Archive for category Strategy

Strategy: Rolling Stone’s ‘Runaway General’ Article And The Poker Game Called Afghanistan

Jun 22

Posted by Matt in Afghanistan, Media News, Strategy | No Comments

     So far, counterinsurgency has succeeded only in creating a never-ending demand for the primary product supplied by the military: perpetual war. There is a reason that President Obama studiously avoids using the word “victory” when he talks about Afghanistan. Winning, it would seem, is not really possible. Not even with Stanley McChrystal in charge.-The last sentences of this article, (and the narrative that Rolling Stone wants the reader to accept)

*****

     This is an interesting article in many ways.  To me, I look at it from several points of view that might provide an explanation for such a thing.  I look at the article as a big commentary on the poker game called Afghanistan, with a table of politicians, a president and his administration, civilian leaders, the enemy, Karzai, the media, and General McChrystal. Each player has their own strategy in this game, and each player has a plan to win.  The stakes are political survival, the direction of the war, and the narrative in the history books and everyone is fighting for public support and opinion. So what is each player’s strategy and goals in this game?

     Well, let’s break it down.  The first up is Rolling Stone.  For them the pot in this poker game is a sensational story and a further narrative of the war as being lost.  That COIN sucks and General McChrystal is a ‘Runaway General’, or uncontrollable. Any way they can show a division between all the crucial leadership running the war, is good for their goal of ending the war. Rolling Stone is also a supporter of the Obama administration, but they also do not support the war in Afghanistan.  So to them, showing a failed war and putting all the blame on an out of control general helps to insulate their guy in office.  To show support for the administration, while at the same time protesting the war by making it the product of that insane guy in charge called General McChrystal.

     The next player to discuss is the President and all of his men.  They need a win in Afghanistan, but they have also painted themselves into a corner with the July 2011 date for withdrawal.  They did this to appease their political base, and this date and the coming election is going to effect all of their decision making on the wartime strategy there.  There is also historical context, and Obama does not want this to be his Vietnam.  No standing President wants that, and every President looks at a war under their watch as how it will look in the history books. So the coming election and history are the two factors pressing this administration.  Not to mention that he also has the economy and the BP spill in the Gulf as two negatives.  He needs a win in one or two of these areas, because coming into re-election with all of those ‘losers’ will definitely hurt him.

     Then there is the civilian leadership like Eikenberry, the U.S. ambassador. Of course there would be friction between him and McChrystal, and especially after McChrystal was his subordinate at one point, and especially after he was not chosen as the viceroy in Afghanistan.  Plus DoD gets way more money than DoS when it comes to budget and resources, and you have that clash.  But there is one part of this story that clued me into the history narrative of this war. When Eikenberry leaked the cable to the New York Times about how pathetic Karzai and the war strategy was, this was a way to seal their place in history books as a ‘I told you so’.  McChrystal and gang referred to it as Eikenberry ‘covering his flank for the history books’.  Anyone see the pattern here?

     The politicians mentioned in the article all have the same goal as the President, and that is political survival.  To understand the mind of a politician, all you have to do is think in terms of votes and re-election.  Whatever it takes to stay in office and rally their base.  So the anti-war politicians whose base is anti-war, only benefit if the war strategy fails.  The pro-war politicians whose base is pro-war, only benefit if the war strategy works.  That is the two sides of this political battle, and each side will latch on to anything that will give them an advantage with rallying their base. As it stands now, Obama has declared the war in Afghanistan as the ‘Just War’, so I imagine that the anti-war politicians really don’t see Obama as a tool to use for rallying their base.  But if they can split Obama from his ‘just war’ view, and get him to not support the war effort or accept that it is lost, then they would benefit.  That is their prize, and going back to the Rolling Stone prize, you can see who benefits from whom.

     The pro-war politicians will rally around the general that will insure success.  They need a winner to rally around.  So if they supported McChrystal and now an article like this is circulating a perception that he is out of control, or worse yet, helps to create a divide between all parties involved, then they will not benefit.  You need a team who has a unified command and a unity of effort, and this article gives the impression that this is not happening.  There is also the issue of Article 88 which prohibits officers from using ‘contemptuous words’ about the president and his staff. Pro-war politicians at this point look at this story as a threat to their chosen winner, and ultimately a threat to winning the war.  But the narrative of the story points to a divided team, and these pro-war politicians need to address this in order appease their base.

     The pro-war politicians could do two things.  They could rally around the general, and especially if the administration and others accept his apology (and not fire him), or they could call for his head and get someone new in there that will work better as a team. In other words, if the General is looked at as the guy who is stronger than the President after the dust settles, because he thumbed his nose at him and his staff and they have not fired him, then he might be a guy they could rally around.  Especially coming into election, and especially if the President is not popular in the polls. But they also need a guy that can seal the deal, and they really need a guy that the troops on the ground support.  Because most of the base of pro-war politicians, are military and military families who all care about winning this thing.

     Karzai is at the table as well, and success to him is just hanging on to power and collecting as much money as he can from the war effort.  He will support anyone that will continue his good deal, and McChrystal is the guy–kind of.  Or at least that is the arrangement that the general has set up.  The general is working with Karzai and doing what is necessary to control him and work with him. Kind of like a SF operator working with a village chief.  He has to, because there is no alternative. Karzai also knows that if the Taliban come into power, he is out, so if he wants to survive politically and even physically, he needs a strong general and western partner to insure that survival.

     The Taliban are also at this table, and their strategy is simple. Keep terrorizing the population/government and just survive long enough to make it to this withdrawal date of July 2011. This date is all they need to win, because all they have to do is pour it on while everyone leaves. And as long as the people perceive the west as weak and unable to defeat the Taliban, they will give in to the Taliban.

     Finally there is General McChrystal.  Personally, I think this article was a way to test the political resolve of those at the top.  If they fired him, then McChrystal can fade away from the war and not be attached to it’s ‘perceived’ demise.  The whole ‘history book effect’ comes into play here as well.

     If they accept his apology and keep the guy where he is at, then that means they are saying ‘we did not like what you said, but we need a win in this war’. It is the same reasoning for contracting with Xe for security work–they might not like them, but they are the best, and for wars, you need the best of the best to win. So in essence, McChrystal was probing the defenses of these leaders at the ‘poker table’, to see what their position is on his command and the strategy.(calling their bluff or trying to determine their cards in the game) If you look at his history in war and life, you can see that this is exactly how he operates. He is testing them. Because an acceptance of the general’s apology, is also an acceptance of the fact that he ‘is the best man’ for the job.  The general needs that acceptance in order to go after what he really needs for a victory in Afghanistan, and that is time.

