Feral Jundi

Friday, June 18, 2010

Jundism: War Zone Corruption Allegations Up Sharply

     In Iraq, investigators have opened 67 fraud cases this year, compared with 69 for all of 2009, according to the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR). In Afghanistan, it’s 42 cases this year vs. four last year.

     Stuart Bowen, who heads SIGIR, says more tipsters are coming forward. “Some of these people have come back to the States, so they’re out of the threat zone,” he says. “Perhaps what they saw is gnawing at their conscience.” 

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     To me, this is great news.  It indicates to me that there is finally a connection between the guy on the ground and the folks tasked with investigating this stuff. That means guys and gals are talking and sending in tips because ‘they have the courage to do what is right‘ and the IG is acting on it. So bravo to you folks out there that are sticking it to these shady people and companies that think they can get away with this stuff.

     It also indicates that there are finally more investigators out there to actually investigate these tips.(contractors have been submitting stuff for awhile now) Although the government and tax payers would have been better served if they would have focused on this in the beginning of the war. Arguably, things would have been less screwed up if they had this manpower in the first place and it is a shame it has gone on this long like it has. The lesson to me, is you must have the necessary manpower and sound leadership in place to expand and contract with the dollars/stuff/people going in and out of war zones. Flexible and scaleable oversight is crucial. This kind of oversight is necessary not only for ensuring the tax payer gets a good value for their money, but that the actions of contractors or military folks does not negatively impact the war time strategy with their actions.

     That last part I cannot stress enough.  With today’s 24/7 media, the internet, blogs, cameras in smart phones, social media, etc., it is almost impossible to operate out of the public’s view. That means when a company screws up or does something it should not have done, the whole world ends up finding out about it.  And then whatever program and strategy that company was a part of in the war, is now threatened by that company who chose the wrong path. That is unacceptable in my view.

     Plus, I just love seeing shady companies/managers/individuals who screw over their fellow contractors or the government, get the heat. So keep sending in those tips to the IG, because what you have to say matters. It is an easy way to keep a company honest and on their toes. And maybe, just maybe, companies will actually start listening to their people and taking care of these problems or wrongdoing before they make their way to Youtube or the desk of the IG.

     Now one tip that I would like to present to the IG, if any of those guys are listening, is that you should also make an effort to connect with the ‘non-english’ writing, or computer illiterate contractors.  An Iraqi or Afghani contractor should have the means of connecting with you, because those folks see all sorts of wrong doings within their companies. The hordes of TCN’s from all over the world who are working on the bases, are in the same boat as well, and there should be an effort to reach out to them.  Perhaps a multi-language tip submit program involving anonymous call ins could be implemented there, because speaking a grievance would probably be better than them writing it.  Plus they could do it anonymously from the convenience of their phone. Interpreters could then translate the message and investigators can go from there.

     Also, there needs to be some pressure on the companies involved with TWISS.  I am getting lots of emails from expats and Ugandans about how screwed up that program is. And because this is an LPTA (lowest price, technically acceptable) program, the companies have all been racing to the bottom to out bid the other guy.  As a result, you have the lowest paid expats in the industry supervising poorly vetted Ugandans or whatever TCN group, and that dynamic does not promote a well running machine.  If anything, expats could care less about doing a good job, and those individuals only look at the job as a stepping stone to go onto something else. Most contractors involved with TWISS that I have talked with couldn’t wait to get out of that contract.

     LPTA does not work, it is a race to the bottom, and eventually LPTA is going to hurt the wartime strategy. The vetting of TCN guard forces like Ugandans is poor as well, and I place the blame on companies who are more concerned with cutting costs to outbid the other guy. They will say things like ‘that was the job of the training company we use in Uganda, and we had no part in that’ or ‘well company X in Uganda said they were good to go’.  Pffft. Meanwhile they man posts in Iraq with folks who are ill or cannot shoot a weapon or whatever, all because the vetting process is ‘technically acceptable’ and ‘lowest cost’. And why would US companies spend the money on this if they didn’t have to?

