Feral Jundi

Sunday, August 8, 2010

Afghanistan: Karzai Calls For Ban On Foreign PSC’s To Get Back At U.S. Over Anticorruption Efforts

Filed under: Afghanistan,Industry Talk — Tags: , , , , — Matt @ 12:12 PM

   Karzai just kills me sometimes.  It was guys from DynCorp and other companies over the years that saved his life with professional PSD teams, over and over again.  But hey, if these anticorruption units are tearing apart Crazy Karzai’s little mafia, then that is great and he can cry all he wants. Maybe he will get the point that there are a lot of people fighting and dying for the sake of his government, and the least he could do is square away his house.  And if he can’t do it, then by god, we will pull him along kicking and screaming. Call it tough love. lol

   As for him actually banning companies?  Good luck there.  It is the foreign companies that are actually delivering a better service than these local afghani companies, just because these ‘foreign PSC’s’ have folks who are trained and have discipline.  They also operate with more scrutiny than any of the local companies.

   I think what might really be happening is that maybe these foreign companies are being tasked to watch over, or even take over some of these local national contracts that have been so screwed up.  If that is the case, then of course Crazy Karzai and his insane clown posse would be pissed, because that would cut into his crew’s profit margin. This is just another opportunity for him to try and further consolidate the market under his family’s control.  Just some thoughts on the matter, and it sounds like politics and business as usual.-Matt

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Karzai Calls for Ban on Private Security Companies

Afghan President’s Remarks Add to Strains With U.S. Over Anticorruption Efforts

AUGUST 8, 2010

By YAROSLAV TROFIMOV And MARIA ABI-HABIB

KABUL—Afghan President Hamid Karzai lashed out against foreign interference and called for a ban on the private security companies that protect many Western installations here, in a speech that ratchets up recent tensions with the U.S. over two American-backed anticorruption agencies.

“We have the ability to rule and govern our country and we have our sovereignty. We hope that NATO countries and the U.S. pay attention,” Mr. Karzai told a gathering of Afghan public servants in a speech on Saturday. “No Afghan administration will be successful unless it lays off its foreign advisers and replaces them with Afghans.”

The call to ban private security companies came a week after a convoy of DynCorp International, which provides security in Afghanistan under a U.S. State Department contract, was involved in a car accident that killed an Afghan civilian in Kabul. The accident sparked rioting and anti-American protests.

The 10 aid workers killed last week as they returned to Kabul from a remote part of the country didn’t have a security detail.

The Afghan leader’s defiant weekend speech came days after U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton phoned Mr. Karzai to press him to live up to his anticorruption commitments, according to U.S. officials, warning that his recent attempt to weaken two U.S.-mentored antigraft agencies could endanger the chances of congressional approval for billions of dollars in aid to Afghanistan.

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Friday, August 6, 2010

Building Snowmobiles: Using Economic Theory To Predict Enemy Strategy?

Filed under: Afghanistan,Building Snowmobiles,Strategy — Tags: , , , , , , , , — Matt @ 1:38 AM

“It is clear that war is not a mere act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political activity by other means.” Karl Von Clauswitz

“What is of supreme importance in war is to attack the enemy’s strategy.” – Sun Tzu

     First off, I want to mention that this post is the product of one of my reader’s ‘a ha’ moments.  What really makes this cool is that this reader is a fan of the ‘building snowmobiles’ posts on FJ and this was him putting together these random pieces and creating something out of all of it.  He had attended a college course years back that covered economic theory, he is well read on the war and a veteran of the war in Afghanistan, he had read Feral Jundi and knew how fun analysis and synthesis can be, and then finally stumbled on some recent news about the war and Taliban strategy, and put it all together. And this is me trying to assemble the thing based on his instructions, and I am thoroughly enjoying myself.

     Simply put, this is about using economic theory as a potential tool to predict enemy strategies, so you can defeat those strategies.  Because like Sun Tzu says, it ‘is of supreme importance to attack the enemy’s strategy’. Of course I am not going to go all out and say you can predict with 100 percent certainty what your enemy will do. Still, the closer you can get the better, and these are potential tools you can use for predictive analysis.

