Feral Jundi

Thursday, April 22, 2010

Al Qaeda: The Search For White Jihadists

Filed under: Al Qaeda — Tags: , , , , — Matt @ 1:28 AM

   This story was interesting to me, because I looked at it from an operational point of view and understood that what the enemy is doing is developing a method.  They are looking for more Maj. Hasan types, and they are wanting to convert them into weapons.  They are also using the internet in new and interesting ways in order to reach out to potential recruits, and I would even say that this technique is the missing chapter in Lawrence Cline’s paper on pseudo-operations. –Matt

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The Search for White Jihadists

April 20, 2010

By DANIEL WILLIAMS

CAIRO — Al Qaeda and its ideological allies are using English-language Web sites and forums to encourage non-Arabic speakers to make war on the West as terrorists seek the next Fort Hood shooters and “Jihad Janes.”

Their goal to widen the pool of prospective terrorists beyond traditional Middle Eastern and Asian sources is part of a search for “white Al Qaeda” activists who could foil racial profiling and initiate attacks, according to Evan Kohlmann, a consultant with FlashPoint Partners, a security research company based in New York. The effort is consistent with the gradual decentralization of Islamic-inspired holy war, he said in a telephone interview.

“It’s a way Al Qaeda can say, ‘You don’t have to speak Arabic or Pashtun or come to Pakistan for training; you just have to be committed, and go out and kill people,”’ Mr. Kohlmann said.

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Publications: Pseudo-Operations To Neutralize Extremist Networks, Insurgents, And Terrorists

   I found this gem of a paper over at Small Wars Journal and wanted to get it out to the FJ readership to consume as well.  If  you follow the link to SWJ, you can actually talk with the author in the comments section of their post.

    Basically, Mr. Wheeler was reinforcing the ideas that Mr. Cline talked about, and tried to convey how important these types of operations would be to the US goal in the GWOT.  I agree, and to me, we should be trying to turn every captured Taliban and Al Qaeda operative we can.  Or they can sit in that resort called Gitmo and rot away.

   As to any new thoughts on pseudo operations?  I think for today’s enemy, the Ft. Hood Shooting and the Underwear Bomber attack should be closely examined with the lens of pseudo operations trade craft development. This was some radical stuff, and the guy that turned these two into human weapons was the cleric Anwar al-Awlaki. He is using religion and the internet in order to reach out to folks that he could potentially convert, and he is succeeding.  That is powerful, and to replicate that and find out the method, would be very valuable. –Matt

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Pseudo-Operations to Neutralize Extremist Networks, Insurgents, and Terrorists

by Major Seth Wheeler

Terrorism is a threat to the stability and national security of many countries, and has undermined countless governments. However, technological improvements within the last century have allowed greater, more spectacular attacks and broadened the means by which terrorists may broadcast their message. Although previous terrorist attacks against United States citizens have drawn a measure of global attention, the world became acutely aware of the effects of terrorism on 11 September 2001 during the World Trade Center attack orchestrated by Osama Bin Laden and his terror group al Qaeda. The psychological impact of such a devastating attack—conducted so efficiently at such little cost to the attacker—jumpstarted a global level of effort to defeat terrorism and extremism. Indeed, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates identified terrorism as a Global National Defense priority in his 2008 National Defense Strategy, and discussed terrorism on 15 occasions throughout his 23-page report. Degrading terrorism requires full-spectrum deterrence and counter strategies: the incorporation of effective foreign policy measures against state-sponsors of terrorism; international security forces assistance programs to ensure competent counter-terror skill-sets within our allies’ ranks; military or police action to kinetically defeat armed resistance or restore sovereignty; and other internal defense and development programs to deny terrorists sanctuary or resources and political advantage.

That stated, terrorists’ geographic or political sanctuaries that the United States cannot directly or indirectly influence through foreign policy initiatives will remain in certain pockets of the world, such as the remaining insurgent-terror organization FARC controlled areas of Colombia or Somalia. Assuming that some terrorists will remain irreconcilable for a variety of reasons not discussed here, and that comprehensive deterrence strategies or counter-terror efforts may prove ineffective, then how does the United States influence or neutralize irreconcilable terrorists protected by a foreign population? What tools can be implemented to eradicate, deflect, isolate, or neutralize typically suicidal extremists employing terror as a weapon? One consideration is pseudo-operations. Penetration of terrorist and insurgent groups by foreign services is inherently difficult, due to the existing mistrust within the organization and extensive vetting required for membership. Pseudo-operations may overcome these challenges and create conditions congruent with the interests of the United States, as several case studies will demonstrate in a later section. However, an overview of what pseudo-operations are and what they can do is first necessary.

