David knocked out a good one with this article. I had no idea such a paper existed, about using Special Forces and PMC’s together for small wars like what is going on in Darfur. Why not? I am sure Special Forces units are used to working with far less capable forces, why not combine them with a western PMC. It would be interesting to hear some perspective on this from the snake eater community. Or better yet, I would love to hear this Major Jorgensen on Combat Operator Radio talk about this concept.
As for combining the two groups and creating some kind of unity of command? Incident Command all the way. Matter of fact, if all NGO’s and Government types could get on the same band wagon of the Incident Command System, then we could all be speaking the same language out there. It would be the middle ground, and something that would have excellent application in wars and other disasters. This example of Special Forces combined with PMC’s reminds me of my smokejumper days.
On fires, we would parachute in with two possible missions. If the fire was small, then we would put it out ourselves with minimum support. If the fire was big, or got big as we were on the ground, then we instantly transitioned to Incident Command mode and start to organize. We would make our assessments, and call into dispatch on what we would need to put out our fire–from man power, to equipment and logistical support, to air power. During that process, we would find our selves managing a whole slew of varied agencies and private contractors. It would not be odd at all, to have a Bureau of Indian Affairs hand crew, a Type 2 Private Contractor hand crew, a Type 2 Contractor Crew from Southern California that had maybe a few guys that spoke english, an Engine or two from the Forest Service, a Cop from a local PD, and some structure Engines from the Local Fire Department, all on one fire. The key to organizing such a mess of folks, is simple. They were all red carded forest firefighters, and new the common language of Incident Command. And if they didn’t, it was so simple, that it could be explained to them on the scene.
All in all though, most folks on a fire knew the drill. They had to have programable radios that were set up on scene to communicate for that fire, they had to have the fire clothing and equipment, they had to know plan of attack and who the Incident Commander was, they had to know their part in the battle, and who the adjacent forces were, and they had to have some knowledge of fires and the red flag and fire watch out situations. If they had a red card, that meant they knew what a forest fire was all about, and they knew what the incident commander was all about, and they worked from that point.
So how does this mesh up with what David, Jorgensen, and Taylor are all talking about? I believe with my experience in war zones as a Marine and as a contractor, along with my experience as a forest fire fighter and smokejumper (and a dispatcher), that the system I keep screaming about, would absolutely work in this capacity. It would add order to chaos, and it is the answer to all of our ‘unity of command’ problems. Plus, it is soooooo easy to learn and apply. It also allows for individual units to still maintain their command language and system, but brings them online with a universal management system that everyone can learn and use. Plus, you could transport this system in your back pocket, like a Leatherman Tool, and use it with other companies/government agencies/NGO’s etc. But it takes the guys paying the checks (UN, US, NGO’s, Companies, etc.) to implement this and make it happen. And they can do this, and it would benefit all of them.
Here is the other angle. Would a civilian like calling a sergeant a sergeant, or saluting an officer? Would they understand those concepts of management, or just mock them? Vice versa, would a sergeant like being called Bob or Day Shift Supervisor by a civilian? And that stuff already happens–and it ends up either a joke or damaging fragile egos, and the two groups kind of handle each other with kid gloves. To me, the sweet spot in the middle is something that is used, for when military and civilian groups are combined. With a little tweaking to the system, we can certainly implement this and make it happen. The pay off will be a more effective and efficient task force. It works well for disasters already, and war is just one more disaster that this stuff could be applied to. Organize, organize, organize–Incident Command System all the way! –Matt
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Dogs of War: Theory is fine, action is better
Published: March 20, 2009
By DAVID ISENBERG
WASHINGTON, March 20 (UPI) — The International Criminal Court issued a warrant on March 4 for the arrest of Sudanese President Omar Hassan al-Bashir for war crimes and crimes against humanity. Among other things, he is suspected of “intentionally directing attacks against an important part of the civilian population of Darfur, Sudan, murdering, exterminating, raping, torturing and forcibly transferring large numbers of civilians and pillaging their property.”
As a result, Bashir halted the work of relief organizations operating primarily in Darfur, leaving more than 1 million people without food, medical care or drinking water.
For many Sudanese, the relief agencies are their only source of protection and provisions; millions are now in an extremely vulnerable state. Without the supplies the relief organizations bring in, the camps are about to start failing. As New York Times columnist Nicholas Kristof wrote March 8:
“The camps will quickly run out of clean water because generator-operated pumps bring the water to the surface from wells and boreholes. Fuel supplies to operate the pumps may last a couple of weeks, and then the water disappears.
“Health clinics have already closed, and diarrhea is spreading in Zam Zam camp and meningitis in Kalma camp. These are huge camps — Kalma has perhaps 90,000 people — and diseases can spread rapidly. Children will be the first to die.”