     It is a ‘race to the bottom’, and the government thinks this is a good idea. Wait until a poorly supervised or poorly vetted Ugandan kills some civilian or soldier, or fails at performing the duties of their post? That is not to say that there are not squared away expats or Ugandans in this program. But it is the program itself and the contracting vehicle that supports it, lends itself to such a screwed up set of circumstances. If the IG wanted a program to investigate, TWISS and the pathetic results of LPTA would be a good one to focus on. –Matt

Edit: 06/21/2010 -Doug Wethington from DCIS just responded in the comments below, and I wanted to put his information in an edit. Here is the important part:

I can also tell you we activity seek “non-English” sources of information for the reasons you site. We know these folks have valuable information and we try diligently to get the word out that we are interested in hearing what they have to say. I welcome any suggestions that will assist us with those efforts. We also welcome email tips, in whatever language, to:   icctf@iraq.centcom.mil

Forgot to add, the only phone number we currently have where a recording could be left and tranlation accomplished is the Defense hotline at 800-424-9098. I will take your suggestion and see if we can get a dedicated line with a recorder to receive complaints in country. Thanks for the advise.v/r

Douglas Wethington, Regional Director of Investigations, DCIS

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War zone corruption allegations up sharply 

By Aamer Madhani

June 17, 2010

WASHINGTON — The U.S. government, which is pressing Iraqi and Afghan leaders to get tough on internal corruption, is doing the same in its ranks.

Cases of suspected fraud and other wrongdoing by U.S. troops and contractors overseeing reconstruction and relief projects in Iraq and Afghanistan are up dramatically.

James Burch, the Defense Department’s deputy inspector general for investigations, says his agency is investigating 223 cases — 18% more than a year ago.

Investigators have charged an Army officer with pocketing cash meant to pay Iraqi civilian militiamen, contractors offering an Army officer $1 million for the inside track on a road project in Afghanistan, and three contractors for an alleged conspiracy to steal hundreds of thousands of dollars worth of fuel from a U.S. base in Baghdad.

Army Maj. John Cockerham was sentenced in December to 17½ years in prison for accepting $9 million in bribes for contracts to sell water and other supplies to the U.S. military.

(more…)

Monday, June 14, 2010

Industry Talk: DoS Wants To Form A Mini-army For Iraq Security

     Well duh! It all makes sense now.  CNAS comes out with a report on contractors, fully supporting our use and the future use of contractors in our wars, and now DoS wants to form a ‘mini-army’?(well…. they’ve always had a mini-contractor army)

     And the ‘monopoly of force’ argument gets another challenge by none other than…… the US Department of State? Max Weber is rolling in his grave as we speak. lol (I had to stick that one in there…)

     I am also reminded of the scenes of Air America rescuing South Vietnamese and American civilians off of the roof top during the last days of the Vietnam War. That was a contractor air force that did that, and not a military one.  The idea here is that contractors are the filler during the dangerous stages of a draw down or build up of a war.  We can fill those gaps of operational need, and as fast as they come up.  Private industry is flexible enough to do this, and account for the surprises or worse yet, poor planning of the war.

     Even with natural disasters like the BP spill in the gulf, you must have a partnership between private and public forces in order to meet the operational requirements of the disaster.  When the feds run out of a specific resource, or let’s say a disaster has done something completely unexpected, private industry can instantly address the problem. Or in some cases, the federal government can jump in and take over where private industry is faltering.  The key to me is to find some kind of equilibrium within that war or disaster, where we reach the sweet spot of private and public partnership. –Matt

Edit: 6/14/2010- I would like to correct one of the things I mentioned in this post that one of my readers brought to my attention as partially wrong.  During the draw down stage of the Vietnam war, this was largely a military effort. So I want to emphasize that the military did most of the heavy lifting, and Air America ‘assisted’ in that process. Or in other words, it was a team effort, with the military taking the lead. Here is a run down of Operation Frequent Wind, as just one example of that process.

   Also, check this out.  The author of this article changed the title of the thing.  The content is the same.  I will bet that he got some heat for putting together this original title below. The new one says “State Dept Wants Combat Gear For Security In Iraq”.  Just a tad bit less flowery or sensationalistic than the original. lol

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BAE Caiman

This BAE Caiman is what the DoS is requesting for their security force. They want 50. They also want 24 Blackhawk Helicopters.