    In this exercise, we will use Afghanistan and the current war against the Taliban there. At this time, we are also using a counter-insurgency strategy.  The Taliban are considered the insurgents in this case, and they too are using a insurgency type strategy.  Both strategies are heavily influenced by gaining the support of the population. Famous counter-insurgent David Galula had this to say about counterinsurgency:

The aim of the war is to gain the support of the population Galula proposes four “laws” for counterinsurgency:

1.The aim of the war is to gain the support of the population rather than control of territory.

2.Most of the population will be neutral in the conflict; support of the masses can be obtained with the help of an active friendly minority.

3.Support of the population may be lost. The population must be efficiently protected to allow it to cooperate without fear of retribution by the opposite party.

4.Order enforcement should be done progressively by removing or driving away armed opponents, then gaining support of the population, and eventually strengthening positions by building infrastructure and setting long-term relationships with the population. This must be done area by area, using a pacified territory as a basis of operation to conquer a neighbouring area.

Galula contends that:

A victory [in a counterinsurgency] is not the destruction in a given area of the insurgent’s forces and his political organization. … A victory is that plus the permanent isolation of the insurgent from the population, isolation not enforced upon the population, but maintained by and with the population. … In conventional warfare, strength is assessed according to military or other tangible criteria, such as the number of divisions, the position they hold, the industrial resources, etc. In revolutionary warfare, strength must be assessed by the extent of support from the population as measured in terms of political organization at the grass roots. The counterinsurgent reaches a position of strength when his power is embedded in a political organization issuing from, and firmly supported by, the population. 

   I wanted to put this out there first as one of the main definitions of COIN, so we have somewhere to start.(most strategies are population-centric)  In this war, we are basically fighting for the support of the people, and you could easily say that this is politics with guns.  You could also say that both sides of this conflict are selling to the population that they are a better idea and friend than the other guy.  The Taliban use their methods to achieve population support, and we use ours. In other words, we are in the business of politics in this war. We are trying to win votes or popularity, and like politicians, we are finding all and any way to win as many votes as possible.

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Thursday, August 5, 2010

Logistics: DoD Continues Undeclared War Against Private Sector Sustainment, By Daniel Goure, Ph.D.

Filed under: Afghanistan,Industry Talk,Iraq,Logistics — Tags: , , , , , , — Matt @ 1:36 AM

     This was a quick blog post by the author, but definitely interesting. I was really curious about this concept called a ‘whispering campaign’? Check it out. –Matt

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DoD Continues Undeclared War Against Private Sector Sustainment

Daniel Goure, Ph.D.

Wednesday, August 4, 2010

Even as Secretary Gates and Under Secretary Carter conduct civilized exchanges with leaders of defense industry, the undeclared war by the Department of Defense (DoD) on the private sector continues. This war has focused particularly on the role of private companies in providing logistics and sustainment for U.S. forces. It has not only been overt with contracts being cancelled and work once done by private contractors dragged back into the government depot system, but it also includes a “whispering campaign” in which the cost effectiveness of private contractor logistics providers is questioned. Senior DoD logistics and sustainment officials routinely make comments in public meetings or to media outlets critical of the private sector and its need for profits. DoD executives have repeatedly asserted that contractor logistics support (CLS) and performance-based logistics (PBL) contracts are too expensive and that the government could do the same work for less.

These kinds of assertions fly in the face of available evidence. Data available to DoD officials clearly demonstrates that private sector support is generally less costly than the same work done by the organic or government sustainment system. The Air Force’s own data shows that the average annual cost growth for aircraft programs supported solely from the organic industrial base was greater than that for aircraft programs under either PBL or CLS arrangements. The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics has identified a set of PBL contracts which collectively have saved the government more than $1.5 billion.

