Posts Tagged FBO

Industry Talk: FBO–RFI For 500-600 Armed Guards For Kandahar Airfield

By the end of the year US troop levels in Afghanistan will fall to 9,800, with another 3,000 – 5,000 NATO troops sticking around as well through the end of 2016. And while those remaining forces will be focused solely on training and advising the Afghan Army, Air Force, police and border patrol mostly at the leader and Ministerial level in Kabul and a few other sites, jobs like security for the major bases will have to be outsourced to private companies.-Paul Macleary of the Intercepts blog.

This just came out and it is hot off the press. A big hat tip to the blog Intercepts over at Defense News for finding this one. So let’s dig into the particulars of this FBO RFI requiring between 500 and 600 folks to guard the Kandahar Airfield in Afghanistan.

The first thing that came to mind is the whole 45-60 day mobilization period? That is not a lot of time to recruit, train, and spin up such a sizable force. And if you force a company to adhere to such a thing, then they will get sloppy and they will allow bad seeds to get into the mix, just because of the sheer volume of guys they have to hire for this. Anything is possible, but the more you compress the time for this, the more the company will be rushed and will be sloppy with vetting and recruiting. The contract should emphasize the importance of spinning up a quality guard force, and the appropriate time to do so.

Also, I imagine that the standing force requirements are probably a little under half of this number, meaning maybe 200 to 300 guys actually on site protecting the facility (see the photo below)? So these guys that are standing up this contract better have some clue as to how static security works on this base and the leaders of this contract better know how to integrate well with the base QRF elements and the base defense plan. I highly recommend whatever company that stands this up, to study the Camp Bastion attack reports written by the Marines, so that they can get an idea of what their guard force needs to think about in Afghanistan. All actions by this guard force, should be focused on unity of command and unity of effort with BDOC or the military command and QRF of the base.

Another point. Base defenses these days have heavy weapons. If the Kandahar Airfield has posts with heavy weapons, and these guards will be manning those weapons, then training requirements should be specified in the contract. I would absolutely insist on some kind of deal where contractors are able to get training in a controlled environment, and then continue that training on these weapon systems while in Afghanistan. Meaning allow them to shoot the weapons, work the ranges with those weapons, and train on the TTP’s with those weapons. The base defense is highly dependent on that guard force to do it’s job. That would mean structure shifts to be smaller, so that there is more time for training. A contract could stipulate 8 hour shifts at the max, which would then give the company time to train while out in the field. The concept of 12 hour shifts does not help at all for training.

Like wise, if posts have special equipment like thermal imagers or military radios, these guards absolutely need to be spun up on this stuff. They should also be versed in a sound action plan for when the base gets attacked, and the contract should require that they do drills and maintain proficiency. With an 8 hour shift scheme, the companies would have plenty of time to do these drills and training. Like I mentioned before, the Camp Bastion attack is an excellent example of stuff a guard force needs to think about and work on.

Final point would be communications. The guard forces, be it military or contractor, need to be talking to one another and interacting. They need integrated communications, and this relationship should be geared towards creating unity of effort and unity of command. The BDOC should absolutely insist on this, and whomever is tasked with spinning up this contract for the Army, should think long and hard about how to structure the contract to meet those ends.

As for the pay and benefits, all I can say there is that if you ‘pay peanuts, you will get monkeys’. I have seen multiple complaints from contractors on how the Camp Leatherneck or Camp Dwyer contracts have materialized. If these contracts are poorly structured, poorly managed, and not given the time to properly set up, then of course things will get screwed up. And if the contract is paying an unreasonably low salary, then the guard force you hire will not have any respect for the job. They will be miserable, and this attitude will permeate throughout the contract. Guys will also jump contract at the first opportunity of a better gig. My advice is to pay a living salary that is respectable in this industry, and structure the leave and shift scheduling that will keep guys around, and not scare them away.