     I really think all of this boils down to one thing, and that is that stupid withdrawal date of July 2011. If COIN takes as long as most of the experts claim it takes, then attaching a time frame to the current strategy is stupid.  The general knows this, and this was a huge debate with the Iraq war. During that time, it was debated furiously during the presidential debates and between the pro-war and anti-war crowds. With Iraq, the narrative was ‘get out now’ versus ‘leave based on success and results’. The latter is what we went with, and that is what worked.

     A withdrawal should only be based on victory, a retreat is what happens when you lose.  I personally think this article was McChrystal saying ‘if you want me in charge of this war effort, you must give me time and the flexibility to win’. Because as it stands now, to seal any kind of a victory in Afghanistan by July of next year is impossible. I think most observers would say so as well, and this article symbolizes the very battle between all parties who have a stake in this war and the pressing issue of time. Each player in this game looks at time as a leverage for their specific goals in this game. Each player is also looking at their place in the history books and their political survival.

     There are plenty of angles to this war, and I am sure I am missing a few in this discussion. Below I posted a few pieces of the article that were interesting to me. Anyway, check out the entire article and  let me know what you think. Things are changing pretty quickly and it will be interesting to see how this unfolds over the days and weeks. -Matt

Edit: 6/23/2010 – And he is replaced by General Petraeus.  Wow, and all because of an article from Rolling Stone. He played his cards, he lost, and now there is a new player at the table.

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The Runaway General

By Michael Hastings

July 2010

(Pieces of the article are posted below–all curse words edited)

Today, as McChrystal gears up for an offensive in southern Afghanistan, the prospects for any kind of success look bleak. In June, the death toll for U.S. troops passed 1,000, and the number of IEDs has doubled. Spending hundreds of billions of dollars on the fifth-poorest country on earth has failed to win over the civilian population, whose attitude toward U.S. troops ranges from intensely wary to openly hostile. The biggest military operation of the year – a ferocious offensive that began in February to retake the southern town of Marja – continues to drag on, prompting McChrystal himself to refer to it as a “bleeding ulcer.” In June, Afghanistan officially outpaced Vietnam as the longest war in American history – and Obama has quietly begun to back away from the deadline he set for withdrawing U.S. troops in July of next year. The president finds himself stuck in something even more insane than a quagmire: a quagmire he knowingly walked into, even though it’s precisely the kind of gigantic, mind-numbing, multigenerational nation-building project he explicitly said he didn’t want.

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Afghanistan: U.S. Eager To Replicate Afghan Villager’s Successful Revolt Against Taliban

Jun 21

Posted by Matt in Afghanistan, Strategy | No Comments

     Conversations with Gizab leaders and Special Forces officers suggest that there was no single proximate cause. The uprising appears to have been the result of a combination of Taliban overreaching, U.S. encouragement and local resentment.

     “We’re looking for the patterns,” said a State Department official in southern Afghanistan. “If we can find it, we’ll be on the verge of a breakthrough.”

*****

     I really liked this article for several reasons. For one, good for Lalay for taking matter into his own hands and rallying the village for the defense. The second part I like, is the strategy development aspect of this article. They are trying to see the patterns that led up to Lalay taking matters into his own hands, and the keys to success of a tribal defense force like this.

     So let’s look at some of the factors of success which I keyed in on, and also what is required to replicate this. (in my opinion at least)

     The first is motivation. There must be motivation within the village to rise up against the Taliban. You also need a leader who has the motivation to rise up, and manage the revolt. So motivation is important. And consequence do to inaction is also important. These guys had both.

You also need a leader who has the will or resolve to do this. Not everyone can be a Lalay–someone that folks look up to and think of as a strong leader. This guy has to be someone that people respect and identify with. And that ‘Lalay’ needs to be pissed off enough to act. Which goes back to motivation. The Taliban pissed off Lalay by wanting the money that the government gave Lalay for the loss of his family, due to a Taliban IED. That would piss me off too. But acting on that anger, and putting action to words takes a special kind of individual.

     Notice also that Lalay executed three prisoners. Culturally speaking, this was acceptable to them and at that time. This shows the kind of resolve Lalay has, and how much hatred he has for the Taliban. Acts like that may be be repulsive to the west, but in Afghanistan, that is an act of someone with determination and little regard for an enemy that has little regard for him. It also shows that Lalay has the strength necessary to kill the bad guy–no weakness there, and a village in dire straights needs a leader who has that strength. And notice in the article that folks are flocking to his program of village defense. Of course we would like him to not kill prisoners, and I don’t condone that here. I am just saying that the act itself is something he felt he had to do in order to get the respect(from the village, from the Taliban) necessary to do what he had to do. To him, showing compassion (weakness) was not part of the game plan.

     It kind of reminds me of the old west movies, where a town is held captive by some bad people, and no one has the courage to step up. And then some contract sheriff comes into town, or some stranger on a pale horse, and motivates the people to do something about it (of course after the pale rider has that motivation to do so). Meanwhile, that individual shows great resolve in defeating those bad people. And usually in those movies, that leader had to be more ruthless and effective than those bad guys. In the case of Lalay, he was that stranger riding into town on the horse. He was that guy that said ‘follow me’.

     Now the next point is where I can inject some common sense free market warfare principles into this conversation, that the military planners and strategists continue to miss or forget. You must provide reward or interest, much like General George Washington provided such things to his troops in order to maintain a standing army(or village defense force). If you want to make this the most popular team to be on, then pay them accordingly and give them the weapons and training necessary to do the job. I cannot emphasize this enough. Pay them more than the Taliban offers, and pay them enough to be competitive with the military or police.

     If that won’t work, then provide a bounty system for the endeavor. Put a price on the heads of Taliban that are wanted by the government. It worked in the wild west, and it could work in Afghanistan if set up properly. The point with all of this is there must be incentive. Because without incentive, a volunteer force will eventually dissolve because they have more important things to do like take care of their family, farm, etc. Stuff to think about, and I think any effort dedicated to understanding the dynamics of this event is time well spent.

