Archive for category Strategy

Leadership: Lecture Series–The Art Of Critical Decision Making, By Professor Michael Roberto

Nov 24

Posted by Matt in Cuba, Disaster Response, Industry Talk, Jundism, Leadership, Podcasts, Strategy | No Comments

     After the Bay of Pigs failure, President Kennedy and his advisors reflected on their mistakes and created a new process for group discussion and decision making to prevent future groupthink and promote diverse perspectives. Here, Professor Roberto introduces the concept of developing a decision-making process. -From the Lecture ‘Deciding How To Decide’

paragraph dividerLeadership: Lecture Series The Art Of Critical Decision Making, By Professor Michael Roberto

     This is a great lecture series that a friend of mine hooked me up with, and I highly recommend it. It was engaging and thought provoking, and there were so many cool ideas to take away from this if you are looking for leadership guidance. As I listened to it, there were many Jundism concepts that kept popping up in various forms and examples.

     The particular lecture that I will highlight in this post is the ‘deciding how to decide’ portion.  I took notice, because this method of decision making was born out of the highest levels of leadership during the Cuban Missile Crisis and the Bay of Pigs invasion failure.  The Bay of Pigs invasion was an embarrassing mistake that resulted from poor decision making at the top.  Or what the professor referred to as ‘group think’ (being surrounded by ‘yes men’ and folks unwilling to question the group or leadership out of fear of being wrong or just assuming everyone else is right)

     The Cuban Missile Crisis was an extreme test of wills, and required the best possible strategy that would prevent the US and the Soviet Union wiping each other out with nuclear weapons. President Kennedy devised a system of decision making that would produce the best product or solution possible, that was not a victim of group think.  He used a system of subgroups that would develop solutions independently, then those groups would exchange their solutions with the other groups and critique.

    A second set of devils advocates or eyes would also review the solutions, and further nitpick the possible solutions until the best idea was standing. So this solution was hammered out of truly honest debate, and any influences that would cause people to not speak up was eliminated.  I thought it was an ingenious way of problem solving, and especially during crisis. (be sure to listen to the series to get the specifics on how to set up this system) The situation with North Korea bombing South Korea, and the US and China reaction to it is a prime example of modern day critical decision making with high stakes involved.  How President Obama decides, will really be based more on deciding how to decide first, so that the solution he gets is strategically sound and not at all influenced by group think.

    Military leaders and CEO’s can learn from this as well.  Leaders should strive hard to have honest debate about strategy and it takes listening to your people, and being open to ideas to get there.  It also requires breaking down those walls that limit honest debate, and really being aware of group think and it’s dangers. Check out the series to learn more, and let me know what you think. Also check out Professor Roberto’s blog if you want to follow his ideas or contact him. -Matt

rule dividerLeadership: Lecture Series The Art Of Critical Decision Making, By Professor Michael Roberto

THE ART OF CRITICAL DECISION MAKING

Genre: Audio or video CourseLength: Twenty-four, thirty-minute lecturesTeacher: Prof. Michael Roberto, Bryant UniversityPublisher: The Teaching Company

By Tom Alderman

July 23, 2009

Following the disastrous 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion, President Kennedy asked former President Eisenhower to the White House to seek the old soldier’s counsel. The new president wanted to know what he could learn from the whole sorry mess. Instead of the expected military hoo-hah, Ike wanted to know how the decision was made to go ahead with the Cuban invasion? How did the president gather advice from his advisors? Not a surprising question considering the five-star general led a contentious military coalition during World War II, not because of his martial skills, but because of his extraordinary leadership abilities which included understanding the core ingredient in all critical decision making: whether you’re launching a D-Day invasion, a career, a product or service, HOW you decide is more important than WHAT you decide. The process you use determines a successful outcome and if that process is not clear and effective, you’re going down.

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Building Snowmobiles: Corporate Insurgency, By Professor David James

Nov 12

Posted by Matt in Building Snowmobiles, Leadership, Strategy | No Comments

     So I thought I would put this up as a ‘building snowmobiles’ post, because A. it mentions the OODA loop as applied to business and B. they are copying some of the strategies that work for today’s insurgents or pirates, and applying it to business as well.

     I really wish I could find a copy of Corporate Insurgency though, or get the professor onto the blog here to discuss the concept a little more. This story was also taken from the Economist.

     The main theme here is to leverage the power of small forces against larger forces, or for larger forces to act like smaller forces to compete with them in business.  Insurgents will not take on armies directly, and will try to attack the bigger foe’s weakest parts. Professor James talks about how businesses can do the same thing in the market place.

     He also talks about the decision making cycle of large companies versus small companies. That in order for large companies to compete with smaller ones, they cannot be micro-managers of the brand. The professor derives examples of this de-centralized type command structure from today’s insurgents in places like Afghanistan. Imagine that, learning business lessons from how the enemy does it’s thing in the war?

