Feral Jundi

Tuesday, June 22, 2010

Letter Of Marque: Is It Legal To Kill Osama Bin Laden?

     I wanted to enter this into the record for LoM related stuff.  This is interesting that there seems to be more discussion going on about Article 1, Section 8, and finally we might get some serious critique on the matter. For an idea to be strong, it needs to be forged in the furnace of debate and criticism.  So I like hearing the concepts being thrown around.

     One of the things I have been researching with the LoM lately is the reasoning why it still exists in the Constitution.  With that, I had to go back to the Civil War during the 1860’s and see what the factors were during the signing of the Declaration of Paris in 1857. I thought this was some very intriguing history and it indicated how crucial the LoM was to wartime strategy for the US in it’s early wars–politically and militarily.  It is also interesting how the Confederate Privateer’s wikipedia only presents part of the story about why the US did not sign the Declaration of Paris in 1857, and they make no mention of the Union paying blockaders (or basically private naval forces) to enforce the blockades necessary to stop the Confederate privateers. Ha! But there is certainly enough info about it all if someone cared to make the connections.(like me, hee hee)

     Nor do they make any mention in this Confederate Privateer wiki of the Marcy Amendment or how the US thought privateering was necessary for a country who did not have a navy as strong as the European navies.  Back in 1857, the US was all about privateering, and 4 years later, they were still all about privateering.  I think Lincoln only publicly protested the concept because his enemy was using privateers and issuing LoMs to Americans and anyone in the world that qualified and wanted one.

   Well, back to the article below.  It is important to get the history and record straight as to what the real deal is about the Letter of Marque and why the US did not remove it from the US constitution.  Because if there ever was an effort to bring back the LoM as a tool of warfare, this history will be crucial to the intellectual and legal discussion about such things. Interesting stuff. (all Civil War/Declaration of Paris information is at the end of this post) –Matt

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Is It Legal to Kill Osama bin Laden?

Not really. But if you act alone, you’re probably in the clear.

BY JOSHUA E. KEATING

JUNE 22, 2010

Gary Faulkner, the American man detained in Pakistan while trying to kill Osama bin Laden, will be released this week without charges, according to his family. The 52-year-old Colorado construction worker was arrested last week in northwest Pakistan for carrying weapons — including a pistol and 40-inch sword — without a permit. Questions of practicality (and sanity) aside, had Faulkner succeeded, could he have been charged with murder?

Probably not. Faulkner probably couldn’t be charged with murder if he killed bin Laden and then returned to the United States, since the murder would have happened abroad where U.S. courts have no say. “Universal jurisdiction” for crimes against humanity is an increasingly popular notion in human rights law, and one that’s been gaining some traction in the United States — a U.S. citizen was convicted of committing torture abroad for the first time last year — but a simple murder, particularly when the victim is the world’s most infamous terrorist, probably wouldn’t qualify.

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Strategy: Rolling Stone’s ‘Runaway General’ Article And The Poker Game Called Afghanistan

     So far, counterinsurgency has succeeded only in creating a never-ending demand for the primary product supplied by the military: perpetual war. There is a reason that President Obama studiously avoids using the word “victory” when he talks about Afghanistan. Winning, it would seem, is not really possible. Not even with Stanley McChrystal in charge.-The last sentences of this article, (and the narrative that Rolling Stone wants the reader to accept)

*****

     This is an interesting article in many ways.  To me, I look at it from several points of view that might provide an explanation for such a thing.  I look at the article as a big commentary on the poker game called Afghanistan, with a table of politicians, a president and his administration, civilian leaders, the enemy, Karzai, the media, and General McChrystal. Each player has their own strategy in this game, and each player has a plan to win.  The stakes are political survival, the direction of the war, and the narrative in the history books and everyone is fighting for public support and opinion. So what is each player’s strategy and goals in this game?

