This is a subject close to my heart, and I think it deserves some attention. I respect Peter Singer’s work and I have read Corporate Warriors, and it was an interesting book about the history of security contracting. I have also read his article about the harm military contractors are doing to the current counterinsurgency(COIN) operations and it has troubled me to some degree. The article makes the case as if there is no place in today’s wars for the private industry and that we are not worth the effort. I guess my argument is that we do have a place in today’s wars, and we are performing crucial services for the US Government. But I do agree that we could be doing some harm to the overall COIN strategy and that we need to find some solutions on how to work together more efficiently.
Now my focus will be more about the operational relationship out in the field between the military companies and the military. I cannot even begin to talk about contracts or money or all of that other stuff. But what I can talk about is the operational relationship of the two, and some possible solutions to get us all on the same sheet of music so we can only enhance the war effort, and not hinder it.
As for my background, I have worked for the US Government in one capacity or another for most of my adult life. But the most relevant job to this discussion I held was as a smokejumper and forest fighter in the US wild land fire services. I fought forest fires with the Bureau of Land Management and with the Forest Service, and I witnessed the use of thousands of private industry service providers doing an amazing job providing support to these incidents. From cooking food, to cleaning clothes, to providing shelter, all the way up to fighting fires from the land and air–the private fire fighting industry does it all. I also think today’s military companies and military can learn a lot from this relationship.
What was most unique with this relationship is the fact that the services of these fire contractors could be called up at a moments notice through a dispatch center, and released at a moments notice through what is called a ‘call when needed contract’. And this call up was all based on the Incident Commander’s decision(the manager of the fire). If this commander of the fire did not need those services anymore, he would just tell them that they were no longer needed and inform the Dispatch Center that they have been released from incident. There is something remarkably simplistic about this system of command that the military companies and military can learn a lot from.
I am also uniquely positioned to evaluate this relationship between security contractors and the US Government in this war. I have been working as a security contractor since 2004 and have had the opportunity to work on several contracts in Iraq as a armed Security Specialist. The camps I worked at, were remote operations run completely by contractors, with the loose oversight by one Army Corps of Engineers liaison/handler. At these camps I worked at, private industry bomb technicians would destroy munitions and the Security Specialists would protect the bomb technicians and the camp from any threats. We were on our own at these remote sites, and certainly operated outside the wire of the FOB’s and Air Bases over there. And these camps had everything from kitchens to trailers for lodging to shower units and a garage to work on vehicles. There was also a supervisor that ran the bomb disposal operations, a supervisor that ran security operations, and a supervisor that ran the camp.
In this comparison, I would place the ACE liaison/handler as the Incident Commander of our camp and operations. These individuals had no real command over the camp though. Instead, the contractors were in command of operations, and the ACE was there to ensure that the bomb disposal job was completed to the specifications of the contract. The ACE was not tasked with hiring or firing, or bringing in resources or releasing resources, and to me, this was a problem. It was as if we had separate units doing their own thing at these sites, and there were always arguments as to who had to do what.
Of course the subcontracted companies had to answer to the company that hired them, but that main company could care less about the internal matters of these companies, and all they really cared about was the contract and finishing the job. There was no real unified command, just companies managing themselves. At these remote sites, the bomb technician supervisor was supposed to be in charge of all of us, because he was a part of the top company that hired the rest of us. He wasn’t in that position because he was qualified to an entire camp or that he knew security operations, he was just the guy in charge of the bomb technicians.
I also had to answer to a Site Security Manager and a Team Leader, and to the company that hired me. It was always interesting when you would get one command from the SSM and then get another command from the bomb tech supervisor that conflicted. Or if you had an issue with leadership, you had to go through your company and that the bomb tech supervisor was out of that loop. There were just so many issues that were confusing and conflicting, because there wasn’t a solid system of command that included all parties involved. If leaders were universally recognized in a system that everyone knew and operated off of, then we could go a long way towards unified command. A Site Security Manager and their capabilities should be universally recognized. I should be able to expect the same standard from a SSM, where ever I go in that war zone amongst the military companies. And I should also know who to answer to with this command system, and how that command system works with the other companies.