PBLs have a proven record of providing high availability rates as well as delivering year over year cost savings greater than the 2-3 percent productivity goals of the OSD efficiency initiative. This is supported by the OSD Product Support Assessment Team’s report on PBLs. For example, Boeing’s C-17 Global Support Program provides for one of the lowest DPFH (dollars per flight hour) platforms in the USAF inventory. Comparing FY04 costs to FY09 costs, U.S. Air Force data shows the GSP program has reduced C-17 DPFH by 28 percent over that period. The C-17 GSP 28 percent reduction was achieved while maintaining the best mission capable rates in airlift (84-85 percent).

It should be noted also that DoD is almost totally dependent on private contractors for its logistics and sustainment. For example, a recent article in Government Executive recounted the extraordinary efforts of “defense logisticians” in maintaining the flow of weapons, fuel and supplies to our forces in Afghanistan. According to a senior DoD official quoted in the article, “We are meeting a 1.1 million gallons a day demand for fuel for the U.S. and coalition forces while feeding 435,000 meals a day to U.S. service personnel and civilians on the ground.” Except for a brief reference to the use of commercial routes to get supplies into Afghanistan from the north, the article fails to note that all the supply routes, from the south and north, are run by private companies such as Maersk Line Limited and APL. Defense logisticians know this and respect the work of private logistics providers. Unfortunately, this article helps to perpetuate the myth that the government is providing the logistics for U.S. forces in Iraq and Afghanistan.

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Tuesday, August 3, 2010

PMC 2.0: The Middle East Declares War Against BlackBerry Smart Phones

Filed under: Afghanistan,Kuwait,PMC 2.0,Technology,UAE — Tags: , , , , , , , , , , , — Matt @ 1:28 AM

     The  author of “City of Gold” a history of Dubai, Jim Krane said, “The U.A.E. has never been a place that offered much in the way of electronic privacy. “The government makes no secret that it monitors electronic communication, including text messages, phone calls and e-mail. The revelation that secure BlackBerry data is frustratingly out of the government’s reach only confirms this.” 

*****

     This is definitely some PMC 2.0 news, just because many contractors carry BlackBerry smart phones, and many companies have management teams that depend upon this phone.  So imagine all these guys having to give up those phones just to do business in the middle east?

     One interesting tidbit with all of this is that these countries really don’t have a problem with iPhones, just because they can easily monitor the traffic on those devices. That is good and bad for contractors that have iPhones.  It kind of confirms what the best phone is for privacy–the BlackBerry.  Although there are still ways to make iPhones secure, it’s just with this crackdown on ‘CrackBerry’s’, it seems that the BlackBerry is the winner.

      Below, I posted three articles.  The last one is from 2005, but still a good one on how PIN messaging works for BlackBerry phones. The other articles detail what fears the various middle eastern countries have in regards to the BlackBerry. Interesting stuff. –Matt

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UAE crackdown on BlackBerry services to extend to foreign visitors

Tuesday, August 3, 2010

DUBAI, UNITED ARAB EMIRATES — The United Arab Emirates’ crackdown on BlackBerry services will extend to foreign visitors, putting the government’s concerns over the smartphones in direct conflict with the country’s ambitions to be a business and tourism haven.

The UAE’s telecommunications regulator said Monday that travelers to the city-state of Dubai and the important oil industry center of Abu Dhabi will — like 500,000 local subscribers — have to do without BlackBerry e-mail, messaging and Web services starting Oct. 11, even when they carry phones issued in other countries. The handsets themselves will still be allowed for phone calls.

UAE authorities say the move is based on security concerns because BlackBerry transmissions are automatically routed to company computers abroad, where it is difficult for local authorities to monitor for illegal activity or abuse.

Critics of the crackdown say it is also a way for the country’s conservative government to further control content it deems politically or morally objectionable.