     Well, let’s break it down.  The first up is Rolling Stone.  For them the pot in this poker game is a sensational story and a further narrative of the war as being lost.  That COIN sucks and General McChrystal is a ‘Runaway General’, or uncontrollable. Any way they can show a division between all the crucial leadership running the war, is good for their goal of ending the war. Rolling Stone is also a supporter of the Obama administration, but they also do not support the war in Afghanistan.  So to them, showing a failed war and putting all the blame on an out of control general helps to insulate their guy in office.  To show support for the administration, while at the same time protesting the war by making it the product of that insane guy in charge called General McChrystal.

     The next player to discuss is the President and all of his men.  They need a win in Afghanistan, but they have also painted themselves into a corner with the July 2011 date for withdrawal.  They did this to appease their political base, and this date and the coming election is going to effect all of their decision making on the wartime strategy there.  There is also historical context, and Obama does not want this to be his Vietnam.  No standing President wants that, and every President looks at a war under their watch as how it will look in the history books. So the coming election and history are the two factors pressing this administration.  Not to mention that he also has the economy and the BP spill in the Gulf as two negatives.  He needs a win in one or two of these areas, because coming into re-election with all of those ‘losers’ will definitely hurt him.

     Then there is the civilian leadership like Eikenberry, the U.S. ambassador. Of course there would be friction between him and McChrystal, and especially after McChrystal was his subordinate at one point, and especially after he was not chosen as the viceroy in Afghanistan.  Plus DoD gets way more money than DoS when it comes to budget and resources, and you have that clash.  But there is one part of this story that clued me into the history narrative of this war. When Eikenberry leaked the cable to the New York Times about how pathetic Karzai and the war strategy was, this was a way to seal their place in history books as a ‘I told you so’.  McChrystal and gang referred to it as Eikenberry ‘covering his flank for the history books’.  Anyone see the pattern here?

     The politicians mentioned in the article all have the same goal as the President, and that is political survival.  To understand the mind of a politician, all you have to do is think in terms of votes and re-election.  Whatever it takes to stay in office and rally their base.  So the anti-war politicians whose base is anti-war, only benefit if the war strategy fails.  The pro-war politicians whose base is pro-war, only benefit if the war strategy works.  That is the two sides of this political battle, and each side will latch on to anything that will give them an advantage with rallying their base. As it stands now, Obama has declared the war in Afghanistan as the ‘Just War’, so I imagine that the anti-war politicians really don’t see Obama as a tool to use for rallying their base.  But if they can split Obama from his ‘just war’ view, and get him to not support the war effort or accept that it is lost, then they would benefit.  That is their prize, and going back to the Rolling Stone prize, you can see who benefits from whom.

     The pro-war politicians will rally around the general that will insure success.  They need a winner to rally around.  So if they supported McChrystal and now an article like this is circulating a perception that he is out of control, or worse yet, helps to create a divide between all parties involved, then they will not benefit.  You need a team who has a unified command and a unity of effort, and this article gives the impression that this is not happening.  There is also the issue of Article 88 which prohibits officers from using ‘contemptuous words’ about the president and his staff. Pro-war politicians at this point look at this story as a threat to their chosen winner, and ultimately a threat to winning the war.  But the narrative of the story points to a divided team, and these pro-war politicians need to address this in order appease their base.

     The pro-war politicians could do two things.  They could rally around the general, and especially if the administration and others accept his apology (and not fire him), or they could call for his head and get someone new in there that will work better as a team. In other words, if the General is looked at as the guy who is stronger than the President after the dust settles, because he thumbed his nose at him and his staff and they have not fired him, then he might be a guy they could rally around.  Especially coming into election, and especially if the President is not popular in the polls. But they also need a guy that can seal the deal, and they really need a guy that the troops on the ground support.  Because most of the base of pro-war politicians, are military and military families who all care about winning this thing.

     Karzai is at the table as well, and success to him is just hanging on to power and collecting as much money as he can from the war effort.  He will support anyone that will continue his good deal, and McChrystal is the guy–kind of.  Or at least that is the arrangement that the general has set up.  The general is working with Karzai and doing what is necessary to control him and work with him. Kind of like a SF operator working with a village chief.  He has to, because there is no alternative. Karzai also knows that if the Taliban come into power, he is out, so if he wants to survive politically and even physically, he needs a strong general and western partner to insure that survival.

