What I did here is to read through the good General’s report and statements, and bring out some of the quotes of stuff I thought was cool. The first quote came from a question that Petraeus answered in regards to private security contractors in Afghanistan. This quote only reconfirms the idea that contractors will continue to be used in the same way, and until Afghanistan can square away their project. The statement hints to this concept of an ‘Afghan public protection force’ through the Ministry of Interior. We will see how that goes?
The other quotes speak for themselves. The bottom line assessment basically states that the Taliban momentum has been halted in Afghanistan. That is awesome, but it also mentions how fragile this is–which is a common theme with many of Petraeus’ assessments during war time. Always giving a cautionary thumbs up…
I was also intrigued by the Afghan Local Police Initiative, and it seems like this is an area that Petraeus is really enthused about. It would make sense that this is working, just as long as it was being done correctly. If villages have the ability to protect themselves, then the Taliban is limited in using their default mechanism of control–and that is fear and intimidation. We just have to make sure that we are not giving up any moral or mental ground, strategically speaking, when it comes to this battle over the local populations. Thats fine that we arm them, but we still need to be working on keeping them on our side. Good stuff though.
And along those lines, the Taliban reconciliation efforts sound promising. With ‘turned enemy combatants’, we have the ability to possibly create some pseudo-operators? I would have to think that out of the 700 or so turned Taliban, that there would be a few that we could use to penetrate into Pakistan and get bigger fish? Progress in Afghanistan is great, but I say use these guys to go after the big prize called Osama Bin Laden and his irhabist scum bag friends.
Under the purchases quote, the thing that I clued in on were the blimps and aerostat towers. Lots of eyes in the sky, to include the drones, really help in our decision making loops or OODA. (the observe portion) With blimps and tower systems, you don’t have to depend upon fuel or electricity to keep it constantly flying. You just put it up in the air or raise it, and put eyes on the areas of importance. This observation capability is a night and day operation, and that is a huge advantage on the battlefield.
I also liked the mention of the CERP or Commander’s Emergency Response Program. This was used to great advantage by commanders in Iraq, and it is great to see that it is useful in Afghanistan. It is simply using money as a strategic asset to local operations. A commander could pay for a ditch to be dug, or pay some blood money to the parents of a lost child. They can do all sorts of interesting things with this money to positively impact relations between the locals and that military unit. The Taliban uses money to impact relations with the locals as well, and this is just one area a commander can compete in and even dominate in, to deny the Taliban any advantage.
The way I see it, is that this is a ‘all politics is local‘ issue, and you could frame this as the foreigner versus the local thug (with emphasis on local). CERP at least allows a commander to be competitive, and help to make him a better idea than the other guy. –Matt
Private Security Contractors
(In regards to a recent agreement that would allow the Afghan government to continue to use private contractors for a specified period.)
“My deputy commander e-mailed me this morning right before this and said there had been an agreement on the ability to continue the use of private security contractors for a specified period, as a bridge to achieving what, I think, President Karzai understandably wants to do – which is to bring these kinds of forces underneath the oversight of the Afghan public protection force, an element of the Ministry of Interior, so that they are not in a sense armed elements that may be working for a former warlord or another,” he said.
Link to quote here.
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STATEMENT OF GENERAL DAVID H. PETRAEUS BEFORE THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE, 15 MAR 2011
Bottom Line Up Front
As a bottom line up front, it is ISAF’s assessment that the momentum achieved by the Taliban in Afghanistan since 2005 has been arrested in much of the country and reversed in a number of important areas. However, while the security progress achieved over the past year is significant, it is also fragile and reversible. Moreover, it is clear that much difficult work lies ahead with our Afghan partners to solidify and expand our gains in the face of the expected Taliban spring offensive. Nonetheless, the hard-fought achievements in 2010 and early 2011 have enabled the Joint Afghan-NATO Transition Board to recommend initiation this spring of transition to Afghan lead in several provinces. The achievements of the past year are also very important as I prepare to provide options and a recommendation to President Obama for commencement of the drawdown of the US surge forces in July. Of note, as well, the progress achieved has put us on the right azimuth to accomplish the objective agreed upon at last November’s Lisbon Summit, that of Afghan forces in the lead throughout the country by the end of 2014.
The Afghan Local Police Initiative
President Karzai’s Afghan Local Police initiative has also been an important addition to the overall campaign. It is, in essence, a community watch with AK-47s, under the local District Chief of Police, with members nominated by a representative Shura Council, vetted by the Afghan intel service, and trained by and partnered with Afghan Police and US Special Forces elements. The initiative does more than just allow the arming of local forces and the conduct of limited defensive missions; through the way each unit is established, this program mobilizes communities in self-defense against those who would undermine security in their areas. For that reason, the growth of these elements is of particular concern to the Taliban, whose ability to intimidate the population is limited considerably by it.
There are currently 70 districts identified for ALP elements, with each district’s authorization averaging 300 ALP members. Twenty-seven of the district ALP elements have been validated for full operations, while the other 43 are in various stages of being established. This program has emerged as so important that I have put a conventional US infantry battalion under the operational control of our Special Operations Command in Afghanistan to increase our ability to support the program’s expansion.
Taliban Reconciliation
And we have provided assistance for new Afghan government-led initiatives in reintegration, supporting the recently established Afghan High Peace Council and Provincial Peace and Reintegration Councils. Indeed, we recognize that we and our Afghan partners cannot just kill or capture our way out of the insurgency in Afghanistan; Afghan-led reintegration of reconcilable insurgents must also be an important element of the strategy – and it now is. In fact, some 700 former Taliban have now officially reintegrated with Afghan authorities and some 2,000 more are in various stages of the reintegration process.
On Purchases
Second, I want to express my deep appreciation for your support of vital additional capabilities for our troopers. The funding you have provided has, for example, enabled the rapid deployment of a substantial increase in the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets supporting our forces. To take one example, we have increased the number of various types of persistent surveillance systems – essentially blimps and towers with optics – from 114 this past August to 184 at the present, with plans for continued increases throughout this year. Your support has also enabled the rapid procurement and deployment of the all terrain vehicle version of the mine resistant ambush protected family of vehicles, with 6,700 fielded since I took command. And, your support has continued to provide our commanders with another critical element of our strategy, the Commander’s Emergency Response Program funding that has once again proven absolutely invaluable as a way of capitalizing rapidly on hard-won gains on the ground. Indeed, CERP funding, the establishment of the Afghan Infrastructure Fund, and the specific authorization for the reintegration program have been instrumental in enabling key components of our overall effort.
Publication of report on Scribd here.