Excellent little article and it is always cool to check out what William Lind has to say. If you are familiar with the term ‘4th Generation Warfare‘, then you would know that Lind was one of the originators of the concept. So in the world of strategy and warfare, I tend to listen to what guys like this have to say. (read the paper here)
As far as I can tell, the reception of this article is kind of luke warm. Meaning it is debatable, and the guys over at Zen Pundit did a pretty good job of pointing out where Lind was short.
However, I think Lind errs in ascribing too much credit to the Taliban here. A much simpler explanation is that the usually illiterate ANA soldier is a product of the same xenophobic cultural and religious environment that created the Taliban, the Haqqanis, vicious Islamist goons like Gulbuddin Hekmatyar or the Afghan tribesmen who slaughtered the retreating garrison of Lord Elphinstone in 1841.
While the Taliban have infiltrators, it remains that many of the “Green on Blue” killings are just as easily explained by personal grievances, zealous religious bigotry, indiscipline, mistreatment by American advisers or Afghan superiors and sudden jihad syndrome. While it is impolitic to emphasize it, Afghan betrayal and murder of foreign allies (generally seen as “occupiers”) is something of a longstanding historical pattern. The Taliban capitalize on it politically but they are not responsible for all of it.
Although I must say that the Taliban have still held out the last ten years, and they are still fighting. They are also doing all they can to exert influence on the people, hanging out in the shadows and dropping violent hints that as soon as the foreigners are gone that all of those that supported them will be paying the price. That, and the Taliban are doing all they can to show how inept the Afghan government is.(and the government is doing a great job on it’s own of doing that-lol)
But back to this tactic of green on blue. It is a good tactic if the Taliban are able to get individuals into those positions. They either have to ‘turn’ a police or military officer or infiltrate the unit with one of their own. That can be difficult but it is possible.
You also have moles or use pseudo operators to create chaos as well. They can gain valuable intelligence on the enemy or the supporters of the enemy, and give plenty of information to Taliban planners.
The Taliban are also conducting suicide assaults wearing police and military uniforms. Anything that would create a hesitation amongst the responding forces, or create chaos and confusion during the attack. The end result is very visual and has impact, even if they are not successful. Those attacks show their dedication to the cause (willing to die for it), it shows that they can strike anywhere and the police and military are not able to protect everyone, and it is a reminder to all for when the ‘foreigners’ leave that this is what is in store for everyone.
So maybe Lind should have expanded on all of the little things that the Taliban are doing and have done over the years, that have contributed to their survivability against such a formidable western foe? They are today’s fourth generation warfare ‘fighters’, much like Al Qaeda or even the cartels in Mexico are. They are small forces that have found ways to combat large forces in the modern era, and survive. In some cases flourish…. So how do you defeat these guys?
Personally, I always default to mimicry strategy for this stuff, just because in the history of warfare, that seems to be what has worked. That you copy what your enemy is doing or what the competition is doing, and add that one little thing to give you the edge over your opponent.
To apply Kaizen to that strategy, and constantly attempt to find weakness in your strategy and plans before the enemy, all so you can modify it and make it better. (destruction and creation–fight dogma Boyd style) You are also looking for weaknesses in your enemy and their strategy, and constantly looking for advantage.
It also takes innovation, and not just adaptation to find that novelty that will give you the edge in the fight. I know many smart folks out there are seeking just that, and I know I am constantly exploring ideas in regards to this interesting and complex problem. I highly depend upon the feedback of the readership here and the knowledge that is out there to help me ‘build my own snowmobiles’, and I am optimistic about the process. It is also a fun thought experiment, to put yourself in the strategist’ or general’s chair, and find your own solutions to defeating these enemies. Check it out and let me know what you think? –Matt
Unfriendly Fire
Posted By William S. Lind
June 27, 2012
The greatest intellectual challenge in Fourth Generation war—war against opponents that are not states—is how to fight it at the operational level. NATO in Afghanistan, like the Soviets three decades ago, has been unable to solve that riddle. But the Taliban appears to have done so.
The operational level of war lies between strategy and tactics. While great commanders have always thought and fought at the operational level, the concept was not formally recognized until the 19th century. As usual, it was the Prussian army that led the way. Some historians think the operational level may have been formalized by Field Marshal von Moltke himself in the Franco-Prussian war as a way to keep Bismarck out of his business. (“Yes, my dear Bismarck, you are in charge of strategy, but you simply must not interfere in operational matters.”)