     The Taliban are also at this table, and their strategy is simple. Keep terrorizing the population/government and just survive long enough to make it to this withdrawal date of July 2011. This date is all they need to win, because all they have to do is pour it on while everyone leaves. And as long as the people perceive the west as weak and unable to defeat the Taliban, they will give in to the Taliban.

     Finally there is General McChrystal.  Personally, I think this article was a way to test the political resolve of those at the top.  If they fired him, then McChrystal can fade away from the war and not be attached to it’s ‘perceived’ demise.  The whole ‘history book effect’ comes into play here as well.

     If they accept his apology and keep the guy where he is at, then that means they are saying ‘we did not like what you said, but we need a win in this war’. It is the same reasoning for contracting with Xe for security work–they might not like them, but they are the best, and for wars, you need the best of the best to win. So in essence, McChrystal was probing the defenses of these leaders at the ‘poker table’, to see what their position is on his command and the strategy.(calling their bluff or trying to determine their cards in the game) If you look at his history in war and life, you can see that this is exactly how he operates. He is testing them. Because an acceptance of the general’s apology, is also an acceptance of the fact that he ‘is the best man’ for the job.  The general needs that acceptance in order to go after what he really needs for a victory in Afghanistan, and that is time.

     I really think all of this boils down to one thing, and that is that stupid withdrawal date of July 2011. If COIN takes as long as most of the experts claim it takes, then attaching a time frame to the current strategy is stupid.  The general knows this, and this was a huge debate with the Iraq war. During that time, it was debated furiously during the presidential debates and between the pro-war and anti-war crowds. With Iraq, the narrative was ‘get out now’ versus ‘leave based on success and results’. The latter is what we went with, and that is what worked.

     A withdrawal should only be based on victory, a retreat is what happens when you lose.  I personally think this article was McChrystal saying ‘if you want me in charge of this war effort, you must give me time and the flexibility to win’. Because as it stands now, to seal any kind of a victory in Afghanistan by July of next year is impossible. I think most observers would say so as well, and this article symbolizes the very battle between all parties who have a stake in this war and the pressing issue of time. Each player in this game looks at time as a leverage for their specific goals in this game. Each player is also looking at their place in the history books and their political survival.

     There are plenty of angles to this war, and I am sure I am missing a few in this discussion. Below I posted a few pieces of the article that were interesting to me. Anyway, check out the entire article and  let me know what you think. Things are changing pretty quickly and it will be interesting to see how this unfolds over the days and weeks. –Matt

Edit: 6/23/2010 – And he is replaced by General Petraeus.  Wow, and all because of an article from Rolling Stone. He played his cards, he lost, and now there is a new player at the table.

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The Runaway General

By Michael Hastings

July 2010

(Pieces of the article are posted below–all curse words edited)

Today, as McChrystal gears up for an offensive in southern Afghanistan, the prospects for any kind of success look bleak. In June, the death toll for U.S. troops passed 1,000, and the number of IEDs has doubled. Spending hundreds of billions of dollars on the fifth-poorest country on earth has failed to win over the civilian population, whose attitude toward U.S. troops ranges from intensely wary to openly hostile. The biggest military operation of the year – a ferocious offensive that began in February to retake the southern town of Marja – continues to drag on, prompting McChrystal himself to refer to it as a “bleeding ulcer.” In June, Afghanistan officially outpaced Vietnam as the longest war in American history – and Obama has quietly begun to back away from the deadline he set for withdrawing U.S. troops in July of next year. The president finds himself stuck in something even more insane than a quagmire: a quagmire he knowingly walked into, even though it’s precisely the kind of gigantic, mind-numbing, multigenerational nation-building project he explicitly said he didn’t want.

(more…)

Monday, June 21, 2010

Publications: Warlord Inc.– Extortion And Corruption Along The U.S. Supply Chain In Afghanistan

     Relatively unknown before U.S. forces arrived in Afghanistan in fall 2001, Ruhullah is “prototypical of a new class of warlord in Afghanistan,” the report said. Unlike more traditional warlords, he has no political aspirations or tribal standing but “commands a small army of over 600 guards.”

