Archive for category Leadership
After the Bay of Pigs failure, President Kennedy and his advisors reflected on their mistakes and created a new process for group discussion and decision making to prevent future groupthink and promote diverse perspectives. Here, Professor Roberto introduces the concept of developing a decision-making process. -From the Lecture ‘Deciding How To Decide’
This is a great lecture series that a friend of mine hooked me up with, and I highly recommend it. It was engaging and thought provoking, and there were so many cool ideas to take away from this if you are looking for leadership guidance. As I listened to it, there were many Jundism concepts that kept popping up in various forms and examples.
The particular lecture that I will highlight in this post is the ‘deciding how to decide’ portion. I took notice, because this method of decision making was born out of the highest levels of leadership during the Cuban Missile Crisis and the Bay of Pigs invasion failure. The Bay of Pigs invasion was an embarrassing mistake that resulted from poor decision making at the top. Or what the professor referred to as ‘group think’ (being surrounded by ‘yes men’ and folks unwilling to question the group or leadership out of fear of being wrong or just assuming everyone else is right)
The Cuban Missile Crisis was an extreme test of wills, and required the best possible strategy that would prevent the US and the Soviet Union wiping each other out with nuclear weapons. President Kennedy devised a system of decision making that would produce the best product or solution possible, that was not a victim of group think. He used a system of subgroups that would develop solutions independently, then those groups would exchange their solutions with the other groups and critique.
A second set of devils advocates or eyes would also review the solutions, and further nitpick the possible solutions until the best idea was standing. So this solution was hammered out of truly honest debate, and any influences that would cause people to not speak up was eliminated. I thought it was an ingenious way of problem solving, and especially during crisis. (be sure to listen to the series to get the specifics on how to set up this system) The situation with North Korea bombing South Korea, and the US and China reaction to it is a prime example of modern day critical decision making with high stakes involved. How President Obama decides, will really be based more on deciding how to decide first, so that the solution he gets is strategically sound and not at all influenced by group think.
Military leaders and CEO’s can learn from this as well. Leaders should strive hard to have honest debate about strategy and it takes listening to your people, and being open to ideas to get there. It also requires breaking down those walls that limit honest debate, and really being aware of group think and it’s dangers. Check out the series to learn more, and let me know what you think. Also check out Professor Roberto’s blog if you want to follow his ideas or contact him. -Matt
THE ART OF CRITICAL DECISION MAKING
Genre: Audio or video CourseLength: Twenty-four, thirty-minute lecturesTeacher: Prof. Michael Roberto, Bryant UniversityPublisher: The Teaching Company
By Tom Alderman
July 23, 2009
Following the disastrous 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion, President Kennedy asked former President Eisenhower to the White House to seek the old soldier’s counsel. The new president wanted to know what he could learn from the whole sorry mess. Instead of the expected military hoo-hah, Ike wanted to know how the decision was made to go ahead with the Cuban invasion? How did the president gather advice from his advisors? Not a surprising question considering the five-star general led a contentious military coalition during World War II, not because of his martial skills, but because of his extraordinary leadership abilities which included understanding the core ingredient in all critical decision making: whether you’re launching a D-Day invasion, a career, a product or service, HOW you decide is more important than WHAT you decide. The process you use determines a successful outcome and if that process is not clear and effective, you’re going down.
So I thought I would put this up as a ‘building snowmobiles’ post, because A. it mentions the OODA loop as applied to business and B. they are copying some of the strategies that work for today’s insurgents or pirates, and applying it to business as well.
I really wish I could find a copy of Corporate Insurgency though, or get the professor onto the blog here to discuss the concept a little more. This story was also taken from the Economist.
The main theme here is to leverage the power of small forces against larger forces, or for larger forces to act like smaller forces to compete with them in business. Insurgents will not take on armies directly, and will try to attack the bigger foe’s weakest parts. Professor James talks about how businesses can do the same thing in the market place.
He also talks about the decision making cycle of large companies versus small companies. That in order for large companies to compete with smaller ones, they cannot be micro-managers of the brand. The professor derives examples of this de-centralized type command structure from today’s insurgents in places like Afghanistan. Imagine that, learning business lessons from how the enemy does it’s thing in the war?
