Relatively unknown before U.S. forces arrived in Afghanistan in fall 2001, Ruhullah is “prototypical of a new class of warlord in Afghanistan,” the report said. Unlike more traditional warlords, he has no political aspirations or tribal standing but “commands a small army of over 600 guards.”
The “single largest security provider for the U.S. supply chain in Afghanistan,” Ruhullah “readily admits to bribing governors, police chiefs and army generals,” the report said. In a meeting with congressional investigators in Dubai, he complained about “the high cost of ammunition in Afghanistan — he says he spends $1.5 million per month on rounds for an arsenal that includes AK-47s, heavy machine guns and RPGs,” or rocket-propelled grenades. It added: “Villagers along the road refer to him as ‘the Butcher.’ “
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$1.5 million a month for ammunition? Wow, that’s impressive. Or maybe that is just another over inflated number to add to the stack of corruption accounts in this report.
I guess all I have to say about something like this is what you get when you don’t care about how companies operate. You must have adult supervision and you must have enough of that oversight manpower to effectively watch over these folks.
One of the things I thought was interesting about this report was the idea of ‘going outside the wire’ to get a feel on what is going on with these contracts. That is fine and all, but you still will have no way to really get a feel for what is going on with them. I like the surprise inspection thing or the ride along thing, but in my opinion, you need ride-a-longs every time. In other words, have an expat company that is required as that source of supervision and make those guys responsible for how the operation is conducted. That is how it was done in Iraq, and that is how it should go down in Afghanistan and Pakistan. That kind of arrangement would ensure some adult supervision is on scene, and at all times.
That brings up the other issue I have with the way contracting is done these days. Why are we not requiring companies to be bonded? This was common practice with privateers back in the day, and it something we should consider now. If you want a company to play straight, then having them put their money where their mouth is, is just one way to keep them in line. Fines are another means. But really, you need someone riding with these convoys at all times to check on the whole process. These guys will get away with whatever they can if we don’t.
We could call them liaison officers or whatever, and they could be contractors, military, or federal employees. I say make them contractors, and ensure they are expats with secret clearances at the least. Then these DoD inspectors can go outside the wire and actually talk with a guy that has been watching the whole process. That inspector can use that liaison officer to great effect, and that would be a far better arrangement than just trying to surprise that company every once in awhile.
Plus, assigning expat liaison officers to these convoys could allow supervision all the way into Pakistan or whatever country they are in. US military would not have the same ability to cross into Pakistan. Federal employees would be too high of a target in Pakistan as well. But having expat contractors doing this kind of thing is feasible, and it has already been happening on numerous contracts over the years. Just make it mandatory, and pay the extra amount for this supervision and contract stipulation. I would also allow these liaison officers to be managed, armed, equiped and paid by their expat companies, and not by the Afghan company they are riding along with. That will make things a lot more simple for that contractor assigned to such a duty. I also think that liaison officer should be paid a top salary, because such a job would be extremely dangerous.
Finally, I think these convoys should be looked at as bait to lure out the enemy with. The more assets that can be assigned to overwatch and QRF, the better. Communications between that force and the liaison officer on these convoys could help in that process as well. Especially if drones in the area see any enemy movement or if the enemy attacked a convoy or military patrol earlier in the day on that road the convoy is on. There are a number of things we could do to help out these convoys with survival and with killing the enemy. Hell, our armed drones should be tracking every square inch of these convoy routes, and use these weapons as tools to really go to town on the enemy up in the mountain passes. Those are my thoughts on the matter. –Matt
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Recommendations of the report Warlord Inc.
There are numerous constructive changes that could be made to the U.S. military trucking effort in Afghanistan that would improve contracting integrity while mitigating corrupting influences. As the Department of Defense absorbs the findings in this report and considers its course of action, the Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs Majority staff makes the following recommendations:
1. Assume Direct Contractual Responsibility for Supply Chain Security Providers. If the United States is going to use small armies of private security contractors to defend its massive supply chain in a war zone, the Department of Defense must take direct responsibility for those contractors to ensure robust oversight. Trucking companies are wholly incapable of overseeing this scale of security operations. The U.S. government needs to have a direct line of authority and accountability over the private security companies that guard the supply chain.
