Feral Jundi

Friday, June 19, 2009

Building Snowmobiles: Turning The Taliban–The Selous Scout Way

   “It was simple and direct. He [the terrorist] had the option of being handed over to the police, after which he would be prosecuted for … offenses related to terrorism. If found guilty he would be hanged. He could, however, change sides and work with the security forces against his former comrades. After a short period of intensive contemplation, the capture elected to change sides. He was immediately given back his weapon, but unknown to him, its firing pin had been removed. The fact that he had been given a weapon astonished … him. [I]t was a shrewdly calculated move designed to sow the seeds of trust. A pseudo group always had to make a hard decision … quickly. Could they trust the ex-insurgent or not? The answer to that question…demanded a considerable amount of moral courage on the part of the team. It meant … placing their lives in the hands of a former enemy whom, having turned once, might very well turn again, and kill and betray them.” -Retired Lt. Col. Ron Reid-Daly, a former commander of the Selous Scouts and author of “Pamwe Chete: The Legend of the Selous Scouts,” on capturing and turning the enemy.

   This is totally building snowmobiles, because this activity totally goes against our current mindset in the war.  I found these two stories, because they both complement each other, regardless of the fact that they were written for two different aspects of the war.  The first story is from Strategy Page, and actually talks about turning Taleban who no longer want to fight for the other side.  Except the turning strategy is not going far enough in my opinion.  We could go further, but it would require some guts and some strong leaders to manage the process.  But he who dares, wins… right?

   The second story is about the Selous Scouts method for turning enemy combatants, and using them in the war they were fighting.  The author was trying to apply the ideas to Iraq in the early days, but to me, it has equal application to what we are doing in Afghanistan.  The quote up top is classic.  Let me know what you guys think and Pamwe Chete! –Matt

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Foreigners Fighting Foreigners

June 19, 2009

Strategy Page

While the Taliban have been successful with their human shield tactics, they have done so at great cost to the popularity of the Islamic radical group. The Taliban were never noted for their desire to be popular. These guys are on a mission from God, and earthly trifles do not concern them. While the frequent use of human shields has spared the Taliban some casualties, and sometimes made it easier to escape death or capture (mainly because the propaganda value of dead civilians has caused the rules of engagement for foreign troops to become more restrictive), the practice has increased Afghan hostility to the Taliban. This means that the Taliban increasingly find themselves operating in a hostile environment as they move through Afghanistan. This is made worse by the fact that many Taliban units are often half, or more, composed of foreigners. Many of these are Pakistanis, who at least look like Afghans (and only betray themselves when they speak, and reveal a foreign accent). But a growing number of foreigners are Arabs, who are generally disliked throughout Pakistan. This is because many Arabs look down on Afghans, and often do not try to hide this disdain.

(more…)

Thursday, June 18, 2009

Afghanistan: Private Security Called a Boon to Canadian Bases in Afghanistan

   Be sure to check out Tundra’s courses you can take which are SIA certified.  I guess if you want to work for them, you have to go through their courses as well, although I doubt it would be a guarantee for employment. –Matt

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Private security called a boon to Canadian bases in Afghanistan

By Colin Perkelx

June 18, 2009

PANJWAII DISTRICT, Afghanistan — The increased reliance on private companies to provide basic security for Canadian bases in southern Afghanistan is freeing up critical military manpower, officers say, although some soldiers worry about the effectiveness of local Afghan guards.

Several operating bases in the dangerous Panjwaii district are now farming out the sentry work, the latest switch-over coming just this week.

“It definitely gives us flexibility,” said Maj. Steve Jourdain, infantry commander and head of a patrol base. “If it was not for the private security, it would not be possible for me to do the next operation.”

In this particular case, the Canadian-owned security company Tundra Strategies won the contract with the Department of National Defence.

(more…)

Wednesday, June 17, 2009

Military News: General McChrystal’s New Way of War

What Gen. McChrystal realizes, in effect, is that we need to create our own Robert Warburtons. If his experiment succeeds, future commanders can build on the precedent to provide the kind of cultural and linguistic skills that we will need to win the long war against Islamic extremists. 

