Archive for category Strategy

Industry Talk: The Father Of Modern Counterinsurgency Dr. David Kilcullen, Joins MEP’s Board Of Advisors

     This is a little late, but none the less very important to bring up. Dr. Kilcullen will now be advising MEP on company strategy, ethics, and world affairs. Not to mention that the other board members are pretty impressive as well. Still, the father of today’s counterinsurgency strategy and modern day Lawrence of Arabia has joined a PMC! How cool is that?

     Now the question I have is if this new board will actually take the company to the next level? To me, that level has always been to be profitable as well as earn the respect of it’s employees, world and peers. Could a PMC achieve the status of some of today’s more respected companies, like Google or Apple?

     That is a tall order for our industry. At this point, PMC’s really don’t have a great reputation and are frequently attacked. Hell, I just posted a deal where ABC News attacked MEP. This entire blog is filled with the various problems and histories of this industry, and we need all the help we can get.

     If Dr. Kilcullen can do for this company and this industry what he did for today’s military and counterinsurgency strategy, then that would be really impressive. Perhaps he or one of the board members could come up on the blog and do a little ‘strategic communications’? That’s if they care to engage with one of the ‘few’ new media sources out there that really cares about this stuff? -Matt

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david kilcullenIndustry Talk: The Father Of Modern Counterinsurgency Dr. David Kilcullen, Joins MEPs Board Of Advisors

Mission Essential Personnel Announces New Board of Advisors

July 26, 2010

Mission Essential Personnel, LLC, (MEP) today announced the creation of a board of advisors to counsel senior company leadership on company strategy, ethics, and world affairs. A trio of highly accomplished professionals, this board will enhance MEP’s strategic planning, thought leadership, and superior performance throughout the world.

MEP CEO Chris Taylor said, “MEP’s exponential growth has brought us great success and new challenges and choices. In order to ensure we continue to deliver certainty to our customers, we will look to the collective wisdom of our Board of Advisors to help us critically think through the opportunities of the new global economy and how MEP can continue to create value for our stakeholders. We are all excited about this new relationship and Mitchell, Sarah, and David will serve as the cornerstones of MEP’s bright future.”

The board of advisors consists of:

Ambassador Mitchell Reiss – Recently made the 27th president of Washington College, Reiss was previously Vice Provost at the College of William & Mary. He is a scholar and diplomat best known for successful negotiations during the Northern Ireland peace process and the North Korean nuclear crisis. From 2003 to 2005, he was Director of Policy Planning at the US State Department under Secretary of State Colin Powell and earned the Foreign Affairs Award for Public Service. Reiss concurrently served as President George W. Bush’s Special Envoy to Northern Ireland Peace Process until 2007. As a White House Fellow from 1988-89, he served as special assistant to the national security advisor.

Sarah Sewall – Sewall teaches international affairs and directs the Program on National Security and Human Rights at the Harvard Kennedy School of Government, and is the founder and faculty director of the Mass Atrocity Response Operations (MARO) project. She led President Obama’s Transition National Security Agency Review process. Sewall is a member of the DOD’s Defense Policy Board Advisory Committee and the Center for Naval Analyses Defense Advisory Committee. She served as the first Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Assistance in the Clinton Administration. From 1983-1996, she served as senior foreign policy adviser to Senate Majority Leader George J. Mitchell.

Dr. David Kilcullen — Kilcullen served more than 20 years as an Australian light infantry officer before joining the US Government and serving in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Southeast Asia and the Horn of Africa in counterterrorism, diplomacy, international development, strategy, and counterinsurgency roles. In 2007, Kilcullen was Senior Counterinsurgency Advisor to Gen. David Petraeus, then Commanding General, Multinational Force-Iraq. In 2008-2009, he served as Special Advisor for Counterinsurgency to the Secretary of State. Since leaving government, he has worked closely with NGOs, international aid agencies and communities affected by conflict. He is the author of “The Accidental Guerilla” and “Counterinsurgency” and is a consultant to NATO in Afghanistan and to the US and allied governments.

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PMC 2.0: Paying Your Local Guard Force With ‘Mobile Cash’

     This is an excellent article that discusses a very unique solution to a problem that we are dealing with in the war zones and other places throughout the world.  When companies subcontract with local guard companies for security, you often hear about how the managers screw over their guard force by skimming off the top of their pay.  They do all sorts crappy things to their people, and it can do a lot of damage to the morale of the guard force.

     The idea of mobile cash is about how the customer that pays for this guard service, can ensure that their contracted guard force is getting paid on time and in full via cell phone/text messaging.(read the article below for details) This is especially pertinent in war zones where telecom might be up and running, but not much else. Africa, Afghanistan and Iraq all have thriving telecom markets, and everyone has cell phones, and this is one more way to tap into this technology for the good of the company and mission.

     In order to maintain the edge in this market of force, and not lose folks to the enemy or a competitor, you need to make sure every last penny you are spending on these guard contracts is accounted for.  It also makes it very hard for your subcontracted field managers to take from the guards, which will also help in your market of force optimization. Anything you can do to minimize the potential for corruptive activities is a good thing.

     Now on to some ideas with this ‘mobile cash’ concept that the authors could have expanded on.  I have talked before about COIN and SMS, and this kind of cell phone payment system will make it easier to crowd source and spread messages. Some of the ideas I was thinking of is to offer bounties through the same system for any individuals that can locate wanted enemies or provide information. You could also provide bonuses to guards that participate in surveys.  How about an english learning program, which would make it a game for guards to learn english?  There are a ton of things you could ask the guards to do in order to get ‘feedback gold’ before they could collect their paycheck. I guess the point is, is just offering payment through this convenient service will be reward enough for anything you need them to do.

