This was an excellent special report written by the good people at the Economist. Be sure to follow the link I provided and read the entire thing, because this was just the teaser article below. There were lot’s of great ideas in this report, and I highly recommend reading it. What was really motivating to me, was to read about the current state of Al Qaeda and how we have actually accomplished some pretty remarkable things.
For me, Al Qaeda has always symbolized an idea more than anything. And AQ has certainly tarnished the rest of the Islamic world with their war. And like the article pointed out, the one thing that really hurts them in this war, is their killing of other muslims in the name of Allah. And when one of the founders of Al Qaeda named Dr. Ladl even says that Al Qaeda has gone too far, then I think we are starting to make some headway in this war.
And what really gets me, is that in Iraq, Zarqawi and company proclaimed that Iraq will be the main battle ground to fight the infidels at. Soon after this proclamation, we killed Zarqawi and then the surge happened and the rest is what we have today. A Iraq that is significantly better than it was, and Al Qaeda being run out of town by the Iraqis and the Coalition. The turning point with AQ was when Iraqis said enough was enough, and joined forces with us to rid the country of these islamic extremists. My point with this, is that the surge and our new counter-insurgency strategy was certainly a contributing factor, for this victory against AQ. And I say victory, because they are now a shadow of themselves in Iraq.
I also think it is significant what Saudi Arabia has been able to do in this war. I would have certainly expected AQ to have carried out several massive and successful attacks by now. But it seems that Saudi Arabia has done a pretty good job of putting down AQ, and I am sure Bin Laden and company have been biting their lip about that one. Bin Laden has always held a grudge against the Saudi Royal family, and it must kill him that Al Qaeda of Saudi Arabia sucks.
So now they are all running to Afghanistan, to join the fight there I guess. And to me, this is one of the most complex problems we have right now to deal with in this war. In Pakistan, you have the FATA region where AQ and the Taliban have been training and enjoying a safe haven. And then during the fighting season(summer), they make the cross over into Afghanistan and cause trouble. Couple that with the poppy situation(drugs for guns) and a nation ravaged by years of war and terrible infrastructure, and we have a really complex problem to solve there. And I am not even sure if more troops will solve this. We’ll see how it goes, because I think Afghanistan will be a huge deal in the coming months and then next summer with a new US President. I am optimistic, with Petraeus and company at the helm. If anyone could think up the correct strategy, it is the batch of warrior leaders we have right now. –Head Jundi
How to win the war within Islam
Jul 17th 2008
From The Economist print edition
In the long run, al-Qaeda will be defeated by Muslims, not foreigners. But the West can still help
AMERICA’S “global war on terrorism”, now in its seventh year, has gone on longer than the second world war. Will it ever end? Optimists believe some kind of victory is in sight: Iraq is improving; al-Qaeda has been unable to stage a big attack in the West in three years; and terrorists have shown little sign of using weapons of mass destruction. Jihadists face an ideological backlash, even from radical “brothers” who support jihad but disagree with killing Muslims.
Welcome as al-Qaeda’s setbacks may be, the world should not be complacent. As our special report in this issue explains, the threat is likely to last for decades. One reason is that al-Qaeda, though weaker in Iraq, has created a new sanctuary in Pakistan’s tribal belt. Another is that al-Qaeda’s ideology has spread far and wide thanks to the internet and ease of travel. A third is that anti-Americanism remains powerful across the Muslim world. Only a tiny proportion of the world’s billion or so Muslims need to take up jihad to create serious trouble.
That is particularly true because al-Qaeda is so nebulous and its violence, unlike that of earlier nationalist or sectarian terrorists, is so unrestrained. The days when the Irish Republican Army telephoned warnings of its bombs, and at times apologised for killing bystanders, seem quaint in an age of human-guided bombs seeking to maximise bloodshed.
In the 19th century anarchists mainly assassinated rulers; in the 1970s terrorists typically killed tens of people; and by the 1980s and 1990s hundreds died in bombings. On September 11th 2001 al-Qaeda killed nearly 3,000 people. If it had chemical, biological or radiological weapons or, less likely, nuclear ones—all big “ifs”, admittedly—it would use them.
For global jihadists the reward is in paradise, so life is cheap. They do not seek realistic political gains, but dream of restoring the mythologised caliphate that was abolished by Ataturk in 1924. Al-Qaeda has woven many strands of grievance into a simple single narrative: Islam is under attack from all sides; America, the West, the Jews (along with puppet Arab leaders and treacherous Shias) are to blame; it is the duty of every Muslim to fight them; and Muslims who object are apostates. Thus is mass murder justified as a defence of Islam.
How to confront the menace? Al-Qaeda must be denied victory, denied sanctuary and denied the ability to organise attacks. Regardless of the rights and wrongs of Western intervention, America must not leave Iraq over-hastily and will need to shore up its forces in Afghanistan. In time, though, the West should draw back from combat in favour of more discreet assistance. Al-Qaeda seeks to attack the “far enemy”, America, because the “near enemy”, the region’s governments, are hard to fight. The West should seek to invert this equation. It must encourage and help weak governments, such as Pakistan’s, to extend their writ and deny the terrorists a haven. International intelligence co-operation must be strengthened.
All this will mean supping with less-than-savoury figures. But the West must not lose sight of its most compelling idea: democracy. The greater struggle against jihadists is in the realm of ideas. Al-Qaeda must be denied the claim to be defending Muslims or to speak on their behalf. Jihadists say democracy is sinful “man-made” law, but Muslims everywhere seize the right to choose their leaders when given the opportunity.
Democracy, though, is neither an instant nor complete solution. Elections can heighten sectarian tensions, and may produce weaker or more anti-Western governments. It becomes discredited if it is seen as an imposition, or if democracies use torture. Nevertheless, it offers the best hope of moderating those who use Islam as a weapon of protest. Authoritarian regimes, even if friendly, should be nudged towards reform.
In Pakistan America invested all in its military ruler, Pervez Musharraf, but his support collapsed. Islamists who are not violent, like the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, should be able to contest free elections. In Turkey, secularists are wrong to try to ban the Islamist-tinged ruling party, AKP (see article). Preventing moderate Islamists from gaining power at the ballot box only encourages extreme ones to seek it by violence.
Some lump together all forms of Islamism as a deadly enemy, akin to fascism and communism. A more accurate analysis, and a better strategy, would be to disaggregate the problems. The rhetoric of the “global war” on terrorism only strengthens global jihad. As the West learns the limits of force, it is Muslims, not foreign soldiers, who will defeat al-Qaeda.
Yet foreigners do still have a role to play in what is, at its core, a violent contest within Islam. A useful move would be to make a greater effort to extinguish some of the fires of radicalism, such as the conflicts over Palestine and Kashmir. But diplomacy, like democracy, is no panacea. Muslim resentment of the West has a complex pathology, dating back to the Spanish reconquista in medieval times; that is hardly something that can be undone. Still, it is worth addressing real grievances.
In an internet video in September 2007 Abu Yahya al-Libi, a prominent al-Qaeda leader, mockingly gave the West six tips to wage ideological warfare: highlight the views of jihadists who renounce violence; publicise stories about jihadist atrocities against Muslims; enlist Muslim religious leaders to denounce jihadists as heretics; back Islamic movements that emphasise politics over jihad; discredit and neutralise jihadist ideologues; and play up personal or doctrinal disputes among jihadists. These would indeed be good starting-points.
Link To the Economist Special Report on Al Qaeda