   I read this story, and Tim Lynch of Free Range International came to mind as one of those ‘Warburton types’ that are mentioned in the article.  But I also think the mention of contractors as ‘Robert Warburton‘ types was incredibly understated.  I have known guys in Iraq who have worked the same gig or region for years.  The private industry has easily created individuals like this, and many of them.

   Also, the deployment and leave schedules for private industry has evolved to be way more conducive towards what Gen. McChrystal is wanting to do. In our industry, most companies do not go beyond a 6 month deployment.  I have seen everything from 2 month, 3 month, 4 month, 6 month, and even some 12 month deployment(rare).  My personal view on it is that 2 to 3 month deployments are about perfect, and this allows as much time as a contractor needs to do their business at home(if the contractor is given a sizable amount of time home, with some flexibility built into it). And that is what it really is all about.  Companies have to know, that if you want to attract or even keep your really good employees, taking care of them means giving them a leave and deployment schedule that is family and life friendly.  Burned out employees or contractors make mistakes.

   I also think deployment length is a huge problem for today’s military men and women.  From a private industry point of view, the longer the deployments, the longer the chance for burn out incidents to happen.  Fights, suicides, shooting incidents, etc. can all happen as the soldier’s stress is increased over time.  By changing the time frames a little, I think we could see some really positive developments.  And if General McChrystal and Max Boot get their way, if units are assigned regions and allowed to cycle in soldiers in more condensed deployment cycles, then I think that will have a dramatic impact on morale and troop welfare. It will also contribute to creating better learning organizations, for each specific region.

   Finally, and this is a call to guys like Max Boot and others who have the ear of the military strategists out there.  We must have the conversation about contractors and war, in a strategic sense.  We are not going away, and if General McChrystal, President Obama, General Petraeus, and the rest of the US (and worldwide partners) are actually serious about winning in the wars we are fighting in, then eventually they are all going to have to talk about the 246,000 of us contractors that are in the war.  We have an impact on the war–we are fighting and dying in these wars, we are rebuilding in these war zones, we are working with and around soldiers from all over, and we are intimately connected with much of the local populations out there. What other reasons do you guys want for this discussion?

     246,000 of us folks in the Warburton Fan Club are waiting for an answer….and some leadership.-Matt 

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General McChrystal’s New Way of War

The U.S. has been bringing soldiers home as soon as they get any experience.

JUNE 17, 2009

By MAX BOOT

Gen. Stanley McChrystal was appointed commander in Afghanistan to shake up a troubled war effort. But one of his first initiatives could wind up changing how the entire military does business.

Gen. McChrystal’s decision to set up a Pakistan Afghanistan Coordination Cell means creating a corps of roughly 400 officers who will spend years focused on Afghanistan, shuttling in and out of the country and working on those issues even while they are stateside.

Today, units typically spend six to 12 months in a war zone, and officers typically spend only a couple years in command before getting a new assignment. This undermines the continuity needed to prevail in complex environments like Afghanistan or Iraq. Too often, just when soldiers figure out what’s going on they are shipped back home and neophytes arrive to take their place. Units suffer a disproportionate share of casualties when they first arrive because they don’t have a grip on local conditions.

There was a saying that we didn’t fight in Vietnam for 10 years; we fought there for one year, 10 times. The North Vietnamese, on the other hand, continued fighting until they were killed or immobilized. That gave their forces a huge advantage.

In Vietnam, units already in the field would get individual replacements from home, thus making it hard to maintain unit cohesion. Sometimes new soldiers were killed before anyone even knew their names.

The policy now is unit rotation — an entire battalion or brigade (or a higher-level staff) trains together, deploys together, and leaves together. That makes for better cohesion, but makes it even harder to maintain continuity because there is little overlap between units.

(more…)

Friday, June 12, 2009

Video: CNAS Conference

Filed under: Afghanistan,Video — Tags: , — Matt @ 2:46 PM

Publications: At What Cost? Contingency Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, By the CWC

 

   Interesting report and check it out.  The things I thought were interesting was the discussion about the TWISS2 contracts, the RUF, and the fear of repeating the same mistakes in Afghanistan.  You think? pfffffft.-Matt

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Wartime Contracting Report

At What Cost? Contingency Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan

By the Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan 

 

Let the commission know what you think, click here. 

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