Boy, where do I start with this thing. First of all, in their panel of experts and contributors to this report, I didn’t see any security contractors? What is up with that? You would think these guys would at least bring in a couple of actual guys that have done the job out there and could give some perspective about the industry. I was never contacted about this, nor have I seen them advertise on the forums. The only names I recognized were Robert Young Pelton and David Isenberg. Pelton is a travel author who writes books about traveling to war zones, that also wrote a book about security contractors. Isenberg has a column about the industry over at UPI, and that is it for input about the industry. The rest of the panel were experts in foreign policy and other related fields. I think they would have produced a better product if they would have actually included us ‘grunts’ that have some ground truth input about the industry.
The other one that killed me about this report, is they made the suggestion that security contractors should only be used for static security posts in the war. That PSD and Convoy operations should be done by the military. Where I disagree on this, is this completely limits operational capability for the companies over there that are operating on their own. And this also rips away the military to serve civilian supply efforts. So will these civilian companies pay the military to do these services. How about for transporting employees for leave or for medical situations? Will the military provide an on call shuttle service for us civilians operating at these camps?
The one example I have, where this new policy could really screw up things, is with the CMC or CMD program. This is an Army Corps of Engineers program where civilian contractors lived at small base camps located at old munition dumps in Iraq. These dumps were bombed during Gulf War 1 and the current war, and munitions were no longer secured and scattered all over the place–it is a mess and they needed to be cleaned up to protect the local populations and the troops. The government contracted this task out to the civilian industry, and we have done an outstanding job of getting rid of these bombs. Every bomb we destroyed, was one less IED in the hands of the enemy.
My point is, that these camps were completely civilian operated, secured and supplied. Convoy operations to get supplies to these camps were vital to the survival of these camps. To put the resupply effort into the hands of the military, would take them away from their main fight, and would put them at risk in supplying a civilian operation that is being paid to do this dangerous job. The military should not be in the business of getting involved with a company’s day to day operations that require a certain amount of flexibility to function properly. And yes, the military could easily do this type of operation, I just don’t think they should. They should instead focus on fighting the enemy, and continue to allow us to supply ourselves. And from my experience, it worked out just fine and we destroyed tons of munitions.
The authors of the report, are basically taking the few negative experiences in the past, as an example of why we should never do these operations. My point is, that if military and civilian contractors were more coordinated and better organized to work with one another, then we would not have these types of issues. So let me go back to some of the things I have talked about before on Feral Jundi, and refresh the discussion about it.
What this all goes back to is civilian and military interaction out there in the war zones. It is also about unity of command. My advice for the client(DoD, US Aid and DoS) is give us the tools to communicate with the military, or assign a liaison with a radio to work with these convoy operations. Also, include us in the COIN effort, and let us know how we are supposed to act around certain villages and roads. Talk with us, coordinate with us, give us guidance. And this concept is nothing knew, but from what I have seen in Iraq, commanders just don’t want to do it or don’t know how. Maybe it’s because they don’t trust us, or they don’t think we are capable or ego is in the way–I don’t know. But it takes leadership to drive home this idea that we must find a way to coordinate with one another so that we do not endanger the overall strategy in the region. I think the latest buzzword for that is called ‘Strategic Communications’, and it just amazes me that we have 230,000 (plus or minus) in this war, with over 12,000 plus gun totting security contractors, and we are still at this level where we do not know how to interact with one another? Amazing.
When I was federal forest firefighter(smokejumper), and tasked with being an Incident Commander (IC) on a forest fire, here are a couple of things that we had to deal with, that could help give some ideas for the contractor/military relationship. We all had radios that were programable, and everyone could talk with each other. I am talking about civilian fire contractors, state crews, federal crews, federal aviation assets, state aviation assets, you name it. If an agency wanted to ‘play’ on that fire, they needed a programable radio that could connect them to the IC and the adjacent troops on the fire. That is vital, and I could not imagine fighting a fire without this communications capability.
Also, if they wanted be on that fire, they needed to be red carded(qualifications card) and be registered in a national database called the Incident Command Qualifications System. Under that system, everyone had to go through forty hours of forest fire training. And every year, everyone had to be refreshed as a forest fire fighter to do their job. That is the minimum, and it is widely enforced in the fire community. All the positions you are qualified to do, are backed up by what is called a ‘Task Book’ and if you are a trainee, then your card must represent that you are trainee for that position.
The other deal that all forces needed to know about, is the chain of command and basic tactics and strategies involved with fighting a forest fire. The reason for this, is they will be given orders by the IC, and the language of those orders revolve around the concepts of basic forest fire fighting. The chain of command is based on the Incident Command System, and it is a system used world wide by forest fire fighters. It is scaleable(used for 1 acre fires, all the way up to hundred thousand plus acre campaign fires) and easy to understand. A ‘crew boss’ under this system, has the same meaning across the entire forest fire fighting universe, and that is just one example of a position in the IC system. Everyone knows what the Incident Commander position is as well and they go to this person for guidance on what they are supposed to do on the fire. There are other positions, but the theme is, that everyone knows what these positions are and what they generally do. It is a common command language.