That last part is key. If companies are getting paid for training folks, and are not penalized for pushing contractors out with horrible policies and poor management, then what pops up is a revolving door training scam. The companies will push contractors to the edge with dumb policies so that folks eventually just leave, and then those same companies can train more people and charge the government more money for that. So my advice to the government is to incentivize the company they work with, to keep guys hanging around. The contract should use longevity bonuses, if a contractor stays an ‘x’ amount of days. The contract should also protect the salary of those contractors, so the company can’t play games with the salary. The contract should require paying a higher salary to shift leaders or other small unit leaders, to attract those who would want to do that kind of work. Reward companies for treating their people with respect and setting up excellent systems. Penalize companies that create training schemes, where they push out contractors so they can train more and grow their training business back home. And make damn sure your contracting officer that is assigned to watch this contract, knows what they are doing and actually cares what the company is doing in the field. You need to watch every step of the way, and have plenty of tools to keep that company in check so it does exactly what you want it to do.

My personal preference for a contract, is for the government to stipulate that companies form teams or platoons, where guys are assigned a unit. That way you can actually build some kind of unit cohesion within the contract. True leaders will rise to the top, because they have been forged in that furnace of a team. The current contracts on various bases, where guys are not assigned any team and are just thrown into the mix every time they come back from leave, is idiotic. It doesn’t build unit cohesion, or mutual trust, and folks are constantly having to adapt to a new group of people. It is better to build that trust between individuals through the mechanism of a team or platoon or squad or detail formations, as opposed to constantly breaking up that mutual trust that forms within a unit in a war zone. Teams are also important for mission command to be successful, and if the military is truly focused on implementing mission command within it’s operations, then they should practice what they preach with the formation of contracts that help support that type of structure and culture.

Something to think about for the companies and contracting officers that are reading this. All of this stuff can be spelled out in a contract and implemented by a company. There are other checks and balances that I am missing in this post that I could spend days talking about, but the big one to remember is that a contract should help in the creation of an environment and culture where folks are successful because of the system or contract, and not in spite of it. -Matt

 

Kandahar Airfield is a massive site, and you can see why it would require such a sizable guard force.

 

This Request for Information (RFI) is a market research survey to determine the availability and adequacy of potential sources prior to determining an acquisition and contract strategy to procure Private Security Company (PSC) services in support of U.S. Forces – Afghanistan (US FOR-A) Garrison Command, and tenant organizations at Kandahar Airfield (KAF), Afghanistan. Only  expatriates  from  the  FVEY  (Five  Eyes)   International  Intelligence  Sharing Network Nations (United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, New Zealand) will be permitted to perform work as permanent or temporary residents of Kandahar Airfield under any future contract – no exceptions.  There is a requirement for U.S. Secret level security clearances for supervisory and operations personnel.

This RFI does not constitute a solicitation (Request for Proposal or Request f or Quotation) or a promise to issue a solicitation in the future.   As stipulated in FAR 15.201(e), responses to this notice are not considered offers, shall not be used as a proposal, and cannot be accepted by the Government to form a binding contract.    This RFI does not commit the Government to contract for any services whatsoever.   We are not seeking proposals at this time.  Responders are advised that the Government will not pay for any information or administrative costs incurred in response to this RFI.

The information received will be utilized by RCC-South in developing an acquisition strategy and Purchase Description and Specification.   The information in this notice is based on current information available to date.   This information is subject to change and is not binding to the Government.    Responses to this RFI may or may not be returned.    Not responding to this RFI does not preclude participation in any future solicitations, if one is issued.

Any resulting procurement action will be the subject of a separate, future announcement. The proposed acquisition is for services for which the Government intends to solicit and award in conjunction with policies procedures from FAR Part 15, Contracting by Negotiation.

The proposed acquisition is expected to be a firm fixed price contract for a ten (10) month base period, which includes a sixty (45-60) day mobilization period (estimated), and no option periods.   The requirement calls for an approximate of 500-600 guards, armorers, and management  personnel;  no  less  than  30%  of  which  must  be  FVEY  Expatriates,  with  the remaining 70% from an allowable ISAF Troop Contributing Nation: http://www.nato.int/ISAF/structure/nations/index.html

The following information is provided to assist with developing your response:

1.  The government will provide all lodging and office space to meet this requirement. Contractors may have access to MILAIR, DFACs, PX, and MWR.  A contractor man- camp is not required.

2. The contractor shall provide all vehicles, weapons, ammunition, communications equipment, optics, and other equipment necessary to perform the PSC mission.  There will be some government furnished equipment, but this is not relevant to the mobilization questions.