     What I really thought was interesting though was the creation of a business ‘commando’ unit for the larger companies. Something that can quickly react to the local situation and can make quick decisions outside the realm of the standard boardroom. This would be ideal for jumping on deals or business that requires speed of decision–something that smaller companies or individuals are more apt to do than lets say the larger companies.

     How I envision a business commando unit in the private military sector, is a group that would seek out business in all parts of the world, or deal with the fast paced nature of the PR world. This kind of group would be ideal for getting the word out about what is going on with a company, or communicating with folks like me for a company’s strategic communications. They could be the ones that provide more of a personal touch to these larger companies, and really explore ways of connecting with potential clients or employees. I am sure there are other areas that these types of units might actually benefit a large PMC or similar defense company, and the imagination is the only limitation.

     My final thought here, is what lessons could PMC’s learn from pirates or insurgents?  Well I have talked about the New Rules of War in the past, and the whole OODA thing, but I have really never explored how these strategies of war could be applied to business. By taking the advice of the professor, this might show the way for smaller defense companies to take market share from the bigger PMC’s by jumping on very niche oriented services. For you guys and gals out there with small businesses, hopefully these ideas will help you to focus your energies on the niches in the market place that will give you a higher chance of success. Do you want to compete directly with a company like DynCorp for the big contracts, or do you want to become successful by tackling the small and unique types of business that DynCorp is not quick enough to jump on? Food for thought. -Matt

rule dividerBuilding Snowmobiles: Corporate Insurgency, By Professor David James

Pirate copy

What managers can learn from Somali pirates

November 07, 2010

PURVEYORS of management-speak are fond of quoting cod insights from military strategists. According to David James, a professor at Henley Business School, they would do better studying the management styles of some of those the armed forces are fighting, such as Somali pirates. Alongside Paul Kearney, a lieutenant-colonel in the Royal Marines, Professor James has been studying the operations of the pirates, as well as insurgents in Afghanistan and Iraq, to see if they have anything to teach legitimate firms.

The threat to life and liberty aside, Somali pirates’ business model is impressive. According to the professor, each raid costs the pirates around $30,000. On average one raid in three is successful. The reward for a triumphant venture, however, can be in the millions.

The organisation behind the pirates would be familiar to many ordinary businesses. For a start, they have a similar backend—including the kind of streamlined logistics and operations controls that would be the envy of most companies. Their success has even prompted one village to open a pirate “stock exchange”, where locals can buy shares in up to 70 maritime companies planning raids.

But Professor James believes that the most important lesson firms can learn is one of strategy. He teaches his MBA class that one reason for the pirates’ success is that they avoid “symmetrical” conflict—challenging their targets head on by, for example, lining up against the Western navies patrolling the waters—battles they would surely lose. Instead, they use stealth and surprise, attacking targets at their weakest point. In this way, with only a dozen-or-so sailors, they wrest control of huge assets, in the form of oil tankers.

This is a lesson that serves smaller companies well as they look to take bites out of larger rivals. It might be foolish, for example, for a start-up to take on one of the traditional banks head-to-head—only another large bank could afford the pyrrhic battle that would ensue from it protecting its market. But by picking a small, localised fight a start-up can make an impression before a bank has had time to react. An example, says Professor James, is wonga.com. It has taken market share by attacking banks’ inflexible lending policies by offering loans for the exact amount and length of time the customer wants. It processes the loans extremely quickly and customers can even get immediate approval using an iPhone app.

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Building Snowmobiles: Open Source Counter-Terrorism

Oct 12

Posted by Matt in Al Qaeda, Building Snowmobiles, Strategy | No Comments

     The other day I read an interesting post over at Global Guerrillas called ‘open source jihad’. Open source is a concept borrowed by the computer and software development community with a philosophy derived by what Eric Raymond conceived in his essay ‘The Cathedral and the Bazaar’. (see below)

     What John Robb was referring to specifically was Al Qaeda’s new open source jihad magazine called Inspire. It is kind of a comical magazine, but it is also a symbol of what open source warfare looks like in today’s modern world. It is a magazine designed to give jihadists throughout the world the ideas necessary to successfully attack and defeat infidels. The magazine has no license over the ideas, and hands these ideas out to anyone who wants them. That is the power of the idea exchange, and the intent is for people to take those ideas and do something with them.

     Now this is where my ideas come into the picture. John Robb continues to promote what today’s enemies of the world can and will do with this concept of open source warfare. But to me, I would like to present what today’s ‘good guys’ can do with open source warfare. Call it ‘open source counter-terrorism’, or whatever you want to call it–because that is the point, you can call it whatever you want to call it. lol All you have to remember is that this is a strategy of ‘mimicry’. (taking your enemy’s strategy, and adding something to it to give you the edge)

     With that said, what would open source counter-terrorism look like? Simply stated, read Feral Jundi and that is open source counter-terrorism. My target audience is security and military professionals, as well as the public, and my message has always been that of countering today’s enemies with new and interesting strategies and ideas. From destroying the cartels, to counter-piracy off the coast of Somalia, to defeating the Taliban and Al Qaeda at their game. This blog is an open source warfare publication for those that care about the fight. This Inspire magazine is the enemy’s equivalent.

