Feral Jundi

Thursday, April 7, 2011

Bounties: The US Congress Paid $100 Per British Prisoner Captured During War Of 1812

1814, March 19. The $25 for each prisoner captured by private armed vessels of the United States to be $100 hereafter. $200,000 appropriated.
(What cost $100 in 1814 would cost $1025.20 in 2010.)

Now this is interesting, and I found this nugget of information in the Spirit of 76, Volume 6 edition. Did you know that the US Congress authorized a bounty system for British Prisoners during the War of 1812?  Apparently back then, the British had captured a ton of American prisoners during that war. The reason for that was because there were hundreds of American privateers involved in the war that went after the enemy, and many of these privateers were captured during operations.  These privateers were not as experienced and as professionalized as the Royal Navy back then, and suffered the consequence of being ill prepared.

Another problem that popped up in the war was that many of these American privateers had no use for prisoners and often let them go.  So in 1814, that is when Congress decided to appropriate money for bounties for privateers to hang on to prisoners and turn them in to US detention. My guess is that Congress wanted to do prisoner exchanges to get all of these Americans freed from British prisons. So naturally, Congress created an industry out of capturing prisoners to solve the problem. That is on top of the prize capture system implemented by Congress, which was an industry created to destroy enemy logistics and infuse money into the US Treasury.

With that said, privateers did some damage during that war and were a very important part of the overall strategy.  Despite the risks and poor conditions, many guys were driven to join the privateer schooners in the hopes of capturing a prize (or enemy vessel).  I compare it to today’s crab fishermen in Alaska, and a good visual representation of that ‘risk versus reward’ mindset is to watch a show like the ‘Deadliest Catch‘. It is the allure of the hunt and of striking it rich, that drove these men to do what they did back then.  Plus it was the patriotic thing to do at the time, and privateering was very popular.

Another little nugget I found out recently, was the concept of Prize Tickets.  What these were, were contracts between the sailors and the privateer company in which that sailor would get his share of the prize, after all the proceedings of the prize court and after everyone was paid.  The interesting thing here is that guys didn’t know how much they would get for their efforts, and it required patience to wait for the final outcome. What happened with many privateers is that instead of waiting, they would instead sell their prize tickets to brokers who would pay a small fee.  These brokers would stand to make a killing, just because they were rich enough and patient enough to wait for the final outcome of the prize.

The other thing that I thought was interesting is that privateer and letter of marque were two types of vessels/enterprises during that war. Not only was a Letter of Marque a commission/license issued to privateers, but the name Letter of Marque was given to a certain type of enterprise/vessel in this war. A Letter of Marque was a cargo vessel whom was issued a LoM for the possible chance that they might come across an enemy vessel and make a capture. But their primary task was shipping their cargo.  A privateer was a vessel that was primarily a fighting vessel, and prize captures/commerce raiding was is it’s purpose.

For more information on the War of 1812, I highly suggest a new book that came out called the Perilous Fight: America’s Intrepid War With Great Britain On the High Sea’s 1812-1815, By Stephen Budiansky. And I really liked this quote from the product description of this book: “Never again would the great powers challenge the young republic’s sovereignty in the aftermath of the stunning performance of America’s navy and privateersmen in sea battles that ranged across half the globe. Their brilliant hit-and-run tactics against a far mightier foe would pioneer concepts of “asymmetric warfare” that would characterize the insurgency warfare of later centuries.” Pretty cool. –Matt

ACTION FOR THE BENEFIT OF REVOLUTIONARY SOLDIERS.
COMPILED FROM THE MINUTES OF CONGRESS
The Spirit of ’76, Volume 6
1812, Jan. 18. Act declaring war with Great Britain.
1812, June 26. Act concerning letters of marque, prizes and and prize goods. The 17th section says: “That two percentum on the net amount (after deducting all charges and expenditures) of the prize money arising from capture of vessels and cargoes, recaptured by the private armed vessels of the United States, shall be secured and paid over to the collector or other chief officer of the customs at the port or place in the United States at which such captured or recaptured vessels may arrive; or consul or other public agent of the United States residing at the port or place not within the United States, at which such captured or recaptured vessels may arrive. And the moneys arising therefrom shall be held, and is hereby pledged by the government of the United States as a fund for the support and maintenance of the widows and children of such persons as may be slain; and for the support and maintenance of such persons as may be wounded and disabled, on board of thte private armed vessels of the United States, in any engagement with the enemy, to be assigned and distributed in such manner as shall hereafter by law be provided.” ) (more…)

Wednesday, April 6, 2011

Letter Of Marque: Ben Franklin’s ‘Privateer’ Fleet

This is a great documentary. What I thought was interesting is that Ben Franklin used privateers as a way to get British prisoners, in order to do a prisoner exchange with Britain for American prisoners. But because he did not provide incentive for the privateers to keep prisoners and deliver them or hold them, that the privateers just let them go. So I put the blame on Ben for not posting a bounty for prisoners captured, or at least some payment system that would motivate his privateers to capture and hold these prisoners.