If any place calls out for peace and stability, it is Darfur. Now consider that for years private military and security contractors have been saying they could bring exactly that, if only they were allowed to. Back in 2006, J. Cofer Black, then vice chairman of Blackwater USA, said that Blackwater could provide forces for Sudan’s Darfur province. He said the company could bolster existing peacekeeping forces from the African Union.
In the past few years, the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy at Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government and the U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute have been working on something called the Mass Atrocity Response Operations project. The idea is to equip the United States, other states and regional and international actors with the credible military planning tools to prevent or halt genocide or mass atrocity. It would do so by harnessing the professional expertise of retired and active U.S. military planners, who have extensive experience in planning responses to a broad range of complex contingencies. The response would, by design, include numerous private contractors. Indeed, one of the contributors to the project is Chris Taylor, a former vice president of Blackwater who is now with Mission Essential Personnel.
On MARO’s Web site, one can download the Annotated Planning Framework, a step-by-step guide intended primarily for use by military planners to quickly develop response options for developing genocide or mass-atrocity situations. Its first sample scenario is for “Mass Atrocity in Country X: A Land-Locked Country in Sub-Saharan Africa.” The first and only mention of contractors, “Protect contractor and NGO stabilization personnel and resources,” is at the end of Stage I, which presumes direct military intervention to stop ongoing genocide. So much for contractors operating instead of military forces. Talk is cheap.
Notwithstanding excellent work that PAE Group and DynCorp, under Defense Department contract, have been doing for years in Sudan supporting the African Union force, the fact is that just like regular military forces, they cannot be used unless political authorities give them permission.
So, what next? That brings us to Brent M. Jorgensen. He is an Army major who wrote a paper, “Outsourcing Small Wars: Expanding the Role of Private Military Companies in U.S. Military Operations,” published in 2005. In it, he outlines a Special Forces-led PMC model that could be used in Darfur.
Keep in mind that despite all the hand-wringing about the disaster, there are no nations — other than those of the AU — that are going to deploy troops there. And you can forget about the United States. If it did not do it when Colin L. Powell, as the U.S. secretary of state, called the conflict genocide, it is not going to do it now, at a time when the United States is sending more troops to Afghanistan.
Jorgensen postulates that the current situation in Darfur gets to the point where the United Nations labels it genocide. With memories of Rwanda, the Security Council authorizes an intervention to protect the non-Arab Sudanese. The United States does not want to commit any troops but does want to help the people of Darfur for various reasons.
The situation becomes a “small war,” which would “involve a wide range of military operations in conflicts involving states or nontraditional actors,” according to the Marine Corps Small Wars Manual.
The United States “supplies a very small contingent of U.S. soldiers backed by several PMCs to not only support the operation but also to provide security for the people of Darfur,” Jorgensen wrote. “This mission would consist of providing security for medical assistance, food relief, water purification and all other manners of aid. Also within this plan would be a security training effort by the United States’ contribution for the victimized Darfur residents. The Special Forces-led (private military force) could operate in this situation.”
In Jorgensen’s model, a Special Forces Operational Detachment essentially acts as contracting officer representatives over a group of PMCs to conduct an operation. Special Forces are chosen because their core mission includes managing surrogate forces in a small war — or unconventional warfare, to use the official jargon. The total number of U.S. troops would be 15; each one, with the exception of a judge advocate general, would act as COR for one to three PMCs. A SFOD is designed to manage a battalion size element of indigenous force — usually around 600 personnel. That means the total force would be around 615.
This is not a perfect solution, if for no other reason than contractors are not used to working directly under military command. But it is better than the alternative of doing nothing. And if private security and military contractors are not willing to consider this, then they should at least be honest enough to stop calling themselves the peace and stability industry.
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(U.S. Navy veteran David Isenberg is a researcher at the International Peace Research Institute in Oslo, Norway. He is an adjunct scholar with the Cato Institute and the author of a new book, “Shadow Force: Private Security Contractors in Iraq.” His “Dogs of War” column, analyzing developments in the private security and military sector, appears every Friday.)
Story Here
MARO Project Website Here
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Outsourcing Small Wars: Expanding the Role of Private Military Companies in U.S. Military Operations
Authors: Brent M. Jorgensen; NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY CA
Abstract: “Outsourcing Small Wars: Expanding the Role of Private Military Companies in U.S. Military Operations” argues that, under current domestic and international laws, and current military regulations and doctrine, the U.S. Army could, with only a few uniformed personnel, employ a force consisting of predominately private military companies (PMCs) to fight a non-vital interest U.S. small war. This work identifies a historical U.S. willingness to outsource operations that are traditionally conducted by its uniformed military; categorizes outsourcing as surrogate warfare and, therefore, manageable by U.S. Army Special Forces; addresses some of the risks involved with outsourcing; and analyzes the legal environment in which PMCs operate in today today’s environment. The recommendation from this thesis includes an illustration of how a Special Forces-led private military force should be organized, paying particular attention to the key components of the contract.
Purchase the Paper Here