Feral Jundi

Monday, March 25, 2013

Industry Talk: US Embassy In Iraq Reducing Staff From 10,500 To 5,500 By End Of Year

Filed under: Industry Talk,Iraq — Tags: , , , — Matt @ 10:01 AM

Wow, that is a pretty substantial cut in personnel. Although from the sounds of it, there will still be a significant security force to support the fewer than 1,000 diplomats that remain. Which makes sense, because the embassy is still a large area to cover down on, regardless of how many folks are in it.
If anything, the reduction in security folks would be WPS personnel who would normally provide PSD teams to go out into the countryside. But even that might not see too much of a reduction just because the diplomats that are left, still have to go outside the wire. I also wonder how many missions they were really doing ever since the troops pulled out and the threats not going away in Iraq? If anyone with an inside track on this would like to comment, feel free to do so below.
I also think it is telling that we have had this massive presence at the embassy in Iraq, and the return on investment has been so poor. Meaning recently, Secretary of State John Kerry visited Iraq and got into it with Iraq about their policy of supporting the Assad regime with cargo/weapons flights coming out of Iraq into Syria. Obviously this is a source of contention, and Iraq could care less what the west wants them to do. So much for having a thousands of diplomats and a $750 million dollar embassy? lol –Matt

 

Massive American Embassy in Baghdad cutting staff sharply decade after war in Iraq began
March 20, 2013
A decade after the start of the war in Iraq, the American diplomatic footprint here is shrinking fast.
As recently as a year ago, the immense U.S. Embassy in Baghdad and other sites around the country were staffed by more than 16,000 personnel. Today, that number has fallen to about 10,500, U.S. Ambassador Robert Stephen Beecroft said this week.
By the end of the year, Beecroft said he expects to have just 5,500 employees in Iraq. Most of them will be security personnel and other outside contractors assigned to support the fewer than 1,000 diplomats who remain. More cuts are expected beyond the end of the year.
“That number will continue to go down. . And they’ll go down largely on the contracting side,” Beecroft said in his residence on the heavily guarded compound on the banks of the Tigris River.
The sprawling, fortress-like U.S. Embassy officially opened in early 2009 at a cost of more than $730 million as the largest American mission in the world. But it has been under pressure to cut costs.
The downsizing in many ways reflects how sharply wartime assumptions about the extent of American influence in Iraq have shifted since construction on the Vatican City-sized compound began in 2005. Sweeping reconstruction and nation-building efforts championed early on are much less of a priority today, even as Iraq’s Shiite-led government forges stronger ties with neighboring Shiite powerhouse and U.S. foe Iran.
America still has influence here, with Iraq-based diplomats and officials in Washington in frequent contact with Iraqi political and military leaders. But Washington was unable to win Iraqi guarantees that would have allowed a continued military presence — something that deprived the U.S. of important leverage in Baghdad, former U.S. Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta recently told a government watchdog.

(more…)

Saturday, February 9, 2013

Publications: Contractor Support Of USCENTCOM AOR, 1st Quarter FY 2013

For those looking for the source of this data, here is a link to the DASD Program Support that puts these reports together every quarter. They have been very useful and I have put everyone of them into my Scribd if you would like to reference and check this stuff out.

William over at Danger Zone Jobs has been tracking this data over the years and he has put together some excellent graphics showing exactly what the trends are over the last seven quarters.

Interesting stuff and check it out below. –Matt

 

Contractor Support Of USCENTCOM AOR, 1st Quarter FY 2013 by Feral Jundi

Monday, November 26, 2012

Afghanistan: The Discussion On Troop Numbers Beyond 2014

Filed under: Afghanistan,Iraq — Tags: , , , , , — Matt @ 11:03 PM

A Wall Street Journal report, meanwhile, said top Obama administration officials want to keep about 10,000 American troops in the country – a midpoint in the range of options that Allen presented to Panetta, which the newspaper said varied from 6,000 to 15,000.
Many observers have said the Afghan government is unlikely to be able to take over logistical operations, air support and other facets of the current war, in addition to the training and counterterrorism missions foreign troops would provide.

As the article pointed out below, a solid number is premature. But you can definitely point to a ‘range’ of what we are looking at in the quote up top.

The other thing to think about with this stuff is the logistics requirements of Afghanistan beyond 2014. We have given the Afghans a military force that requires some serious upkeep, and especially the aviation assets. Couple that with the idea that most Afghans have a poor reading capability (hence cannot read a manual to fix or maintain whatever), that it will take someone with outside expertise to continue to assist. That is where contractors will come in.