The U.S. Army did not officially recognize the operational level of war until 1982, but the tsarist Russian army and later the Soviets picked up on it. By 1944-45, the Red Army was as competent at what they called “operational art” as the Wehrmacht. That was never true of the Western allies.
The Russian term, operational art, is a good one, because unlike tactics or strategy it is not a thing but a link. It is the art, not science, of using tactical events, battles and refusals to give battle, victories and sometimes also defeats (from the North Vietnamese perspective, the Tet offensive was a tactical defeat but a decisive operational victory) to strike as directly as possible at the enemy’s strategic center. Because it resorts to battle only when and where necessary, operational art is a great economizer of fighting strength—even a battle won eats up soldiers, fuel, equipment, and, most importantly, time.
A brilliant example of its application comes from General Heinz Guderian’s XIXth Panzer Corps in the 1940 campaign against France. Guderian led the famous advance through the Ardennes mountains’ weakest point, the junction between the strong forces the French had pushed forward into Belgium and those manning the Maginot fortifications. After Guderian crossed the Meuse river at Sedan, he faced French forces coming up from the south. He could have stayed there and fought them. Instead, thinking operationally, he held the crossing with minimum force and threw everything he had north toward the English Channel. That collapsed the “hinge” between the French and British forces in Belgium and those in France, winning the campaign in one stroke. France, which by everyone’s account had the best army in the world, went down to defeat in six weeks.
Were war to remain in its Third Generation incarnation, a matter of fast-moving campaigns led by tank armies, the U.S. military might eventually get operational art. But war has moved on: tank armies are now as irrelevant as armies of mounted bowmen. So the question must be asked anew—how do you link tactical events to winning strategically?
The Soviet army focused its best talent on operational art. But in Afghanistan, it failed, just as we have failed. Like the Soviets, we can take and hold any piece of Afghan ground. And doing so brings us, like the Soviets, not one step closer to strategic victory. The Taliban, by contrast, have found an elegant way to connect strategy and tactics in decentralized modern warfare.
What passes for NATO’s strategy is to train sufficient Afghan forces to hold off the Taliban once we pull out. The Taliban’s response has been to have men in Afghan uniform— many of whom actually are Afghan government soldiers or police—turn their guns on their NATO advisers. That is a fatal blow against our strategy because it makes the training mission impossible. Behold operational art in Fourth Generation war.
According to a May 16 article by Matthew Rosenberg in the New York Times, 22 NATO soldiers have been killed so far this year by men in Afghan uniforms, compared to 35 in all of last year. The report went on to describe one incident in detail—detail NATO is anxious to suppress. There were three Afghan attackers, two of whom were Afghan army soldiers. Two Americans were killed. The battle—and it was a battle, not just a drive-by shooting—lasted almost an hour.
What is operationally meaningful was less the incident than its aftermath. The trust that existed between American soldiers and the Afghans they were supposed to train was shattered. Immediately after the episode, the Times reported, the Americans instituted new security procedures that alienated their native allies, and while some of these measure were later withdrawn,
Afghan soldiers still complain of being kept at a distance by the Americans, figuratively and literally. The Americans, for instance, have put up towering concrete barriers to separate their small, plywood command center from the outpost’s Afghan encampment.
Also still in place is a rule imposed by the Afghan Army after the attack requiring most of its soldiers to lock up their weapons when on base. The Afghan commanding officer keeps the keys.
One American soldier nonetheless advised a visitor to take an armed escort to the Afghan side of the base, which was about 100 feet away, ‘just in case.’
Multiply the aftermath of this incident 22 times since the beginning of the year and it becomes operationally important. Each incident quickly becomes known to all NATO troops in Afghanistan, which spreads the impact. Just a few hundred more such “green on blue” attacks will effectively end our training mission.
? [1]The Taliban know this technique is operational, not just tactical. They can be expected to put all their effort into it. What counter do we have? Just order our troops to pretend it is not happening—to keep trusting their Afghan counterparts. That order, if enforced, will put our soldiers in such an untenable position that morale will collapse.
So powerful is this taste of Taliban operational art that Washington may fear the example it sets. During a recent visit by Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta to Afghanistan, no American soldiers were allowed to get near him with loaded weapons. Might the Pentagon be worried that our own troops could learn from the Taliban? Were I an American soldier who had been told to hand over or unload his weapon before approaching Secretary Panetta, I would certainly have read it that way.
William S. Lind is director of the American Conservative Center for Public Transportation.
Story here.
