So I have been hanging out the last couple of days over at Tim’s blog, Free Range International, and talking about the concept of hybrid remote camps in Afghanistan. It’s a very simple concept–use civilians to support these smaller outposts to free up the military to do their thing. Tim’s point was that contractors could totally defend a camp and assist in reconstruction efforts, all while being close to and working with the local populations in these camps for the long term. And because we are limited with troops, adding more contractors to the equation, if done right, could certainly be a force multiplier. Tim brought up a UN civilian contractor/ Special Forces hybrid remote camp in his post, and I brought up the various camp defense scenarios in Iraq with Blackwater in Najaf and Triple Canopy in Al Kut. The best point I brought up, in my opinion, were the remote camps that were completely supplied, operated and defended by civilians with the CMC (Coalition Munitions Clearance) program in Iraq.
What we are exploring with this idea, is how do you get the most bang for your buck in this war, and how do you make your combat troops more lethal and efficient? Our point in the discussion was using contractors to free up the war fighters even more, to get them out into the populations centers and do good things–like kill the enemy or protect and serve the local populations.
Civilians can set up man the defense, they can run camp services, they can run logistics operations to supply the camp, they can fix stuff, and do all the menial tasks that take troops away from the fight. We have already been doing this in Iraq, and to some degree in Afghanistan, but what we are talking about are the small combat outposts that are posted near the villages that we are trying to protect, do road construction and infrastructure projects for, and generally reduce the commute distance between the military and local populations. Tim was making the point that military units come and go, and the continuity of the operation is hindered. If there was a civilian component that was always there, and always manning the operation, that the local populations could recognize and constantly work with, then that would be good. All the military has to do is just keep moving in and out of these camps, and focus on bad guys, we can stay and ensure that the promises we made to the villages are being kept and constantly being worked on until finished.
If we promised a road, then that civilian component works until the contract is finished, and uses local workers and local security, along with security contractors and engineers to run and manage the project. That is how the CMC project ran, and it worked great. The CMC project cleared literally tons of munitions in Iraq, and employed hundreds of Iraqis with jobs. The project was moral, it was looked at as good by the people, it infused money into the local economies, it insured the protection of the camp(except from foreign insurgencies not connected to the villages) and it united two peoples and two groups under a common cause.
We can run that camp indefinitely or until all the missions and contracts are completed. That civilian core can constantly be working with the local leaders for manpower issues and even security forces, to supplement the camp forces. For the CMC projects, this is exactly how it worked. The project employed hundreds of locals in munitions clearance and security. And most of the private security locals, had the same mentality as private contractors in any part of the world. They want to make money, they are there to work, they want good leadership and training, and they want the tools necessary to survive. Often these private security local nationals would either just go home after the contract to spend their money and enjoy their family, or go on to join the military or police. I imagine in Afghanistan, the freedom of security contracting is more appealing than joining the military or police–and maybe because of low pay with police or military, poor management in those forces, a distrust in government with corruption or whatever are the reasons why guys would much rather work these kinds of security contracts.
When I worked in Iraq, many of the contract local security I worked with were all there because they wanted to earn money to build a home and get a wife. There were others that were very into their new country as well, but the primary reason was job related. Hell, I am sure a few even fought for the other side in the past, but because we paid better and were stable and had the moral high ground (destroying old unstable bombs), that we were able bring them in and keep them busy with the CMC stuff. If you are busy working and making money, it’s kind of hard to find time to work for the other side. Maybe the true believers, but the average Joe’s could care less and just want peace and stability, and something to show for their efforts and sacrifice.
My other point I brought up is that contractors will work a camp for as long as it is running. We look at a contract as putting food on the table, and not just a long term deployment. If the site is run well, with plenty of rotating leave schedules/excellent pay/and well managed operations, then you will get a situation that not only benefits the local population, but also provides incentive for the contractors to keep coming back. And best of all, those efforts free up the military to go after the Taliban and physically protect and serve the local populations.
Now if a camp got attacked, the fear I guess is that guys would just up and leave. I didn’t see that too much in Iraq, but yeah, guys leave after incidents. (both local security, and security contractors) But in my experience, if individuals are properly managed and vetted in the first place, you won’t see much of this. Everyone knows by now what it means to work in a war zone. And in Afghanistan, you have young men with guns who have a proud tradition of being the warrior. Many security contractors that have been doing this awhile, or even fresh out of the services, know what it means to ‘hang tough’ in a war zone.
The other thing that is keeping guys on the ground is the economy as well. It’s either hang with the contract and make it work, or go back home and join the unemployment line. And for a lot of us, a four year degree as a grunt only goes so far in today’s world. The key for our industry is to attract those grunts back into the fold, and introduce them into a world the totally embraces their skillsets–and hopefully keep them around awhile by taking good care of them.
In essence, we could be a vital component of the COIN effort in the war in Afghanistan, and we will definitely be the ‘soup stock of this war soup’. And to bring some relevance to the discussion, John Nagl brought up some key points about the war in Afghanistan and what is required for effective operations.
“In 2007, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Adm. Michael Mullen, was very blunt before the Senate Armed Services Committee. He admitted, “In Iraq, we do what we must.” Of America’s other war, he said, “In Afghanistan, we do what we can.”
Doing what we can has been insufficient in Afghanistan. Fortunately, an improving security situation and an increasingly capable Iraqi government now allow the United States to shift the balance of effort east, to America’s forgotten war.
This shift comes in the nick of time. The Taliban has been growing stronger in the poorly administered Pashtun tribal areas on either side of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. Last year was the bloodiest year on record for the international coalition, and service in Afghanistan is far more dangerous on a per-soldier basis than is service in Iraq. It is clearly time for a change in strategy.
The essence of success is counterinsurgency, which requires boots on the ground, and plenty of them — 20 to 25 counterinsurgents for every 1,000 people, or some 600,000 for all of Afghanistan, a country larger and more populous than Iraq. The additional 30,000 American forces on tap for deployment to Afghanistan over the next year are sorely needed, but obviously insufficient to protect all 30 million people in the country.
However, insurgencies are not defeated by foreign forces. They are defeated by the security services of the afflicted nation. Thus the long-term answer to the Taliban’s insurgency has to be a much expanded Afghan National Army. Currently 70,000 and projected to grow to 135,000, the Afghan army is the most respected institution in that troubled country. It may need to reach 250,000, and be supported by a similarly sized police force, to provide the security that will cause the Taliban to wither. Building such an Afghan Army will be a long-term effort that will require American equipment and advisers for many years, but since the Afghans can field about 70 troops for the cost of one deployed American soldier, there is no faster, cheaper or better way to win.” -John Nagl, NYT Blog
The blog called the Captain’s Journal also agreed with what Nagl had to say about this, and I also heard it being discussed over at other forums and blogs out there. The main point is, we need a lot of troops, both Afghani and military, and I will argue contractors as well, to deal with this problem.
To sum up this thread, private industry will answer the call, if in fact this something the war planners want done. It must be done right though, and if civilians are to be used in such a way, you must give them to tools necessary to defend and support a camp. The contracts must be well written, with clear objectives, and monitored by quality control mechanisms(government and the company). And once the correct model is established for setting this up, we must insure that it is being replicated and each camp is always striving for customer satisfaction, good morale and always improving the defense and operations so the military component of the camp can do their job. –Matt