For equipment, everyone that comes to a federal fire, must have the equipment that is authorized by the government. From the planes and fire trucks, all the way down to the boots. Everything must meet a standard if they want to be on that fire. There is some flexibility in this, based on what the market can bring, but for safety related items, the standard is set and there is no wavering.
Finally, everyone coordinates through one dispatch center. These centers are usually multi-agency. But at these centers, they are the ones that get the fire calls from the public, decide what resources go to that incident, and dispatch them. The resources they use, are based on distance and status. Are they local, are they federal or civilian, are they on contract, are they available, are they up to date with their red card qualifications? The dispatch centers maintain the databases like ROSS and Wildcad and ICQS, and draw upon these databases for future operations, or for investigations about incidents.
Many of these ideas could be applied to the security contractor industry, and today’s war planners could learn a lot about how to integrate the civilian and military organizations out there in war zones. And if organized and used properly, then we can certainly be an asset in the war effort.
With this report, they made a reasonable effort about describing similar ideas to the ones I mentioned above. But because they made no mention of Incident Command or looking at this model, then they missed out on a wonderful opportunity to learn from an industry that is getting it right when it comes to government contracting. I also think the recommendation to limit security contractors to static security positions shows a sign that no one really has an idea of how to manage us out there, nor have they really made the effort to figure that out. Sure it is a difficult task, but it is not impossible.
One thing I could suggest to the readership is to write the authors of this report, and explain to them where they are wrong or right. If they are truly interested in creating a product of any value, then it should have as much input as possible. And the reason why the security industry should care about reports like this, is because these things are what influence congressional committees, UN committees or government policy makers that decide our place in the big picture. The media also rely on reports like this, because these things are endorsed by powerful think tanks that have agendas. Read the report below, pass it around to everyone, and let these folks know how you feel. –Head Jundi
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Changing the Culture of Pentagon Contracting
By Maria Figueroa Küpçü, Michael A. Cohen, New America Foundation
Roger D. Carstens, Senior Fellow, Center for a New American Security
November 5, 2008
While the U.S. military has long relied on private contractors, the outsourcing of key national security functions has increased dramatically over the past five and a half years. From intelligence gathering and logistical support to personal security services, training, and operational support tasks, the efforts of contractors are now integral to the success of America’s security and stabilization missions around the world. Since the beginning of the Iraq War, one dollar out of every five has been spent on private contractors. By most estimates, there are more private contractors in Iraq than uniformed military.
Numerous observers have raised questions about the legal accountability of contractors and the efficacy of utilizing private actors in an active battle space, but few studies have examined the culture of contracting and the larger failure of the military to effectively account for and integrate contractors into U.S. military planning, training, and operations. This report in intended to help policymakers, both in the executive and legislative branches as well as the uniformed military, develop solutions to the growing challenge of integrating contractors more effectively into U.S. national security operations.
A failure to accept the inevitability of contractors as a key element of the military force structure has contributed to inertia and an abdication of responsibility for managing the interaction between government departments and private contractors. While it is important to acknowledge that in recent years there have been significant improvements in oversight of private contractors, particularly by the Department of Defense, serious systemic and institutional problems persist.
A cultural shift is required in which civilian and military leaders take steps to fully integrate private contractors not only into the force structure but also into mission requirements. Without this sort of institutional change, the problems we have experienced in connection with contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan will continue, significantly retarding the military’s ability to adjust to the evolving security challenges of the 21st century.
The U.S. government should:
* Transition away from the use of private security contractors in the battle space and build up the capabilities of the State Department’s Bureau of Diplomatic Security and the military police to take on security responsibilities. As this transition takes place, the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act should be expanded to govern the actions of private security contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan not currently covered by the Uniform Code of Military Justice; improved training of security contractors, vetting of third-country nationals, and third-party accreditation of contractors should be instituted; and interagency coordination between the military and other government agencies should be strengthened.
* Move away from reliance on the flawed and widely misunderstood term “inherently governmental” in deciding how and when to use private contractors, and instead focus on the question of core competencies and mission success. Congress should permit government agencies to use broad discretionary leeway in determining where and how contractors should be used. Congress should establish red-lined activities that must not be outsourced and require the military to maintain a “resident capacity” for any function it outsources, particularly as it relates to the ability to conduct proper contractual oversight.
* Designate a high-ranking official in each branch of the military to conduct a top-to-bottom review of how that branch interacts with contractors and where there are areas for greater or lesser reliance on contractors.
* Strengthen the contractor and acquisition workforce so that it is better equipped to make contracting decisions and to conduct robust oversight and management of contractors. In addition, the Army should develop and support its newly created contracting career field for enlisted personnel and officers.
* Create a clear chain of command from Secretary of Defense through the Joint Chiefs of Staff and service departments that lays out the responsibilities for contracting and holds commanders accountable for the integration of contractors into the Total Force.
* Integrate contractor oversight into officer training in all branches of the military.
* Include contingency contracting as an “area of emphasis” in the 2010 QDR.
* Create and sustain an enforcement arm of the FBI to conduct overseas investigations of private contractors as well as an extraterritorial U.S. attorney to prosecute criminal behavior.