What I really thought was interesting though was the creation of a business ‘commando’ unit for the larger companies. Something that can quickly react to the local situation and can make quick decisions outside the realm of the standard boardroom. This would be ideal for jumping on deals or business that requires speed of decision–something that smaller companies or individuals are more apt to do than lets say the larger companies.
How I envision a business commando unit in the private military sector, is a group that would seek out business in all parts of the world, or deal with the fast paced nature of the PR world. This kind of group would be ideal for getting the word out about what is going on with a company, or communicating with folks like me for a company’s strategic communications. They could be the ones that provide more of a personal touch to these larger companies, and really explore ways of connecting with potential clients or employees. I am sure there are other areas that these types of units might actually benefit a large PMC or similar defense company, and the imagination is the only limitation.
My final thought here, is what lessons could PMC’s learn from pirates or insurgents? Well I have talked about the New Rules of War in the past, and the whole OODA thing, but I have really never explored how these strategies of war could be applied to business. By taking the advice of the professor, this might show the way for smaller defense companies to take market share from the bigger PMC’s by jumping on very niche oriented services. For you guys and gals out there with small businesses, hopefully these ideas will help you to focus your energies on the niches in the market place that will give you a higher chance of success. Do you want to compete directly with a company like DynCorp for the big contracts, or do you want to become successful by tackling the small and unique types of business that DynCorp is not quick enough to jump on? Food for thought. -Matt
What managers can learn from Somali pirates
November 07, 2010
PURVEYORS of management-speak are fond of quoting cod insights from military strategists. According to David James, a professor at Henley Business School, they would do better studying the management styles of some of those the armed forces are fighting, such as Somali pirates. Alongside Paul Kearney, a lieutenant-colonel in the Royal Marines, Professor James has been studying the operations of the pirates, as well as insurgents in Afghanistan and Iraq, to see if they have anything to teach legitimate firms.
The threat to life and liberty aside, Somali pirates’ business model is impressive. According to the professor, each raid costs the pirates around $30,000. On average one raid in three is successful. The reward for a triumphant venture, however, can be in the millions.
The organisation behind the pirates would be familiar to many ordinary businesses. For a start, they have a similar backend—including the kind of streamlined logistics and operations controls that would be the envy of most companies. Their success has even prompted one village to open a pirate “stock exchange”, where locals can buy shares in up to 70 maritime companies planning raids.
But Professor James believes that the most important lesson firms can learn is one of strategy. He teaches his MBA class that one reason for the pirates’ success is that they avoid “symmetrical” conflict—challenging their targets head on by, for example, lining up against the Western navies patrolling the waters—battles they would surely lose. Instead, they use stealth and surprise, attacking targets at their weakest point. In this way, with only a dozen-or-so sailors, they wrest control of huge assets, in the form of oil tankers.
This is a lesson that serves smaller companies well as they look to take bites out of larger rivals. It might be foolish, for example, for a start-up to take on one of the traditional banks head-to-head—only another large bank could afford the pyrrhic battle that would ensue from it protecting its market. But by picking a small, localised fight a start-up can make an impression before a bank has had time to react. An example, says Professor James, is wonga.com. It has taken market share by attacking banks’ inflexible lending policies by offering loans for the exact amount and length of time the customer wants. It processes the loans extremely quickly and customers can even get immediate approval using an iPhone app.
Industry Talk: AGNA Report News–Sloppy Reporting And Range Violations By The IG In Afghanistan
Oct 31
A senior level review of the misconduct allegations against AGNA personnel, combined with AGNA’s history of contract compliance de?ciencies, led DS, AQM, and Embassy Kabul to conclude that it was in the best interests of the Government to compete a new contract. In light of recent legislation, the KESF contract has been combined with the Baghdad Embassy Security Force and Worldwide Personal Protective Services II (WPPS II) contracts into one base Worldwide Protective Services (WPS) contract. The new WPS contract is a multi-award, inde?nite delivery, inde?nite quantity (IDIQ) contract that will be awarded on a best value basis. Individual requirements, such as the KESF, will be awarded as task orders under the base WPS contract. The current KESF contract with AGNA expired on June 30, 2010, but performance has been extended until the end of December 2010 to allow for the completion of the acquisition process for the new WPS contract and KESF task order and to provide for an orderly transition to the next provider. -From the Bureau of DS Comments in Report
What I wanted to do here is give the former contractors and managers of Armorgroup North America a chance to voice their opinion of the latest report. My inbox is filled with numerous emails from former employees and managers of AGNA, all wanting to tell their side of story. Partly because Congress, State or the IG really could care less about the little guy on the ground, and partly because the report is sloppy. So call this a rebuttal from the little guy.