Also, he poorly vetted the privateers he gave commissions too. I mean Ben really stumbled through this first effort of privateering. Although I am glad that the practice was improved upon and later turned into a key element of the Revolutionary War. It was private industry that targeted the logistics and commerce of the British, and basically made the American venture for Britain very costly.  Sun Tzu would refer to this as attacking weakness with strength, and British commerce and logistics was ravaged by American privateers.

What is also interesting is that with this bad experience, Ben made the conclusion that he did not like using privateers. Personally, I just think he didn’t have a clue on how to use them. Because if you look at the history of privateer usage in the War of 1812, congress used a bounty system to secure prisoners that privateers would have captured–all so they could do a prisoner exchange. In other words, America created a better offense industry using better rules and incentive. –Matt

 

Saturday, March 26, 2011

Building Snowmobiles: Col. John Boyd On US Military Reform After Operation Desert Storm

Filed under: Building Snowmobiles,History,Leadership,Strategy,Video — Matt @ 5:26 PM

Wednesday, March 9, 2011

Weapons: A Force Multiplier And Strategic Asset–The Girandoni Air Rifle Used By Lewis And Clark

Filed under: History,Weapons — Tags: , , , , — Matt @ 2:54 PM

Wednesday, February 23, 2011

History: Gaddafi’s Islamic Legion

Filed under: Al Qaeda,Chad,History,Libya — Tags: , , , , , , , — Matt @ 3:02 PM

     What I wanted to do here was bring up some history about Gaddafi and his use of an Islamic Legion, and his contracts with Islamic extremist mercenaries like Abu Nidal. From his desire to cleanse North Africa of all non-Arabs to his misguided wars against his neighbors and the West–this dictator has definitely been busy.

     I think what fascinated me the most was his usage of his Legionnaires in Chad, versus France’s use of their Legion and military forces.  The Islamic Legion started off alright in it’s beginnings, but later was poorly used, had low moral and was poorly organized in subsequent years. Hence why they failed in key battles towards the end.  The low moral was also a result of forcing folks to serve in this legion, and sending them to Chad to fight against a superior enemy with a better strategy.

    Now compare this to France and it’s use of it’s military forces. The French Foreign Legion played a pretty important role, but what was probably more important of a factor in defeating this Libyan enemy in Chad was the concept of the Toyota War and air domination. (pickup trucks with Milan Anti-tank missiles mounted)

    But back to the other areas of interest with Gaddafi’s Islamic Legion.  The Janjaweed was an unfortunate outcome of this legion, and of course they are famous for their genocidal activities in the Sudan.  The leaders of this group got their start in the Legion.

    The other bit of history that needs to be brought up is Gaddafi’s relationship with Abu Nidal, one of the world’s most infamous mercenaries and terrorist. He was contracted by Libya to do all sorts of awful things. Matter of fact, you could look at all of the attacks linked to Libya as contracts that Gaddafi issued to Islamist mercenaries, and they certainly did some damage. The 1986 Disco Tech Bombing and the 1988 Lockerbie Bombing come to mind, and no telling what else Libya and their buddy Abu were a part of.

     The Disco Tech Bombing is also why the US bombed Libya back in 1988.  But the really kick ass retaliation was when the US supplied missiles, Toyotas and equipment to the Chadian Army, and helped Chad to defeat Libya. Interesting history and certainly relevant to today’s events. –Matt

The Islamic Legion of Libya

Paramilitary forces of Libya

Abu Nidal’s Relationship with Gaddafi

History of the Janjaweed

This is just a parade of his current military forces. I could not find any photos of the Islamic Legion.

The Islamic Legion of Libya

The Islamic Legion (aka Islamic Pan-African Legion) was a Libyan-sponsored pan-Arab paramilitary force, created in 1972. The Legion was part of Muammar al-Gaddafi’s dream of creating the Great Islamic State of the Sahel.

Creation

Gaddafi, who had come to power in September 1969, was not only a Pan-Africanist, but an Arab cultural supremacist. His hostility to Chad’s government of President François Tombalbaye was at least partly inspired by Tombalbaye’s African and Christian background. It also led Gaddafi to drive the Toubou of Libya, who were considered ‘black’, off Fezzan and across the Chadian border. Gaddafi supported the Sudanese government of Gaafar Nimeiry, referring to it as an “Arab Nationalist Revolutionary Movement”, and even offered to merge the two countries at a meeting in late 1971. Gaddafi’s plans for the peaceful formation of an “Arab Union” were dashed when Nimeiry turned down his offer and negotiated the Addis Ababa Agreement ending the First Sudanese Civil War, fought with the black animist and Christian South. Gaddafi’s definition of “Arab” was broad, including the Tuareg of Mali and Niger, as well as the Zaghawa of Chad and Sudan.

In 1972, Gaddafi created the Islamic Legion as a tool to unify and Arabize the region. The priority of the Legion was first Chad, and then Sudan. In Darfur, a western province of Sudan, Gaddafi supported the creation of the Arab Gathering (Tajammu al-Arabi), which according to Gérard Prunier was “a militantly racist and pan-Arabist organization which stressed the ‘Arab’ character of the province.” The two organizations shared members and a source of support, and the distinction between the two is often ambiguous.

(more…)

« Newer PostsOlder Posts »

Powered by WordPress