     Finally, I have to inject another point into this discussion that is not talked about. If the Taliban are giving up to Lalay, then Lalay is in a prime position to set up pseudo-operations, and use those former enemy combatants to find even more of these booger eaters. If Lalay declared that if these former Taliban want redemption in the village, that they ‘must do this one thing’ for the village, then this might be a way to turn some of these guys. These former Taliban would be outstanding tools to use for really screwing up their former employers. That is how you find out who the shadow government is, what they are up to and where they are at. We could be making awesome matrixes off of this information, and doing some heavy duty damage. You could also find out who is sympathetic to the Taliban in these villages, all because you have turned Taliban who can walk the walk, and talk the talk. No acting really required there, and turning these guys and using Lalay for that process should be considered. -Matt

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U.S. eager to replicate Afghan villagers’ successful revolt against Taliban

By Rajiv ChandrasekaranMonday, June 21, 2010

GIZAB, AFGHANISTAN — The revolt of the Gizab Good Guys began with a clandestine 2 a.m. meeting. By sunrise, 15 angry villagers had set up checkpoints on the main road and captured their first prisoners. In the following hours, their ranks swelled with dozens of rifle-toting neighbors eager to join.

Gunfights erupted and a panicked request for help was sent to the nearest U.S. troops, but the residents of this mountain-ringed hamlet in southern Afghanistan held their ground. By sundown, they managed to pull off a most unusual feat: They kicked out the Taliban.

“We had enough of their oppression,” Lalay, the one-named shopkeeper who organized the uprising, said in recounting the late April battle. “So we decided to fight back.”

U.S. diplomats and military officials view the rebellion as a milestone in the nearly nine-year-long war. For the first time in this phase of the conflict, ordinary Afghans in the violence-racked south have risen on their own to reclaim territory under insurgent control.

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War Art: A Man With A Heart For Stone

Jun 20

Posted by Matt in Cool Stuff, Strategy, War Art | No Comments

     “I can’t understand why people do what they do just from looking in their eyes, but when I see what they make I see different creative views,” said Wagner. “Everybody has a different opinion of how life is, and you can see that when someone is given a piece of stone and turns it into a unit crest, a shot glass, or even just a ball.”

*****

     The reasons why I keep coming back to art on this blog is not only do I enjoy the art itself, but I have a profound respect for the process and inspiration needed to make that piece of art.  It requires analysis and synthesis, and it is a great ‘building snowmobiles’ exercise.

     One of my favorite examples of artists/strategists was Myamoto Musashi.  He was a big fan of art and for good reason.  For problem solving or developing unique strategies, you need a brain that can look at situations from different angles and find multiple solutions.  It takes creativity and the ability to really bend and mix the concepts to come up with unique solutions, much like an artist does on a canvas or with marble.

     Of course you need to know yourself and your enemy, but if your enemy has that same mindset, you must have something a little different in your strategy to gain the upper hand. Getting inside his OODA loop is important too, but what if your enemy is aware of OODA as well? The real winner in this fight, is the one that is able to take all strategies and all inputs, and create a winning strategy that is more effective that your enemy’s. It is something to think about when trying to figure out how a ‘John Boyd’ could defeat a ‘John Boyd’. Having a creative mind is just one factor of many that will help you to get there.

     On a side note, it is also interesting to go back to the patterns of battlefield innovation that I keep seeing. (here, and here)  Where the dominate combatant’s strategy is copied by the weaker combatant’s strategy, and then the weaker combatant adds something to that newly adopted strategy to make it even more effective.  A technological advantage could be one addition, or a multitude of little changes, all born from a different point of view, all from a creative mind. Borrowing brilliance seems to be a good way to go, just like artists get inspired by other artists. Interesting stuff and bravo to Charles Wagner for producing some beautiful marble work. -Matt

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291999War Art: A Man With A Heart For Stone

291998War Art: A Man With A Heart For Stone

Charles Wagner, a native of Rainier, Wash., explains the process of carving the 2nd Infantry Division shield into the emblem of 3rd Stryker Brigade Combat Team, 2nd ID. Wagner worked during his down time for almost a month to create the marble carving, which he will present to the brigade at the end of their deployment.

*****

A Man With a Heart for Stone

Story by Pvt. Zach Zuber

June 19, 2010

DIYALA, Iraq — It all started with grief in 2004-05 timeframe. Three Soldiers lost their lives, and a U.S. civilian contractor, who had befriended them, was left with a loss. Charles Wagner, a mechanic for General Dynamic Land Systems, was working in Mosul, Iraq, at the time and had to find a way to deal with his pain.

In an effort to relieve the pain felt from the passing of his friends, Wagner began shaping marble stones into crests, crosses and hearts. Since that time, he has created many works of art to escape from the stress that comes during deployment.

“This started out as a way to displace myself from what’s going on over here, working during off hours to focus on other things,” said Wagner, a native of Rainier, Wash.

Wagner said he lost three Soldiers on one mission, and he created hearts, crucifixes, and lancers for each of the parents as a way to connect to them.

During that first tour, in 2004-05, he carved a full-size lancer for 1st Stryker Brigade Combat Team, 25th Infantry Division. Then, during the 2006-07 tour with 3rd SBCT, 2nd ID, he created a replica of the Indian-head shield that represents 2nd Infantry Division. When he traveled with the Arrowhead Brigade to Iraq last August, he received the request to make the 3rd Stryker Brigade crest, which includes the 2nd ID shield on top of an arrowhead, with the number three located above the shield.

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Strategy: The Eight Imperatives Of COIN, By General Stanley McChrystal

Jun 12

Posted by Matt in Afghanistan, Strategy | No Comments

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Publications: Contracting In Conflicts–The Path To Reform, By John Nagl And Richard Fontaine

Jun 8

Posted by Matt in Afghanistan, Iraq, Letter Of Marque, Publications, Strategy | 2 Comments

     Now this is a better product and I can tell they actually listened to their contributors.  So bravo to CNAS for putting together a great report.  If you look at the cast of contributors, you will also see that they took advice from guys like Doug Brooks, David Isenberg and a whole bunch of private military companies and military professionals. For the record, I was not a direct contributor, but I know some of the ideas of FJ made it out there in one way or another.

     For one, they actually brought in Article 1, Section 8 of the US Constitution as a counter to Max Weber’s definition of the state. (the Second Amendment could also be looked at as a counter as well) I was beside myself when I read this in their ‘inherently governmental’ section, and I had to read it a couple of times to make sure they actually went there.  They did and bravo to them for having the courage to challenge this sacred cow of thought.