2. Consider the Role of Afghan National Security Forces in Highway Security. To be sure, the ANP and ANA will ultimately have a role in ensuring safe passage on Afghanistan’s roads. However, that would likely require a medium-term, if not long-term, transition. Numerous witnesses in this investigation have expressed extreme skepticism at any plan to rapidly transfer convoy security to the Afghan security forces due to concerns about capacity, competence, and corruption. Proposals to reform the convoy security scheme ought to take into account the Ministry of Interior’s vision of a future role of Afghan security forces in highway security. If there is to be no immediate role for the ANA in convoy security, a plan must be developed to reach that goal with credible security alternatives that address immediate U.S. military logistics needs.
3. Inventory Actual Trucking Capacity Available to the Department of Defense. The Department should conduct a survey of the available trucking capacity in Afghanistan under the HNT contract to ensure that its needs will be met with the additional forces under orders to deploy to Afghanistan. Where there is information to suggest that there is a finite pool of trucks some owner operated, some as tribal assets, some owned by second or third-tier subcontractors adding prime contractors does not necessarily add to the pool of available trucks.
4. Draft Contracts to Ensure Transparency of Subcontractors. Contracts between the Department of Defense and its trucking and/or security prime contractors need to include provisions that ensure a line of sight, and accountability, between the Department of Defense and the relevant subcontractors. Such provisions should make clear the subcontractors’ obligations, including full Department of Defense inspection and audit rights. Such provisions should also mandate the Department of Defense’s obligation to have visibility into subcontractors critical to its wartime supply chain. There should also be robust and verifiable incident reporting requirements. Where Department of Defense regulations already require such provisions, the Department needs to enforce them.
5. Oversee Contracts to Ensure Contract Transparency and Performance. Similarly, the Department of Defense needs to provide the personnel and resources required to manage and oversee its trucking and security contracts in Afghanistan. These are not contracts that can be managed responsibly from a desk in Bagram or Kandahar alone. Contracts of this magnitude and of this consequence require travel ‘outside the wire.’ For convoys, that means having the force protection resources necessary for mobility of Department of Defense personnel to conduct periodic unannounced inspections and ride-alongs.
6. Analyze Effect of Coalition Contracting on Afghan Corruption. The national security components of the U.S. government, including the Department of Defense, the Department of State, the U.S. Agency for International Development, the Department of Justice, and the Intelligence Community, need to begin to systematically track and analyze the effects of U.S., NATO, and other international donor funds on corruption in Afghanistan. Corruption is smothering the nascent efforts at Afghan governance that are fundamental to our strategy in Afghanistan. The effects of billions of dollars in development projects and security aid for Afghanistan, combined with billions of dollars spent in support of the U.S. and NATO military footprint in Afghanistan, need to be at the center of any analysis of metrics of our performance in the Afghan effort. Public reports in early June 2010 suggest that U.S. intelligence assets have been assigned to analyze Afghan corruption and governance. The U.S. government needs to devote sufficient assets to the endeavor, and the mandate should include an analysis of the effects of coalition contracts.
Download report here.
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U.S. indirectly paying Afghan warlords as part of security contract
By Karen DeYoung
Tuesday, June 22, 2010
The U.S. military is funding a massive protection racket in Afghanistan, indirectly paying tens of millions of dollars to warlords, corrupt public officials and the Taliban to ensure safe passage of its supply convoys throughout the country, according to congressional investigators.
The security arrangements, part of a $2.16 billion transport contract, violate laws on the use of private contractors, as well as Defense Department regulations, and “dramatically undermine” larger U.S. objectives of curtailing corruption and strengthening effective governance in Afghanistan, a report released late Monday said.
The report describes a Defense Department that is well aware that some of the money paid to contractors winds up in the hands of warlords and insurgents. Military logisticians on the ground are focused on getting supplies where they are needed and have “virtually no understanding of how security is actually provided” for the local truck convoys that transport more than 70 percent of all goods and materials used by U.S. troops. Alarms raised by prime trucking contractors were met by the military “with indifference and inaction,” the report said.