     The other thing that you could do with this concept for government related services, is to constantly ask police, military, and government folks to identify issues that need to be addressed within their organizations–before they collect their paycheck via phone. You don’t want to piss them off by making them go through too many hoops, but you could definitely tap into all of these ‘human sensors’ throughout the organizations, and get a feel for what is going on and collect data.

     I really like the commerce angle on this.  If this mobile cash concept makes transactions more transparent with better record keeping, then that will make banks more accountable. Especially when you have dorks like Karzai’s family in charge of the Kabul Bank, and because they keep playing games and writing checks to all their friends, that now you have a bank in trouble. (and I will pull my hair out if the US bails out this bank…pfffft) Hell, if there was a way to bypass corrupt local banks and maybe use international banks or even try a telecom bank type system?  Who knows, but either way the cell phone transaction will only add more record keeping to the whole thing.

     Now for the future.  I believe in several years, the smart phone market will catch up in these war zones.  People might joke, but locals in the cities will purchase these things because they are status symbols. The car, motorcycle, satellite dish, cellphone, and the soon to become a hit ‘smart phone’ are all status symbols that locals in these countries want to have. These devices will also be within their reach just because there will be such a large supply of them throughout the world.  The telecom industries in these countries will also do their best to keep up with this latest trend.  That is just my thoughts on the future of this stuff.

     Now imagine a local Afghan businessman with basically a computer in his pocket?  The apps, the online payment systems of international banks, the social networking, all of it, will be available to these folks in developing countries. It will be wise for us to take advantage of this new reality, and develop strategic communications plan that utilizes these devices as a means to reach out. Good article and a big hat tip to the guys at Small Wars Journal for putting it out there. -Matt

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One Cell Phone at a Time: Countering Corruption in Afghanistan

by Dan Rice and Guy Filippelli

September 2, 2010

Download the full article: One Cell Phone at a Time

American commanders are preparing for a major offensive in Afghanistan to attack one of the most formidable enemies we face in country: corruption. Despite sincere efforts to promote governance and accountability initiatives, Afghanistan has slipped from 112th to158th place on Transparency International’s global corruption index. One reason the international community has been unable to effectively tackle corruption in Afghanistan is that our own reconstruction efforts perpetuate the problem. As Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton recently acknowledged, “Corruption, frankly… is not all an Afghan problem.” Money appropriated to secure and stabilize the country is too easily siphoned and redirected as it changes hands, inevitably making its way to local powerbrokers, insurgent networks, and offshore bank accounts, rather than the individuals who need it most. One solution to this problem lies in the palm of our hands: the mighty cell phone.

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Afghanistan: Know Your Enemy–Behind Enemy Lines With The Taliban

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Building Snowmobiles: Using Economic Theory To Predict Enemy Strategy?

“It is clear that war is not a mere act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political activity by other means.” Karl Von Clauswitz

“What is of supreme importance in war is to attack the enemy’s strategy.” – Sun Tzu

     First off, I want to mention that this post is the product of one of my reader’s ‘a ha’ moments.  What really makes this cool is that this reader is a fan of the ‘building snowmobiles’ posts on FJ and this was him putting together these random pieces and creating something out of all of it.  He had attended a college course years back that covered economic theory, he is well read on the war and a veteran of the war in Afghanistan, he had read Feral Jundi and knew how fun analysis and synthesis can be, and then finally stumbled on some recent news about the war and Taliban strategy, and put it all together. And this is me trying to assemble the thing based on his instructions, and I am thoroughly enjoying myself.

     Simply put, this is about using economic theory as a potential tool to predict enemy strategies, so you can defeat those strategies.  Because like Sun Tzu says, it ‘is of supreme importance to attack the enemy’s strategy’. Of course I am not going to go all out and say you can predict with 100 percent certainty what your enemy will do. Still, the closer you can get the better, and these are potential tools you can use for predictive analysis.

    In this exercise, we will use Afghanistan and the current war against the Taliban there. At this time, we are also using a counter-insurgency strategy.  The Taliban are considered the insurgents in this case, and they too are using a insurgency type strategy.  Both strategies are heavily influenced by gaining the support of the population. Famous counter-insurgent David Galula had this to say about counterinsurgency:

The aim of the war is to gain the support of the population Galula proposes four “laws” for counterinsurgency:

1.The aim of the war is to gain the support of the population rather than control of territory.

2.Most of the population will be neutral in the conflict; support of the masses can be obtained with the help of an active friendly minority.

3.Support of the population may be lost. The population must be efficiently protected to allow it to cooperate without fear of retribution by the opposite party.

4.Order enforcement should be done progressively by removing or driving away armed opponents, then gaining support of the population, and eventually strengthening positions by building infrastructure and setting long-term relationships with the population. This must be done area by area, using a pacified territory as a basis of operation to conquer a neighbouring area.

Galula contends that:

A victory [in a counterinsurgency] is not the destruction in a given area of the insurgent’s forces and his political organization. … A victory is that plus the permanent isolation of the insurgent from the population, isolation not enforced upon the population, but maintained by and with the population. … In conventional warfare, strength is assessed according to military or other tangible criteria, such as the number of divisions, the position they hold, the industrial resources, etc. In revolutionary warfare, strength must be assessed by the extent of support from the population as measured in terms of political organization at the grass roots. The counterinsurgent reaches a position of strength when his power is embedded in a political organization issuing from, and firmly supported by, the population. 

