Feral Jundi

Friday, November 20, 2009

Industry Talk: Karzai Says Private Security Companies Will Leave Afghanistan Within Two Years

   Tough talk coming from Hamid.  Completely unrealistic, but whatever it takes to add some legitimacy to his government I guess.  Next. –Matt

Edit: 11/30/09- Check out this article that Mother Jones did on this.  I was surprised that MJ wasn’t more anti-contractor in the piece.

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Hamid Karzai

 

Karzai: private security companies will leave Afghanistan within two years

November 19, 2009

Richard Beeston in Kabul

President Karzai told private security companies that they would have to cease operating in Afghanistan within the next two years.

In a move that will be hugely popular with ordinary Afghans who resent the presence of thousands of heavily armed private security guards in their country, Mr Karzai said that their operations would be taken over by the army and police.

(more…)

Afghanistan: Afghanistan’s Gray Line: The Education of “Combat Platoon”

Filed under: Afghanistan,Video — Tags: , , , , — Matt @ 12:23 AM

Thursday, November 19, 2009

Film: Terror in Mumbai

Filed under: Film,India — Tags: , , , , — Matt @ 7:21 AM

   Outstanding.  This is the kind of film I like, just because it breaks down what happened and allows the viewing public to see first hand how to combat something like this.  Knowing is half the battle, and we have to expect that attacks like this will happen again, and in all corners of the world.  Get prepared, and study how these things work I say.  Be a ‘hero in waiting’, and foil these attacks by being able to recognize the signs and actions of it, and inserting a monkey wrench into the terror machine. That smart phone in your hand, is your weapon, along with anything else you can think of to cause harm to or stop this kind of attack.  Or you can coward away, and expect someone else to save you. –Matt

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Terror in Mumbai

Synopsis

TERROR IN MUMBAI features exclusive audio tapes of the intercepted phone calls between the young gunmen and their controllers in Pakistan, and testimony from the sole surviving gunman.

The Mumbai attackers’ targets included the city’s main railway station, a popular cafe, two major hotels and a Jewish center. Leaving the city’s iconic Taj Mahal Hotel in flames, and Mumbai’s woefully unprepared police and security forces paralyzed with fear, the attacks sent an ominous message to governments around the world.

“Much as the 9/11 attacks in the U.S. did in 2001, the events that unfolded last November in Mumbai served as a terrifying wake-up call, not just to India but to the rest of the world,” says narrator Fareed Zakaria, who appears on camera in the opening and closing of the film. “It broadened the spectrum of our enemies and brought attention to the number of different terrorist groups that exist, who may be bigger and better organized than we ever imagined. The fact that a small group of gunmen was able to inflict so much pain, and the government of the second most populous nation on earth was unable to stop them for three days, should change our sense of the dangers out there.”

In the words of one of the operation’s masterminds, who remotely controlled the terrorists’ every deadly move by cell phone from neighboring Pakistan, “This was just the trailer. Just wait till you see the rest of the film.” The assailants belonged to the terrorist group Lashkar-e-Taiba, or “Army of the Righteous,” which aims to “liberate” Muslims living under Indian rule in Kashmir. Their mission: global jihad against the “infidels.”

TERROR IN MUMBAI presents a moment-by-moment account of the horrific attacks through interviews with survivors and Indian police officials, archival news coverage, extensive video surveillance footage of the terrorists in action, and chilling audio excerpts of cell-phone conversations intercepted by security forces. The phone intercepts provide a grotesque running commentary as the controllers, watching events unfold on live TV, direct the gunmen, telling them where the security forces are, which of their hostages should be killed and how to do it. With the killers wounded and asking what to do next, the tapes reveal the controllers calmly urging them to fight to the death and not allow themselves to be taken alive.

Guests from the Taj Mahal and Oberoi hotels tell how the terrorists first staged mass executions, then worked their way through the corridors, killing whenever they managed to enter a room. An elderly couple recounts how they were spared by the terrorists when it was realized they were fellow Muslims, while all around them were mowed down in a hail of bullets. Perhaps the most unsettling testimony comes from Ajmal Amir Kasab, the sole surviving terrorist, who answers his captors’ questions with startling frankness from a gurney soon after being captured.

While the Mumbai attacks differed in many ways from the Al Qaeda assault on the U.S. on September 11, 2001, the personal motives of the Laskar-e-Taiba terrorists bear some of the same hallmarks, notably the belief that there would be material wealth for their families and heavenly glory for themselves if they died for the cause of jihad.

What remains unclear is how this quest for holiness meshed with the indiscriminate nature of the killings, which mowed down Muslims and non-Muslims alike.

(more…)

Film: The Surge, The Untold Story

Filed under: Film,Iraq — Tags: , , — Matt @ 4:20 AM

Understanding the Surge from ISW on Vimeo.

Industry Talk: FedBizOps–Security Guard Contracts for FOB Lightening, Wilderness, Herrera, and Zormat in Afghanistan

Filed under: Afghanistan,Industry Talk — Tags: , , , , — Matt @ 3:11 AM

   Interesting news, and I will let you know who picks up what for this.  Part of the deal for these contracts is that part of the security has to come from local nationals that live in the area.  This can work, if it is done properly and is actually managed well by whatever company has taken this on.  The benefits of hiring locally is that guys tend to protect their cash cow, or the job that feeds their family.  So it benefits them to know about any bad guys in the area.  These local guards can also help to feed the base with any local info about IED’s or bad guys in the area.  But that only works when you actually engage with your guards and work with them.  If you treat them as if less than, then of course there won’t be any info obtained.

   These guards can also identify bad guys within the worker units coming onto the base to do work.  They will know who is local and who the foreigners are, so it is smart to really work with these guards and treat them with respect. More than likely though, these guards will first and foremost show loyalty to the local tribal chief, so it is important that the company works with that individual as well. Nothing new, but it all can go pear shape if you don’t be careful.  The big one is just stay engaged with everyone.

     If you are a guard force supervisor, you should be checking up on your guys often, learn a little language, and apply some Jundism to your connections.  Know your stuff, have the courage to do what is right, and most of all, take care of your people.  And that goes for the company as well.  Do not hamstring your guard force commanders, by not giving them the tools necessary to be good leaders.

   The kind of tools I am talking about are disciplinary tools (the ability to fire folks, or punish by withholding pay), or giving them the time and money necessary to train or equip their guard force.  You are asking a lot of your guard force commanders, the least you can do is back them up and give them everything they need to succeed.  Don’t be marshmallow eaters and take the easy way out by signing on to contracts that don’t allow for that kind of support for your guard force commanders. Or by purchasing crap equipment or weapons. pffft.

     These men and women you put in charge of the local national forces, are the backbone of your contract–you should treat them as such, because the security of that FOB rides on their ability to effectively lead. Better yet, take the time to pick guard force commanders that will do a good job for you, and trust-yet verify that they are doing a good job for you, and stay involved with what is going on out there. Or you can pull a AGNA, and watch your company become the embarrassment of the industry. –Matt

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From FedBizOps (click on the blue links)

Air Force-Afghan Security Guards – FOB Lightening

Solicitation Number: W91B4P-10-R-0014

Agency: Department of the Air Force

Office: United States Air Force Europe

Location: 48 CONS/LGC – Lakenheath

Army-Afghan Security Guard Services – FOB Wilderness, Herrera, Zormat (WHZ)

Solicitation Number: W91B4P-10-R-0015

Agency: Department of the Army

Office: Joint Contracting Command, Iraq/Afgahnistan

Location: SALERNO RCC

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