     I would also classify other blogs and forums/message boards I follow as a form of open source counter-terrorism or open source warfare. We all locate the stories that would be interesting to our peers, we present them to the community, and we discuss. Folks come up with strategies and ideas in their brain about how to counter a specific threat, or what equipment to buy, or how to set up their weapon, etc. Hell, I originally learned about contracting by visiting a forum called Tactical Forums, and I would classify that as ‘open source contract job search’. lol Because in the beginning, there were no books or schools to teach you how to contract. You had to learn from numerous online sources and build off of other contractor’s strategies for the job search and working in the industry.

     But what is missing in the whole open source counter-terrorism game is more of a focus on the public at large. To me, the jihadist fears a public that is armed with the knowledge necessary to defeat them. The jihadist, pirate, cartel, or whomever all depend on the idea that civilians do not have the mental or emotional fortitude to defeat them. That terrorism will always reign supreme. Pfffft. I would like to change that.

     To be realistic though, I don’t expect grandma to pick up an M-240 and mow down terrorists. But I do think grandma can do things that can throw a serious wrench into the Usama or Zetas terror machine. Grandma can pick up a phone, she can identify scenarios that would be of concern, she can identify persons, she can film/tweet/text via smart phone all sorts of stuff that would be interesting to the sheep dogs. There are tons of things grandma can do within her power. She also has a brain, and can logically think out strategies and tactics, or provide a missing piece of information that no one else thought up. She has value and an empowered grandma can certainly be a counter to the empowered jihadist.

     Another concept that was brought up on my Face Book page by some readers was developing games to help educate the public on how to fight these folks. Massive multiplayer games on Facebook, or spectacular video games like Modern Warfare are examples of the kind of games that get incredible reach. They also present scenarios for players to strategize and out think enemies. Just the kind of thing to fuel open source counter-terrorism. The TV show called Surviving Disaster is another example of empowering civilians to survive and even stop terrorism. Entertainment is an excellent way of getting the ideas out there.

     On a side note, one other area of open source warfare that I keep introducing and hoping others will build off of is the concept of Letter of Marque and Reprisal. It is an old system of licensing that provided structure and a legal mechanism for the state and private industry partnership during times of war. I think it can be an effective system if given some modern upgrades.

     The number one theme of open source counter-terrorism though is to promote the concept that counter-terror is not just for police or military. It is a concept that gets the civilian population involved with counter-terror, both directly and indirectly. Directly– meaning armed with knowledge to defeat these folks or disrupt their operations, and indirectly by discussing, developing and sharing new strategies and ideas, or building off of current strategies and ideas via blogs and forums, that can help police/military/public to defeat these enemies. A big hat tip to John Robb and his ideas, and to my readers over the years for fueling the great open source counter-terror game here on this blog. -Matt

Open Source Warfare

The Cathedral and the Bazaar

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Open Source Warfare

Glenn ReynoldsJohn Robb’s chilling brief on postmodern terrorism23 May 2007

Brave New War: The Next Stage of Terrorism and the End of Globalization, by John Robb

Last year, I wrote a book called An Army of Davids: How Markets and Technology Empower Ordinary People to Beat Big Government, Big Media, and Other Goliaths. It was a celebration of how technology empowers the little guy, though I did spend some time discussing the darker sides of this development. John Robb’s Brave New War is in a way the mirror image of my argument: it devotes a lot of space to the dark side of the technological empowerment of individuals and small groups, and much less to potential upsides.

The dark side is certainly there. In the old days, you needed many people to commit significant mayhem—something like a Roman legion, or at least a century. Nowadays, one man with an AK-47 is probably a match for a hundred Roman legionaries, and modern explosives make matters even more asymmetrical. In the foreseeable future, Robb concludes, we may even see a situation where an individual can declare war on the world—and win. Or as science fiction writer Vernor Vinge put it in his recent book Rainbows End, set in 2025: “Nowadays Grand Terror technology was so cheap that cults and criminal gangs could acquire it . . . . In all innocence, the marvelous creativity of humankind continued to generate unintended consequences. There were a dozen research trends that could ultimately put world-killer weapons in the hands of anyone having a bad hair day.”

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Al Qaeda: New Strategy–Less Apocalypse, More Street Fighting

Oct 10

Posted by Matt in Al Qaeda, India, Strategy | 1 Comment

    For the most part, I would have to agree with this article. Although what the authors are forgetting is that when these people have an idea in their brain, they will continue to attempt the operation over and over again. They could take another decade to attempt the attack if it failed the first time around, or even wait twenty or thirty years. Time is not a factor to these folks. So it is important to remember that yes, they might focus on the Mumbai style urban warfare, but the apocalyptic stuff like 9/11 will always be on their mind.

