Feral Jundi

Monday, September 24, 2012

Leadership: General Mattis On ‘Command And Feedback’, And The Use Of ‘Eyes Officers’

From his lead position, Mattis stayed close to the regiments involved in the fiercest fighting and got a good sense for events on the battlefield. The general refused to believe that images on a computer screen in the quiet hum of a command post could tell him what he needed to know about how the battle was progressing and what his subordinates required. Mattis could be ruthless; he would relieve the commander of one of his regiments in the middle of a campaign. In the marines, only performance counts. Mattis picked several officers to act as what he called his “eyes only” representatives. They had no authority but, he said, like “Frederick the Great’s focused telescope or Wellington’s lieutenants in the Peninsula Campaign,” they had the duty of wandering the battlefield to keep him informed of things they thought he needed to know: troops or officers who were exhausted by combat, supplies that were not reaching the front line, and the other human factors that can be crucial in combat. -page 116 and 117 of The Iraq War: A Military History, By Williamson Murray, Robert Scales

The Slate put this out last year, but I just recently stumbled upon it and wanted to share. General Mattis is a Marine’s Marine and he is very much respected. With that said, when I found out that he was implementing some concepts that are familiar here in Jundism and some of my leadership posts, I perked up.

Specifically, the mystery shopper concept or having folks on the inside of your organization to give you some honest feedback about the true health of your company or military unit. With this data, you can actually make adjustments to policy that will better serve the mission or contract.

I also liked the focus on innovation and gaining feedback. Or, command and feedback, which is a play on the phrase command and control. This also led to the best quote in the article below about where that feedback or innovation could come from.

If you are always on the hunt for complacency, argues Mattis, you will reward risk-takers, and people who thrive in uncertainty. “Take the mavericks in your service,” he tells new officers, “the ones that wear rumpled uniforms and look like a bag of mud but whose ideas are so offsetting that they actually upset the people in the bureaucracy. One of your primary jobs is to take the risk and protect these people, because if they are not nurtured in your service, the enemy will bring their contrary ideas to you.”

That is awesome and all companies and military units should learn from this. Leaders should dare to listen and seek feedback from all quarters of their organization, and soldiers/contractors should dare to come forward and disagree, or present the better idea. Any policies and actions within an organization that supports this command and feedback process should be looked at and attempted.

We should constantly be supporting and pushing innovation within the ranks, and constantly seeking feedback and using these innovations in order to continuously improve the organization/mission/contract/war fighting/strategy. Awesome stuff. –Matt

 

 

Gen. James Mattis, USMC The general who is fighting a constant battle to keep the military innovating.
By John Dickerson
Aug. 9, 2011
When speaking to rising officers, Marine Gen. James Mattis likes to tell the story of the British Navy. At the turn of the 19th century, it had no rival in the world, but 100 years later it had grown complacent in dominance. Officers amassed rules, ribbons, and rituals that had little to do with the changing nature of war. “They no longer had captains of wars,” he tells them, “but captains of ships.”
As commander of the U.S. Central Command, Mattis oversees the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, but his career mission has been against complacency. In modern warfare the reliance on better technology and superior firepower deadens the talent for innovation, he argues. This blinds some officers to emerging threats and slows their ability to react to them. The U.S. military, he argues “must avoid becoming dominant and irrelevant.”


A student of history and the beneficiary of decades of Marine teachings, Mattis also saw the dangers of failing to adapt firsthand. He commanded the First Marine Division that led the invasion into Iraq in 2003. Two months later he was called back to Iraq to fight a far different enemy than the one he had left: An insurgency had grown largely unchecked, and some military leaders had failed to spot the change. Mattis’ innovative approach to adapting to insurgent warfare where soldiers and Marines must “apply violence and chivalry often changing block by block” helped inform the doctrine contained in the Counterinsurgency Manual that he co-developed with Gen. David Petraeus, who will take over the CIA in September.
The higher your rank, the harder it is to get unfiltered information. So to keep his rank from getting in the way of seeing the battle and his men clearly, Mattis instituted reforms big and small. He uses the Marines term to “command and feedback” not the traditional “command and control” to emphasize communications. He tasked “eyes officers” to go through the ranks and report back to him those problems and concerns officers might be too tentative to report up the formal chain of command.
If you are always on the hunt for complacency, argues Mattis, you will reward risk-takers, and people who thrive in uncertainty. “Take the mavericks in your service,” he tells new officers, “the ones that wear rumpled uniforms and look like a bag of mud but whose ideas are so offsetting that they actually upset the people in the bureaucracy. One of your primary jobs is to take the risk and protect these people, because if they are not nurtured in your service, the enemy will bring their contrary ideas to you.”
He could easily be describing himself. As a colonel in the Gulf War, he pestered his operations officer so often with new ideas, C.H.A.O.S. came to stand for: “Colonel Has Another Outstanding Solution.”
Story here.

1 Comment

  1. I like Mattis, always have. I was in the 1st Mar Div during the invasion, and the MEF during a couple subsequent tours in Ramadi.  One of those tours I was the PSD Team Leader for the MEF(FWD) CG and deputy CGs.  Mattis was the MarCent cmdr so he’d fly into Iraq all the time to tour the area. On one occasion I was tasked to take him from Camp Fallujah to the Government Center in downtown Ramadi – not the nicest area.  He, along with his damn yes men entourage, wanted to go to the roof top where all the posts and machine-gun positions are.  Back in ’06 that place was hit every single day, multiple times a day.  Sure enough, about 15-minutes after we arrive in our gun-trucks, the place his hit with SAF and RPG fire.  While his entourage was trying to get their CARs, he went into the bunker with the .50 cal.  The young marine behind the M2 was just going to town, banging away with that gun.  Mattis did a little a-gunning for him.  While I was annoyed with his strap-hangers, Mattis was something else.

    Comment by MoreLiberty — Wednesday, October 10, 2012 @ 12:10 PM

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