3.   The service is to secure the entirety of Kandahar Airfield (man towers), man/operate ECPs, and conduct roving patrols 24/7 for the specified period of performance.

Interested parties shall submit a response that answers the following questions:

1.  Can you mobilize the required number of personnel, complete with medical screening, vetting and arming authorizations processed, within 45 days of contract award?

2.  If not, what is the maximum number of personnel feasible to mobilize within 45 days of contract award?

3.  Can you mobilize the required number of personnel, complete with medical screening, vetting and arming authorizations processed, within 60 days of contract award?

4.  If not, what is the maximum number of personnel feasible to mobilize within 60 days of contract award?

5.  What is the minimum timeframe feasible for full mobilization of a guard force of approximately 500-600 personnel?

6.  If a phased approach is used for mobilization, please describe the number of personnel and timelines you could reasonably expect to accomplish full operating capability?

7.  What are some of the barriers you anticipate could impact expedited mobilization?

You have the option to present evidence that you are capable of providing the services required and as such your response may contain any information that you feel is relevant.  Please provide an electronic copy of your submitted information to the point of contact theodore.m.epple@swa.army.mil NO LATER THAN 13 October 2014 by 1800 hours EST.

FBO RFI here.

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Industry Talk: FBO–Security Assistance Mentors And Advisors Services In Iraq

This just popped up on my radar screen about Iraq. Of course things have really gotten bad in Iraq with the advance of IS/ISIL/ISIS/Daash and Iraq is having a heck of a time stopping them. Of course this is of grave concern to those that have an interest in a stable Iraq or want the ISIS threat to be stopped.

What is significant here is that contractors are a way to get more ‘boots on the ground’, when politically it is very difficult to do so. Especially when President Obama made promises to the world that we will ‘not’ have soldiers fighting in Iraq, nor will we have ‘boots on the ground’. He also made campaign promises that the US will have nothing to do with Iraq and really trumped up his achievement of pulling all the troops out back in 2011…Well, I guess plans change? lol

At this time, there are several hundred military advisors on the ground, and that number just keeps going up as the situation gets more dire in Iraq. But this also counters the politics of this administration’s views on Iraq involvement. So how do you stop the bleeding in Iraq, but still hold to your promise of not getting involved in Iraq? Enter contractors, the ultimate American Express of contingency operations.

I should also note that contractors are a huge component of security at the Embassy in Baghdad. I have heard estimates thrown around, and given the situation, I would say these are pretty close. Triple Canopy, according to some of my sources, has anywhere from 300 to 350 guys, and SOC has about 200-250 ERT guys. (I am open to any corrections there) That is a pretty substantial force and goes in line with what has been reported over the years in reports. It is also a massive facility, and if ISIS presses the fight closer into the city, those defenses will be tested. That is on top of the current military staffing at the Embassy which was reported to be about 100. As for DoD or OGA contractors, who knows?…

Now back to this FBO. The submission deadline is August 25th, so I imagine all the companies interested will be jumping all over this one and scrambling to put something together. How much this is worth, who knows? This part was interesting thought.

‘The proposed contract is for a single Firm Fixed Price (FFP) DoD contract with a period of performance of twelve (12) months and two (2) twelve month option periods. Security Assistance Mentors and Advisors (SAMA) services in Iraq’.

We will see how this goes and if any other contracts spin up or requests, I will be on the look out. H/T the Washington Post for picking up on this one. -Matt 

 

A police liaison officer, hired by DynCorp to help build the Iraqi police force, walks among the rubble of a police station in 2005 in Fallujah. Agence France-Presse/Getty Images

 