This particular email was from a former manager at AGNA, whose identity I will refer to as ‘former manager’. I would hope that this would have some significance to those that are reading this, and that what he has to say pretty much conflicts with what the IG is reporting. Specifically that the weapons issue pointed out in the report was lacking some key points, and that the IG violated the range rules during their inspection.
I might also add that there is nothing in the report that discusses how AGNA came to be contracted in the first place. The Commission on Wartime Contracting came out with an excellent and damning report about how Lowest Priced, Technically Acceptable contracting is what created the environment that forced State to contract with the lowest bidder.
It is also interesting to me that Danielle Brian of POGO still asserts that LPTA is a legitimate contracting mechanism for security contracting in war zones, when there has been several reports presented that have identified the horrific secondary affects of this type of contracting in war-zones.
Best Value contracting would have given State more choice and flexibility in the matter, and they could have gone with the best company for the job and not with the cheapest or technically acceptable. It would not have been a race to the bottom, but a race to the best value company for the job.
Furthermore, why is POGO so silent about the TWISS program, another example of the failure of LPTA? (did I mention that companies are now considering Sierra Leone contractors as guards because they are cheaper than Ugandans?) I know POGO reads the blog and I have directed everyone that has complained to me, to go to POGO and voice their concern. I would like to think that POGO would actually listen to what the guys on the ground have to say about such things?
Or why is the Army using LPTA for FOB security in Afghanistan, when the CWC is so opposed to it? I posted a ton of contracts flying that were all LPTA, and here we are trying to convince Karzai to not ban PSC companies. With LPTA, we are giving him more ammunition by putting our lowest bidders, ‘junior varsity squads’ out there. Pffft.
The other thing that pisses me off about LPTA, is that the troops see the direct result of this on the FOBs. How would you feel if you were being protected by the lowest bidder? It is a simple question, that pisses off most when they come to the conclusion that they don’t like it. Especially if their base has been attacked, like what has happened frequently in Afghanistan.
LPTA doesn’t work for picking a doctor to cure your sick mother, and it doesn’t work for picking a company to protect your people in a war zone. LPTA is great for picking a company to rake your leaves though. lol You get what you pay for, and that is the lesson I got out of the reports.
Thats not to say that State or AGNA doesn’t share any fault here, but Congress must take more blame, and all because they insisted on lowballing the security for Embassy protection in the first place.
Finally, this post is about the guys on the ground who were contracted to operate in this environment. They are the ones that take on the task of trying to make this mess work. No one signs on to a contract to do bad. They sign on so they can be employed and pay their bills/feed their family at home. They sign on because they care about participating in the war. They are also sacrificing by being away from family, or facing death and injury in war-zones–and all for their country and for the war effort. We should support them, not hate them.
Most guys whom have done the contracting thing for awhile have also worked for numerous companies. A contractor could have worked for Xe, Custer Battles, Erinys, Aegis, AGNA etc., and that is not abnormal nor does that mean the contractor is a bad guy. They are going where the work is so they can continue to earn a living and serve in the war. I am sure when EODT takes over this contract in Kabul, AGNA guys will be ‘switching t-shirts’ and transition under the management of this new company.
I want to make sure that Congress, State, AGNA, and now EODT knows that these men need leaders who can manage a ‘properly funded, staffed, and equipped’ contract at all levels. These men are not the bad guys, and they deserve the best management we can give them.