    In essence, this urban warfare direction is the strategy ‘du jour’.  It still causes havoc and it still makes the news. And if done right, the terrorist team could get plenty of press out of the operation.

    As for the how, I simply point towards what these guys are doing in the war zones. War zones are the ultimate training grounds for what they want to do in peaceful urban populations, because they are able to refine methods or create new ones. They are able to learn how to assemble a one time use human weapon system, and the success rate of this weapon is dependent on how squared away the planners are. Planners can gain experience in the wars, and use that knowledge to great advantage for attacks against population centers that are not on a war footing. Soldiers and contractors in Afghanistan are armed and think about the defense 24/7. People in a city like Seattle might think about their next cup of coffee that day, and being armed or thinking about the defense or survival is the last thing on their minds.

    The other aspect to remember is the ability of an attacker to melt away into society. A swarming attack takes seconds to kick off, and if the attackers are able to maneuver as close as possible (wearing police, military, or medical uniforms), they can be more effective. This is tough to spot in a war zone, and I speculate that most don’t care to notice these things in peaceful cities. Even if attackers are not wearing uniforms, they can still blend in really well.

    What is also important to note is that an assaulter force might wear body armor so they can effectively fight into pockets of human concentration once the attack is on. So a defense in urban population centers must have weapons that can not only knock these guys down, but the guard should be able to shoot the head or pelvic area of the attacker in order to shut down that terrorist. If not, they will just get back up and continue the assault.

     Being able to take the terrorist out at an appropriate distance will be important as well.  If you shoot one of these guys at pistol range, and they detonate, it could potentially kill you and destroy the barriers in place, which would then allow the swarmers behind that terrorist to penetrate deeper. The defense should allow for adequate stand off between vehicle/people traffic and the guards, and it should be layered or spread out. One bomb should not be able to take out the entire guard force. This can be hard to achieve in war zones, and really hard to achieve in urban population centers that are not in war zones. None the less, these things have to be thought about and planned for.

    Bottom line, a good urban defense needs preparation.  Police, private security, and the public will be the only ones in the position to stop these types of attacks in the urban setting. Although realistically, it will be the public that will be the ones to initially identify the attack and potentially stop it. Police and private security cannot be everywhere at once. AQ and company knows this and they are depending on the idea that a country’s citizenry is not capable of thwarting their attack.

    One thing governments can do to defeat them is to promote certain simplistic things that people can do in order to defeat a swarming suicide assaulter attack. It would take education via websites, public service announcements, posters, etc. to get the word out. Some ideas to promote is to get people using their smart phones. Tell them to take photos, to tweet, to chat, take pictures and video, but most importantly, just connect with authorities as soon as possible, and feed as much information to them as possible. Authorities would be wise to facilitate that connection any way possible via an Incident Command system that makes it one of their priorities.

    Another idea is to tell folks to always plan escape routes out of any building they are in and to not bunch up.  Remember, the suicide assaulter is looking for pockets of human concentration to shoot into or blow up.  The more spread out people are, the better. So as people get over the initial shock of the attack, hopefully some leader types within that group will get on the ball and tell people to separate and escape as best they can. To not wait for law enforcement to save them, but to take matters into their own hands and get out in an organized and hopefully logical matter. Hopefully someone in the group will be armed or use something as a weapon to maybe take out a terrorist. It’s either stop them, get the hell out of there, or hand your life over to these animals–you make the call.

    My opinion on the whole thing is that the government needs to put together an adequate program that can educate the local population on how they can help, and how they can defeat a Mumbai type attack. The government should also work more with entertainment shows that connect with the population. Spike TV’s Surviving Disaster was an excellent show, and they presented multiple scenarios that teach people exactly what they can do to protect self and defeat terrorists. To me, it is all about the message of ‘government needs your help’ and ‘police cannot be everywhere at once’. A population must get involved and they must be armed with the knowledge necessary to defeat this stuff. The police and security will always work on their job and continue to do what they can, but civilians must get in the game as well. After all, civilians are the target of these terrorists and they can either stand and fight, or hand over their lives to these heathens and give them the satisfaction and success they seek. -Matt

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kasab mumbai terror attackAl Qaeda: New Strategy Less Apocalypse, More Street Fighting

Mumbai attacker with AK-47. 

Al-Qaeda’s new strategy: Less apocalypse, more street fighting

By Steven Simon and Jonathan Stevenson

Sunday, October 10, 2010

The scene in Europe last week called to mind the heyday of the IRA in the 1970s or of Algerian terrorism in the 1990s: Buckingham Palace and Trafalgar Square were teeming with police, the Eiffel Tower was repeatedly evacuated, and everywhere, tourists were on edge. The threat, however, involved a newer brand of terrorist: The CIA and its European counterparts warned of an al-Qaeda plot to kill civilians in France, Germany and Britain, and alerted travelers, especially Americans, to be extra-vigilant.