Security Assistance Mentors and Advisors (SAMA) services in Iraq
Solicitation Number: W560MY-14-R-0004
Agency: Department of the Army
Office: Army Contracting Command
Location: ACC – Rock Island (ACC-RI)
Aug 11, 2014
Solicitation Number: W560MY-14-R-0004
Notice Type: Sources Sought
Synopsis:
Added: Aug 11, 2014 10:54 am
SOURCES SOUGHT to locate interested vendors with the capability of performing Security Assistance Mentors and Advisors (SAMA) services in Iraq. The contractor shall provide advice and assistance to the Office of Security Assistance – Iraq (OSC-I) senior personnel in their mission to support the Government of Iraq (GoI), cognizant of the goals of goals of reducing tensions between Arabs and Kurds, and Sunni and Shias, with key focus on core process and systems which involve, but are not limited to administration, force development, procurement and acquisition, contracting, training management, public affairs, logistics, personnel management, professional development, communications, planning and operations, infrastructure management, intelligence and executive development.
Contract personnel shall assist the military and government personnel assigned to OSC-I in the assessment of MoD, CTS, or MoP processes, policies, and systems and then advising, coaching, mentoring, training, and liaising with MoD, CTS, or MoP officials to improve and refine these processes, policies, and systems. The contractor shall also ensure that training facilitation and the degree of interaction between contractor personnel and Iraqis being trained will conform to evolving local Iraqi requirements as may be agreed upon between the contractor and the Contracting Officer.
MISSION STATEMENT: The Office of Security Assistance – Iraq (OSC-I) has a requirement to provide Security Assistance Mentors and Advisors (SAMA) services to mentor and assist the Ministry of Defense (MoD) and the Iraqi Counter Terrorism Service (CTS) to build processes and institutional capacity within the ministry or bureau in order to place them on the critical path towards Iraqi security self-reliance.
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Aviation: FBO News–DoS Set To Fire Up A $10 Billion Drug Interdiction Air Services Contract

The total dollar value of services could reach $10B over the life of the resulting contracts. The Department requests industry feedback into the most effective way to provide these services. An abbreviated list of requirements is presented below.?Operate and Maintain DoS Aircraft Worldwide. DoS currently has 412 aircraft in its inventory. 120 are operational globally for drug interdiction and transport of personnel. 292 aircraft are in flyable or non-flyable storage.
Current locations of performance are in Central Florida, Colombia, Bolivia, Peru, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Guatemala, and Iraq. However, it is anticipated that performance may extend into other worldwide locations and the contractor(s) must be able to quickly extend operations to new locations on short notice, for limited duration. Recent examples of such include Sudan, Honduras, Malta, Libya, and Egypt.

A hat tip to Danger Room for picking up on this one. This is a big contract and it includes all sorts of services and missions that would have to be fulfilled. And like Wired mention, this looks more like a private air force than just a air services contract. lol

So how would this apply to the security folks? Well this quote under the ‘requirements’ section is what perked me up. This would be a task that could potentially be subcontracted or maybe done in house. But either way, it is a security contractor specific task.

Provide defensive security for air fields and housing when required. This may be coordinated through USG security elements, Host Nation elements, or subcontracted, depending on the site and situation.

We will see how it goes. Between this contract and CNTPO, drug interdiction aviation services is quite the money maker, and companies like Dyncorp are well positioned to dominate this sector. -Matt

 

US DEPARTMENT OF STATE AVIATION SUPPORT SERVICES
Solicitation Number: SAQMMA13R0044
Agency: Department of State
Office: Office of Acquisitions
Location: INL Support
Nov 30, 2012
Solicitation Number: SAQMMA13R0044
Notice Type: Sources Sought
Synopsis:
1. INTRODUCTION
The Department of State is sponsoring an Industry Best Practice and Vendor Identification Conference to identify potential business sources with the resources, capabilities, and experience to successfully deliver requisite services to sustain the Department’s Aviation Fleet. The Department staff will present an Air Wing Command Briefing, present functional core and supporting contract requirements with a focus on small business set-asides, provide an open forum to ask questions, and a chance to have a one-on-one session with the Government. Industry should be prepared to discuss innovative solutions, available technology, and capabilities. This conference will be held on January 9 and 10, 2013 in Melbourne, Florida. The location will be provided as an amendment to the Federal Business Opportunities (FBO) website. ?Following the overview presentations and the open discussion forum on January 9, 2013, the Government will host one-on-one sessions with interested companies, along with their anticipated subcontractor teams, provided prior coordination with the Government is established. The one-on-one sessions give companies a chance to ask specific questions regarding the program that they did not want to share during the presentation. These sessions will be limited to 30 minutes and may begin the afternoon of January 9, 2013 and between 8:00 AM – 5:00 PM on January 10, 2013 (January 11 will be an overflow day if needed). Session times will be assigned and companies will be notified of their time slot via email.