     This kind of sets the pace for the entire publication, because CNAS and all of it’s contributors were actually making the argument for the use of contractors in war time.  It is an acknowledgement of that ‘elephant in the room’ called contractors, and it is an excellent first step towards combining private industry and government for the good of the nation and the wars it fights. To me, it has always been about unity of effort and command, and ensure private industry only helps government, not hurt it.  If we can figure out how to achieve that unity of effort and command, I think the next step is what will really be radical.

     I have argued on this blog that today’s war planners, leaders and strategists should make an effort to at least acknowledge that elephant in the room called contractors or private industry.  We are getting there and I am enthused about the process.  But to me, the next level of discourse about private industry is how do you turn that animal into a war elephant?

     To me, it is not enough to just acknowledge our existence and say ‘oh well, private industry is that big dumb animal that we all have to get used to’. That is like using a pistol to hammer nails.  I would make the argument that instead, private industry should be looked at from a strategic point of view and the question should be asked is ‘how do we use private industry to help win our wars and maintain a position of strength in the world today’?  That is the next level of discourse about this subject, and that is the kind of thinking that could possibly lead to victory in our current wars. I say this, because there is a tremendous effort taking place to actually figure out how to regulate and utilize private industry during times of war, and this paper and current legislative action is proof of that process. So once we figure out how to shoot the pistol, as opposed to using it to hammer nails, we can then start discussing how to use that pistol in warfare.

     Now on to the paper.  Below I have listed some of the issues that popped up as I was reading it. Just little things that came to mind, that could help refine the product.  Ideas are cheap, and I throw them around freely here. I have also listed some interesting portions of the paper to give the reader a taste. Be sure to check out all of the contributors, to include Allison Stanger (she provided the forward). Enjoy and let me know what you think.-Matt

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Contracting In Conflicts: The Path To Reform

By John Nagl and Richard Fontaine

06/07/2010

CNAS

In both Iraq and Afghanistan today there are more private contractors than U.S. troops on the ground. This exploding reliance on contractors costs U.S. taxpayers tens of billions of dollars and has grown with inadequate government oversight.   This report – authored by Richard Fontaine and John Nagl - details the urgent need for comprehensive reform. The United States must embark on a path of ambitious reform that will require: new laws and regulations; an expansion of the government’s contracting workforce; a coordination mechanism within the executive branch; greater scrutiny, more transparency and clearer standards for private contractors; a strategic view of the roles contractors play in American operations; and a change in culture within the government.

Download the paper here.

Link to website here.

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History: John Coffee Hays And The Evolution Of War Fighting In The Wild West

May 27

Posted by Matt in History, Strategy, Texas, Weapons | 2 Comments

   The other day I was reading a great little book called The Empire Of The Summer Moon, and came across some very interesting history.  For those that have read my history posts, I tend to gravitate towards tipping points in war fighting history, all with the idea of learning what led towards that tipping point. It is important to do this, so we can apply these lessons of warfare to current and future wars. That is my intent and that is what being a student of warfare is all about.

   The book itself describes the Comanches as the most feared and capable indian tribe on the frontier in early America.  These guys were masters of horse mounted warfare, and they were actually doing quite a good job of holding off the advances of the Spanish, Mexicans and French, as well as the Americans for a long time.  Back in the day, the borderlands and the plains were definitely not easy to live in. Between the Comanches and bandits, the advancement of civilization was brought to a standstill.  Enter the Texas Ranger, John Coffee Hays.

   It is always interesting to boil down the turn around or tipping point of conflict, and Hays and his use of the Colt repeating pistol is that tipping point.  This warrior developed the methods necessary to defeat the Comanche and other tribes, and I think it is important to identify what led to this evolution in warfare.  Because up until John Hays entered the scene, Indian fighting was unorganized and not very effective.  The Comanches were the masters.

   So what contributed to John Hays and his way of fighting?  His upbringing was interesting and he came from a long line of leaders and war fighters, starting with the Revolutionary War. But ultimately, he developed a passion for fighting the indian tribes while working as a surveyor in Texas.  This is when he was first exposed to the indian way of war, and in order to continue living and working as a surveyor back then, you needed to figure out how to survive that kind of warfare. Also, surveyors hired guards to protect them on their little outings.  Those guards would later fill the ranks of the citizen army called the Texas Rangers and the ranging companies.

   Hays joined the Texas Rangers out of patriotism and a desire to defend Texas, and witnessed first hand what this kind of warfare produced. I am sure burying hundreds of victims of the Goliad Massacre left an impression on him.  The Comanches and other tribes did not take prisoners back then, and took it upon themselves to torture captives to death as well. They would burn them alive on wagon wheels, scalp them, cut them up and mutilate them, skin guys alive, etc. Mind you, the Comanche fought other tribes and did unspeakable things to each other, and they applied this same brand of warfare to the advancing white man. The Comanche also took prisoners and made them into slaves, to include white settlers.   These were some bad dudes to fight and they did not mess around.  These warriors were also incredible horsemen and could wield their bows and arrows on a horse far better than any white men. They were even considered to be pretty awesome amongst the other tribes, if that gives you an idea of the kind of fighters they were.  Most importantly, their weapons were more effective than anything Hays and his men had at that time.  For every one shot of a single shot pistol, an indian could launch six arrows from a quiver.  The indians could also move very fast with horses, and were extremely accurate with said bows and arrows.

   The Comanches also had hundreds of years of warfare behind them.  They fought other tribes and of course the Spanish and French, and these guys were definitely the Vietcong of the old west.  They could survive off the land, track anyone with amazing ability, and they could ride a horse like no other.

   So how did John Hays and the Texas Rangers step up to the challenge? They basically copied the Comanche, used indian scouts, were more pragmatic and calculated than the Comanche, had extreme courage, and most importantly–embraced new technologies.

   Not only did they copy the Comanche, but they also stole ideas from the Mexican forces and other indians they came across.  They would ride on special horses that could keep up with the Comanche horses, they would wear leathers to protect against brush, a sombrero hat to protect against the sun, and they would carry plenty of single shot revolvers, rifles, and knives.  The revolver is what is key in this story, because before the multi-shot repeating revolver came onto the scene, the Rangers were extremely limited in capability and the Comanches knew it.

   Hays also created a learning organization within his ranger company.  He would study the Comanche and figure out strategies of attacking them based on the capabilities of the rangers and past battles with the Comanche. Most importantly, he used indian scouts that had a beef with the Comanche.  These guys could track, understand the language, and otherwise be the tool necessary for understanding the Comanche and defeating them.  This is a crucial point of warfare in the wild west, and it is a factor of warfare that is important today.  Your local national interpreters are the ones that will help you to navigate the human terrain and to understand the enemy.