     The “single largest security provider for the U.S. supply chain in Afghanistan,” Ruhullah “readily admits to bribing governors, police chiefs and army generals,” the report said. In a meeting with congressional investigators in Dubai, he complained about “the high cost of ammunition in Afghanistan — he says he spends $1.5 million per month on rounds for an arsenal that includes AK-47s, heavy machine guns and RPGs,” or rocket-propelled grenades. It added: “Villagers along the road refer to him as ‘the Butcher.’ “

*****

   $1.5 million a month for ammunition?  Wow, that’s impressive.  Or maybe that is just another over inflated number to add to the stack of corruption accounts in this report.

   I guess all I have to say about something like this is what you get when you don’t care about how companies operate.  You must have adult supervision and you must have enough of that oversight manpower to effectively watch over these folks.

   One of the things I thought was interesting about this report was the idea of ‘going outside the wire’ to get a feel on what is going on with these contracts.  That is fine and all, but you still will have no way to really get a feel for what is going on with them.  I like the surprise inspection thing or the ride along thing, but in my opinion, you need ride-a-longs every time.  In other words, have an expat company that is required as that source of supervision and make those guys responsible for how the operation is conducted.  That is how it was done in Iraq, and that is how it should go down in Afghanistan and Pakistan.  That kind of arrangement would ensure some adult supervision is on scene, and at all times.

   That brings up the other issue I have with the way contracting is done these days.  Why are we not requiring companies to be bonded?  This was common practice with privateers back in the day, and it something we should consider now. If you want a company to play straight, then having them put their money where their mouth is, is just one way to keep them in line.  Fines are another means.  But really, you need someone riding with these convoys at all times to check on the whole process.  These guys will get away with whatever they can if we don’t.

   We could call them liaison officers or whatever, and they could be contractors, military, or federal employees. I say make them contractors, and ensure they are expats with secret clearances at the least.  Then these DoD inspectors can go outside the wire and actually talk with a guy that has been watching the whole process.  That inspector can use that liaison officer to great effect, and that would be a far better arrangement than just trying to surprise that company every once in awhile.

   Plus, assigning expat liaison officers to these convoys could allow supervision all the way into Pakistan or whatever country they are in.  US military would not have the same ability to cross into Pakistan.  Federal employees would be too high of a target in Pakistan as well.  But having expat contractors doing this kind of thing is feasible, and it has already been happening on numerous contracts over the years.  Just make it mandatory, and pay the extra amount for this supervision and contract stipulation. I would also allow these liaison officers to be managed, armed, equiped and paid by their expat companies, and not by the Afghan company they are riding along with. That will make things a lot more simple for that contractor assigned to such a duty.  I also think that liaison officer should be paid a top salary, because such a job would be extremely dangerous.

    Finally, I think these convoys should be looked at as bait to lure out the enemy with. The more assets that can be assigned to overwatch and QRF, the better. Communications between that force and the liaison officer on these convoys could help in that process as well. Especially if drones in the area see any enemy movement or if the enemy attacked a convoy or military patrol earlier in the day on that road the convoy is on. There are a number of things we could do to help out these convoys with survival and with killing the enemy. Hell, our armed drones should be tracking every square inch of these convoy routes, and use these weapons as tools to really go to town on the enemy up in the mountain passes. Those are my thoughts on the matter. –Matt

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Recommendations of the report Warlord Inc.

There are numerous constructive changes that could be made to the U.S. military trucking effort in Afghanistan that would improve contracting integrity while mitigating corrupting influences. As the Department of Defense absorbs the findings in this report and considers its course of action, the Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs Majority staff makes the following recommendations:

1. Assume Direct Contractual Responsibility for Supply Chain Security Providers.  If the United States is going to use small armies of private security contractors to defend its massive supply chain in a war zone, the Department of Defense must take direct responsibility for those contractors to ensure robust oversight.  Trucking companies are wholly incapable of overseeing this scale of security operations.  The U.S. government needs to have a direct line of authority and accountability over the private security companies that guard the supply chain.