Few operational details were released. But unlike many thwarted al-Qaeda operations of days gone by — such as the 2006 Heathrow plot in which several airliners bound from London to America were to be blown up at coordinated intervals — it was clear from news reports that the European plan called for less spectacular, smaller-scale attacks, perhaps using machine guns to strafe clusters of tourists near public landmarks.

Has al-Qaeda become dispirited? No.

Recent plots, including the Mumbai raid in November 2008, the Times Square car bomb attempt in May of this year and now the plot in Europe, show that al-Qaeda is not only operationally alive and well, but has transformed its post-Afghanistan tactical retreat into a formidable new strategy. In the early part of the last decade, al-Qaeda had no choice but to use conventional explosives and old-fashioned terrorist tactics to hit soft targets, the 2002 bombing of nightclubs in Bali being perhaps the best example. With its leadership under siege in Pakistan, it lacked the capacity to mount sophisticated and coordinated attacks that would match, let alone exceed, the innovation or shock value on display on Sept. 11, 2001, or even in the USS Cole operation the year before.

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Strategy: Fourth Generation Warfare And Grand Strategy, By Chet Richards

Sep 28

Posted by Matt in Strategy | 2 Comments

4GW and Grand Strategy

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Leadership: The Next Petraeus–What Makes A Visionary Commander?

Sep 27

Posted by Matt in Building Snowmobiles, Jundism, Leadership, Military News, Strategy | No Comments

“One day you will take a fork in the road, and you’re going to have to make a decision about which direction you want to go. If you go one way, you can be somebody. You will have to make your compromises and … turn your back on your friends, but you will be a member of the club, and you will get promoted and get good assignments. Or you can go the other way, and you can do something, something for your country and for your Air Force and for yourself. … You may not get promoted, and you may not get good assignments, and you certainly will not be a favorite of your superiors, but you won’t have to compromise yourself. … In life there is often a roll call. That’s when you have to make a decision: to be or to do.”

-Col. John Boyd

*****

     As I read through this I was thinking ‘What makes a visionary PMC/PSC CEO?’ You really don’t hear much about that kind of thing in our industry.  Although there is plenty of good stuff to learn from the military community, and that is why I wanted to post this.

     I also had that famous quote running through my head ‘to be, or to do…’ from the mighty Col. John Boyd. One of the points of this article is that the military has a hard time producing leaders that are there ‘to do’ the job, primarily because the system really doesn’t lend itself for that.  It is more restrained and not very flexible.  Everyone has a specific career track, with boxes that must be checked off. God help you if you draw outside the lines in this world, or dare to take a different path.

     The other point made was that of life experiences and preparation for the real world of being in the high command. That these guys are having to not only be masters of the combat arms and strategy, but must also be the ultimate ‘everyman’.  They could be working with civilians, talking with Rolling Stone reporters, hanging out with Presidents that could care less about winning wars and more about politics, working with disaster relief organizations in disaster zones, trying to manage a massive civilian contractor force and ‘building snowmobiles’ on a daily basis just to win the numerous political wars, as well as the real wars. Being a general these days is no joke.

     I would also apply the same standard to today’s CEO of PMC’s and PSC’s.  This is an incredibly fast paced and technological world we live in. In order to stay competitive, a company and it’s leaders must always stay ahead of the game and their competitors. At least in our industry, CEO’s either do well and keep the company profitable, or fail miserably and be kicked to the road.  The free market is what produces our ‘visionary commanders’.

     Good article and check it out. -Matt

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The next Petraeus

What makes a visionary commander, and why the military isn’t producing more of them

By Renny McPherson

September 26, 2010

President Obama recently demoted General David Petraeus, the man who led the turnaround in Iraq and is widely acknowledged to be the most effective military officer of his generation.

In June, the president needed a new commander to lead the war effort in Afghanistan, after General Stanley McChrystal spoke too openly with a Rolling Stone reporter and was forced to resign. And, while few may realize this, when Petraeus was appointed to take over in Afghanistan, he was replacing a subordinate. Petraeus may yet be hailed for saving the day. But he also got a new boss and moved one step down the chain of command.

How does this happen to the best our military has to offer? Why was there no other general to take the job?

The short answer is that the US military has failed to produce enough leaders like Petraeus–the kind of broad-minded, flexible strategic thinkers needed to lead today’s most difficult missions. And a large contributor to this failure is the military’s inflexible system of promotion, which can actively discourage young officers from getting the mind-expanding, challenging experiences that could turn them into potent generals.

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Colombia: FARC Military Leader Mono Jojoy Death Is Blow To Four-Decade Insurgency

Sep 26

Posted by Matt in Aviation, Colombia, Strategy, Technology | 1 Comment

They said Operation Sodom, as it has been dubbed, started on Tuesday 21 September, when the heads of all three branches of the Colombian military, the police and the Ministry of Defence met in Bogota to finalise details of the attack.