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Industry Talk: FBO News– US Trade And Development Agency ‘Definitional Missions’, Libya

Man, they should have done this awhile back. But this is cool none the less. Libya has the money and has plenty of reconstruction projects that companies can assist in. So this is great that the USTDA is making this happen.

Now of course the NTC is still trying to get everyone under the same tent and they will be dealing with internal issues for awhile. But as life normalizes throughout the country and services/jobs are brought back into the fold, then perhaps people will have better things to do than fight amongst each other.

On another note is the strategic use of contractors or private industry. The solicitation even mentions this. Check it out.

The Libyan sectors targeted for review under the new USTDA initiatives are: (1) Oil and Gas; (2) Power Generation; (3) Transportation, and: (4) Information and Communications Technology.
USTDA’s stated purpose behind the sector evaluations is to increase “strategic opportunities for the utilization of U.S. goods, services, and technologies as the country rebuilds its economy…”

‘Oil and gas’ is of utmost strategic importance to the west, and especially Europe. So hemming up those other sectors are key to supporting this oil and gas sector. It’s a little hard for engineers to drive out to the plant, if the roads suck or they can’t make a phone call to arrange a meeting as an example.  All of these sectors help support one another, and together they help in stabilizing the country and getting that oil and gas production humming along. Or at least that is the idea behind this stuff, and private industry is key to make that happen.

Not only that, but a country like Libya is perfect for today’s contingency operations companies. Especially as Iraq or Afghanistan continues to wind down. It is also great for US companies who are wanting to expand their opportunities into other markets, and Libya is prime for that.  Below this first article, I also posted a quick snippet of all four USTDA solicitations on FBO with links. Check it out. -Matt

 

Obama eyes rebuilding business – in AFRICA!
Sending contractors to evaluate plans by National Transitional Council
By Steve Peacock
April 2012
The Obama administration is considering future funding of industry modernization ventures in Libya, and has proposed sending contractors to assess U.S. investment prospects.
Four separate “definitional missions,” or DMs, soon will be carried out by private vendors on behalf of the U.S. Trade & Development Agency, an independent White House entity.
According to planning documents that WND located via routine database research, USTDA has issued Requests for Proposals from contractors capable of identifying and evaluating industry projects that Libya’s National Transitional Council is proposing.
The USTDA-funded missions come at a time when the council is struggling to contain divisive conflicts between tribal and regional militias.
As WND reported last month, the NTC is threatening to use force to keep those opposing forces in check, a move seen by some as necessary to avoid fracturing the nation.

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Industry Talk: Triple Canopy Awarded $159.9 Million For Afghanistan Security Services

Congrats to TC, but I have to say that I am not too interested in promoting their job for this. For the simple reason that the pay is too low and the leave schedule sucks. As it stands now, you have to work 344 days in order to get the bonus. That’s if the contract is still in place after a year. Who knows what will happen in Afghanistan a year out?

The other thing is burn out. Work is nice, but if you are working 12 hour days for 344 days out of the year, then that is a horrible schedule. For that reason, I think TC is going to have a tough time keeping this thing staffed. What I could see happening with this  is that guys use this contract as a ‘stepping stone’ contract in order to get into a better paying/better leave schedule job. Especially for those guys that have families.

In my opinion, I think this is a poorly constructed contract if these are the terms. The industry standard (in my opinion) for pay in a war zone like Afghanistan or Iraq should be more in the neighborhood $400 to $600 a day for static, to reflect the various management positions and seniority of contractors within the company. I should also note that such contracts like WPS is an excellent model for an ‘industry standard’ for pay. That is what this contract should have been modeled after, and DoS’s WPS program get’s it right in that department.

The industry standard for leave should be more around 2 to 3 months on, and about 1 month off. That is a great leave schedule, and the contract should allow some flexibility within that leave schedule to allow for emergencies and contractor personal choice. Requiring a contractor to work 344 days in a war zone is a recipe for disaster. Guys will burn out and their families will hate them for being away that long. I doubt that you will even see guys complete the contract to get the bonus, just because they will jump on the first gig that comes up with better pay and a better leave schedule. I know that is what I would do.