   I wanted to put this out there first as one of the main definitions of COIN, so we have somewhere to start.(most strategies are population-centric)  In this war, we are basically fighting for the support of the people, and you could easily say that this is politics with guns.  You could also say that both sides of this conflict are selling to the population that they are a better idea and friend than the other guy.  The Taliban use their methods to achieve population support, and we use ours. In other words, we are in the business of politics in this war. We are trying to win votes or popularity, and like politicians, we are finding all and any way to win as many votes as possible.

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Publications: CRS-DoD Contractors In Iraq And Afghanistan: Background And Analysis, July 2010

     The 2010 QDR, which runs almost 130 pages, contains little discussion on the role contractors play in military operations. The QDR has a seven page section on counterinsurgency, stability, and counterterrorism operations, including a list of ten priorities for improvement. However, the word “contractor” does not appear once in the discussion, despite the fact that contractors make up more that 50% of DOD’s workforce in Iraq and Afghanistan, including more than 13,000 armed contractors. Some analysts argue that DOD missed an opportunity to address the issue in the most recent QDR.

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     I like posting these, just because they are running records of where contractors stand in this war.  But what I really like about this publication is that Mr. Schwartz has taken aim at the folks who wrote up the QDR.

     The reason why I like that, is because I have been screaming on this blog as long as I can remember that contractors must be included into the discussion on strategy for these wars.  Especially when we account for over half of the manpower in these conflicts (and probably for future conflicts).

     It still amazes me that today’s strategists and war planners do not adequately cover this stuff.  If you read the QDR, it’s like we don’t even exist.  And yet we have thousands of expats, third country nationals, and local nationals, all interacting with today’s populations and militaries in today’s wars. We are also dying and paying our toll in blood for this war–yet nothing is really mentioned about us when it comes to strategy.

     Mr. Schwartz also took the time to cut and paste some key components of today’s COIN strategy out of some manuals, and how contractors should and could intermix with that strategy.  The bottom line is that if contractors are interacting with the populations of these war zones, then they ‘must’ be aligned within the strategies of COIN. We must be on the same sheet of music as the militaries are, or we will continue to inadvertently cause problems.

     Now for a couple of critiques.  In the beginning of this publication, Mr. Schwartz actually mentioned the use of contractors during the Revolutionary War, but he made no mention of the use of privateers or of Article 1, Section 8, Paragraph 11 of the US Constitution.

     It’s odd to me that he wouldn’t, because our use of privateers is actually a fantastic example of using contractors during times of war to achieve a strategic goal.  Our privateer industry is what we had as a continental navy at that time. The damage they inflicted onto the enemy’s logistics, as well as the capture of enemy weapons and munitions were very significant components of that war. Not to mention the massive infusion of wealth into our young country from all of the commerce raiding done by this government licensed privateer force. And the Letter of Marque in the US Constitution is proof of that existence between private industry and government for ‘offensive’ operations against an enemy.  How’s that for ‘inherently governmental’? lol

     The only other critique that is missing is a combination of DoS’s and other’s numbers into a report like this. I know the DoD doesn’t want to mix with those ‘others’, but it gets kind of old for us to continue to see separate reports all the time. I say combine all of them to save a little money and time, and let’s see every last contractor be counted.  I would also like to see the deaths and injuries of all, and get that stuff on one nice (and complete) report for everyone to analyze and reference. Something to think about for all of you analysts out there who keep throwing this stuff together. -Matt

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Department of Defense Contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan: Background and Analysis 

Moshe Schwartz

Specialist in Defense Acquisition

July 2, 2010

Summary

The Department of Defense (DOD) increasingly relies upon contractors to support operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, which has resulted in a DOD workforce that has 19% more contractor personnel (207,600) than uniformed personnel (175,000). Contractors make up 54% of DOD’s workforce in Iraq and Afghanistan. The critical role contractors play in supporting such military operations and the billions of dollars spent by DOD on these services requires operational forces to effectively manage contractors during contingency operations. Lack of sufficient contract management can delay or even prevent troops from receiving needed support and can also result in wasteful spending. Some analysts believethat poor contract management has also played a role in abuses and crimes committed by certain contractors against local nationals, which may have undermined U.S. counterinsurgency efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan.

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Strategy: Secrets From Inside The Obama War Room

     I know this is a little old, but it is totally relevant to today’s discussion about the future of Afghanistan.  As you read through this story, you come to understand why McChrystal or any other military leader in this war might be frustrated.  I said this before, and I will say this again.  There is not a general out there that thinks that declaring a withdrawal date is a good idea in the context of winning wars.  This administration is set on July 2011, and General Petraeus has made his promises to that administration that he could finish this in that time frame. It is a promise he will have to break in my view.

     Most of all, the Taliban love this date, and it is a countdown to their victory. The enemy will certainly pour it on as this date gets closer, and I just don’t see how this is helpful for any kind of plans with Afghanistan. Or the Taliban will just sit and wait, and then pour it on as soon as we leave. It just makes no strategic sense.