Hi Matt, A very interesting post, thanks. I have always believed that insurgencies start for many reasons (primarily numerous failures of government that collide at a certain time) but the counter fails due to governments not knowing (a) what they are dealing with and (b) how to deal with it. Whereas strategy is driven by intelligence and intelligence contributes to operational art, I believe a great failing is the lack of real, credible and actionable intelligence. This type of intelligence requires that we need to conduct long-term intelligence planning and its product allows us to make short to medium-term intelligence predictions. It is the predictions that allow us to plan, prepare and posture ourselves to counter threats. When our intelligence services are unable to provide this intelligence, we have an intelligence failure and all strategies will therefore be based on fantasy as opposed to reality. Whereas I cannot comment on the situation in Afghanistan, apart from what I read and hear, I do know that all insurgencies are aimed at protraction. Additionally, they will avoid a pitched battle wherever possible and instead strike at a time and place of their choosing to demoralise, terrorise and confuse. The selection of targets is very important as they need to create the perception that they are “everywhere”. While the armed forces are trying to achieve area domination – something that is impossible in a large area – the insurgent can build his forces in his so-called safe areas. Protraction results in attrition of forces, financial losses as well as impacts on the national will of the people. When we attack, invade or subjugate a country or a people, the insurgent will seek ways of overinflating his strength in order to keep his options open insofar as the support of the populace is concerned. The populace – his “water” – can be passive or even turn into a raging torrent. It is up to us to ensure that the water remains passive but the armed forces cannot do that on its own. It is after all, a failure of government that led to the insurgency to begin with and government needs to take responsible and exercise their mandate and therefore they have a crucial role to play. When people have lost hope, they believe they have one of two options. (1) Do nothing and accept their fate or (2) take action even if it means they will perish. When we look at them adopting option 2, we also need to look at what will be the prime motivator. Credible intelligence will provide the answers we seek. Whereas it may appear that many are accepting of their lot, they are not really and will do what they can to support those who are active in the insurgency. It is those who are active insurgents that they believe will offer them a better life once power has been seized. This can be a genuine belief or as a result of indoctrination, propaganda and terror. But, in the minds of locals who see 1 insurgent killed for every 10 we lose, the perception is that we are losing. Whereas I have great respect for William Lind’s work and appreciate Zen Pundit’s comments, I will agree with Zen Pundit in that there are many “possible” explanations why we see what we see. Ultimately though, it boils down to a lack of cultural and clan understanding, an unacceptable approach towards the locals and their perception of our disrespect for them, their culture, beliefs and religion. Keep up you good work of always keeping us in the loop. Rgds, Eeben
Comment by Eeben — Sunday, July 1, 2012 @ 4:40 AM
@Eeben Hey Eeben, and thanks for the excellent comment about this article. After reading Lind’s deal, I have been mentally playing around with all of the pieces and seeking further understanding and even enlightenment on the subject.
Along with your points, I think waiting us out and hitting the weak points is a big component of what the Taliban are up to. We might have the watches, but they have the all the time in the world…lol
Also, your point about weak governments is extremely valid when discussing today’s Arab Spring or insurgencies. The vanguards of the guerrilla or rebel or whatever group, is all about winning over the people to their side versus the government’s side. And they will use all and any method to make that happen, based on their own intelligence and ‘orientation’. (OODA)
The Taliban also have some key cultural advantages that is very difficult for western forces to compete with. They speak the language, they share a common religion (in most cases), they look alike and might even have relatives together. The people are also poorly educated and do not have computers or the ability to understand and know the rest of the world. Compare that to the western force and a local government that no one likes or trusts, and we can see how hard it is for us to make a connection with the people and/or make headway in that country. It is not impossible, but the cards are stacked against us.
I think one thing that is going for us, is that the people still remember what the Taliban gave them back when they were in charge, and those scars are still fresh. There are also those who are hedging their bets that another ‘Northern Alliance’ will be needed for the coming civil war, if the government get’s too cozy with the Taliban for fear of having to deal with them when we leave.
With that said, I have to go back to what John Boyd said about guerrilla warfare and how to defeat it in his Patterns of Conflict. It rings true today, as it did when he wrote it.
Break guerrillas’ moral-mental-physical hold over the population, destroy their cohesion, and bring about their collapse via political initiative that demonstrates moral legitimacy and vitality of government and by relentless military operations that emphasize stealth/fast-tempo/fluidity-of-action and cohesion of overall effort.
* If you cannot realize such a political program, you might consider changing sides!
