Feral Jundi

   If you have the time, check out this excellent paper.  I loved it, because this is the kind of stuff that we need to be doing more of in this war. All it takes is one guy that we can use to deeply penetrate into Osama Bin Laden’s network or some drug cartel, and we could effectively dismantle those operations.

   Dr. Cline gave a big mention to the Selous Scouts in this treatment of the subject, and brought up numerous other groups that had conducted pseudo operations in their wars.

   Towards the end of the article, he builds a snowmobile out of all of this data from all of these other countries, and puts together a pretty good ‘lessons learned’ of how to do pseudo operations correctly:

1. Money counts.

2. The alternative to cooperation can be dire.

3. Coordination is critical.

4. Breaking guerrilla communications systems is a key tool.

5. Effectiveness of pseudo operations depends in large part on

the effectiveness of response forces.

6. The role of “turned” guerrillas is critical.

   The two big components of turning enemy combatants it seems, is money and leveraging the choice of harsh incarceration or execution. That, and treating the captives really well in the beginning and having a really well planned system of turning these folks. It is quite clear though, that pseudo operations can be effective, and they are not impossible to do. It ain’t easy either, because if it was, everyone would be doing it successfully.

   One of the things that is working against the US for pseudo operations, is that we detain terrorists with no chance of execution. There is nothing scary at all about our detention, despite what the media might have the public believe .  If anything, terrorists want to go to Gitmo, so they can conduct propaganda campaigns for their cause while in detention.  They love the idea that they can continue to live and wage jihad from a cell. The paradox though, is that they want to be martyred, so execution would be cool with them as well. So right there is one factor working against us for doing pseudo operations. Still, I think there are other incentives that we could use in order to turn these guys, and we should leave no stone unturned with a pseudo operation strategy.

   Finally, the one theme that repeated throughout the paper, is that pseudo forces should focus primarily on information collection.  When you involve them in more kinetic stuff, that tends to muck up everything.  So whatever turned guerrillas or terrorists you use, it would probably be best to use them just to collect information and have a very flexible and quick reaction force to work off of that information. And to figure out a means of not accidently killing good guys or screwing up the pseudo operator’s operation. Lot’s to think about, but I really think this is the kind of stuff we need to do more of.

   Now to put my industry hat on.  Could a PMC offer these type of services?  If a company was able to claim some kind of speciality in turning guerillas and terrorists, that is the kind of service that would really give states an advantage in their wars. Hell, I know non-states are already doing this kind of thing, and you see examples of it everywhere in this war. But if a company had a proprietary method for turning folks within the framework of international law, and within the laws of that host/contracting country, you could probably name your price. Especially if you were able to produce results. –Matt

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Pseudo Operations and Counterinsurgency: Lessons from Other Countries

June 2005

Authored by Dr. Lawrence E. Cline

SUMMARY

Pseudo operations, in which government forces and guerrilla defectors portray themselves as insurgent units, have been a very successful technique used in several counterinsurgency campaigns. Pseudo teams have provided critical human intelligence and other support to these operations.

These operations, although of considerable value, also have raised a number of concerns. Their use in offensive missions and psychological operations campaigns has, at times, been counterproductive. In general, their main value has been as human intelligence collectors, particularly for long-term background intelligence or for identifying guerrilla groups that then are assaulted by conventional forces. Care must be taken in running these operations both to avoid going too far in acting like guerrillas, and in resisting becoming involved in human rights abuses.

Just who should control pseudo operations has been somewhat contentious, but the teams typically have worked for police services or intelligence agencies. This has been largely a result of weaknesses in the military intelligence system. Ideally, strengthening military intelligence structures to support pseudo operations would be the best solution since it would provide better connectivity between the pseudo teams and response forces.

Several factors have marked successful pseudo operations. First has been a system of incentives for insurgents to defect to the government. These incentives can be positive, usually monetary rewards for surrendering; or negative, causing insurgents to cooperate to avoid severe punishment. A mix of these forms has proven to be very effective, with very few incidents of insurgents redefecting to the guerrilla side. In general, the role of guerrilla defectors has been critical in successful operations.

A critical environmental factor enabling pseudo team success is weakness in insurgent command and communications systems. Pseudo forces can thrive in environments in which guerrilla forces have problems in their communications and in which centralized control of the guerrilla groups has been weakened. Pseudo teams,in fact, can help create a synergistic cycle by further weakening insurgent command and control, leading to even more opportunities for their use.

The final critical element of these operations is the effectiveness of the response to the intelligence the teams collect, and coordination with other government forces. Unless government response forces, whether military, police, or intelligence services, are well-trained and prepared to take full advantage of the intelligence provided by pseudo teams, these operations are unlikely to have their maximum impact. Also, unless secure systems are established to avoid interference between the pseudo groups and other security forces, the teams can be in as much danger from their own side as they are from the insurgents.

Pseudo operation strategies used in earlier counterinsurgency campaigns can offer valuable lessons for future missions. It is likely that most guerrilla movements have become more sophisticated in their operations; as a result, pseudo teams must also develop better techniques. Still, the pseudo operations strategy should provide major benefits against insurgent groups.

CONCLUSIONS

Pseudo operations have proven to be a valuable tool in several foreign counterinsurgency campaigns. In general, they have been best suited for collecting intelligence information that would be difficult to acquire through other means. When used for offensive operations, the best use for pseudo teams is to capture or kill key guerrilla leaders. The teams typically have been controlled by police services, but this largely was due to weaknesses in the respective military intelligence systems.

In the best situations, pseudo teams can enter a synergistic cycle in which their capture of guerrillas leads to more accurate intelligence which in turn results in capturing more guerrillas. Capture should always take priority over killing insurgents. Whether the captured guerrillas are used primarily for gaining current intelligence or are actually part of pseudo teams, their willing and active cooperation is essential for the success of pseudo operations.

Many of the early pseudo operations look in retrospect to be rather amateurish in terms of tradecraft. Nevertheless, they worked very well. It is likely that most guerrilla movements have become more sophisticated in their operations; as a result, pseudo teams must also develop better techniques. The pseudo operations strategy, however, still should provide major benefits against insurgent groups

Publication here.