     Petraeus has a lot of work to do in turning around the war. There is alleviating the fears that Karzai has with this date, there is letting our troops fight the way they see fit and allowing them to win battles, there is dealing with Pakistan and ensuring they continue their fight, there is the training of the ANA and police so they can take control of the country, and all of this is dependent on changing that stupid date for withdrawal. Or Petraeus can keep his promise of defeat and go down with the ship. Only time will tell, and the clock is ticking. -Matt

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Secrets From Inside the Obama War Room

by Jonathan Alter

May 15, 2010

The first of 10 “AFPAK” meetings came on Sept. 13, when the president gathered 16 advisers in the Situation Room in the basement of the White House. This was to be the most methodical national-security decision in a generation. Deputy national-security adviser Tom Donilon had commissioned research that backed up an astonishing historical truth: neither the Vietnam War nor the Iraq War featured any key meetings where all the issues and assumptions were discussed by policymakers. In both cases the United States was sucked into war inch by inch.

The Obama administration was determined to change that. “For the past eight years, whatever the military asked for, they got,” Obama explained later. “My job was to slow things down.” The president had something precious in modern crisis management: time. “I had to put up with the ‘dithering’ arguments from Dick Cheney or others,” Obama said. “But as long as I wasn’t shaken by the political chatter, I had the time to work through all these issues and ask a bunch of tough questions and force people to sharpen their pencils until we arrived at the best possible solution.”

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Somalia: Al Shabab Is Gaining Strength, TFG Corruption Causes Soldier Defections

     Boy, this isn’t a pretty picture.  I have mentioned in the past on why it is important to ‘pay your soldiers’ if you want them to stick around, and this is a prime example of how important that is. Al Shabab has made some moves lately that have increased their size and hold on territory.  Not good for the TFG, and not good for the west.

     I also wanted to mention that Petraeus was the one that signed off on US military covert operations in Somalia. So if we have guys there right now, then a really excellent thing they could do to stop the bleeding is to gain a foothold on the payment and management of these Somali troops.  We spent the money to train them in Ethiopia, we can certainly watch over the payment of their services in Somalia. I compare this to our handling of the HTN contracts in Afghanistan that are causing so many headaches.  We must insure there is adult supervision with this stuff.

     Or, we should just allow the TFG to crumble, and let Al Shabab to take over….  Because as it stands right now, Al Shabab has momentum and they are closing in fast.  And as they conquer and absorb these other Islamic extremist groups, the people will see this strength and bow down to this Islamic force.  How could they not, if the TFG can’t even do the simple task of paying their troops? (and that’s after we gave them the money to pay their troops with) This is basic Governance 101.

      I guess what I am saying is that Al Shabab, and in a larger sense Al Qaeda, is on the verge of a ‘win’ in Somalia. Can we afford this, and especially with what is going on in Afghanistan, or with the victory we are claiming in Iraq? Momentum is quite a thing, and if you give an enemy ground, they will now have something to promote their effectiveness with.  Hell, if we want to give General McChrystal a way to redeem himself, I say let the ‘industrial death machine of Iraq’ have a go in Somalia? Don’t put him charge of AFRICOM, but definitely put him in charge of some kind of project he can focus his talents on. Somalia needs that kind of talent and attention, or we will lose it. -Matt

Furious Soldiers storm Villa Somalia

Hizbul-Islam vanishing into Al-Shabab

U.S. Is Said to Expand Secret Actions in Mideast

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From Strategy Page

June 25, 2010

The Transitional Government (TG) is negotiating with Hizbul Islam. This Islamic radical group is the smaller rival of al Shabaab, and less radical. The more radical members of Hizbul Islam are defecting to al Shabaab, so it makes sense that the less radical ones would try to cut a deal with the TG. Otherwise, an even smaller Hizbul Islam could be crushed by al Shabaab. Meanwhile, the TG is itself threatened with fragmentation as many members of the government strive to rearrange the deal that determines which clans get how many seats in the parliament. Somalis have a hard time compromising, and prefer to fight, which is the main reason the country is such a mess. Corruption is the other big problem. This was seen recently when hundreds of government soldiers, trained by foreign instructors, demonstrated at the presidential palace for back pay. The money had been stolen by government officials, who consider a government job as a license to steal. Donor nations have a hard time convincing officials that effective government cannot survive such attitudes.

Story here.

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Hizbul-Islam vanishing into Al-Shabab

Saturday 19 June 2010

Somaliweyn – Mohammed Omar Hussein

The warriors of Hizbul-Islam one of the adversary Islamist functions in Somalia are in their hundreds joining Al-Shabab another Islamist function in Somalia, which is also extra superior than Hizbul-Islam according the areas which each group is controlling and in terms of fighters as well.

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Building Snowmobiles: Human-flesh Search Warfare

     Sinnreich adds a psychological component. “A lot of us really know next to nothing about what’s really going on militarily in Afghanistan,” he says, “so when a schism like this opens up, we think, ‘There must be more to this.’ ” A “collective detection mentality” takes over, he says, and thousands of people start piecing together thousands of bits of information to get a bigger picture.

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     If anyone is wondering how I come up with this stuff, I will explain.  I will read about one interesting concept, store it away in my brain, and then when I hit some trip wire ideas that fit in with that prior concept, some ‘illumination’ occurs. In this case, I was reading about human-flesh search engines a week or so ago, and then the Rolling Stone atomic bomb of a story comes out, and I started putting two and two together.