   The Rangers did not use bow and arrows either(except for the indian scouts in the company), just because that is a skill that takes years of development. They instead depended on muzzle loaders. I think about the long bow archers of yesteryear and how specialized they were, and how valuable they were to the various armies that used them.  The old west was no different, and I look at the Comanches as long bow archers on horseback.  Lethal and highly mobile.

   But the Rangers did develop horsemanship skills, and tried to copy the Comanche style.  They would hang off a saddle, and shoot their pistols from under the neck of the horse–all while the thing was moving!  The Rangers would train at shooting their rifle at one target, then switch to their pistol for another, all while on horseback. (old school transition drills) They also did the same things to the Comanches as the Comanche did to others.  One tactic was to stampede the enemy’s horses so they would be without mounts.

   This is an important tactic to cover, because out in the high plains, if you did not have a horse you were going to die out there.  Horses are what got you to towns or watering holes before you starved or became dehydrated.  Taking out your enemy’s horses, was like destroying the fuel and logistics trains of a tank battalion in modern warfare.

   Hays also learned about killing the tribal leaders as a strategy.  It was bad medicine when a chief was killed, and often times a Comanche war party would break their attack if the chief was killed.  So Hays would use a sharp shooter and focus on killing the chiefs.  Then he would charge the remaining war party for the ultimate in shock factor.  Boyd would have been proud of Hays.  It kind of reminds me of today’s way of breaking an ambush or of how a bayonet charge scares the crap out of a defender.

   But Hays and his men were always limited in their lethality by the weapons they carried. Things changed big time when Hays and his Rangers got a hold of a repeating pistol from a failing company called Colt.  Without Hays and his requirements for a weapon that could better suite his method of warfare, Colt would have arguably never existed.  The repeating pistols they originally produced were kind of junky, and no one in the military or US were at all sold on the things.  But all it took was some Rangers to use the pistols and give glowing reviews on their effectiveness in battles, and then things turned around for Colt. Colt also listened to their Texan customers, and built a better pistol for them.  Nothing sells a concept more than proof of concept and these Texas Rangers proved handily how effective this pistol was in their fight.  For a more detailed explanation of this history, please read below.

   The first real test of these revolvers, and the proof of concept of using a repeating pistol while mounted on horse happened at the Battle of Walkers Creek. This was the west’s version of the Battle of Margiano back in the 14th century. It was there that the first repeating pistol was used in warfare, and Hays and his men cleaned house so to speak.  From that point on, the Rangers were delivering victories time and time again.  They copied the Comanche tactics, they used their indian scouts to track and ‘know the enemy’, they were fearless and calculated with their assaults, and they introduced a new technology to give them the strategic edge in battle.  Sound familiar? (The German Landsknecht vs. the Swiss Guard)

   So from then on, the concept of a repeating revolver and fighting from a horse caught on.  Everyone copied this new way of warfare in the west, or at least tried to.  Cavalry units, stage coach teams, lawmen, bounty hunters, cowboys, range detectives, prospectors, mountain men, frontiersmen, etc.  If you did not have a horse and a repeating weapon, you were at a severe disadvantage against the indian way of war.  The horse allowed for speed, the repeating pistol allowed for lethality.  And as the pistol and rifles evolved into bigger calibers, better barrels, and cartridges, the lethality increased. That evolution of warfare in the west all started with John Coffee Hays and his Rangers, along with the introduction of the repeating pistol. -Matt

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689084 f260History: John Coffee Hays And The Evolution Of War Fighting In The Wild West

John Coffee Hays.

1844%20Colt212 030408 pic 424569907 t607History: John Coffee Hays And The Evolution Of War Fighting In The Wild West

Jack Hays and the Colt Revolver

The Texas six-shooter was first made famous by a Ranger captain named Jack Hays. John Coffee Hays was a Tennessean, from the same county as Andrew Jackson and Sam Houston; in fact, his grandfather had sold Jackson the Hermitage estate. Hays was a born adventurer, of the type called forth by many frontiers. He went west to Texas as a surveyor, was mustered into a ranging company, and suddenly found his métier. Hays was a natural warrior. He was soon recognized as the captain of his band, and, at the age of twenty-three, he commanded the San Antonio station, the most dangerous and important Ranger post in western Texas.Jack Hays was the prototype for a certain kind of emerging American hero. He did not look like a fighting man’s hero: he was slight and slim-hipped, with a clear, rather high voice; he had lovely manners and was seen as a “perfect gentleman” by the belles of San Antonio. Hays was utterly fearless-but always within the cold, hard bounds of practicality, never foolhardy. He was not a talker, and not even a good gunman, but a born leader of partisans who by great good luck had been born in the right time and place. Hays was calm and quiet, almost preternaturally aware of his surroundings and circumstance, utterly in control of himself, and a superb psychologist, in control of all the men around him. His actions appeared incredibly daring to other men who did not have Hay’s capacity for coolly weighing odds. It is known that most of the other Ranger leaders, and hundreds of future riders, consciously tried to “be like Jack Hays”-strong, silent, practical, explosive only in action. He put an indelible stamp on the force that was soon to be formalized as the Texas Rangers. Read the rest of this entry »

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Maritime Security: The Greater Strategic Threat Of The Jihad Corsairs Of Somalia, By Dr. Walid Phares

May 24

Posted by Matt in Al Qaeda, Letter Of Marque, Maritime Security, Somalia, Strategy | No Comments

     I had actually linked to this article awhile back when I was discussing jihadist privateers, and Dr. Phares had actually written a similar article with a similar theme.  So I just wanted to get this article registered in the database here, for future research.

     The best part of this article to me, was the use of the arabic word for corsair or qursaan.  This is what the middle east press call the Somali pirates, and qursaan has it’s roots in the French word corsair.  So I thought that was kind of cool, but I am not sure if the ME press actually consider the Somali pirate a privateer or practitioner of legalized piracy?  Which leads me to my next point.

     It is difficult to determine if in fact piracy is becoming the tool of jihadists or not. I would think that most pirates at this point are just in it for the money, and would claim an islamist slant to their project if it would help them to get more money or support for their ventures.