(more…)

Monday, August 2, 2010

Industry Talk: Use Of Force And Riot Control For Contractors

Filed under: Afghanistan,Industry Talk,Iraq,Law Enforcement,Publications — Tags: , , , , , , , , — Matt @ 1:56 AM

     What I wanted to do here is go over a very tough problem for contractors, that really has not been addressed by the industry or today’s war planners. The latest incident in Kabul serves as an example of a real problem out there, and that is what happens when contractors are the victims of riots? Worse yet, what happens when they are the targets of ‘agents provocateurs’ in war zones, who are trying to create riots as a way to attack contractors or the military? Because these guys in Kabul could have ended up like the Blackwater contractors who were burned and hanged on a bridge in Fallujah Iraq.

     So with this post, I wanted to find out what contractors could do in these kinds of situations. I decided to put up a section of a FM manual on how the military deals with riots, but as you can see, there is nothing in these FM manuals on what contractors can or should do in such situations. I don’t even know of any civilian schools that train contractors to deal with such a threat, and especially for small teams in one or two vehicle motorcades.

     With a quick search, I did come across an article about Xe having CS gas in Iraq, and the outrage and shock that caused. But of course, the only reason why they would have such a thing is so that they could have something other than bullets to disperse a crowd with. As it stands now, if contractors are not allowed to use non-lethal munitions like CS gas or whatever, then of course contractors will be put in a position of either A. standing there and die by the hands of a violent crowd or C. shoot their weapons in self defense. A stone can kill a man, and especially when a hundred stones are thrown at that man. Shooting your weapon to defend self or others, is a main theme of the Rules for the Use of Force, but of course it would be far better if there was a way to not use that weapon. If using CS gas to disperse that violent crowd could be the non-lethal ‘B.” solution in this incident, then to me that is logical. And yet contractors are not allowed to have this stuff, or it is ‘shocking’ if they have it?

     The other question this brings up is what are the appropriate riot control or just riot survival tactics for a small team that is entrapped or involved in a similar situation as the guys in Kabul were? For that, I urge contractors and companies alike to war game the appropriate response to such a thing, and figure out what works for you in your neighborhood. Talk it up with the local military forces and get some suggestions from them if you are stumped. Find those in your team who have law enforcement or military police backgrounds who might have experience in riot control and figure out the best SOP’s. Because no one has yet to write a chapter in the FM manuals or give out any kind of guidance to this massive contractor force operating outside the wire in Iraq and Afghanistan.

     I also think this is of strategic importance, because it would be far better if contractors were implementing SOPs for dealing with crowds that did not endanger the various regional strategies, or overall COIN strategy in the war. Something to think about, and I would like to hear what you guys think. –Matt

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FM 3-19.40 Appendix B

Use of Force and Riot Control Measures

The I/R facility commander provides guidance to all MP guard forces in the appropriate use of force to protect internees and internment facilities and to control unruly and rebellious internee populations. This includes establishing uniform procedures that govern the use of force, weapons, and restraining devices. He ensures that a QRF is organized and trained to respond to disturbances inside and outside the facility—whether prisoners are creating a disturbance or there is a Level I threat against the facility. Supporting MP units train squad- to platoon-sized QRFs and squad-sized elements for extraction and apprehension teams. (See FM 19-15 for more information on civil disturbances.)

USE OF FORCE

B-1. When force is necessary, use it according to the priorities of force and limit it to the minimum degree necessary. (See AR 190-14 for the use of deadly force.) The application of any or all of the priorities of force, or the application of a higher numbered priority without first employing a lower numbered one, depends on and will be consistent with the situation encountered. Per AR 190-47, the priorities of force are—

• First: Verbal persuasion.

• Second: Show of force.

• Third: Chemical aerosol irritant projectors (subject to local and HN restrictions).

• Fourth: Use of physical force (other than weapons fire).

• Fifth: Presentation of deadly force.

• Sixth: Deadly force.

B-2. The I/R commander coordinates with the higher echelon commander and the SJA. He designates representatives who are authorized to direct the use of firearms and riot control agents during riots or disturbances. He includes the rules for using these means in appropriate plans, orders, SOPs, and instructions. He specifies the types of weapons to be used, which are not limited to shotguns and pistols for guarding prisoners.

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