Instead of the companies creating their own separate command systems, what is needed is a system that unifies all that are involved. A system that everyone can understand and use, and at any site and at any war zone. It should also be a system that the military understands and can use, so that everyone is on the same sheet of music. And one system that deserves some attention, and has been tested and widely used, is the Incident Command System.
In the US, the Incident Command System was developed as a universal management tool that all participating forces could understand and use. It is a system of management used throughout the world in emergencies, and it is very simple to use. It was a system primarily developed by the wild land fire fighting community as an answer to some of the problems they were facing in the past with command and control.
And that problem was, ‘how do you unify a command, when none of the resources have worked with each other before or are not bound by any agreement or contract to work with each other’? The Incident Command system is used as a common language and instant chain of command. And having used this command system in the past and witnessing it’s effectiveness, I can say that the military contracting world and military could use such a thing. It would be a common language between the two groups, but would not shut down the internal command and control structures. In essence, the military could still speak Latin, the military companies could still speak French, but when they all get together they speak English(Incident Command).
It’s either that, or force the military companies to adopt specific service related ‘command and control’ systems. But then we cross into that area of what are military companies? Are we civilians or are we military? Should we start calling one another by rank, like Sergeant or Private? Should we be saluting officers? How far do we go towards being an ‘attachment’ of the military, as opposed to a service provider?
The other crucial aspect of the Incident Command structure is communications. Everyone needs the same radios or the ability to program radios so that everyone can talk. They also needed a common tactical voice on that radio, that everyone could understand. You don’t call the Incident Commander of a fire ‘chief’ or ‘honcho’ , you called him ‘(the name of the fire) IC…’. Although I did witness the use of a military type language over the radios, with lots of ‘over’ and ‘roger that’, but as for common command language between military and private military, there was none. What does a Team Leader mean to a Captain? What does a Site Security Manager mean to an S-1?
So going back to the remote camps I worked at, in regards to communications, I thought it was severely lacking. The problem is that big military will not hand over radios and encryption gear because of some perceived security risk. Instead we depended upon satellite phones, cell phones, and handheld radios. The deal is though, that military really doesn’t closely monitor their phones during incidents. They are on their main radios and chatting away. And with incidents evolving quickly, instant and clear communications is vital. That is why I always thought it to be ridiculous and dangerous that we did not have the same communications equipment as the military. Instead, we would hand a few of the military patrols some handheld radios that we used internally, and that is about it for our integration. But that is putting a band-aid on the sucking chest wound of communications.
To me, communications is vital for coordinating med-evacs or stopping fratricide or coordinate forces to deal with threats. The lack of communications support between military contractors and military has the potential to hinder overall COIN strategies in those areas of operation. And going back to the Armies COIN manual, unified command is vital in order to ensure all adjacent forces are talking and on the same sheet of music. Anything less, and you put that mission at risk, and could destroy months of work one single mindless act that either offended some sheik or made a stupid promise that only worked against the military’s work with the locals. There are a number of things that could go down, and military companies and military need to be talking, and not have hindered communications.
The final point I wanted to make was strategy in itself. In the fire service, the Incident Commander was always responsible for coming up with a strategy and gave a briefing for all the resources on that fire. And a big part of that strategy was built upon the idea that everyone on that fire had some idea of how fires are to be fought. And this goes back to qualifications. In the fire service we have what’s called a Incident Qualifications System (or ‘Red Card’ because of the color of the paper used for the card) system which showed wether or not an individual was certified to be on that fire or do that job on a fire.
At the remote camps, there was no real universal qualifications system that anyone could refer to. A Team Leader was simply hired based on the whims of the company. A Camp Manager was hired because he supposedly did logistics in the Army at one time in their past. Or a Security Specialist was hired in country, because the company needed to fill a slot and not because that certain security specialist was necessarily qualified. There was no universal qualifications system that identified a particular person’s capabilities. And in my judgement, this has led to some serious issues out in the field.