     A couple weeks back, I posted some stuff about islamists falsely claiming to take over pirate towns to get rid of piracy. In fact they were just trying to gain control over ports so they can make money off of the secondary businesses related to piracy.  Someone has to tax these pirates, or feed them, or use them for arms and soldier shipments, or provide a place for the wary pirate to sleep.

    But it is hard to determine if these Jihadist are actually investing in piracy ventures, or directing attacks in a strategic sense.  It would not be that much of a stretch for them to do so, and that is why it is important to keep this kind of stuff in the back of our heads when looking at piracy in the modern age.

     The other thing I was thinking about the other day, is what is the Islamic version of the Letter of Marque?  Is it the Fatwa or would you call this Ghazawat? Interesting stuff. -Matt

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The Greater Strategic Threat of the Jihad Corsairs of Somalia

by Walid Phares, Ph.D.Published 21 Apr 09

Most of the media discussion about piracy in the Gulf of Aden has drifted understandably towards the sensational part of the story: how are the Pirates able to roam the Ocean? Is paying them ransom a better option than to engage them militarily? Last but not least, will a military intervention against the Pirates worsen the situation; will it lead to a massive escalation in Somalia and a Vietnam like quagmire for many years to come?

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Afghanistan: Taliban Shadow Government Strikes In Marja

May 18

Posted by Matt in Afghanistan, Strategy | No Comments

     “The Taliban are everywhere, they are like scorpions under every stone, and they are stinging all those who get assistance or help the government and the Americans,” Mr. Rahman, the farmer, said.

*****

     You know, sometimes the best way to understand Afghanistan, is to look at it from the eyes of the farmer on the ground that is wedged in between this fight between the Afghan/Coalition and the Taliban. And honestly, I don’t blame these farmers and their families for packing up and leaving out of fear for their lives. I can also see why they are probably mad, confused, and have no respect at all for the Afghan government and the Coalition.

     The bottom line is that the Taliban are the home team, they are everywhere and they are all whispering into the ears of Afghans everywhere. They are telling them that when the coalition leaves, anyone that supported them or the Afghan government, is going to get their throats slit. They are also telling them that time is on the Taliban’s side–’the coalition has the watches, but the Taliban have the time’.

     The Taliban are also doing their best to show that they are a better government for the people, than the Afghan government, and they are doing it in classic mafia style. It’s a shadow government, and they are doing anything they can to either win support, or get that support out of fear and intimidation.

     So let’s go back to how we turn this around. There is no such thing as one solution or just one thing that will fix it all. It is my belief that you have to attack problems from multiple angles, and learn from mistakes to create the better solution. So having a learning organization is important, if in fact we want to find the right solution for a specific problem. It is what John Nagl identified as one of the reasons why we lost in Vietnam, and it is a lesson that should be applied today if we want to win in Afghanistan. So are we learning from mistakes and do we have learning organizations all focused on ways to defeat this shadow government, while at the same time elevating the legitimacy of the current Afghan government? Are we learning new ways of separating the Taliban from the population, or are we stuck in old ways that just don’t work? Most of all, are we listening to customer (locals) feedback and doing all we can to win their support, or are we standing around and just allowing the Taliban to do whatever the hell they want in places like Marja?

     And in true Feral Jundi fashion, I don’t just criticize, I also like to suggest solutions. The first solution I want to offer, is that we should assign squads to each farm, blocks of houses, or small cities. Tim has mentioned this on his blog, and the one thing that puts a cramp in the style of mafias, is a police or military that shows presence and hinders bad guy business on that particular patch of soil. In other words, we need to own Marja and in a big way. It’s like the ships that keep getting hijacked in the Gulf of Aden. You put security details on the ships, then pirates will have a tougher time of attacking it. Navy patrols do not stop pirates alone, and having well armed security professionals on the boat is insurance that the boat is protected if the patrols fail. We should be treating towns and farms in Afghanistan, like we should be treating ships in the Gulf of Aden. (I say should, because we are still not there completely–but close)

     I also think that if there is not enough soldiers to do this, well then contract the thing out. If contractors can protect FOBs, we can protect small towns, farms, etc. This is not rocket science, and to me, it is purely a numbers game. Determine the needs in manpower, put it out for bid, and treat it just like TWISS or the CMC program that the Army Corps of Engineers put on. Instead of defending bases, we could instead be defending Farms and Ranches. (hint)

     So on top of implementing sufficient defenses for these locals and showing presence to crimp the style of the Taliban shadow government/mafia, we should also be doing all we can to cause chaos within the ranks of the Taliban. I keep coming back to pseudo-operations as the best way to do that, along with relying on tips from the locals. But with pseudo-operations, the Taliban would really become paranoid, much like organized crime gets all paranoid by snitches or undercover cops posing as criminals within their organization. We should be doing all we can to insert ‘scorpions’ of our own into the Taliban machine, to share that space under the rock and get within their OODA loop. The Taliban needs some paranoia and confusion within their ranks, and the less centralized the Taliban are, the better it is for us. This would be labeled under ‘finding is better than flanking’. Hell, I would even call this tactic, ‘finding and flanking all rolled up into one big burrito of chaos’. lol Hey, the Taliban are conducting their own version of pseudo-operations every time they put on a police or soldier uniform and attack the Afghan government and/or people, we should be doing it too.

     Another point I wanted to make, is that we should also be looking more at honey pot strategies in order to lure out these ‘scorpions’. I read a great story the other day in the Stars and Stripes about a unit who is tasked with finding IED’s in Afghanistan, and they are doing a great job of it. The reason why they are doing a good job, is presence on the roads, becoming a better learning organization because of it, and looking at the roads as honey pots that draw in the enemy so they can kill them. If you give a unit the freedom to think up the solutions necessary to not only find IED’s but to actually go after the planters of IED’s and make the lives of those bomb farmers a living hell, well then now we are talking success. Matter of fact, I would take it one step further. I would provide a financial incentive to units that are able to find IED’s. Make it a game where finding the things and the makers/planters have value. If the Taliban want to make the roads a battleground, then we need to destroy them on that battleground. We also need to dominate the other battleground called people. And hey, if we actually got off the roads and hung out at the farms and villages for awhile, well then that would kind of throw a wrench into the whole IED game.