   First, let’s discuss what each component is and then we can discuss how they fit together, and then finish up on how to weaponize the concept (if possible).  Because if you look at what happened here, the best general that the US had, second only to Petraeus, was effectively removed from his post, all because of what was said in an article and the flash fire effects of new media.  That is one hell of an attack if you could figure out how to reproduce it.

   The first part of the concept is the human desire to want to know.  And the tools we have available to us these days, give us the ability to ‘know’ what is going on very quickly.  The news cycle and people’s ability to get that news, and how it allows us to pass it on to the next guy is mind boggling fast.  It doesn’t combust like a fire, it explodes like a bomb, and new media/social media is the facilitator for everyone who wants to know.

   For example, when the McChrystal ‘Runaway General’ news came out, I had heard about it via Facebook, Twitter, newsletters, updates via email, and my RSS reader.  I also got the news via my iPhone, which means I did not have to wait until I got home to read all of this stuff. The news exploded, and like most, I passed that news on to my network.  I then got to work on posting a blog entry about the thing, because it was a big story.  And so did thousands of other journalists, bloggers, forum participants, etc.  So analyzing the whole thing kicked in instantly as well.

   On my RSS reader, I saw multiple blog posts coming up from all over about the story.  People analyzing and giving opinions, and everyone was reading everyone else’s stuff and trying to come up with the best conclusions.  Partly because they wanted to know the real deal, and partly because they wanted to choose the right angle on the whole thing so they would not look like an ass to their readers and friends. So not only did bloggers want to ‘know’, they wanted to be the ones that looked like they ‘knew’.  All of these bloggers, to include myself, were furiously going over the material as it came out over the internet.  Our business is to know, and believe me, we were trying to do that.

   That process of wanting to know, or what the professor up top worded as ‘collective detection mentality’ is the first part to understand here. We are human, we are competitive, and knowledge is power.  When everyone is fighting to learn and know what is going on, that process creates the informational tsunami.  That information wave can also do much to force an action and create a desired outcome for whomever originally intended to create such a thing.  If you look at how President Obama and the upper command reacted to this incident, it is startling.  This didn’t happen over the course of weeks or days.  It happened virtually overnight and a top general has been removed from power.

     The second concept to look at is the idea of human-flesh search engines.  This is a concept out of China that has equally startling results. If a person is made a target by whomever on a forum, and whatever act this target did was sufficient to bring on interest and vengeance, well then you have all the elements of a human-flesh search.  People want to ‘know’ why this target did what they did, they want to ‘know’ who they are, what they are doing, where they live, and most importantly, they want to make sure the target suffers for any wrong doing.

   It is that power of wanting to ‘know’ that fuels the crowd in sort of virtual lynch mob.  A prime example of this was the whole Jax Desmond affair here on the blog and forums.  When it came out that Jax was lying about who he was, this industry reacted to it much like how the Chinese human-flesh search engines turned out.  My readers were at first picking apart the guy’s lies, which was great, but then you could see on the forums that people wanted vengeance.  Folks were posting his address, real name, etc. and doing all they could to get back at Jax.  In their minds, he deserved everything he got, and each person out there was going to contribute to his demise. My point with this is that a crowd with the desire to ‘know’, coupled with the desire for vengeance against an individual they perceive as bad, can be quite impressive to watch and certainly damaging to the intended target. As a result, the Jax Desmond name is mud in this industry, and when the crowd decided they ‘knew’ enough to act, they quickly dispensed their justice.

      Now let’s put them together, and build a snowmobile.  Could you initiate a human-flesh search attack (HSA), that could create a desired result? I think you can, but only with a multi-faceted approach, and persistence. You must identify your target, identify the element that the crowd would like to ‘know’, and really exploit the virtual mob mentality if that target has done something that would be considered immoral. Your HSA strategy should strive to mimic other incidents that showed all the hallmarks what is mentioned in these two articles, and the examples I have provided. Most importantly, persistence is key, because you cannot say for sure if your HSA will work the first time out.  It would take a constant attack from multiple angles, to be successful. It helps to throw the match in the right places though, and that is the key.  The forest fire analogy fits well with conducting HSA.  If you can keep shooting flares into pockets of unburned fuel, from across the canyon, eventually you will get one of the pockets burning and they will start the fire that you wanted to start.

   The other thing about Human-flesh Search Warfare is defending against such a thing.  Yet again, I look at the forest fire fighting analogy for the defense.  You must create fire breaks to defend crucial aspects of your forest.  Or in terms of what we are talking about here, you must protect yourself or your principle by insuring you have the appropriate defenses in place.  Having journalists from Rolling Stone hanging out with you for a couple of weeks is probably not a good idea–no buffer there.  Making wild and false claims online about your company or your personal actions, would also not be a good idea–not much buffer there either.

     But most of all, you need good intelligence that focuses on you and the enemy.  ’Know yourself, know your enemy’ as Sun Tzu would say.  Because if you know yourself, you will know what weaknesses, immoralities, etc. that the enemy might possibly use against you in this kind of attack.  Knowing your enemy will help you to figure out their intentions towards you or folks like you, and how they like to conduct HSA. You should also stay up to date with technology and ‘knowing’ yourself. Use the same tools and resources that your enemy uses, if you want to really know what he knows. You can also try to copy your enemy’s strategy and tactics, and add one little technological or operational piece to that package to get an edge.  If your information officer, or whomever is assigned to be your virtual body guard cannot do these basic things, then you should look at firing them. Because this is something any good practitioner of strategic communications or new media should be wary of and try to understand, so they know how to best build that fire break or place the match in the right patch of fuel in the forest.