Comment by feraljundi — Tuesday, July 3, 2012 @ 2:31 AM
@feraljundi
Hi Matt,
You make some very valid comments. However, I believe that any insurgency is a means to an end and not a strategy. Their strategy is political in nature and is ultimately aimed at taking control of government. To achieve this, the insurgency is an approach that is used to attack the pillars of state (I believe there are 7 of them). If they are able to erode and collapse 2 or more of these pillars, they position themselves very strongly in the eyes of the local populace. So, the weaker the government is or the more government neglects its mandate in favour of itself, the easier it becomes (relatively speaking) for an insurgency to take hold and flourish and erode the pillars of state.
It is a fact that in the instance of Afghanistan/Iraq and others, the enemy has a cultural advantage. But this is true in many conflicts or wars where we cross international borders. The analysis of the historical and present-day operational environment (OE) will highlight these differences to us. (This assumes that the intelligence gathering has been focussed on the OE and we have been provided with credible intelligence). But the mission of the armed forces is to find, fix and fight the enemy and not to be sidetracked with humanitarian operations as the priority. Destroying the enemy creates the environment in which government must fulfil its mandate, provide services to the people and govern (Governments fail, according to me, because they do not meet their obligations, hence my post on my blog).
We speak of unity of effort and it is a vital component for countering an insurgency. This unity of effort requires a strong and capable government that fulfils its mandate. The armed forces play a much smaller role in the overall effort. It must find, fix and fight the enemy with ruthless efficiency and relentless pressure. In an unconventional conflict, I suspect that the effort is in the order of 80% government and 20% military, maybe even smaller. What I however see is that in many theatres, the armed forces are saddled with 90% of the effort and the government only about 10%.
For the military to accomplish its mission, it requires balanced forces, mission-specific training, decentralised leadership, equipment and combat support. To me, a balanced force in a COIN environment consists of primarily of composite unconventional forces that are able to sustain themselves during operations and are able to “out-guerrilla the guerrillas”. (To elaborate on this, I will have to cut-and-paste my current book here!).
As I believe that an insurgency comprises a trinity of gravity as opposed to a centre of gravity, the armed forces must attack the armed element – from a military point-of-view – with speed, audacity, high-tempo, aggression and ruthless efficiency. This adds momentum to our actions and allows us to gain the initiative. Culture now becomes less relevant. If it was that important, why can I as a white African working alongside black African soldiers not encounter any animosity/hostility from locals when crossing borders? I think it is because we show them respect, empathy and at times, provide them with some medical or other assistance they may need.
No matter how successful we are – we can destroy the armed element of an insurgency so that it no longer poses any real or credible threat – but if government fails, the insurgency will simply flare up again. This is because an insurgency is a “political war” and very different to a conventional war.
This brings me back to the point I initially made here: an insurgency is not a strategy; it is a means to an end as far as the insurgent is concerned. To counter it, government needs a multidimensional strategy that can be translated, in military terms, into an operational strategy and a subsequent operational design. The operational design will, along with the terrain, lessons learnt and operational support available, dictate our TTPs. Then only can we successfully attack the insurgent and gain victory. However, we must know when to stop and government must know when it must take over.
Sorry for this long-winded response but I hope it makes sense.
Rgds,
Eeben
Comment by Eeben — Tuesday, July 3, 2012 @ 3:43 AM
@Eeben @feraljundi Very articulately stated. Both you and Matt have great contributions to this thread, and I’ve enjoyed reading it all. It almost seems as though Karzai’s administrations has allowed some tremendous opportunities to slip away. While ISAF was dealing with insurgents throughout the region, Karzai’s should have been building infrastructure. Hospitals, schools, water/sewer… So disappointing.
Comment by ThompsonEPotterIII — Tuesday, July 3, 2012 @ 5:27 PM
@Eeben Excellent, excellent commentary here, and this very much a treat on the blog. I am also hoping that others will come out and chime in. It also looks like this is the kind of material we will see in your up coming book?
You mentioned your blog posting, and I think it is absolutely relevant to this discussion here. So I figured I would post the link so people can check it out. Especially the comments.
http://eebenbarlowsmilitaryandsecurityblog.blogspot.com/2012/06/why-goverments-fail_26.html
One thing that was mentioned that I think is missing in today’s western way of COIN, is what you guys were talking about in the comments (towards the end). The percentage of military to government for COIN, and also the lack of spine or stomach to fight this stuff. Here is the quote:
“Ultimately, the main effort to end an insurgency lies with government. The armed forces must remove the violent aspect of the insurgency and thereby create the climate in which the government can do its job. Although one cannot attribute percentages to this, I believe government has an 80% responsibility and the armed forces a 20% responsibility to end the insurgency.”