Download the full article: Pseudo-Operations to Neutralize Extremist Networks, Insurgents, and Terrorists

*****

Major Seth Wheeler, U.S. Army, graduated with a M.S. in Defense Analysis – Irregular Warfare from the Naval Postgraduate School in December, 2009. He is currently attending CGSC ILE at Fort Belvoir, VA, and will join the 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne) in June, 2010.The views expressed above are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

Link to post here.

Wednesday, April 21, 2010

Al Qaeda: AQ’s Top Leadership Have Been Decimated In Iraq

Filed under: Al Qaeda,Iraq — Tags: , , , , , , — Matt @ 1:51 AM

   This is awesome. Nothing like waking up and reading in the news that AQ’s top leadership in Iraq have been decimated.  Two separate attacks, with the top three leaders being al-Masri, al-Baghdadi, and al-Obeidi. Bravo to the SF and Iraqi units involved, and way to stick it to the enemy.-Matt

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U.S. air strike kills al Qaeda in Iraq leaders

Ernesto Londono

April 20, 2010

Two leaders of the Sunni insurgent group al Qaeda in Iraq have been killed in an air strike carried out by American troops, Iraqi and U.S. officials announced Monday.

The deaths of Abu Ayyub al-Masri, as the leader of al Qaeda in Iraq is known, and Abu Omar al-Baghdadi, the alias of the head of an umbrella group that includes al Qaeda in Iraq, should disrupt insurgent attacks inside the country, officials said. Their slayings could also provide Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki with a decisive political boost at a critical time.

“The death of these terrorists is potentially the most significant blow to al Qaeda in Iraq since the beginning of the insurgency,” Gen. Ray Odierno, the top commander of U.S. troops in Iraq, said in a statement. “There is still work to do, but this is a significant step forward in ridding Iraq (of) terrorists.”

The Saturday night raid was carried out a few miles southwest of Tikrit, Saddam Hussein’s hometown, U.S. officials said, after a series of Iraqi-led operations led to a safe house used by the insurgent leaders. An American soldier was killed during the operation when a helicopter crashed.

Al-Masri and al-Baghdadi were killed after “engaging the security team,” the U.S. military said. Al-Maliki said their bodies were found in a ditch. “We have found a lot of documents and hand-written letters” that implicated the men, the prime minister added.

Security forces also killed al-Masri’s assistant and one of al-Baghdadi’s sons, the U.S. military said. Iraqi troops took 16 men into custody after the raid.

In Washington, Vice President Joe Biden declared that the operation demonstrated the growing strength of the Iraqi security forces. “The Iraqis led this operation,” Biden told reporters, adding that Iraqis also gathered the intelligence that led to the targeting. “In short, the Iraqis have taken the lead.”

White House press secretary Robert Gibbs described the United States as playing a supporting role.

Al-Masri, an Egyptian, rose to the helm of the al Qaeda in Iraq organization after former leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi was killed in a U.S. air strike in June 2006.

Story here.

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Third High-Ranking Al-Qaeda Figure Killed In Iraq

April 20, 2010

Iraqi and U.S. troops killed a regional leader of Al-Qaeda in Iraq today, the third top terrorist reported killed in that country in the past 24 hours.

An Iraqi military spokesman, Qassim al-Musawi, said U.S. and Iraqi joint forces launched a morning attack in the northern province of Niniveh, killing suspected insurgent leader Ahmed al-Obeidi.

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Tuesday, April 20, 2010

Somalia: Al Shabab Recruits ‘Holy Warriors’ With $400 Bonus

Filed under: Al Qaeda,Somalia — Tags: , , , , , , — Matt @ 2:12 AM

    So, here we are again with another group of window lickers paying more than the local government to raise an army.  If we want to invigorate the government and it’s army, then they need the money to at least be able to pay more than the Al Shabab. That’s just common sense, and the rule of choice.