   Well, let me know what you think.  If I am missing something here, or you have something to add to this stew of ideas, I would be interested to hear what you got.(be sure to read both stories below because they are relevant to this post) -Matt

New media too speedy to outflank

China’s Cyberposse

Edit: 6/25/2010- I wanted to add one more human-flesh search warfare case to this, for further thought.  Wikileaks is an excellent example of the power of human-flesh search, and what it could do to the war effort.  Some Army Intel kid leaked the videos anonymously to Wikileaks, and that was all that was necessary to spark the human-flesh search engine. Media was linking to the videos and site, and overnight, war leaders and politicians had to deal with this.  When that came out, it exploded as well.  But if you look at Wikileaks, what was the element about it, that would attract that Army Intel kid to contribute in the first place.  That is why this is such an intriguing idea to talk about.

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New media too speedy to outflank

By John Timpane

Jun. 24, 2010

It began as a scattering of acid remarks within earshot of a Rolling Stone reporter. But – thanks in large part to Twitter, the Web, and cable news – barely two days after those remarks were disclosed, a media firestorm ended Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal’s tenure as commander of U.S. and NATO Coalition Forces in Afghanistan.

Fast, overwhelming, decisive: It’s a case study in how tightly connected 21st-century media can whip a story into a full-on tsunami, with startling consequences for individual careers and national policy.

“Rolling Stone broke the story, but it was Twitter that got the story rolling,” says Aram Sinnreich, a media professor at Rutgers University in New Brunswick, N.J. “The peer-produced social media are doing to cable-news networks what cable news did to broadcast. We’ve gone from the one-day news cycle to every hour on the hour to second by second.”

Noah Shachtman, a nonresident fellow at the Brookings Institution and a blogger at Wired magazine, says: “The fact so many of us are networked together enabled the information to spread speed-of-light fast. That turned what might have been a slower-burning flame into an instant conflagration.”

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Strategy: Rolling Stone’s ‘Runaway General’ Article And The Poker Game Called Afghanistan

     So far, counterinsurgency has succeeded only in creating a never-ending demand for the primary product supplied by the military: perpetual war. There is a reason that President Obama studiously avoids using the word “victory” when he talks about Afghanistan. Winning, it would seem, is not really possible. Not even with Stanley McChrystal in charge.-The last sentences of this article, (and the narrative that Rolling Stone wants the reader to accept)

*****

     This is an interesting article in many ways.  To me, I look at it from several points of view that might provide an explanation for such a thing.  I look at the article as a big commentary on the poker game called Afghanistan, with a table of politicians, a president and his administration, civilian leaders, the enemy, Karzai, the media, and General McChrystal. Each player has their own strategy in this game, and each player has a plan to win.  The stakes are political survival, the direction of the war, and the narrative in the history books and everyone is fighting for public support and opinion. So what is each player’s strategy and goals in this game?

     Well, let’s break it down.  The first up is Rolling Stone.  For them the pot in this poker game is a sensational story and a further narrative of the war as being lost.  That COIN sucks and General McChrystal is a ‘Runaway General’, or uncontrollable. Any way they can show a division between all the crucial leadership running the war, is good for their goal of ending the war. Rolling Stone is also a supporter of the Obama administration, but they also do not support the war in Afghanistan.  So to them, showing a failed war and putting all the blame on an out of control general helps to insulate their guy in office.  To show support for the administration, while at the same time protesting the war by making it the product of that insane guy in charge called General McChrystal.

     The next player to discuss is the President and all of his men.  They need a win in Afghanistan, but they have also painted themselves into a corner with the July 2011 date for withdrawal.  They did this to appease their political base, and this date and the coming election is going to effect all of their decision making on the wartime strategy there.  There is also historical context, and Obama does not want this to be his Vietnam.  No standing President wants that, and every President looks at a war under their watch as how it will look in the history books. So the coming election and history are the two factors pressing this administration.  Not to mention that he also has the economy and the BP spill in the Gulf as two negatives.  He needs a win in one or two of these areas, because coming into re-election with all of those ‘losers’ will definitely hurt him.

     Then there is the civilian leadership like Eikenberry, the U.S. ambassador. Of course there would be friction between him and McChrystal, and especially after McChrystal was his subordinate at one point, and especially after he was not chosen as the viceroy in Afghanistan.  Plus DoD gets way more money than DoS when it comes to budget and resources, and you have that clash.  But there is one part of this story that clued me into the history narrative of this war. When Eikenberry leaked the cable to the New York Times about how pathetic Karzai and the war strategy was, this was a way to seal their place in history books as a ‘I told you so’.  McChrystal and gang referred to it as Eikenberry ‘covering his flank for the history books’.  Anyone see the pattern here?

     The politicians mentioned in the article all have the same goal as the President, and that is political survival.  To understand the mind of a politician, all you have to do is think in terms of votes and re-election.  Whatever it takes to stay in office and rally their base.  So the anti-war politicians whose base is anti-war, only benefit if the war strategy fails.  The pro-war politicians whose base is pro-war, only benefit if the war strategy works.  That is the two sides of this political battle, and each side will latch on to anything that will give them an advantage with rallying their base. As it stands now, Obama has declared the war in Afghanistan as the ‘Just War’, so I imagine that the anti-war politicians really don’t see Obama as a tool to use for rallying their base.  But if they can split Obama from his ‘just war’ view, and get him to not support the war effort or accept that it is lost, then they would benefit.  That is their prize, and going back to the Rolling Stone prize, you can see who benefits from whom.