On fires, the Incident Commander had the authority to check anyone’s Red Card to see if they were who they said they were. He could even call the Dispatch Center and have them look up the person’s qualification on a online database. But really, the IC rarely had to use this authority, because the individual out in the field was already nationally screened. In the fire world, you do not get to work on fires, if you do not have the qualifications. You must pass a hiking test with 45 lbs. on your back, you must go through a fire fighting refresher course of 40 hours, and you must have all the appropriate certifications updated on your Red Card in order to work as a contractor or even in the federal government on a fire.
And if that fire contractor wants to work on a fire, they not only have to pass these basic qualifications to be on a fire, but they must also have universally accepted skill sets on their card if they want to be marketable. If they want to be used as a Engine Boss, then they have to become Red Card qualified to be an Engine Boss. And on a fire, they are called an Engine Boss– common command language. If they want to be a Food Unit Leader, then they must be qualified to be a Food Unit Leader and have it in the Incident Qualifications System in order for them to get work as such. This is the basic concept of the Red Card system, and it works.
So what is the strategy and qualifications that all contractors in war zones should be universally up to date on, if we were to implement a Red Card type system? The military has attempted to delve into this concept with the CRC program, which is somewhat equivalent to just taking the ’45 lb. pack test’ in fire. But the program fails to implement any real qualifications system or teach any strategy or command structure to contractors. I should know, I went through the program. They taught us really basic stuff like first aid, chemical/biological warfare survival, and IED recognition, but it wasn’t enought. That and I had to go through a lot of medical check ups, which was great, but none of it really focused on teaching contractors how to integrate and work with big military out in the field. Nor was any strategy talked about, like how contractors are to work around the various COIN (counter insurgency) operations going on in that war zone.
When I worked at the remote camps as a security specialist, we worked with many local town folk. They were doing the security jobs and munitions cleanup jobs at our sites. The result was that we were impacting the local economy of these towns in a very positive manner. Which is great for COIN–hearts and minds stuff. We also were very involved with the local dynamics of the tribes. A sheik or tribal chief or businessman was always trying to do business with us, and we dealt with many of these local types of leaders. And the information that we got from these relationships were of great interest to the local commanders of Coalition forces. For that reason alone, it is absolutely vital that we are on the same sheet of music as far as COIN operations, but we were not.
At the various camps I worked at, the relationship between the leadership of the site and the local commanders of coalition forces was always one of caution and mystery. A commander of military forces knows how to work with his own troops, and they speak a very specific language of command/control and strategy. When they confront a camp like ours in their Area of Operations, they have no clue what to expect or what it is we do or what we are capable of. These commanders don’t even know how talk with a Site Security Manager. But what is worse, is that these commanders had no real control over our operations, nor could they really depend upon us for any kind of real combat support. We are defensive only assets, and the second you use us for any offensive operations or for some kind quick reaction force that goes outside the realm of the contract or Rules for the Use of Force, then you put contractors in a very precarious position. It’s not that we don’t want to help, it’s just that if we do, we could get in serious legal trouble.
But I still think that we have a place in today’s COIN strategy, and we should. The reason I say this is because we are out there with guns, doing a dangerous and necessary job, and we are integrating with the local populations while doing this. If we do not have guidance, and if we do not have a unified command(with a universal command structure and universal communications and a common knowledge base) then we could potentially do more harm than good to the local COIN operations. So it is imperative that this issue be worked out.
Luckily, most of the guys out in the field understand the military command structure and communications because they are prior military. But as for COIN operations, the military companies and military are no where near unified or on the same sheet of music. I am positive that we can work through these issues, but it takes some credible voices on both sides of this issue to bring attention to this matter. I also think that the military thinkers and planners who are trying to work through these problems, in the tradition of Col. John Boyd, should not be afraid to look at the Incident Command system or the Red Card system.