     Finally, why are we not growing food for the troops in Afghanistan itself? We can also grow fennel seed and make biodiesel. (A million dollars per soldier for a year, is waaaaay too much money to spend on this stuff, and we can do better) We can partner with these farmers to grow that food and biodiesel, and create an entire industry out of supporting the troops through agriculture. We can also grow the stuff on the FOBs, and secure food stocks that way too. Of course we will still have to ship in food, but when it is harvest season there is no reason why we shouldn’t take advantage of that. We have been there 9 years, and we are still shipping in food and fuel from other places and that makes things way to expensive-both in lives lost on convoys, and in money terms. The more we can become self sufficient in Afghanistan, the better. We will also interact with and come to depend upon the people, and create real partnerships that will give a true return on investment.

    The other thing to think about is what message does that send to the local farmer, when we ship in tomatoes from somewhere else? It pisses off farmers in the US when we ship in tomatoes from somewhere else and not go local, why wouldn’t it irk local Afghan farmers? To develop a food production plan/strategy (agro-strategy) to feed all of these troops for all of these years, would have been smart and cost effective. It would have also invigorated the local farms of Afghanistan, and given them something to grow other than poppy for the Taliban. It would have also given farmers something to export when we all leave, and the money made off of exports could have brought in money to the Afghan government and people for the rebuild of their country. Not to mention turning Afghanistan into the biodiesel capital of Central Asia by growing their own fuel.(ambitious, I know) We still have a chance to get them going on this path, and agro-strategy and people protection should be top priorities in Marja and in Afghanistan. -Matt

Edit: 5/19/2010 – Check out this excellent article from Strategy Page on how the war on IED’s is going in Afghanistan.

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Taliban Hold Sway in Area Taken by U.S., Farmers Say

By CARLOTTA GALL

May 16, 2010

LASHKAR GAH, Afghanistan — Farmers from the district of Marja, which since February has been the focus of the largest American-led military operation in Afghanistan, are fleeing the area, saying that the Taliban are terrorizing the population and that American troops cannot protect the civilians.

The departure of the farmers is one of the most telling indications that Taliban fighters have found a way to resume their insurgency, three months after thousands of troops invaded this Taliban stronghold in the opening foray of a campaign to take control of southern Afghanistan. Militants have been infiltrating back into the area and the prospect of months of more fighting is undermining public morale, residents and officials said.

As the coalition prepares for the next major offensive in the southern city of Kandahar, the uneasy standoff in Marja, where neither the American Marines nor the Taliban have gained the upper hand and clashes occur daily, provides a stark lesson in the challenges of eliminating a patient and deeply rooted insurgency.

Over 150 families have fled Marja in the last two weeks, according to the Afghan Red Crescent Society in the provincial capital, Lashkar Gah.

Marja residents arriving here last week, many looking bleak and shell-shocked, said civilians had been trapped by the fighting, running a gantlet of mines laid by insurgents and firefights around government and coalition positions. The pervasive Taliban presence forbids them from having any contact with or taking assistance from the government or coalition forces.

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Strategy: Suicide Assaulters, Swarming, And Toyotas–The Taliban And The New Rules Of War

May 11

Posted by Matt in Afghanistan, Al Qaeda, Strategy, Tactical Thought Process | No Comments

Rule 1: “Many and Small” Beats “Few and Large.”

Rule 2: Finding Matters More Than Flanking.

Rule 3: Swarming Is the New Surging.

*****

   This latest suicide assaulter attack in Afghanistan is important to look at and study, and this post is dedicated to ‘knowing your enemy’.  Tim over at Free Range International just posted an excellent run down of this latest attack in Nimroz at the governor’s compound, and Bill Roggio over at Long Wars Journal has some excellent stuff on this incident as well. I highly advise reading Tim’s post, because it comes with pictures and diagrams of the assault, along with Tim’s commentary on the whole thing.

   As you can see, these guys are following a path that John Arquilla and others have laid out with the ‘new rules of war’. They are continuing to use this same type of attack, just because it is so hard to defend against and it causes so much chaos and confusion.  The only thing working against the enemy is their ability to be organized and plan this stuff better.  But some attacks have been successful, and they are learning. What I wanted to do in this post is match up what the enemy is doing with these three new rules I listed up top, and discuss their effectiveness.

     Multiple assaulters armed with AK’s and suicide vests, are the many and small.  Plus, with the suicide vest and AK, the assaulter has multiple options for killing.  They can fight their way into concentrations of enemies, and blow up when close enough (finding). The human bomb can also identify specific targets, and detonate just close enough to kill them. They can also use their suicide vest to clear obstacles so other assaulters can punch in and shoot at people or detonate(swarming).  But as Tim has pointed out in his post about the subject, these latest assaulters were not that organized or effective.  My guess is that they were poorly trained and prepared for the mission at hand, which is a good thing for us. And of course they are poor shots, as Tim and others have pointed out, which is also a good thing.

   But the next angle of this attack is the idea of using Toyota pickups and swarming, in order to arrive on target and overwhelm the defenders.  This is exactly how the Taliban was operating and it deserves closer inspection.  Tim mentioned in his write up that large vehicles really cannot move around in Nimroz, just because of the small streets and power lines all over the place.  You either have to have a small truck, motorcycle, or be walking in order to get around in places like this.  And as the Toyota Horde paper pointed out, small pickups can be a tactical advantage for attackers who are swarming or preparing a battlefield for the defense. They are cheap, you can use many of them, and they are great for all types of utilitarian activities for hybrid warfare.  The Taliban continue to use these small pickup in places that MRAPs cannot go, and they can also use those pickups or motorcycles to outrun our large lumbering vehicles and forces.  They can also blend in with the local population, because they all use pickups.

   Further more, small pickups are essential for swarming operations.  If you want to get a truck load of assaulters into position, and not cause too much attention, the pickup is perfect because it is low profile (meaning there are many of these in the attack area).  Or they could use taxis, cop cars and ambulances as delivery vehicles.  The key here is just getting into position so the assaulters can pour out and attack the target from multiple angles.  Small vehicles that blend in are the perfect tool for delivery in this case.

   What further adds to the attack, chaos, and blending in factor, is assaulters wearing police or soldier uniforms.  These types of attacks can be extremely confusing, and they work great for the assaulter.  They can also do secondary attacks as the real police and military show up, and it is all about blending into that chaotic environment to create as much chaos as possible.  That is another reason why it is essential for defenders to get to know the local police and army stations really well, so they can recognize who should be on scene and shouldn’t.  Still, this is very tough to defend against, and the enemy knows this.  ’Finding’ in this case, is extremely critical if we want to succeed in the defense, because combatants that look like cops or soldiers could be causing a whole slew of problems.