This work force will move mountains for you, if you actually apply a little Jundism to your management principles as well. Know your stuff, have the courage to do what is right, and take care of your people. Trust, but verify. Lead by example. Lead from the front. Your people will support what they help to create. Obtain feedback gold. Create a learning organization and gain a shared reality. Continuous improvement and customer service and satisfaction. Have fun. All of this stuff is important, and all of it should be geared towards results and getting the job done. -Matt
From Former Manager at AGNA
“Sorry I cannot be more forthcoming with dates and witnesses, most have left. A number of the team in Kabul are upset as great progress has been made and this is rarely acknowledged, we just get the old issues regurgitated and inaccurate reporting. No organisation, or individual, is perfect and mistakes will be made, but, this report is poor and has an impact on individuals and corporations. How can organizations be expected to work with the IG if they produce sloppy reports, it is counter productive. Instead of working on ways to improve the contracting process and performance; it erodes it – people do not put things in writing, everyone tries to cover their backs all the time, every decision takes a long time/ or make poor ones, as people try to assess what an inspector or congressman (who has to be re-elected every two years) might say three years from now and with 20/20 hindsight.”
From IG Report In Regards To The Firing Range
AGNA does not adequately maintain training records. AGNA firearms instructors failed to sufficiently instruct guards to help correct firing errors. Instructors also qualified guards who did not achieve the minimum qualifying score at the firing range.
From Former Manager at AGNA
“There are other areas that need to be looked at – such as the statement that AGNA fails to conduct weapon training properly – how can they make this a key finding from a visit to one range? The same range the inspector is removed from the firing line by a former ranger chief instructor for moving in front of the firing line. The same inspector who, in front of the project manager, grabbed an M4 from a guard to check the serial number, not checking the weapon status/ clearing it and muzzle sweeping personnel in the process – we would be disciplined for handling a weapon in this way. How can they say AGNA put guards on post who failed the weapons qual, without checking the source documentation? (which they found difficult to navigate but did not ask the training staff to assist them in finding). Have you looked at the equation they used with regard to rifle quals? It makes no sense to me and I believe the two personnel they say failed actually had passed if you looked at the source document, not the spreadsheet where results are collated. They say guards were on post for 8 months without training, yet they interviewed some of these guards, I would imagine that they should have asked them if they had undergone training and when? If they were trained prior to standing post (which they were) then it is an issue of maintenance of records, which is still a problem to be highlighted and resolved, but does not effect the security of the Embassy.”
From IG Report In Regards To Weapons
AGNA’s current control of U.S. Government-furnished property is generally satisfactory, but AGNA cannot account for 101 U.S. Government-furnished weapons that have been missing since 2007. Additionally, from July 2007 until September 2009, AGNA used U.S. Government-furnished weapons to train guards when contractor-furnished weapons were required by its contract. OIG calculates that AGNA’s loss and misuse of these U.S. Government-furnished weapons cost the government $431,000.
*****
OIG found that AGNA cannot account for 101 U.S. Government-furnished assault ri?es of a lot of 116 that was to be returned to the U.S. Government in July 2007 under a contract modi?cation. OIG found one missing assault ri?e of this lot under a desk in an AGNA of?ce. The photo on the right in Figure 3 shows the assault ri?e as found under the desk. DS was able to locate an addition 14 weapons that had been transferred to other State Department of?ces and US Government agencies. Neither AGNA nor DS could provide documentation verifying the return or location of the remaining 101 assault ri?es. OIG calculates this assault ri?e lot is worth approximately $50,000.
According to correspondence between the Department and AGNA management, from July 2007 until September 2009, AGNA did not provide a suf?cient number of contractor-furnished weapons to the KESF guards. Instead, AGNA used U.S. Government-furnished weapons for training, although the contract required contractor-furnished weapons (U.S. Government-furnished weapons are to be used for guard duty). AGNA and the Department negotiated a ?nancial settlement in which AGNA was to reimburse the U.S. Government $381,000 for the use of these weapons. However, OIG reviewed invoices and found that AGNA has not yet reimbursed the Department. DS of? cials con?rmed that AGNA has yet to reimburse the Department.
From Former Manager at AGNA
“The original contract and mod 1 contained 116 soviet block weapons that were used on the previous contract, before the Govt supplied US weapons. As these weapons were not going to be used on the program DoS moved them to their own storage unit prior to 1 July 2007 (when AGNA took responsibility for the contract). Consequently these weapons were never part of the equipment handover and AGNA did not sign for them on handover. Because of this the contract was modified in mid July 2007 reflecting this. How can AGNA provide handover documentation for items they were never responsible for? It seems as if the IG assumed AGNA was responsible because the contract mod was mid July, but that is a poor assumption, and the IG was informed of the situation by DS.”