Even the hours worked is dumb. In my personal opinion, an 8 hour shift, working 6 days a week with one day ‘off’, is far better than a 12 hour shift 6 days a week. (especially if you are wearing kit all day long and working 344 days a year) I will also say that if this contract does lose guys because they burn out, that those left on the contract will be working a lot of hours without any days off. Just ask the AGNA guys what that is like when contractors bail ship because the company sucks or there are better gigs elsewhere. The guys that are left are the ones having to make up for a lack of manpower.

It is also a threat to the security readiness of a base, and could lead to a default on contract if there is a high attrition rate. Staffing a contract is serious business, and if folks are jumping ship because it sucks, then that has all sorts of consequence. Now imagine low staffing and low morale throughout a guard force because of being over worked, mixed with a high enemy threat or even enemy attacks?  We are not talking about security at some mall in Sandusky Ohio, we are talking about the protection of FOB’s filled with military and civilians in an active war zone, all depending upon that contracted guard force and it’s abilities.

In other words, this contract will have issues. That’s too bad, because I thought the Marines would have been smarter about this, and especially when they had more choice in the formation of this ‘best value’ contract. They should have asked this community what an appropriate contract would look like, and it just seems to me like they created another TWISS-like contract. Too bad…

The other thing I was curious about is if Triple Canopy gets paid for every guy they train?  Meaning when they train a contractor for this gig, they bill the government all the relevant costs. Why this matters is if the contract sucks and is set up to be a revolving door contract for guys, then TC will have to train up more contractors to keep it staffed. So what is TC’s incentive for training these guys and keeping them on the contract in Afghanistan? If anything, they benefit from a contract where contractors ‘don’t’ stick around so they can keep charging the government for training.

Which brings up another crucial point. When you set up a revolving door contract like this, then you lose something that is absolutely vital to organizations and security in war zones. Unit cohesion. Imagine being on a contract where no one sticks around? Where a new contractor shows up every week, or the management jumps ship every other week? Talk about instability. lol So basically you will have a contract where folks are constantly adjusting to new people, and all along you will have the security of a FOB to focus on. How can you trust the guy to the left and right of you, if A. you don’t know who they are and B.you don’t know if they will be there from week to week.

Unit cohesion is so hard to create in a company anyways, but if the contract itself does not lend itself towards making contractors happy and keeping them on the gig, then you can kiss any kind of unit cohesion good bye. And actually, that will be a cause of internal problems. I dare any military unit to try the same thing in a war zone, and see what the end result becomes. And this is what you want protecting these bases?

I sometimes wonder if the military should be setting up these contracts in the first place. How is it that the federal government understands how to set up these things (like WPS), but the military does not?  Could it be that the military purposely constructs poor contracts because contractors are the competition? What incentive do the Marines have in constructing a contract where a company that comes in to replace their Marine force, does a better job than that Marine force– because the contract lends itself to success?  Why would they want that company to be successful, and ‘show them up’?  Food for thought when it comes to the public versus private discussion about this industry, and when it comes to the principal-agent problem.

Finally, it is very simple to understand the game here. You find the industry standard within that war zone, and you stick to that standard. If you want to lose people and could care less about the quality of the contract/services, then by all means set up your contract below that industry standard. Go cheap, pay peanuts, and get your monkey’s.

On the other hand, if you want to attract the best of the best within an industry, then you need to offer incentives that are ‘better’ than the industry standard. And if you want a best value contract that has some degree of stability, then match what the industry standard is, choose a good reputable company, and manage it well. That is my thoughts on the matter. -Matt

 