In the early hours of Wednesday 22 September, 78 aircraft headed for the area known as La Escalera in the Macarena mountain range in Meta province.

They dropped dozens of bombs on Mono Jojoy’s camp, which Defence Minister Rodrigo Rivera has described as “the mother of all lairs” for its size and the number of hidden tunnels it had.

About 400 members of the Colombian special forces then abseiled from helicopters and surrounded the camp.

After hours of fighting, another 400 soldiers and police moved in on the camp, taking it in the early hours of Thursday morning. 

*****

     What can I say?  This is an incredible stroke of luck for the Colombian government in their war against the FARC, and bravo to them for pulling off such an operation.

     The first thing that jumped up at me was how they were able to find out who the boot manufacturer was that Mono used to make his custom made jungle boots.  Because from that little tip, this entire operation was grown.  Basically, once they had a fix on these boots, they were able to slip a GPS tracking device into them and follow the path these boots made from shop to secret jungle camp.

     Once the location was found, you can see from the quote up top that the government forces quickly took advantage.  They knew what they had, and they put everything they had into being successful.

     The use of their Embraer Super Tucanos in this operation is very interesting.  With these things, the cost of the air operation is significantly cheaper.  This aircraft is also getting a lot of looks from other countries who are fighting insurgencies where their enemies do not have jet aircraft or any serious air power.  The reasoning here is that why use multi-million dollar jets that cost thousands of dollars an hour to fuel and maintain, when you can accomplish the same task with cheaper prop aircraft?  Colombia is definitely proving the validity of the concept.

     The capture of computer hardware is impressive as well. I would suspect that the FARC is sweating bullets right now because everyone on Mono’s hard drive will now be a target. Expect to see more clean up operations designed to demoralize the FARC, and drive them to either dissolve or just surrender. I certainly hope that Colombia is able to break their will and sink this pathetic drug fueled organization. (Mexican drug cartels, you’re next. lol)

     Now onto some lessons here. The whole GPS in the boot trick is pretty damn cool and I think any chance we can do the same thing with other enemies in today’s various insurgencies would be a good thing. I say the smaller you can make the device, the better, and make it sturdy enough to insert in all and any objects.  Even troops in Afghanistan could be putting GPS devices in all types of things that the enemy could possibly pick up and want to use. These devices should not be just the tools of specialists, and they should be viewed as the tool of modern day combat trackers.

     One area that the GPS trick might be well served, is in the endeavor to track animals for anti-poacher operations.  Eeben Barlow talked about the Rhino poaching problem in South Africa the other day, and I think small GPS tracking devices would be very helpful in anti-poaching operations.

    Better yet, Joseph Kony of the LRA could be tracked using the same method the Colombians used against Mono Jojoy. Either set up some child’s AK with a GPS in the stock, or introduce several of these devices somehow into the possession of this group.  Any way possible to track these folks should be looked at and planned for. If you strive to know your enemy, you should be able to find some weakness or opening at one point in your hunt for him. The imagination is the only limit and the pay off would be incredible. -Matt

FARC Military Leader Suárez’s Death Is Blow to Four-Decade Insurgency

Colombian police examine Farc rebels’ laptops

A chip hidden in the boots of Mono Jojoy allowed to locate in the jungle

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1285343246 0Colombia: FARC Military Leader Mono Jojoy Death Is Blow To Four Decade Insurgency

The bodies of guerrillas killed, including Mono Jojoy.

Colombia Kills Guerrilla Chief

FARC Military Leader Suárez’s Death Is Blow to Four-Decade Insurgency

By JOSé DE CóRDOBA And DARCY CROWE

BOGOTA—Colombia’s army killed the military leader of the country’s communist guerrillas in a two-day battle that involved airstrikes against his jungle bunker, dealing a major blow to the four-decade insurgency, officials said Thursday.

Victor Suárez, 57 years old, nicknamed “Mono Jojoy,” was the second in command and top field marshal of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, or FARC, Latin America’s biggest and oldest guerrilla group. To many ordinary Colombians, his thick moustache and Che Guevara-style black beret were synonymous with the FARC.

“Mono Jojoy is dead,” Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos told reporters in New York, where he is attending the United Nations General Assembly. “This is the most devastating blow ever dealt to the FARC.”

The strike was a big boost for Mr. Santos, who took office in August. He dubbed the military mission, which involved more than 30 aircraft, “Operation Welcome.” In his role as defense minister under Colombia’s previous president, Álvaro Uribe, Mr. Santos oversaw some notable blows against the FARC.

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Somalia: Using Mobile Cash For The Troops, Using Iraq Strategy For The Win?

Sep 21

Posted by Matt in Africa, Somalia, Strategy | No Comments

“Some forces are being paid today and then it will take them four or five months to get another salary,” he said. “You cannot expect those forces to be loyal and defend the country when they’re not getting … what they’re entitled to.” 