“From what I understand DoS then gave AGNA some of the weapons (7 or so) to use for identification training (they were generally kept on the training/ briefing room in full view), but they were demilitarized (welded bolt, soldered and bent barrel etc). One of these weapons is the one seen in the photograph in the report. Other weapons were sent to the US for use at DS facilites and the rest were disposed of, although I do not know how. Most of the people involved in this are DoS personnel who oversaw the program handover. Those from AGNA have since left the company. However, with all the scrutiny on this program you would think that DoS would have mentioned AGNA ‘losing’ 100+ weapons before now…”
Comments from the Bureau of Diplomatic Security in Report
A senior level review of the misconduct allegations against AGNA personnel, combined with AGNA’s history of contract compliance de?ciencies, led DS, AQM, and Embassy Kabul to conclude that it was in the best interests of the Government to compete a new contract. In light of recent legislation, the KESF contract has been combined with the Baghdad Embassy Security Force and Worldwide Personal Protective Services II (WPPS II) contracts into one base Worldwide Protective Services (WPS) contract. The new WPS contract is a multi-award, inde?nite delivery, inde?nite quantity (IDIQ) contract that will be awarded on a best value basis. Individual requirements, such as the KESF, will be awarded as task orders under the base WPS contract. The current KESF contract with AGNA expired on June 30, 2010, but performance has been extended until the end of December 2010 to allow for the completion of the acquisition process for the new WPS contract and KESF task order and to provide for an orderly transition to the next provider.
Link to report here.
Imagine a company with a new board of directors, charged with entering complex markets while managing rapid growth, both organic and through M&A. This company is struggling to hit its performance targets. It has been hemorrhaging money and hasn’t turned a profit in over eight years. Needless to say, shareholders are upset. How would most senior management teams handle these problems? In today’s competitive business space, chances are they would go outside the organization for highly skilled, industry knowledgeable, impartial consultants to work with them to solve strategic-level inefficiencies.
Now consider that this troubled company is actually NATO’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). ISAF (the “Coalition”) faces real business problems in Afghanistan and are pressured by a global audience to make significant progress by the end of 2010. The Coalition is at a tipping point and should use every resource available to improve their bottom line — promote stability and support security sector reforms throughout Afghanistan. Who are they bringing in to help them expand, operate efficiently, measure success, and develop a unified strategy?- HBR Blog, Consultants: Help Wanted In Afghanistan
*****
I have thoroughly enjoyed this series at Harvard Business Review. The military needs this kind of perspective, because just like business can learn from the military, the military can certainly learn from business. Especially in the realm of getting results. Because lets face it, a military can be highly advanced and well equipped all day long, but if it cannot produce the desired results or win, then what good is it?
In the past I have touched on this idea that private industry has the power of failure that drives it. But when the US Army fails, who fires them? What will replace the the Army if it fails? So in essence, today’s military branches must succeed and they must tap into any and all ways of getting the desired results they are seeking in a war.
Back to this post though. This is about what private industry can learn from military leadership, and I always like reading about these lessons learned. It is always fun to see what professionals in other industries are surprised at or intrigued with in today’s military. They too are trying to get results and win their business wars, so this kind of article is an outcome of their learning organization. And Harvard Business Review is quite the learning organization.
Below I posted all the executive summaries. But if you follow the blog link and website link, you will find other related materials. So definitely take your time and read through everything. I thought it was cool that Admiral Thad Allen was a big fan of Peter Senge and his books. Books like The Fifth Discipline: The Art and Practice of the Learning Organization, which has themes that you see echoed in other military thinker’s and business folk’s publications. John Nagl mentions ‘learning organization’ in his books, and I have talked about that stuff here on the blog in the past. It is also a Jundism. Check it out and let me know what you think. -Matt
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Leadership Lessons From The Military
November 2010
Executive Summaries
Extreme Negotiations
Jeff Weiss, Aram Donigian, and Jonathan Hughes
CEOs and other senior executives must make countless complex, high-stakes deals across functional areas and divisions, with alliance partners and critical suppliers, and with customers and regulators. The pressure of such negotiations may make them feel a lot like U.S. military officers in an Afghan village, fending off enemy fire while trying to win trust and get intelligence from the local populace.
