Clauswitz

I chuckled when I first found out about this and was considering making this a ‘funny stuff’ post. But then I started really looking at this effort from a different point of view, and that is if you can reduce the theories of Clauswitz into a children’s book, then that is pretty damned cool and impressive. It would also really open up the world of strategy to children, and likewise shame adults who did not know about this strategy.

The other thing I like about this project is that I could see this book selling quite well to the defense industry families and military families of the world. Parents are always interested in the whole ‘Baby Einstein‘ concept of buying products that could make their children smarter. Imagine a child learning the very basic elements of strategy at such a young age, and how that could apply to all of their endeavors for the rest of their lives?  I know I have been personally inspired by the leading strategies of business and war, and this knowledge has been immensely helpful for understanding the world we live in. That knowledge of strategy could also make a person wealthy, help in conflict resolution, help in contests of business or war, or even help in their personal survival. Lot’s of positives that can come from this knowledge. So what’s next?  A children’s illustrated guide for Sun Tzu or Col. John Boyd? -Matt

Blog for Children’s Illustrated Clauswitz here.

8 71Cool Stuff: The Childrens Illustrated Clauswitz

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