State wants to form a mini-army for Iraq security

By RICHARD LARDNER

June 14, 2010

WASHINGTON — The State Department is quietly forming a small army to protect diplomatic personnel in Iraq after U.S. military forces leave the country at the end of 2011, taking their firepower with them.

Department officials are asking the Pentagon to provide heavy military gear, including Black Hawk helicopters, and say they will also need substantial support from private contractors.

The shopping list demonstrates the department’s reluctance to count on Iraq’s army and police forces for security despite the billions of dollars the U.S. invested to equip and train them. And it shows that President Barack Obama is having a hard time keeping his pledge to reduce U.S. reliance on contractors, a practice that flourished under the Bush administration.

In an early April request to the Pentagon, Patrick Kennedy, the State Department’s under secretary for management, is seeking 24 Black Hawks, 50 bomb-resistant vehicles, heavy cargo trucks, fuel trailers, and high-tech surveillance systems. Kennedy asks that the equipment, worth hundreds of millions of dollars, be transferred at “no cost” from military stocks.

Contractors will be needed to maintain the gear and provide other support to diplomatic staff, according to the State Department, a potential financial boon for companies such as the Houston-based KBR Inc. that still have a sizable presence in Iraq.

(more…)

Saturday, June 12, 2010

Iraq: Baghdad To Cull A Million Stray Dogs

Filed under: Fish and Game,Iraq,Medical — Tags: , , , , , , , , — Matt @ 1:53 PM

     This is actually a good thing.  The wild dog population in Iraq is out of control and a huge problem there.  One thing for everyone to think about when you are out there is don’t be surprised if you see these guys walking around with shotguns, shooting up dogs in the streets and cities.  It would be very easy to mistake these guys as the enemy or think there is some kind of firefight with all of the gun fire caused by this culling operation. It looks like they are operating in teams of four–two shooters, two vets, and possibly some police escorting them around.  And this is just for Baghdad.  I can’t even imagine how big the stray dog population is throughout Iraq. –Matt

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Iraq dogs

Baghdad to cull a million stray dogs as rogue canine population soars

June 11, 2010

More than a million stray dogs roaming Baghdad are facing destruction.

The initiative has so far led to 42,000 strays being killed in only two months.

Teams of riflemen and vets are trying to thin out a rogue canine population that has reached at least 1,250,000.

Numbers grew hugely after the fall of Saddam because of the lawless state of the Iraqi capital.

But with the streets now much safer, the authorities are trying to clear out the stray dogs.

(more…)

Tuesday, June 8, 2010

Publications: Contracting In Conflicts–The Path To Reform, By John Nagl And Richard Fontaine

     Now this is a better product and I can tell they actually listened to their contributors.  So bravo to CNAS for putting together a great report.  If you look at the cast of contributors, you will also see that they took advice from guys like Doug Brooks, David Isenberg and a whole bunch of private military companies and military professionals. For the record, I was not a direct contributor, but I know some of the ideas of FJ made it out there in one way or another.

     For one, they actually brought in Article 1, Section 8 of the US Constitution as a counter to Max Weber’s definition of the state. (the Second Amendment could also be looked at as a counter as well) I was beside myself when I read this in their ‘inherently governmental’ section, and I had to read it a couple of times to make sure they actually went there.  They did and bravo to them for having the courage to challenge this sacred cow of thought.

     This kind of sets the pace for the entire publication, because CNAS and all of it’s contributors were actually making the argument for the use of contractors in war time.  It is an acknowledgement of that ‘elephant in the room’ called contractors, and it is an excellent first step towards combining private industry and government for the good of the nation and the wars it fights. To me, it has always been about unity of effort and command, and ensure private industry only helps government, not hurt it.  If we can figure out how to achieve that unity of effort and command, I think the next step is what will really be radical.

     I have argued on this blog that today’s war planners, leaders and strategists should make an effort to at least acknowledge that elephant in the room called contractors or private industry.  We are getting there and I am enthused about the process.  But to me, the next level of discourse about private industry is how do you turn that animal into a war elephant?

