Feral Jundi

Asked if he would be forced to end contracts if the situation was not resolved, one development company official said, “Absolutely.”
“We apply what we call the son and daughter standard,” said the official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity in order to avoid alienating American and Afghan government officials. “Would we send our sons and daughters out there to do this work, and the answer is no.”

Boy, who couldn’t see this one coming? lol Of course Afghanistan is not able to put together this Afghan Public Protection Force.  As you all remember, this was the force that was supposed to replace private security forces in Afghanistan.

As that quote up top hints at, this APPF concept is not exactly giving all of the aid and development groups the confidence they require in order to send ‘their sons and daughters’ to Afghanistan. I wouldn’t trust my life in the hands of such a force, even if half of this report is true. This quote below is what perked me up:

The assessment makes it clear that much work needs to be done. Of 166 “essential” criteria to determine if the government was able to recruit, train and sustain the guard force, less than a third could be fully met, the assessment found. Sixty-three of the measurements could not be met at all.

Really?  So here is my suggestion. Private industry is really the only solution here, and the Afghans need to face reality, or everyone is going to pack up and leave. And that is a lot of money and projects just going out the door.

My suggestion is to implement a license and bonded PSC system. Streamline the licensing process, and tell the companies to put their money where their mouth is if they want to operate.  If they violate the contract, then they are fined via the surety bond. If they violate the terms of the license, then suspend the license. If they break a law, then prosecute those individuals. But the point is, find a way to work with private industry and do not try to re-invent the wheel. Let the various aid and development groups in country choose what licensed security they want, and focus on managing and regulating that. –Matt

Report Details Problems for Afghan Security Force Plan
By RAY RIVERA
November 1, 2011
KABUL, Afghanistan — President Hamid Karzai’s plan to disband private security companies that protect billions of dollars worth of aid projects and replace them with government forces is fraught with problems and unlikely to meet the president’s March deadline to complete the transition, according to a six-month assessment of the program.
The assessment, conducted by NATO and the Afghan Interior Ministry, outlines dozens of issues that have slowed the development of the new security force and raises questions about the government’s capacity to carry out and sustain the program and others as international aid money and military support dwindle in coming years.
The report, a copy of which was obtained by The New York Times, comes as international development companies are becoming increasingly worried about the security of their workers, many of whom are Afghans.

President Karzai has said that replacing the private security companies with his country’s forces is an important step toward Afghan sovereignty. Gen. John R. Allen, the top commander of NATO forces in Afghanistan, has also made it a central issue, according to a Western official.
“It’s become a top priority because if it doesn’t work, everything grinds to a halt,” said the official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity in keeping with diplomatic protocol. “If it isn’t sorted out everyone will pull out because they don’t want some fly-by-night security protecting them.”
NATO, the State Department and the United States Agency for International Development are setting up a task force that could grow to more than 170 people to advise and help train the guard force, according to a senior American official and a senior NATO official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity. The Pentagon will also be asking Congress to appropriate $35 million to $40 million in new and reallocated money to pay for the task force, a senior NATO official said.
The assessment makes it clear that much work needs to be done. Of 166 “essential” criteria to determine if the government was able to recruit, train and sustain the guard force, less than a third could be fully met, the assessment found. Sixty-three of the measurements could not be met at all.
Among the shortfalls: the program, which is overseen by the Interior Ministry, “has no money available to procure necessary supplies and equipment”; its training center is not teaching leadership skills and cannot generate enough guards to meet the forecasted demand; and the ministry has failed to provide the seed money — about $10 million — to prop up a state-owned business to run the program.
The program has already failed to supply personnel and equipment for some of its contracts, the assessment said. The report’s authors concluded that the police protection force “is not on track” to assume the responsibilities of the private security companies by March.
The Pentagon referred to the assessment in its latest report to Congress on Afghanistan, saying that in addition to other problems, it found the Interior Ministry to be “inadequate and unresponsive” in sustaining a guard training center. “Examples of this include a lack of authorized or requested equipment, medical supplies, fuel and ammunition,” the report said.
The Interior Ministry, in answers to written questions, insisted that the program had not been slow to develop, adding that the ministry’s efforts so far had been focused on disbanding private security companies with ties to government officials. “All preparations are under way for A.P.P.F. to be ready by March,” the ministry said, using the initials for the Afghan Public Protection Force, as it is formally known.
Despite the many problems cited in the assessment, President Karzai has not wavered in his determination to complete the transition by spring, according to several officials. The senior NATO official said the coalition was “absolutely” committed to helping him do it. But many in the development industry are doubtful.
“There has to be very serious discussion, taking this report into account, whether that transition date is still viable,” said Stan Soloway, president of the Professional Services Council, a trade group in Arlington, Va., that represents government contractors. “From this report, it doesn’t appear to be, so we don’t have a lot of time to come to deal with the implications of this report.”
NATO and diplomatic missions, along with their development partners, employ about 34,000 security guards supplied by private security companies, the Pentagon report to Congress said. About 93 percent of all private security guards are Afghans, more than half of whom are employed by NATO, the report said. The president’s plan includes exceptions for embassies and diplomatic missions and limited exceptions for some NATO bases.
Private security companies have long been a source of tension in the country. Some Afghan companies operated as private militias for warlords and many, along with some American companies, have been plagued by accusations of corruption, illegal use of weapons and reckless use of force resulting in civilian deaths and injuries.
Trying to rein in the companies, President Karzai issued a decree last year ordering most of the guards supplied by private security companies to be replaced by government forces by December 2010, an unlikely goal that he amended last March, setting a 12-month time period for the transition.
But concern over whether that deadline can be met, and to what standard, is causing uncertainty among development organizations. Some development professionals say they may be forced to sever their contracts if they do not have some clarity on the security issue by the end of the year. The timing is important because it can take two months or more to close down a development contract, several development professionals said. They are also concerned about the quality and loyalty of the guards they will get, many of whom will make half what the development organizations pay their Afghan guards now.
Asked if he would be forced to end contracts if the situation was not resolved, one development company official said, “Absolutely.”
“We apply what we call the son and daughter standard,” said the official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity in order to avoid alienating American and Afghan government officials. “Would we send our sons and daughters out there to do this work, and the answer is no.”

Story here.