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But the insurgents aren’t the only ones who have changed their tactics. The peacekeepers now have 70 bases dotted throughout the city, and are expanding at a rapid rate, pulling troops from positions they consider more secure to move closer to insurgent positions. 

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International donors are trying to find a way of paying soldiers directly to stop commanders from stealing their wages. 

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“I have talked to them and asked them to come back,” Ondoga said. “They have their own problems … when the commander is injured, they will leave.”

Some of the problems were political as well, he said. The commander in chief of the army has recently been replaced, and the president and prime minister are publicly feuding. The prime minister faces a vote of no confidence on Saturday. Somali armed forces are basically militias loyal to a single individual; if his political fortunes take a downturn, they will often simply go home. 

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     This is one of those deals where you read the articles and the situation on the ground, and it just screams some very obvious solutions.  For one, if international donors do not want Somali soldiers to leave the post as soldiers, then make sure they get paid their salaries. If leaders are stealing from the troops, then sidestep the leaders and pay them with mobile cash.  Try it, because it just might work.

     If these soldiers depend upon the international donors directly, then they won’t have to depend upon the power and influence of their specific warlord/politician. They could actually keep fighting, and not worry about their next pay check. It would also force leaders to find new ways of winning over the attention of their troops, other than holding their pay checks over their heads.

    The other one that makes sense is to protect these key leaders.  Actually assign PSD teams to protect these folks, if in fact they are so important to the Somali soldiers. If they are hard to kill, then maybe this might provide a little more stability to the whole thing. Those leaders might be able to focus more on managing a country, and less on protecting themselves.

    Finally, it looks to me like the AU is in a prime position to follow in the same footsteps as the Marines and Army in Iraq back before the surge.  All they need is some guidance and possibly a little technological and strategic help. A leadership team from AFRICOM or a PMC could do such a thing.  Because these bases could easily be called COPS, and these AU forces should be mimicking the same COIN strategies:

The standing operating procedure (SOP) for the unit typically focused on: (1) Planning and establishing the COP; (2) Ensuring route security so each outpost could be kept resupplied; (3) Clearing operations after the COP had been stood up to clear IEDs and find weapons caches; and (4) Census patrols to follow after the clearing operations to consolidate the position and gradually work its way into the human terrain of the area - the real target of MacFarland’s campaign. 

     I won’t even attempt to discuss the AU’s dire need of manpower, and given the rush job that they are doing right now, it sounds like they are in a dire need of strategy. Yet again, there are plenty of PMC’s who could stand up a security force to support this operation, or the US military or one of it’s partners could send some professional forces. If this is truly important to the west, and we do not want islamic extremists to win in Somalia, then the time is now to do something about it.  Or we could watch as the AU struggles with what little resources it has against a ruthless enemy? -Matt

PM: Somalia to open 2nd front against insurgents

AU peacekeepers expand bases in Somali capital

Somalia: Suicide Bomber Attacks at Presidential Gates

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PM: Somalia to open 2nd front against insurgents

KATHARINE HOURELD

Sep 17, 2010

Several thousand Somali forces trained in neighboring Ethiopia and Kenya will open a second front against Islamist insurgents by year-end in Somalia’s south and central regions, the prime minister said Sunday.

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Publications: Innovation In War–COIN Operations In Anbar And Ninewa Provinces, Iraq, 2005-2007

Sep 21

Posted by Matt in Industry Talk, Iraq, Military News, PMC 2.0, Strategy | 1 Comment

 The standing operating procedure (SOP) for the unit typically focused on: (1) Planning and establishing the COP; (2) Ensuring route security so each outpost could be kept resupplied; (3) Clearing operations after the COP had been stood up to clear IEDs and find weapons caches; and (4) Census patrols to follow after the clearing operations to consolidate the position and gradually work its way into the human terrain of the area - the real target of MacFarland’s campaign. 

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     This is an excellent paper that discusses some of the key innovations of the war.  The main theme that I am getting from all of this, is intelligence, intelligence, and intelligence.(jundism hint)

     If you notice in the publication, there are some themes that keep getting repeated.  The importance of networks or fusion is one of them.  To bring together different groups of experts, and have them contribute to actionable intelligence. And feeding these fusion groups requires interaction with the terrain, population and the enemy.

    Hence why COPS or combat outposts are so important.  It allows a unit to insert itself into the heart of a population/insurgency center and get as much information as they can via census patrols, sensors, raids, attacks against and by the enemy, etc. All of this is fed into a searchable database that can be cross referenced and searched by other units and organizations, and future deploying units and organizations. In other words, all actions and collected information is fed into the machine.

    I also liked the reference to ‘continuous improvement’. Too bad the author didn’t use the term Kaizen in the paper though. I also saw hints of ‘learning organization’, which is also an incredibly important concept for developing winning TTPs and strategies. Because once you have all of this great information and experience, you have to build a snowmobile out of it so you can win the fight. A rigid organization that doesn’t seek feedback internally and externally, work together and with others, or doesn’t innovate, will not succeed.