That is an interesting figure, and I was curious where you got that? Or if that is your own personal estimate? It also fits well with Boyd’s deal of emphasizing the vitality and legitimacy of government. Very cool stuff.
Comment by feraljundi — Thursday, July 5, 2012 @ 1:30 AM
@ThompsonEPotterIII @Eeben @feraljundi I also suggest heading over to the links to discussions at Lind’s article, and at Zen Pundit. The comments are where the gold is at. Cheers.
Comment by feraljundi — Thursday, July 5, 2012 @ 1:32 AM
@feraljundi
Hi Matt,
Yes, some of this will be in my book but do remember that I am writing almost exclusively on operations in Africa as that is where I have a bit of experience.
I am very concerned at the drive to make the armed forces the main contributor to “hearts and minds”. Soldiers are there first and foremost to do battle with the enemy. To sidetrack and restrict them with ROE and “courageous constraint” is silly in the extreme. Well-trained, well-led men know how to exercise caution and when to shoot or not to shoot. If they don’t, then something is wrong with their training.
The figure of 80/20 was something we were taught in the old army (SADF). I initially wondered on that figure but have lately come to view it as rather significant. My experience is that it may even, in some instances, drop down to 90% for government and 10% for the armed forces. It depends on the intensity at which the war is being fought.
We cannot dare to get soft and lack backbone, especially political and senior military backbone, when we are threatened. We need the support of the politicians and our senior military commanders to prevail. However, when they get themselves tangled up in trying to define wars in terms of “humanitarian actions” and then make silly policies to match their ideas – without being where the bullets are flying – they place everyone at a disadvantage the enemy will exploit.
I firmly believe it all goes back to good or bad governance.
Rgds,
Eeben
Comment by Eeben — Thursday, July 5, 2012 @ 1:51 AM
@ThompsonEPotterIII@Eeben@feraljundi
Hi ThompsonEPotterIII,
I understand why Karzai was initially selected to lead the country (read Henry Crumpton’s The Art of Intelligence) but he never exploited the opportunities given to him by ISAF. Instead, it has a government that is in many instances non-functioning as far as people’s perceptions are concerned and in COIN, perceptions is critically important.
So yes, I think many opportunities were squandered.
Rgds,
Eeben
Comment by Eeben — Thursday, July 5, 2012 @ 1:56 AM
@feraljundi @ThompsonEPotterIII Thanks! I will gravitate there shortly.
Rgds,
E
Comment by Eeben — Thursday, July 5, 2012 @ 1:57 AM
Thanks for the article Matt.
I would argue that we are not quite out of the woods of the 3rd generation of warfare just yet. The blitzkrieg of the Wermacht showed that only a few divisions needed to be mechanized in order to achieve their mastery of combined arms. While the majority of units were still dragging artillery pieces on horseback. The reason I Bring this up is only to show that as US doctrine trends towards the smaller unit tactics favored by JSOC, we will still need to keep our traditional forces ready for action. I think that the author is correct about size of operations limiting our ability to engage the Taliban, but not the numbers of troops, but the levels of beurocracy and the ROE’s that limit us. By the time soldiers in the field receive permission to engage/react the Taliban can slip away (ie: Ganjigal valley vid)
Comment by ThompsonEPotterIII — Monday, July 2, 2012 @ 5:40 AM
@ThompsonEPotterIII Excellent point and many have said, to include even Lind, that it is debatable what 4th generation warfare is really defined as. Lind even did some speculation on 5th generation warfare which was fun to read as well.
I also compare what we are doing in Afghanistan as a ‘bull in a china shop’ scenario. Or basically large forces that end up stepping on innocent people in their pursuit of the bad guys–which happen to small and nimble like mice. We also overstay our welcome, and the common theme is ‘you guys are the most powerful army in the world…so why haven’t you destroyed the Taliban yet, so you can leave us alone’. lol
So yes, a smaller footprint is ideal at this point. But we also need a local government that the Afghans can respect and trust. Or maybe a tribal based government is better–or whatever type of government that is an alternative to what the Taliban offer. I will refer to what Boyd said in Patterns about the importance of a good government, which was listed below in my comment to Eeben’s post.
Comment by feraljundi — Tuesday, July 3, 2012 @ 2:40 AM