     The pro-war politicians will rally around the general that will insure success.  They need a winner to rally around.  So if they supported McChrystal and now an article like this is circulating a perception that he is out of control, or worse yet, helps to create a divide between all parties involved, then they will not benefit.  You need a team who has a unified command and a unity of effort, and this article gives the impression that this is not happening.  There is also the issue of Article 88 which prohibits officers from using ‘contemptuous words’ about the president and his staff. Pro-war politicians at this point look at this story as a threat to their chosen winner, and ultimately a threat to winning the war.  But the narrative of the story points to a divided team, and these pro-war politicians need to address this in order appease their base.

     The pro-war politicians could do two things.  They could rally around the general, and especially if the administration and others accept his apology (and not fire him), or they could call for his head and get someone new in there that will work better as a team. In other words, if the General is looked at as the guy who is stronger than the President after the dust settles, because he thumbed his nose at him and his staff and they have not fired him, then he might be a guy they could rally around.  Especially coming into election, and especially if the President is not popular in the polls. But they also need a guy that can seal the deal, and they really need a guy that the troops on the ground support.  Because most of the base of pro-war politicians, are military and military families who all care about winning this thing.

     Karzai is at the table as well, and success to him is just hanging on to power and collecting as much money as he can from the war effort.  He will support anyone that will continue his good deal, and McChrystal is the guy–kind of.  Or at least that is the arrangement that the general has set up.  The general is working with Karzai and doing what is necessary to control him and work with him. Kind of like a SF operator working with a village chief.  He has to, because there is no alternative. Karzai also knows that if the Taliban come into power, he is out, so if he wants to survive politically and even physically, he needs a strong general and western partner to insure that survival.

     The Taliban are also at this table, and their strategy is simple. Keep terrorizing the population/government and just survive long enough to make it to this withdrawal date of July 2011. This date is all they need to win, because all they have to do is pour it on while everyone leaves. And as long as the people perceive the west as weak and unable to defeat the Taliban, they will give in to the Taliban.

     Finally there is General McChrystal.  Personally, I think this article was a way to test the political resolve of those at the top.  If they fired him, then McChrystal can fade away from the war and not be attached to it’s ‘perceived’ demise.  The whole ‘history book effect’ comes into play here as well.

     If they accept his apology and keep the guy where he is at, then that means they are saying ‘we did not like what you said, but we need a win in this war’. It is the same reasoning for contracting with Xe for security work–they might not like them, but they are the best, and for wars, you need the best of the best to win. So in essence, McChrystal was probing the defenses of these leaders at the ‘poker table’, to see what their position is on his command and the strategy.(calling their bluff or trying to determine their cards in the game) If you look at his history in war and life, you can see that this is exactly how he operates. He is testing them. Because an acceptance of the general’s apology, is also an acceptance of the fact that he ‘is the best man’ for the job.  The general needs that acceptance in order to go after what he really needs for a victory in Afghanistan, and that is time.

     I really think all of this boils down to one thing, and that is that stupid withdrawal date of July 2011. If COIN takes as long as most of the experts claim it takes, then attaching a time frame to the current strategy is stupid.  The general knows this, and this was a huge debate with the Iraq war. During that time, it was debated furiously during the presidential debates and between the pro-war and anti-war crowds. With Iraq, the narrative was ‘get out now’ versus ‘leave based on success and results’. The latter is what we went with, and that is what worked.

     A withdrawal should only be based on victory, a retreat is what happens when you lose.  I personally think this article was McChrystal saying ‘if you want me in charge of this war effort, you must give me time and the flexibility to win’. Because as it stands now, to seal any kind of a victory in Afghanistan by July of next year is impossible. I think most observers would say so as well, and this article symbolizes the very battle between all parties who have a stake in this war and the pressing issue of time. Each player in this game looks at time as a leverage for their specific goals in this game. Each player is also looking at their place in the history books and their political survival.

     There are plenty of angles to this war, and I am sure I am missing a few in this discussion. Below I posted a few pieces of the article that were interesting to me. Anyway, check out the entire article and  let me know what you think. Things are changing pretty quickly and it will be interesting to see how this unfolds over the days and weeks. -Matt

Edit: 6/23/2010 – And he is replaced by General Petraeus.  Wow, and all because of an article from Rolling Stone. He played his cards, he lost, and now there is a new player at the table.

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The Runaway General

By Michael Hastings

July 2010

(Pieces of the article are posted below–all curse words edited)

Today, as McChrystal gears up for an offensive in southern Afghanistan, the prospects for any kind of success look bleak. In June, the death toll for U.S. troops passed 1,000, and the number of IEDs has doubled. Spending hundreds of billions of dollars on the fifth-poorest country on earth has failed to win over the civilian population, whose attitude toward U.S. troops ranges from intensely wary to openly hostile. The biggest military operation of the year – a ferocious offensive that began in February to retake the southern town of Marja – continues to drag on, prompting McChrystal himself to refer to it as a “bleeding ulcer.” In June, Afghanistan officially outpaced Vietnam as the longest war in American history – and Obama has quietly begun to back away from the deadline he set for withdrawing U.S. troops in July of next year. The president finds himself stuck in something even more insane than a quagmire: a quagmire he knowingly walked into, even though it’s precisely the kind of gigantic, mind-numbing, multigenerational nation-building project he explicitly said he didn’t want.