    Now here are my ideas to further the concepts into our industry.  Right now we are witnessing the African Union stumbling along in Somalia and trying to gain a foothold.  My thoughts on the whole thing is that you could take a PMC that was composed of former military leaders familiar with these concepts, and help the AU to organize accordingly. Or AFRICOM could send a leadership team in there to help organize the effort.  Either way, I see no reason why the AU forces could not replicate this strategy in Mogadishu right now.

    I also think that PMC’s could learn a lot from these types of strategies. PMC’s have had to set up remote sites that are very similar to ‘COPS in a box’. The CMC projects are a prime example. But what was missing with those operations was deliberate census patrols or the other means of intelligence collection that the Marines and Army could use.

    The way human intelligence was collected for these projects was often through the process of hiring and working around locals for guard positions and general labor projects. You learn all sorts of things about the locals when you work around them all day, day in and day out.

    Imagine though that if PMC’s actually did census patrols as part of the contract? Or planted sensors in abandoned buildings in their area? That data could not only be useful to that PMC, or future replacement PMC’s, but could also be added to a much larger database that the military could use? A PMC remote site and the routes they travel daily could be an excellent source of intelligence for the military units of that area, but unless that PMC is brought into that fusion process, it will simply be another lost chance at crucial data collection.

     It would also be nice if PMC’s could take advantage of that fusion process as well, and access the COPLINK or whatever database that is established locally. It could save lives and win wars, but it also requires both the military and civilian equivalents to talk and work with each other. Stuff to think about as we continue the fight and learn new ways of doing our thing in this war. -Matt

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Innovation in War: Counterinsurgency Operations in Anbar and Ninewa Provinces, Iraq, 2005-2007

James A. Russella

August 2010

To cite this Article: Russell, James A. ‘Innovation in War: Counterinsurgency Operations in Anbar and Ninewa Provinces, Iraq, 2005–2007′, Journal of Strategic Studies, 33:4, 595 – 624

Abstract

This article analyzes operations by three battalions conducting counterinsurgency, or COIN, operations in Iraq over the period from July 2005 through March 2007: the 1st Battalion, 7th Marine Regiment (1-7) along the Iraq-Syrian border in the first half of 2006; the 1st Battalion, 37th Armored Regiment (1-37) battalion operating in south-central Ramadi in the fall of 2006; and the 2nd Battalion, 1st Infantry Regiment, or 2-1, operating in eastern Mosul in 2005-06. The empirical evidence presented in these cases suggest that, contrary to popular perceptions, the units successfully innovated in war - a process largely executed organically within the units themselves. Innovation is defined here as the development of new organizational capacities not initially present when the units deployed into the theater. The evidence presented in these cases suggests that the innovation process enabled these units to successfully transition from organizations structured and trained for conventional military operations to organizations that developed an array of new organizational capacities for full-spectrum combat operations. The units in this study developed these new capacitites largely on their own initiative.

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Publications: The Use Of Pseudo-Operations In The AFPAK Theater, By Dr Ronald Holt

Sep 15

Posted by Matt in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Publications, Strategy | No Comments

     Awesome stuff and these are the topics I really dig discussing.  The more we talk about this concept, the more people can start looking at the pieces and make a ‘snowmobile’ out of it. What I really like about this paper is that it talks specifically about Afghanistan and Pakistan, which will help us to focus the discussion and make it more relevant. Especially check out the comments section at Small Wars Journal for this topic. -Matt

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The Use of Pseudo-Operations in the AFPAK Theaterby Ronald Holt

September 15, 2010

Download the Full Article: The Use of Pseudo-Operations in the AFPAK Theatre

What would be the effect if we had small integrated groups of former Taliban and US Special Operators working together, masquerading as Taliban, living off the villagers as the Taliban do, and feeding USSOCOM actionable HUMINT?

This short paper is designed to be a “thought-piece” with the purpose of stimulating “out of the box” ideas. Pseudo Operations involve recruiting and training ex-insurgents to operate as insurgents and produce intelligence, cause enemy casualties, and create distrust between the local population and the insurgents. Such on the ground intelligence gives a deeper picture of enemy intentions, infiltration routes and support amongst the local population. Real- time intelligence can lay the groundwork for successful direct actions missions. Sometimes pseudo-operators will disguise themselves as members of adjacent countries’ military in order to operate in enemy sanctuaries. In this paper I will argue that Pseudo-Ops might be of use given the current situation in AFPAK and particularly in southern Afghanistan and in areas of Pakistan such as North Waziristan or even Baluchistan.

Download the Full Article: The Use of Pseudo-Operations in the AFPAK Theatre

Dr. Ronald Holt is a tenured Professor of Anthropology and Fulbright Scholar. He was the senior social scientist for Human Terrain Team AF-1 at FOB Salerno Afghanistan in 2008. Dr. Holt has done fieldwork in several Islamic countries and with Native American tribes.

Link to post at Small Wars Journal here.

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