Wow, this is a stunner! Jim Jones is out and Tom Donilon is in. Secretary Gates is quoted as saying Tom Donilon is a ‘disaster waiting to happen‘ in Bob Woodward’s book. From his bio, he has no military background whatsoever. Yikes. We will see how this pans out and I would love to hear what McChrystal or Petraeus thinks of this one? -Matt
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National Security Adviser Jones to leave White House
By Sam Youngman
10/08/10
President Obama’s National Security Adviser Jim Jones will resign from the White House in two weeks, a senior administration official said.
Obama will announce that Jones, a retired Marine general, will be replaced by Deputy National Security Adviser Tom Donilon in a Rose Garden statement Friday afternoon.
Jones’s departure is just the latest personnel room for a West Wing increasingly turning over before the midterm election.
White House Chief of Staff Rahm Emanuel departed on Friday to run for mayor of Chicago. Larry Sumers, Obama’s chief economic adviser, is leaving after the election and two other members of Obama’s team left the White House over the summer.
Donilon, who had been seen as a possible successor to Emanuel, is not a surprising choice to replace Jones, who reportedly viewed Donilon as his replacement from the beginning of the administration.
According to “Obama’s Wars” by Bob Woodward, Jones gave Donilon three pieces of advice during a performance review.
Jones said Donilon needed to travel to Iraq and Afghanistan, something he had not done before. He also needed to learn to tone down his declarative opinions of military leaders he had never met and develop a feel for the personal lives of NSC staffers.
“One day you will take a fork in the road, and you’re going to have to make a decision about which direction you want to go. If you go one way, you can be somebody. You will have to make your compromises and … turn your back on your friends, but you will be a member of the club, and you will get promoted and get good assignments. Or you can go the other way, and you can do something, something for your country and for your Air Force and for yourself. … You may not get promoted, and you may not get good assignments, and you certainly will not be a favorite of your superiors, but you won’t have to compromise yourself. … In life there is often a roll call. That’s when you have to make a decision: to be or to do.”
-Col. John Boyd
*****
As I read through this I was thinking ‘What makes a visionary PMC/PSC CEO?’ You really don’t hear much about that kind of thing in our industry. Although there is plenty of good stuff to learn from the military community, and that is why I wanted to post this.
I also had that famous quote running through my head ‘to be, or to do…’ from the mighty Col. John Boyd. One of the points of this article is that the military has a hard time producing leaders that are there ‘to do’ the job, primarily because the system really doesn’t lend itself for that. It is more restrained and not very flexible. Everyone has a specific career track, with boxes that must be checked off. God help you if you draw outside the lines in this world, or dare to take a different path.
The other point made was that of life experiences and preparation for the real world of being in the high command. That these guys are having to not only be masters of the combat arms and strategy, but must also be the ultimate ‘everyman’. They could be working with civilians, talking with Rolling Stone reporters, hanging out with Presidents that could care less about winning wars and more about politics, working with disaster relief organizations in disaster zones, trying to manage a massive civilian contractor force and ‘building snowmobiles’ on a daily basis just to win the numerous political wars, as well as the real wars. Being a general these days is no joke.
I would also apply the same standard to today’s CEO of PMC’s and PSC’s. This is an incredibly fast paced and technological world we live in. In order to stay competitive, a company and it’s leaders must always stay ahead of the game and their competitors. At least in our industry, CEO’s either do well and keep the company profitable, or fail miserably and be kicked to the road. The free market is what produces our ‘visionary commanders’.
Good article and check it out. -Matt
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What makes a visionary commander, and why the military isn’t producing more of them
By Renny McPherson
September 26, 2010
President Obama recently demoted General David Petraeus, the man who led the turnaround in Iraq and is widely acknowledged to be the most effective military officer of his generation.
