Feral Jundi

Tuesday, January 3, 2012

Publications: UN Use Of Private Military And Security Companies– Practices And Policies, By Åse Gilje Østensen

A big hat tip to David Isenberg for finding this one. Great little paper and the real value here is all the history between the UN and private military and security companies listed in this thing. Here is a snippet about PAE in Africa which I thought was interesting.

PMSCs in UN humanitarian operations 
…..The role played by PAE in MONUC serves as a more recent illustration of  how  a  PMSC  has  been  deployed  in  a  UN  peace  operation.  In  June  2004  Congolese students released a wave of violence in central and eastern parts of the DRC in protest at the UN mission’s failure to prevent atrocities in Ituri  province.  The  frustration  of  the  Congolese  civil  war  was  directed  towards  UN associated  personnel  and  facilities.  PAE  was  an  integral  part  of  the  UN  operation.  It  ran  six  airfields  for  the  mission  and  its  employees  drove  UN  vehicles  and  were  considered  UN  workers  by  locals  –  and  hence  were  also  subject  to  attacks.  The  violence  in  Kisangani  included  burning  the  UN  headquarters  in  the  city  to  the  ground,  UN  staff  housing  was  attacked  and  burned,  and  over  70  UN  vehicles  were  stoned  and  set  ablaze.  As  the  UN  military  contingent  withdrew,  300  UN  staff  fled  to  the  local  airport  where  they  demanded  emergency  evacuation  from  the  city,  fearing  they  would  be  killed  by  the  rioting  mobs.  PAE  workers  prepared  for  and  carried  out  the  evacuation  of  the  UN  staff,  while  the  PAE  teams  stayed  behind  to complete their  contract.  This  example  in  particular illustrates a fundamental  dependency  on  commercial  companies  for  essential  tasks  in  certain  peacekeeping  operations, and  suggests  that  at  times private contractors may face more risks than UN personnel. 

The other thing that I liked about the paper is that it showed the hypocrisy of the UN and their view of this industry. Here they have the UN Working Group on Mercenaries which criticizes everyone for using PMSC’s, and yet in the same breath, the UN had companies like Executive Outcomes on their vender list. Or they use PMSC’s all over the world to help secure operations and protect personnel.

Anyway, here is the paper and definitely check it out. Let me know what you think in the comments section. –Matt

 

UN Use of Private Military and Security Companies: Practices and Policies, By Åse Gilje Østensen

Saturday, December 11, 2010

Cool Stuff: Principal-Agent Theory

     I wanted to do a quick post on a little bit of knowledge that everyone would be wise to study.  If you want to know why contractors are paid as much as they are paid then definitely wrap your brain around the concept of Principal-Agent Theory and what it all means. It all boils down to ‘ensuring the provision of appropriate incentives so agents act in the way principals wish’.

    By the way, I picked up on this thing while reading a paper that David Isenberg commented on in a blog post. The paper was about Security Sector Reform (SSR) and the author mentioned Principal-Agent Theory towards the end of it. The author did a study on DynCorp/PAE’s SSR mission for DoS in Liberia, and it was an interesting read. Check it out. –Matt

     In political science and economics, the problem of motivating a party to act on behalf of another is known as ‘the principal–agent problem’. The principal–agent problem arises when a principal compensates an agent for performing certain acts that are useful to the principal and costly to the agent, and where there are elements of the performance that are costly to observe. This is the case to some extent for all contracts that are written in a world of information asymmetry, uncertainty and risk.

     Here, principals do not know enough about whether (or to what extent) a contract has been satisfied. The solution to this information problem — closely related to the moral hazard problem — is to ensure the provision of appropriate incentives so agents act in the way principals wish.

     In terms of game theory, it involves changing the rules of the game so that the self-interested rational choices of the agent coincide with what the principal desires. Even in the limited arena of employment contracts, the difficulty of doing this in practice is reflected in a multitude of compensation mechanisms (‘the carrot’) and supervisory schemes (‘the stick’), as well as in critique of such mechanisms as e.g., Deming (1986) expresses in his Seven Deadly Diseases of management. A distinct and relatively new meaning of the principal–agent problem describes the landlord-tenant relationship as a barrier to energy savings.

     This use of the term is described below in the section on the principal–agent problem in energy efficiency. The problem is also discussed in terms of “agency theory”.

Wikipedia for Principal-Agent Theory here.

Sunday, September 27, 2009

Industry Talk: PSI, DynCorp, AECOM, and PAE win AFRICAP Contracts

Filed under: Africa,Industry Talk,Logistics — Tags: , , , , , , , — Matt @ 8:46 AM

     The program encompasses logistics support, construction, military training and advising, maritime security capacity building, equipment procurement, operational deployment for peacekeeping troops, aerial surveillance and conference facilitation. Potential contractors must possess a broad range of functional regional expertise and logistics support capabilities. The intent is to have contractors on call to undertake a wide range of diverse projects, including setting up operational bases to support peacekeeping operations in hostile environments, military training and to providing a range of technical assistance and equipment for African militaries and peace support operations. -FBO DoS Synopsis on AFRICAP

*****

     The big story here is AFRICAP, and what the hell is it? I posted some open source stuff on the contract below. From the quote up top, you get an idea of what this contract is all about. The program has 1.5 billion dollars attached to it, so this is pretty significant.

    The other news is PSI coming on to the scene as a player. From TWISS 2 to AFRICAP, they will be busy. My question is who do they know, because winning these two contracts back to back like this is impressive. That company is going to be spinning up a ton of jobs, so definitely keep your eyes on them over the next couple years.-Matt

—————————————————————–

AFRICAP Recompete (from FBO)

Solicitation Number: SAQMMA08R0237-Solicitation

Agency: U.S. Department of State

Office: Office of Logistics Management

Location: Acquisition Management

Notice Type: Award Notice

Original Posted Date: June 27, 2008

Posted Date: September 11, 2009

Response Date:

Original Response Date: Aug 11, 2008 2:00 pm Eastern

Archiving Policy: Automatic, 15 days after response date

Archive Date: September 26, 2009

Original Set Aside: N/A

Set Aside: N/A

Classification Code: 99 — Miscellaneous

NAICS Code: 561 — Administrative and Support Services 561210 — Facilities Support Services

Solicitation Number: SAQMMA08R0237-Solicitation

Notice Type: Award Notice

Contract Award Date: September 11, 2009

Contract Award Number: SAQMMA09D0083

Contract Award Dollar Amount: Maximum ceiling value across all IDIQ holder is $1.5 Billion

Contractor Awarded Name: Reference below description

Synopsis:

Added: Sep 11, 2009 4:17 pm

The Africa Peacekeeping Solicitation (SAQMMA08R0237) was awarded on 11 September 2009. This is a 5 year, multiple award ID/IQ contract. There are four awardees:

1. PAE Government Services, SAQMMA09D0084

2. AECOM, SAQMMA09D0082

3. DynCorp International, SAQMMA09D0083

4. Protection Strategies Incorporated (Service Disabled Veteran-Owned Business), SAQMMA09D0085

(more…)

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