2. Consider the Role of Afghan National Security Forces in Highway Security.  To be sure, the ANP and ANA will ultimately have a role in ensuring safe passage on Afghanistan’s roads.  However, that would likely require a medium-term, if not long-term, transition. Numerous witnesses in this investigation have expressed extreme skepticism at any plan to rapidly transfer convoy security to the Afghan security forces due to concerns about capacity, competence, and corruption.  Proposals to reform the convoy security scheme ought to take into account the Ministry of Interior’s vision of a future role of Afghan security forces in highway security.  If there is to be no immediate role for the ANA in convoy security, a plan must be developed to reach that goal with credible security alternatives that address immediate U.S. military logistics needs.

3. Inventory Actual Trucking Capacity Available to the Department of Defense.  The Department should conduct a survey of the available trucking capacity in Afghanistan under the HNT contract to ensure that its needs will be met with the additional forces under orders to deploy to Afghanistan.  Where there is information to suggest that there is a finite pool of trucks some owner operated, some as tribal assets, some owned by second or third-tier subcontractors adding prime contractors does not necessarily add to the pool of available trucks.

4. Draft Contracts to Ensure Transparency of Subcontractors.  Contracts between the Department of Defense and its trucking and/or security prime contractors need to include provisions that ensure a line of sight, and accountability, between the Department of Defense and the relevant subcontractors.  Such provisions should make clear the subcontractors’ obligations, including full Department of Defense inspection and audit rights.  Such provisions should also mandate the Department of Defense’s obligation to have visibility into subcontractors critical to its wartime supply chain.  There should also be robust and verifiable incident reporting requirements.  Where Department of Defense regulations already require such provisions, the Department needs to enforce them.

5. Oversee Contracts to Ensure Contract Transparency and Performance.  Similarly, the Department of Defense needs to provide the personnel and resources required to manage and oversee its trucking and security contracts in Afghanistan.  These are not contracts that can be managed responsibly from a desk in Bagram or Kandahar alone.  Contracts of this magnitude and of this consequence require travel ‘outside the wire.’  For convoys, that means having the force protection resources necessary for mobility of Department of Defense personnel to conduct periodic unannounced inspections and ride-alongs.

6. Analyze Effect of Coalition Contracting on Afghan Corruption.  The national security components of the U.S. government, including the Department of Defense, the Department of State, the U.S. Agency for International Development, the Department of Justice, and the Intelligence Community, need to begin to systematically track and analyze the effects of U.S., NATO, and other international donor funds on corruption in Afghanistan.  Corruption is smothering the nascent efforts at Afghan governance that are fundamental to our strategy in Afghanistan.  The effects of billions of dollars in development projects and security aid for Afghanistan, combined with billions of dollars spent in support of the U.S. and NATO military footprint in Afghanistan, need to be at the center of any analysis of metrics of our performance in the Afghan effort.  Public reports in early June 2010 suggest that U.S. intelligence assets have been assigned to analyze Afghan corruption and governance.  The U.S. government needs to devote sufficient assets to the endeavor, and the mandate should include an analysis of the effects of coalition contracts.

Download report here.

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U.S. indirectly paying Afghan warlords as part of security contract

By Karen DeYoung

Tuesday, June 22, 2010

The U.S. military is funding a massive protection racket in Afghanistan, indirectly paying tens of millions of dollars to warlords, corrupt public officials and the Taliban to ensure safe passage of its supply convoys throughout the country, according to congressional investigators.

The security arrangements, part of a $2.16 billion transport contract, violate laws on the use of private contractors, as well as Defense Department regulations, and “dramatically undermine” larger U.S. objectives of curtailing corruption and strengthening effective governance in Afghanistan, a report released late Monday said.

The report describes a Defense Department that is well aware that some of the money paid to contractors winds up in the hands of warlords and insurgents. Military logisticians on the ground are focused on getting supplies where they are needed and have “virtually no understanding of how security is actually provided” for the local truck convoys that transport more than 70 percent of all goods and materials used by U.S. troops. Alarms raised by prime trucking contractors were met by the military “with indifference and inaction,” the report said.