Triple Canopy Awarded $159.9m for Afghanistan Security Services
By DOD
Tuesday, February 14, 2012
Triple Canopy, Reston, Va., was awarded a $159,972,048 firm-fixed-price contract. The award will provide for the security services in Afghanistan. Work will be performed in Afghanistan, with an estimated completion date of Jan. 26, 2017. The bid was solicited through the Internet, with eight bids received.  The U.S. Army Contracting Command, Rock Island, Ill., is the contracting activity (W560MY-12-C-0002).
Link to news here.
—————————————————————
From thread at SOCNET Forum
@camp leatherneck
$200 daily
6-12 hr days a week with the possibility for more hours
(1) 21 day leave period
12k bonus for contract completion
2 week train up on TC site followed by deployment @camp lejune
—————————————————————
From Triple Canopy’s Career section–Afghan Guard, Afghanistan
Position Responsibilities
-Act as armed security officer
-Responsible for internal security shift
-Perform unarmed screener duties by searching visitors, their vehicles and their belongings. Screeners will be proficient utilizing hand-held metal detectors, walk-through metal detectors and High throughput personnel inspection systems.
-Possess the capacity to acquire a good working knowledge of all aspects of contract security
-Must satisfactorily complete all Government required (and supplied) training and certifications prior to employment
Essential Skills and Experience
-US Citizen
-Must have a valid US Driver’s License and US Tourist Passport
-Honorable discharge from the military (if applicable)
-Able and willing to DEPLOY for one (1) year with one (1) 21-day R&R rotation
-Posses or be able to obtain a DOD Secret Level Clearance.
-Be at least 25 years of age
-Posses one (1) year of Military/ Police experience to include the use of personnel and vehicle security screening devices.
-Preferred security experience in the Middle East region.
-Possess a certificate of successful completion of a basic or advanced security guard training and certification program administered or recognized by the Government or professional organizations
-Must have no felony or domestic violence conviction. Record of recent recurring misdemeanors may adversely impact candidate’s suitability rating
-Employment with Triple Canopy is contingent upon a favorable background check to Include no serious financial problems in the past seven (7) years
Physical Demands and Work Environment
Able to perform internal security guard services, at any potential internal security posting, for 12 hours, while donning all required personal protective gear.

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Industry Talk: FBO News–USSOCOM Looking For More Afghan Guards

Thanks to Danger Room for the heads up on this FBO solicitation. This sounds like a continuation of what USSOCOM has already been doing in Afghanistan. (I posted in the past about other contract guard force solicitations that USSOCOM made)

Now one thing that kills me here is that I still haven’t a clue as to what the deal is with PSC licenses in Afghanistan? The solicitation says that it will only do business with companies that are licensed by the Ministry of Interior, and registered with the Ministry of Transportation. Well on the MOI website, there is nothing linked at all about what companies are licensed?

So my suggestion to whomever is helping the Afghans run their website, or assisting the MOI, is to get them to set up a section on PSC’s and post what companies are authorized. Then the public and media will know exactly what companies to watch, and what companies the government supports through a license. It’s called transparency.

It would also be cool to see a blog set up on this, and then the government can actually introduce new companies that are licensed, or discuss where the government is at with the licensing process. Because from what I have heard, this licensing deal has been a huge pain in the neck for companies out there–both foreign and domestic.

I would also set up a tip line run by a third party, so that folks who have information about licensed companies can communicate those concerns. That third party could be a US inspector general or similar federal official that is tasked with helping the MOI. Using a contractor for that could be a conflict of interest. Either way, making the list and process open would help out big time. -Matt


Private Security Contract
Solicitation Number: H92237-11-R-1324_PSC_Gizab
Agency: Other Defense Agencies
Office: U.S. Special Operations Command
Location: Headquarters Field Assistance Division
Notice Type: Combined Synopsis/Solicitation
Posted Date: August 29, 2011
Response Date: Sep 10, 2011 2:30 am Eastern
Archiving Policy: Automatic, 15 days after response date
Archive Date: September 25, 2011
Original Set Aside: N/A
Set Aside: N/A
Classification Code: R — Professional, administrative, and management support services
NAICS Code: 561 — Administrative and Support Services/561612 — Security Guards and Patrol Services
Synopsis:
Added: Aug 29, 2011 7:07 am
***ONLY CONTRACTORS THAT HOLD A CURRENT AFGHANISTAN MINISTRY OF INTERIOR PERSONAL SECURITY LICENSE AND ARE LICENSED / REGISTERED WITH THE AFGHANISTAN MINISTRY OF TRADE WILL BE CONSIDERED FOR AWARD, OFFERORS WHO DO NOT POSSESS THESE QUALIFICATIONS ARE RESPECTFULLY ASKED TO NOT RESPOND TO THIS REQUEST FOR PROPOSAL***

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