     To me, it is not enough to just acknowledge our existence and say ‘oh well, private industry is that big dumb animal that we all have to get used to’. That is like using a pistol to hammer nails.  I would make the argument that instead, private industry should be looked at from a strategic point of view and the question should be asked is ‘how do we use private industry to help win our wars and maintain a position of strength in the world today’?  That is the next level of discourse about this subject, and that is the kind of thinking that could possibly lead to victory in our current wars. I say this, because there is a tremendous effort taking place to actually figure out how to regulate and utilize private industry during times of war, and this paper and current legislative action is proof of that process. So once we figure out how to shoot the pistol, as opposed to using it to hammer nails, we can then start discussing how to use that pistol in warfare.

     Now on to the paper.  Below I have listed some of the issues that popped up as I was reading it. Just little things that came to mind, that could help refine the product.  Ideas are cheap, and I throw them around freely here. I have also listed some interesting portions of the paper to give the reader a taste. Be sure to check out all of the contributors, to include Allison Stanger (she provided the forward). Enjoy and let me know what you think.-Matt

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Contracting In Conflicts: The Path To Reform

By John Nagl and Richard Fontaine

06/07/2010

CNAS

In both Iraq and Afghanistan today there are more private contractors than U.S. troops on the ground. This exploding reliance on contractors costs U.S. taxpayers tens of billions of dollars and has grown with inadequate government oversight.   This report – authored by Richard Fontaine and John Nagl – details the urgent need for comprehensive reform. The United States must embark on a path of ambitious reform that will require: new laws and regulations; an expansion of the government’s contracting workforce; a coordination mechanism within the executive branch; greater scrutiny, more transparency and clearer standards for private contractors; a strategic view of the roles contractors play in American operations; and a change in culture within the government.

Download the paper here.

Link to website here.

(more…)

Sunday, June 6, 2010

Publications: Tribal Engagement–The Jirga And The Shura, By Major Jim Gant And William ‘Mac’ McCallister

     Excellent little paper on the nuances of calling for and attending a Jirga or Shura.  I put this up on the blog because contractors attend these meetings all the time, as well as the military.  That means we can hurt the war effort or help the war effort, all based on how we conduct ourselves at these kinds of meetings. Do you want to be the guy or the company that completely pisses off a region or village because you did not know how these meetings worked?

     My intention here is to get individual contractors thinking about this stuff, and try to apply some of these lessons learned to their own processes out there.  That is Kaizen and that is what is required of any company or individual that claims to have a learning organization or claims to be a student of warfare. Check it out and let me know what you think.

     Also, if you go to this link at Small Wars Journal, you can follow along in the conversation and talk with the authors about the subject. Enjoy. –Matt

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Tribal Engagement: The Jirga and the Shuraby Major Jim Gant and William “Mac” McCallister

According to NATO’s military chief of intelligence in Afghanistan, the Taliban now maintain shadow governors in thirty-three out of thirty-four provinces. While we like to see the world in black and white, the complexities of relationships and alliances in the village and valley make it anything but a straightforward contest between two parties. The U.S. strategy of stripping away Taliban loyalists is not easy in a very complex socio-political landscape. This landscape includes different types of traditional authority, local rivalries and the various configurations of social power in each village and valley.

The rubber of U.S. strategy meets the road in the village assembly. It is in the local assemblies where Coalition Forces speak directly with the local inhabitants and indirectly with the shadow governors of the Taliban. Identifying ahead of time the familial, sectarian, security, economic and political alliances represented in a given village or valley assembly will assist in identifying how these alliances might influence group decisions. We must also contemplate, identify and differentiate between two very different village assemblies: the jirga and shura.

*****

Major Jim Gant is currently assigned to the Afghanistan Pakistan Hands (AFPAK Hands) Program as a Tribal Engagement Advisor. AFPAK Hands is designed to develop cadres of officers (and civilians) from each of the military’s services who agree to three to five year tours to the Afghanistan-Pakistan region. He will be returning to Afghanistan in the near future.

William “Mac” McCallister is a retired military officer. He has worked extensively in Europe, Asia and the Middle East. He has applied his study of tribal culture in assessing reconstruction efforts, as well as insurgency and counterinsurgency operations in Iraq, Afghanistan and the Global War on Terror.

Download the paper here.

Link to Small Wars Journal post and discussion here.

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