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Afghanistan: U.S. Eager To Replicate Afghan Villager’s Successful Revolt Against Taliban

     Conversations with Gizab leaders and Special Forces officers suggest that there was no single proximate cause. The uprising appears to have been the result of a combination of Taliban overreaching, U.S. encouragement and local resentment.

     “We’re looking for the patterns,” said a State Department official in southern Afghanistan. “If we can find it, we’ll be on the verge of a breakthrough.”

*****

     I really liked this article for several reasons. For one, good for Lalay for taking matter into his own hands and rallying the village for the defense. The second part I like, is the strategy development aspect of this article. They are trying to see the patterns that led up to Lalay taking matters into his own hands, and the keys to success of a tribal defense force like this.

     So let’s look at some of the factors of success which I keyed in on, and also what is required to replicate this. (in my opinion at least)

     The first is motivation. There must be motivation within the village to rise up against the Taliban. You also need a leader who has the motivation to rise up, and manage the revolt. So motivation is important. And consequence do to inaction is also important. These guys had both.

You also need a leader who has the will or resolve to do this. Not everyone can be a Lalay–someone that folks look up to and think of as a strong leader. This guy has to be someone that people respect and identify with. And that ‘Lalay’ needs to be pissed off enough to act. Which goes back to motivation. The Taliban pissed off Lalay by wanting the money that the government gave Lalay for the loss of his family, due to a Taliban IED. That would piss me off too. But acting on that anger, and putting action to words takes a special kind of individual.

     Notice also that Lalay executed three prisoners. Culturally speaking, this was acceptable to them and at that time. This shows the kind of resolve Lalay has, and how much hatred he has for the Taliban. Acts like that may be be repulsive to the west, but in Afghanistan, that is an act of someone with determination and little regard for an enemy that has little regard for him. It also shows that Lalay has the strength necessary to kill the bad guy–no weakness there, and a village in dire straights needs a leader who has that strength. And notice in the article that folks are flocking to his program of village defense. Of course we would like him to not kill prisoners, and I don’t condone that here. I am just saying that the act itself is something he felt he had to do in order to get the respect(from the village, from the Taliban) necessary to do what he had to do. To him, showing compassion (weakness) was not part of the game plan.

     It kind of reminds me of the old west movies, where a town is held captive by some bad people, and no one has the courage to step up. And then some contract sheriff comes into town, or some stranger on a pale horse, and motivates the people to do something about it (of course after the pale rider has that motivation to do so). Meanwhile, that individual shows great resolve in defeating those bad people. And usually in those movies, that leader had to be more ruthless and effective than those bad guys. In the case of Lalay, he was that stranger riding into town on the horse. He was that guy that said ‘follow me’.

     Now the next point is where I can inject some common sense free market warfare principles into this conversation, that the military planners and strategists continue to miss or forget. You must provide reward or interest, much like General George Washington provided such things to his troops in order to maintain a standing army(or village defense force). If you want to make this the most popular team to be on, then pay them accordingly and give them the weapons and training necessary to do the job. I cannot emphasize this enough. Pay them more than the Taliban offers, and pay them enough to be competitive with the military or police.

     If that won’t work, then provide a bounty system for the endeavor. Put a price on the heads of Taliban that are wanted by the government. It worked in the wild west, and it could work in Afghanistan if set up properly. The point with all of this is there must be incentive. Because without incentive, a volunteer force will eventually dissolve because they have more important things to do like take care of their family, farm, etc. Stuff to think about, and I think any effort dedicated to understanding the dynamics of this event is time well spent.

     Finally, I have to inject another point into this discussion that is not talked about. If the Taliban are giving up to Lalay, then Lalay is in a prime position to set up pseudo-operations, and use those former enemy combatants to find even more of these booger eaters. If Lalay declared that if these former Taliban want redemption in the village, that they ‘must do this one thing’ for the village, then this might be a way to turn some of these guys. These former Taliban would be outstanding tools to use for really screwing up their former employers. That is how you find out who the shadow government is, what they are up to and where they are at. We could be making awesome matrixes off of this information, and doing some heavy duty damage. You could also find out who is sympathetic to the Taliban in these villages, all because you have turned Taliban who can walk the walk, and talk the talk. No acting really required there, and turning these guys and using Lalay for that process should be considered. -Matt

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U.S. eager to replicate Afghan villagers’ successful revolt against Taliban

By Rajiv ChandrasekaranMonday, June 21, 2010

GIZAB, AFGHANISTAN — The revolt of the Gizab Good Guys began with a clandestine 2 a.m. meeting. By sunrise, 15 angry villagers had set up checkpoints on the main road and captured their first prisoners. In the following hours, their ranks swelled with dozens of rifle-toting neighbors eager to join.

Gunfights erupted and a panicked request for help was sent to the nearest U.S. troops, but the residents of this mountain-ringed hamlet in southern Afghanistan held their ground. By sundown, they managed to pull off a most unusual feat: They kicked out the Taliban.

“We had enough of their oppression,” Lalay, the one-named shopkeeper who organized the uprising, said in recounting the late April battle. “So we decided to fight back.”

U.S. diplomats and military officials view the rebellion as a milestone in the nearly nine-year-long war. For the first time in this phase of the conflict, ordinary Afghans in the violence-racked south have risen on their own to reclaim territory under insurgent control.

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