In June, the president needed a new commander to lead the war effort in Afghanistan, after General Stanley McChrystal spoke too openly with a Rolling Stone reporter and was forced to resign. And, while few may realize this, when Petraeus was appointed to take over in Afghanistan, he was replacing a subordinate. Petraeus may yet be hailed for saving the day. But he also got a new boss and moved one step down the chain of command.
How does this happen to the best our military has to offer? Why was there no other general to take the job?
The short answer is that the US military has failed to produce enough leaders like Petraeus–the kind of broad-minded, flexible strategic thinkers needed to lead today’s most difficult missions. And a large contributor to this failure is the military’s inflexible system of promotion, which can actively discourage young officers from getting the mind-expanding, challenging experiences that could turn them into potent generals.
This is a little late, but none the less very important to bring up. Dr. Kilcullen will now be advising MEP on company strategy, ethics, and world affairs. Not to mention that the other board members are pretty impressive as well. Still, the father of today’s counterinsurgency strategy and modern day Lawrence of Arabia has joined a PMC! How cool is that?
Now the question I have is if this new board will actually take the company to the next level? To me, that level has always been to be profitable as well as earn the respect of it’s employees, world and peers. Could a PMC achieve the status of some of today’s more respected companies, like Google or Apple?
That is a tall order for our industry. At this point, PMC’s really don’t have a great reputation and are frequently attacked. Hell, I just posted a deal where ABC News attacked MEP. This entire blog is filled with the various problems and histories of this industry, and we need all the help we can get.
If Dr. Kilcullen can do for this company and this industry what he did for today’s military and counterinsurgency strategy, then that would be really impressive. Perhaps he or one of the board members could come up on the blog and do a little ‘strategic communications’? That’s if they care to engage with one of the ‘few’ new media sources out there that really cares about this stuff? -Matt
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Mission Essential Personnel Announces New Board of Advisors
July 26, 2010
Mission Essential Personnel, LLC, (MEP) today announced the creation of a board of advisors to counsel senior company leadership on company strategy, ethics, and world affairs. A trio of highly accomplished professionals, this board will enhance MEP’s strategic planning, thought leadership, and superior performance throughout the world.
MEP CEO Chris Taylor said, “MEP’s exponential growth has brought us great success and new challenges and choices. In order to ensure we continue to deliver certainty to our customers, we will look to the collective wisdom of our Board of Advisors to help us critically think through the opportunities of the new global economy and how MEP can continue to create value for our stakeholders. We are all excited about this new relationship and Mitchell, Sarah, and David will serve as the cornerstones of MEP’s bright future.”
The board of advisors consists of:
Ambassador Mitchell Reiss – Recently made the 27th president of Washington College, Reiss was previously Vice Provost at the College of William & Mary. He is a scholar and diplomat best known for successful negotiations during the Northern Ireland peace process and the North Korean nuclear crisis. From 2003 to 2005, he was Director of Policy Planning at the US State Department under Secretary of State Colin Powell and earned the Foreign Affairs Award for Public Service. Reiss concurrently served as President George W. Bush’s Special Envoy to Northern Ireland Peace Process until 2007. As a White House Fellow from 1988-89, he served as special assistant to the national security advisor.
Sarah Sewall – Sewall teaches international affairs and directs the Program on National Security and Human Rights at the Harvard Kennedy School of Government, and is the founder and faculty director of the Mass Atrocity Response Operations (MARO) project. She led President Obama’s Transition National Security Agency Review process. Sewall is a member of the DOD’s Defense Policy Board Advisory Committee and the Center for Naval Analyses Defense Advisory Committee. She served as the first Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Assistance in the Clinton Administration. From 1983-1996, she served as senior foreign policy adviser to Senate Majority Leader George J. Mitchell.
Dr. David Kilcullen — Kilcullen served more than 20 years as an Australian light infantry officer before joining the US Government and serving in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Southeast Asia and the Horn of Africa in counterterrorism, diplomacy, international development, strategy, and counterinsurgency roles. In 2007, Kilcullen was Senior Counterinsurgency Advisor to Gen. David Petraeus, then Commanding General, Multinational Force-Iraq. In 2008-2009, he served as Special Advisor for Counterinsurgency to the Secretary of State. Since leaving government, he has worked closely with NGOs, international aid agencies and communities affected by conflict. He is the author of “The Accidental Guerilla” and “Counterinsurgency” and is a consultant to NATO in Afghanistan and to the US and allied governments.