(more…)

Afghanistan: U.S. Eager To Replicate Afghan Villager’s Successful Revolt Against Taliban

Filed under: Afghanistan,Strategy — Tags: , , , , — Matt @ 1:55 PM

     Conversations with Gizab leaders and Special Forces officers suggest that there was no single proximate cause. The uprising appears to have been the result of a combination of Taliban overreaching, U.S. encouragement and local resentment.

     “We’re looking for the patterns,” said a State Department official in southern Afghanistan. “If we can find it, we’ll be on the verge of a breakthrough.”

*****

     I really liked this article for several reasons. For one, good for Lalay for taking matter into his own hands and rallying the village for the defense. The second part I like, is the strategy development aspect of this article. They are trying to see the patterns that led up to Lalay taking matters into his own hands, and the keys to success of a tribal defense force like this.

     So let’s look at some of the factors of success which I keyed in on, and also what is required to replicate this. (in my opinion at least)

     The first is motivation. There must be motivation within the village to rise up against the Taliban. You also need a leader who has the motivation to rise up, and manage the revolt. So motivation is important. And consequence do to inaction is also important. These guys had both.

You also need a leader who has the will or resolve to do this. Not everyone can be a Lalay–someone that folks look up to and think of as a strong leader. This guy has to be someone that people respect and identify with. And that ‘Lalay’ needs to be pissed off enough to act. Which goes back to motivation. The Taliban pissed off Lalay by wanting the money that the government gave Lalay for the loss of his family, due to a Taliban IED. That would piss me off too. But acting on that anger, and putting action to words takes a special kind of individual.

     Notice also that Lalay executed three prisoners. Culturally speaking, this was acceptable to them and at that time. This shows the kind of resolve Lalay has, and how much hatred he has for the Taliban. Acts like that may be be repulsive to the west, but in Afghanistan, that is an act of someone with determination and little regard for an enemy that has little regard for him. It also shows that Lalay has the strength necessary to kill the bad guy–no weakness there, and a village in dire straights needs a leader who has that strength. And notice in the article that folks are flocking to his program of village defense. Of course we would like him to not kill prisoners, and I don’t condone that here. I am just saying that the act itself is something he felt he had to do in order to get the respect(from the village, from the Taliban) necessary to do what he had to do. To him, showing compassion (weakness) was not part of the game plan.

     It kind of reminds me of the old west movies, where a town is held captive by some bad people, and no one has the courage to step up. And then some contract sheriff comes into town, or some stranger on a pale horse, and motivates the people to do something about it (of course after the pale rider has that motivation to do so). Meanwhile, that individual shows great resolve in defeating those bad people. And usually in those movies, that leader had to be more ruthless and effective than those bad guys. In the case of Lalay, he was that stranger riding into town on the horse. He was that guy that said ‘follow me’.

     Now the next point is where I can inject some common sense free market warfare principles into this conversation, that the military planners and strategists continue to miss or forget. You must provide reward or interest, much like General George Washington provided such things to his troops in order to maintain a standing army(or village defense force). If you want to make this the most popular team to be on, then pay them accordingly and give them the weapons and training necessary to do the job. I cannot emphasize this enough. Pay them more than the Taliban offers, and pay them enough to be competitive with the military or police.

     If that won’t work, then provide a bounty system for the endeavor. Put a price on the heads of Taliban that are wanted by the government. It worked in the wild west, and it could work in Afghanistan if set up properly. The point with all of this is there must be incentive. Because without incentive, a volunteer force will eventually dissolve because they have more important things to do like take care of their family, farm, etc. Stuff to think about, and I think any effort dedicated to understanding the dynamics of this event is time well spent.