So to summarize, I think a common language of command and control needs to be used, possibly similar to the Incident Command system. The military does not need to change their internal systems, nor should the military companies change their internal systems; but when they come together, the two groups should be able to speak the same command language. And this common language would also help the military and civilian agencies talk when on disasters like hurricanes or fires, because the Incident Command system is already known and used in those environments.
I also think a qualifications system like the Red Card system could be implemented within the military companies side of the house, and even the military side of the house. And I say this, because when I was in the Marines back in the day, I actually went through a forest fire fighter course so that I could fight fires. The military has been used on many forest fires in the past, and have always been re-structured under the Incident Command system in order to accommodate the fire services when used. I should know, I was one of those Federal fire service employees that have had to work around the US military on forest fires. So the military could work with a Incident Command type system with the military companies.
And the matter of radios could easily be handled with a Red Card type system. Either you have a secret clearance and the qualifications to operate that radio, or you do not have those qualifications. And with a national(or international)type system, that is universally recognized, then we could make it part of the qualifications of civilians to be able operate these radios. Although I think the biggest stumbling block with this would be the use of foreign elements in a company, and operating these radios. But yet again, I have to bring up the fire services as an example of working through this issue. The Red Card system has not only been a national system, but is also an internationally recognized system. Meaning if Australia wants to send forest fire fighters to the US, which they have done, then those Australians must be qualified under the US Red Card system to fight forest fires. It’s that simple, and if they want to play, they have to get those qualifications. The same could be applied to war zone Radio Operators, and the US government contracting services and DOD/DOS could dictate how that could happen.
But most important out of all of these reforms, would be the advent of the sharing of certain aspects of strategy and ensuring the private companies are all on the same sheet of music. I constantly promote the idea of guys in the industry learning what COIN is or reading the Army/Marines COIN manual, just so they have an idea of what is involved out there. But this is not required reading at the various companies or remote sites, nor is it something that is required in any contracts. With a Red Card type system, we could make it a requirement that all contractors are at least familiar with the concepts and taught them in a certified classroom. The idea being, that as soon as the contractor steps foot in whatever war zone, that they know the impact of their actions on the local COIN operations and will able to easily integrate with that operation. It is absolutely vital in this war, that we have a ‘unified command’ out there, and these simple measures will definitely help us to achieve that unified command. If we do not address these issues, then we will continue to see damage being done to the overall war effort. And who knows, if we can work through these issue, the military companies out there could actually become force multipliers for COIN operations. -Head Jundi
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Can’t Win With ‘Em, Can’t Go To War Without ‘Em: Private Military Contractors and Counterinsurgency
September 2007
By P. W. Singer
Executive Summary
The use of private military contractors appears to have harmed, rather than helped the counterinsurgency efforts of the U.S. mission in Iraq. Even worse, it has created a dependency syndrome on the private marketplace that not merely creates critical vulnerabilities, but shows all the signs of the last downward spirals of an addiction. If we judge by what has happened in Iraq, when it comes to private military contractors and counterinsurgency, the U.S. has locked itself into a vicious cycle. It can’t win with them, but can’t go to war without them.
The study explores how the current use of private military contractors:
• Allows policymakers to dodge key decisions that carry political costs, thus leading to operational choices that might not reflect public interest.
• Enables a “bigger is better” approach to operations that runs contrary to the best lessons of U.S. military strategy.
• Inflames popular opinion against, rather than for, the American mission through operational practices that ignore the fundamental lessons of counterinsurgency.
• Participated in a series of abuses that have undermined efforts at winning “hearts and minds” of the Iraqi people.
• Weakened American efforts in the “war of ideas” both inside Iraq and beyond.
• Reveals a double standard towards Iraqi civilian institutions that undermines efforts to build up these very same institutions, another key lesson of counterinsurgency.
• Forced policymakers to jettison strategies designed to win the counterinsurgency on multiple occasions, before they even had a chance to succeed.
Link Here
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The Incident Command System by Wikipedia
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Buy the Guide Here