   The swarming attack, coupled with the population camouflage I mentioned, is one of those deals that works well because it confuses the defender and brings a whole lot of chaos in a short period of time.  And with assaulters that double as human breachers that blow apart gates (with their bodies strapped with bombs), the swarming attack becomes even more feasible and more lethal.  It just takes really good planning and rehearsal for the enemy to accomplish the mission.

   Finally, I want to give solutions to countering these types of attacks.  The one thing that really screws up planning for these attacks, is the unexpected.  Being random and doing things that no one expected, is definitely one way to counter these types of attacks.  Also having excellent SOP’s to cover these types of swarming attacks is highly advisable, along with drilling over and over again to get proficient.  To also war game all and any scenarios in your head, and talking it up with your fellow guards is another way to keep sharp.  You should have answers in your head for all types of scenarios.  Red teams are great tools to find out how an enemy might attack a facility, and those red teams should do all they can to mimic what the enemy is doing today.

    For simmunitions developers out there, maybe building a paintball suicide vest for red teams would be a good product to sell? (it could already be out there for sale?)  Red teams could simulate fighting their way into your position, and detonate the suicide vest as part of the assault.  We have to start thinking about enemy assaulters as dual weapon systems–they shoot, fight their way in, and are seeking human pockets or obstacles to blow up. We also have to expect that suicide vests will also have plates in them, in order to make the assaulter tougher to kill.  The plates also help to focus the blast outward, and further turn the assaulter into a human claymore. Stuff to think about, and our enemy’s tactics and strategy are definitely evolving–Joker eat your heart out. -Matt

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Taliban hits government compound

May 05, 2010

At least eight attempted suicide bombers have been killed during a gun battle with police in southwestern Afghanistan, the interior ministry said.

Ministry officials said at least two Afghan policemen were also killed and five others wounded before the fighting ended in Nimroz province on Wednesday.

One witness said a female local council member was also killed in the attack.

Musa Rasooli, a senior police official in Nimroz, said the fighters were targeting the provincial governor’s compound and had entered the governor’s office.

He said two suicide bombers had blown themselves up outside the compound.

‘Taliban responsible’

The interior ministry said the fighters had also targeted civilian buildings in Zaranj, the provincial capital.

“A group of terrorists attacked some civilian and government buildings this morning in Zaranj,” Zemarai Bashary, an interior ministry spokesman, said.

Read the rest of this entry »

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Logistics: Energy Islands And Biodiesel

May 3

Posted by Matt in Afghanistan, Industry Talk, Logistics, Military News, Strategy, Technology | 1 Comment

     A significant step in reducing the length, complexity and cost of the US military supply chain for fuel.

     According to army-technology.com, “Every 55,702 barrels of fuel burned in Afghanistan by the US military forces corresponded to one casualty…a 10% reduction in fuel consumption over a five-year period could lead to a reduction of 35 fuel-related resupply casualties over the same period.”

     Also, the development of mobile energy systems allows military commanders options for avoiding a trade-off between lighter weapon systems that offer greater range, and heavier weapon or support systems that offer greater armor protection.

     A report by Deloitte calculated that fuel makes up 50 percent of all convoy activity in Iraq and Afghanistan.

*****

    Today’s discussion is about the military going green. I really like the idea of this, because as the articles below have stated, it takes a lot of fuel to power a military during time of war. Fuel is also a strategic asset, and without it, an army can be dead in the water and lose a war. So I like the idea of bringing in alternative sources of fuel, and diversify the fuel consumption process. And I really like the idea of manufacturing fuel locally, via micro processing plants. Better yet, if those micro processing plants focused on fuel, power and water for the operations of the local base as well as the local population center, well then that is a win win situation for everyone.

     Imagine having the local populations focused on growing fuel, for their use and for the local military base’s use? Plus, each processing plant that we cart into that area, could be a gift to the local population when that military base leaves? Better yet, we could teach the locals how to make biodiesel, and an entire industry could emerge. We keep looking at alternative crops for the farmers in Afghanistan? How about we have them grow fuel for the war effort. I have also talked about that here before, and I really like that concept because it makes sense. I also determined in my research that fuel producing plants like Jatropha could be grown in the south of Afghanistan.

     What’s cool about Camelina Sativa or wild flax seed is that it can be grown very easily in ditches or whatever, and does not require a lot nitrogen or water. Therefore, it does not compete with the local food growing or suck in a massive amount of water. It’s a weed more or less, and I like the idea of turning weeds into fuel. It is also native to Central Asia, so that means it could be grown in Afghanistan.

     The energy island concept is very cool. An all in one processing plant, that takes in the biomass and converts it to fuel, heat and power for the base and the local community. If these ARIES systems can do all of that, that is impressive and that is the kind of thing that could win over populations for COIN strategy. It would keep locals busy processing fuel, it would provide power to light homes and streets so they can see threats at night, and it would invigorate business and make people’s lives more comfortable. Lots of benefits from an energy island. Plus it defines the ‘small and many’ aspect of war. You want multiple power/fuel sources, not just one big one in which all of your cookies are in one basket. So I like having multiple energy islands scattered throughout a war zone, and that makes strategic sense.

     There is also another benefit of processing fuel locally, as opposed to shipping it in. Contractors and military personnel are both tasked with transporting fuel in war zones. If it cannot be flown in, it is convoyed in. And like the quote up top has mentioned, how many deaths can we attribute to this high demand for imported fuel for the war effort in Iraq and Afghanistan? How many contractors have died, trying to bring in fuel or water to some outpost? It is an interesting question, and my thoughts on the matter is that if we can minimize the amount of convoy operations it takes to supply an outpost or some FOB, the better. -Matt

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The Green Side of War

Defense & Security News — By International Relations and Security Network

May 3, 2010

On Earth Day, 22 April, the US Navy conducted a test flight of an F/A-18 Super Hornet at Naval Air Station Patuxent River, Maryland, run on a 50-percent mixture of a fuel refined from the crushed seeds of the flowering Camelina sativa plant. The flight of the Green Hornet, as it was called, followed an Air Force test a month earlier of an A-10C Thunderbolt II at Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, fueled with a similar blend.

Both events had the purpose of testing the performance of biofuel/petroleum mixtures with an eye toward the eventual certification of the fuels for routine use. They also demonstrate the efforts of the Department of Defense to increase its use of renewable energy, not only for environmental reasons but also to protect the military from energy price fluctuations and dependence on overseas sources of petroleum.