   Even this industry is guided by this rule.  People not only join something because they believe in it, but they also join a group/company/gang because it will improve their capacity for independent action. It could be for food, money, protection, whatever–we are all striving to improve our lot in life. If Al Shabab has a better deal than the government, then that is what the government should worry about and fix. –Matt

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Somalia’s Al Shabab Recruits ‘Holy Warriors’ with $400 Bonus

War-torn and Impoverished, Some Somali Youths Join Extremist Group to Make Money

By SCOTT BALDAUF and ALI MOHAMED

April 17, 2010

When Dahir Abdi joined the Somali extremist group Al-Shabab early last year, his motive had more to do with money than with God.

Back home in the Barawa district of southern Somalia, his parents and younger brothers and sisters were living on less than a single meal per day. His mother was too weak to fetch firewood to sell in the market, and too poor to buy the all-covering veil that was now required by Al-Shabab.

So when a recruiter from Al Shabab (whose name means “the youth” in Arabic) gave him $400 and the promise of a regular salary, Dahir joined willingly. He knew that even if he didn’t survive the war, his family would have a better chance to ward off starvation.

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Saturday, March 6, 2010

Strategy: The New Rules Of War, By John Arquilla

Filed under: Al Qaeda,Strategy — Tags: , , , , , — Matt @ 1:19 PM

   Just a heads up, John was one of Rumsfeld’s advisors. lol  But he does bring up some good points to think about, and I wanted to put them out there for the FJ readership to analyze. Here is a quick run down of the rules the author came up with:

   Rule 1: “Many and Small” Beats “Few and Large.”

   Rule 2: Finding Matters More Than Flanking.

   Rule 3: Swarming Is the New Surging.

   I guess the common theme of it all, is getting smaller and more mobile, in order to defeat a smaller and more mobile enemy. I just wonder if today’s militaries are even capable of this kind of flexibility? Because if we haven’t been able to get there yet, then when will we?

   Better yet, if you are reading this and would like an interesting thought to ponder, here it is.  How could a PMC use this information against an enemy it was tasked with destroying? The interesting angle with PMC’s is that the company with the better strategy and tactics, will win.  So if these new rules of warfare are sound, then they could be applied by an army or PMC for today’s battles, and they should come out victorious. Right?

   Or are these concepts really that radical, and just a rehash of older strategy?  I tend to go with this position, and today’s strategists have a tendency to just repackage old themes. The proof in the pudding is for John Arquilla to apply his rules in a war game in which the opposition is let’s say some player taking the side of Al Qaeda.   Either way, it is food for thought, and I would like to hear what you guys think. –Matt

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The New Rules of War

The visionary who first saw the age of “netwar” coming warns that the U.S. military is getting it wrong all over again. Here’s his plan to make conflict cheaper, smaller, and smarter.

BY JOHN ARQUILLA

 MARCH/APRIL 2010

Every day, the U.S. military spends $1.75 billion, much of it on big ships, big guns, and big battalions that are not only not needed to win the wars of the present, but are sure to be the wrong approach to waging the wars of the future.

In this, the ninth year of the first great conflict between nations and networks, America’s armed forces have failed, as militaries so often do, to adapt sufficiently to changed conditions, finding out the hard way that their enemies often remain a step ahead. The U.S. military floundered for years in Iraq, then proved itself unable to grasp the point, in both Iraq and Afghanistan, that old-school surges of ground troops do not offer enduring solutions to new-style conflicts with networked adversaries.

So it has almost always been. Given the high stakes and dangers they routinely face, militaries are inevitably reluctant to change. During World War I, the armies on the Western Front in 1915 were fighting in much the same manner as those at Waterloo in 1815, attacking in close-packed formations — despite the emergence of the machine gun and high-explosive artillery. Millions were slaughtered, year after bloody year, for a few yards of churned-up mud. It is no surprise that historian Alan Clark titled his study of the high command during this conflict The Donkeys.

Even the implications of maturing tanks, planes, and the radio waves that linked them were only partially understood by the next generation of military men. Just as their predecessors failed to grasp the lethal nature of firepower, their successors missed the rise of mechanized maneuver — save for the Germans, who figured out that blitzkrieg was possible and won some grand early victories. They would have gone on winning, but for poor high-level strategic choices such as invading Russia and declaring war on the United States. In the end, the Nazis were not so much outfought as gang-tackled.

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