     Finally, I have to inject another point into this discussion that is not talked about. If the Taliban are giving up to Lalay, then Lalay is in a prime position to set up pseudo-operations, and use those former enemy combatants to find even more of these booger eaters. If Lalay declared that if these former Taliban want redemption in the village, that they ‘must do this one thing’ for the village, then this might be a way to turn some of these guys. These former Taliban would be outstanding tools to use for really screwing up their former employers. That is how you find out who the shadow government is, what they are up to and where they are at. We could be making awesome matrixes off of this information, and doing some heavy duty damage. You could also find out who is sympathetic to the Taliban in these villages, all because you have turned Taliban who can walk the walk, and talk the talk. No acting really required there, and turning these guys and using Lalay for that process should be considered. –Matt

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U.S. eager to replicate Afghan villagers’ successful revolt against Taliban

By Rajiv ChandrasekaranMonday, June 21, 2010

GIZAB, AFGHANISTAN — The revolt of the Gizab Good Guys began with a clandestine 2 a.m. meeting. By sunrise, 15 angry villagers had set up checkpoints on the main road and captured their first prisoners. In the following hours, their ranks swelled with dozens of rifle-toting neighbors eager to join.

Gunfights erupted and a panicked request for help was sent to the nearest U.S. troops, but the residents of this mountain-ringed hamlet in southern Afghanistan held their ground. By sundown, they managed to pull off a most unusual feat: They kicked out the Taliban.

“We had enough of their oppression,” Lalay, the one-named shopkeeper who organized the uprising, said in recounting the late April battle. “So we decided to fight back.”

U.S. diplomats and military officials view the rebellion as a milestone in the nearly nine-year-long war. For the first time in this phase of the conflict, ordinary Afghans in the violence-racked south have risen on their own to reclaim territory under insurgent control.

Saturday, June 19, 2010

Call To Action: Free South African Security Contractor Philip Young From Afghan Prison!!!

     One operator said Phil Young had shot the Afghan guard in order to stop the bloodbath. According to the operator, the dead man’s brother was well-known in Taliban ranks. His family lived in a Taliban stronghold on the Pakistani border.    

     Trouble maker. The guard had apparently been a troublemaker for some time and was about to be fired. The six guards had apparently been conspiring for some time to kidnap or kill the foreigners on a certain day early in October. Young and the guards worked for the American company Anham, which is linked to the American government’s Counternarcotics Advisory Teams (CNAT), in Lakshar Gah. The Macedonian guard commander apparently knew of the plot but did nothing to stop it. 

     “Phil and some of his colleagues returned that day from a mission and when he saw the six in civilian clothes but armed with AK47s, he immediately suspected trouble,” said the operator. “He confronted the men, upon which one aimed a weapon at Phil and fired a shot.” The shot missed Young and in self-defence, he fired three shots at the guard as he apparently realised that the lives of many of his colleagues would be in danger if all six of the men started firing at them. According to the operator, the central government in Afghanistan had rules and regulations for security guards, which stated that a person could fire back if he was being shot at.

*****

     This makes me sick.  All of these contractors that I have posted lately who are currently imprisoned in Afghanistan, are at the mercy of a corrupt government and pathetic justice system.  Just look at the facts with Philip Young’s case?  He should be given a medal and not a prison sentence. From the sounds of it, his actions probably saved the lives of his fellow contractors on that day, and yet he is currently being jerked around by a pathetic justice system in Afghanistan.

     So what can we do?  First, pass this around to everyone.  Second, write to the British Embassy in Kabul and let them know how you feel.  South Africa does not have diplomatic representation in Afghanistan, and the British government has agreed to help.  I say write the US Embassy as well, because what is going on with this man is just plain wrong. Thanks to Cassie for giving me the heads up on this. –Matt

Facebook for British Embassy in Kabul here.

Facebook for Philip Young here

Address: British Embassy, 15th Street Roundabout, Wazir Akbar Khan,PO Box: 334 Kabul, Afghanistan

Opening Hours: Sunday – Thursday  08:30  to 16:30

Telephone:  (93)  (0) 700 102 000 (Switchboard)

Fax:  (93)  (0) 700 102 250  (Management)

E-mail: BritishEmbassy.Kabul@fco.gov.uk

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SA man gets longer sentence

2010-06-18

Erika Gibson, Beeld

Pretoria – A South African man who appealed against his five-year prison sentence in Afghanistan was given even worse news when his imprisonment was extended to 16 years.Security specialist Philip Young was devastated by the news, his brother Pat Young said.”My brother is dismayed, angry and frustrated.”

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