All I can say is that ITG provides a quality course of instruction, and this particular course should be outstanding.( I have not attended this course for the record) This is the kind of stuff that I have continued to harp on ever since I started this blog, and it is really cool to finally see some courses like this pop up. Good leadership requires a mastery of the basics, and a dedication to continuous improvement. A course like this will give you some solid cement for a foundation in security contracting and executive protection leadership.
I am also giving a big Feral Jundi thumbs up to the International Training Group, and I can’t recommend their Executive Protection course enough. It is a course that has paid for itself in more ways that one over the years, and it has been an excellent foundation to my career as a security contractor. Follow the links below to apply, and give them a call to learn more. -Matt
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The Detail Leader’s Course
Professional Executive Protection Leadership Training
Duration: 40 Hours
Contact Us For More Information
Toll Free: +1.866.904.4484
Next Course:
Detail Leader’s Course 8/30/2010
COURSE PREREQUISITES: The Detail Leader’s Course is designed to provide executive and dignitary protection professionals with the communications and management skills necessary for advancement within their field of endeavor and the knowledge necessary to successfully assume and excel in leadership positions within any protective services organization. It is about communication, planning, organizing and reporting of information, and developing personal leadership skills. This is NOT a basic training program. Students will be expected to understand protective methodology and be familiar with industry vernacular prior to attendance. The ITG® Executive Protection Agent’s Training Course and/or other similar training from a credible government agency or private sector training program will be considered prerequisites for this course.
STUDENT EQUIPMENT: All prospective candidates must bring a fully functioning laptop computer with Microsoft® Office software programs Word, Excel, and Power Point® installed. A drawing program of some sort is also required (the instructional staff will be utilizing Microsoft’s Visio®) to illustrate methodology during this training course. The 2007 versions of these programs will be used during the course. Personal Computers, not Macintosh computers are used by the instructors. Students may attend with MAC computers and/or earlier versions or other programs of relevant software but should be aware that they will be responsible for extrapolating the instruction and software commands to their particular software requirements. MAC users should insure that they are using the Intel® driven systems versus the older Motorola chip configurations and have the latest operating system updates. A computer mouse, mouse pad, and portable printer are highly recommended but not required.
Mr. Gaffney sounds like a star performer from his days at ITT and IAP, and DynCorp will be well served. It sounds like Bill will still be involved with the direction of things with a seat at the board.
So I just classify this as a reshuffling of some key leadership. Cerberus stands to do well with this arrangement, and will certainly be a powerhouse coming into the future. I just hope DynCorp is ready for WPPS in Iraq and their crisis management game is locked on. -Matt
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Dyncorp International President and CEO Announces Departure, Successor Named
August 20, 2010
FALLS CHURCH, Va. (August 20, 2010) – DynCorp International (DI) today announced that Steve Gaffney will become the company’s chief executive officer and president effective August 25, 2010, the date that current CEO and president, Bill Ballhaus, has announced that he will resign. Mr. Ballhaus, who joined the company in May 2008, will continue to serve on the company’s Board of Directors as vice chairman and has accepted a position as a strategic advisor to DI’s new parent, Cerberus Capital Management L.P.
“Over the past two years the DI team has accomplished great things: we redefined our core values, strengthened our leadership programs, entered new business sectors and expanded our global footprint,” said Mr. Ballhaus. “The company is now in a position of strength and, while I am stepping down from my day-to-day role, I look forward to remaining actively engaged in DI’s future through my involvement on the Board and as a senior advisor to its owners.”
Mr. Gaffney, who already serves as chairman of DI’s Board of Directors and will operate out of the company’s Falls Church headquarters, joins DI from IAP Worldwide Services, Inc. (IAP), where he has served as CEO since January 2009.
“Bill and I have worked closely together over the past several months, discussing the company’s operations, management and future. I look forward to continuing to work with Bill in his role as a key strategic advisor and on the company’s Board,” said Mr. Gaffney. “He deserves a great deal of credit for expanding the company’s global footprint and establishing a solid foundation of corporate goals and core values that will guide the company’s future success.”