I also look at Afghanistan’s means of financially supporting this military as the west exits. Where will the revenue come from to pay salaries and maintain this military and government?  So economics plays into this, and I think the west will continue to support Afghanistan well after we are gone. So yet again, with western dollars comes western contractors to support the Afghans.

One final point is Iraq and how that turned out, might be a scenario for Afghanistan. Meaning we purposely depended upon Iraq to use their parliament to come up with a SOFA, knowing full well that parliament would not support immunity of any sorts for US troops in their country. It is a smart political move by the US administration, who wanted fully out of Iraq, because they knew that Iraqi politicians did not want to be known as the leaders that wanted US troops to stay. Some would say we pulled out prematurely in Iraq because of those politics and not because of a logical withdrawal plan–but that is another discussion and only time will tell with that country.

So if we start doing actions that put the full decision of troops staying in Afghanistan, into the hands of Afghans and not just one main leader, then we might see an exodus of troops from Afghanistan much like how Iraq turned out. Just because Afghan politicians do not want to be viewed as the folks that supported foreign occupiers to stay. (May is when a new SOFA is to be decided upon…) Any SOFA that does not have troop immunity in it, is a sure sign that we will be exiting, and contractors will be the only ones left standing–just like in Iraq. –Matt

 

Pentagon: Discussion of troop numbers remaining in Afghanistan ‘premature’
By CHRIS CARROLL
November 26, 2012
The Pentagon says it plans to tell the White House within weeks how many American troops military leaders believe will be needed in Afghanistan after 2014 to train local forces and continue to target al-Qaida.
With NATO’s formal combat role set to end in just over two years, the United States — along with its NATO allies and the Afghan government — is keen to define a postwar presence well in advance, avoiding the precipitous pullout and security problems that came with the end of the Iraq War.
The troop calculations, however, have to achieve a delicate balance that weighs military capability against the U.S. public’s weariness of continuing conflict – and meets Afghan expectations of the residual force.
The troop strength recommendation will be based on options presented in recent weeks by Marine Gen. John Allen, the NATO commander for the war, to Defense Secretary Leon Panetta. The final decision has yet to be made, officials said.

(more…)

Saturday, November 3, 2012

Publications: CRS On Contracting–Learning From The Past And Preparing For The Future, By Moshe Schwartz

This is a great little document, just because Moshe Schwartz has been in the middle of this contracting reporting game for a long time, and has come up with some great lessons learned. He also works for the congressional research service and has authored several reports on the war that I have commented on in the past.

Some stuff that jumped out at me was the idea of teaching ‘how to manage contractors’ in the military academies and schools. To actually have mock contractors on exercises with the military, so officers and NCO’s have some experience working with this group. Especially since we make up over ‘half’ of the forces in the war–it kind of makes sense that the military should learn to how to work with and manage this force. So bravo to Moshe for pointing this out and I hope the military continues to pursue this and professionalize contractor management.

This leads me to another thought. I think the best group to set up mock contracting scenarios during exercises, would be contractors themselves. So perhaps this would be a niche that a company can provide to the military? There are numerous companies that provide mock villages and cultural training to the military to better prepare the troops before they deploy. The same concept could be applied to training the military on how best to work with and manage contractors.

One of the mantras of the military is to train as you fight and fight as you train. Given the extent to which contractors may be relied upon in future operations, conducting exercises without contractors could be akin to training without half of the force present. A number of analysts have called for incorporating contractors and contractor scenarios into appropriate military exercises to better prepare military planners and operational commanders for future operations. -pg. 7-8

Another way to look at this is that contractors, much like Iraqis or Afghans, are a group that you must understand ‘culturally’ in order to best work with them. I say culturally, because strangely enough, not all contractors are prior service. And not all contractors come from the US. So you have a lot of factors that the military command has to deal with, if they want those contractors to be assets to the mission and not liabilities.

Which brings me to the next point of interest. Moshe mentioned that as the wars wind down, and troops and budgets get cut, the military will be looking for ways of saving money and expanding the usefulness of the manpower they have. So to do that would require a smarter use of contractors to support the programs they have. The British mentioned this as well in their drive to save money and stay operational.

To what extent will potential budget cuts or force structure changes impact DoD reliance on contractors?
As discussed in this report, post-Cold War budget cuts resulted in an increased reliance on contractors. According to reports, budget cuts and plans to restructure the military in Britain will result in an increased reliance on contractors to provide operational contract support. Further budget cuts to the US military could have similar result. One question for Congress is to what extent budget cuts, the imposition of personnel caps, or a restructuring of the force will lead to an increased reliance on contractors? -pg. 12

Not only that, but if you remember the paper written by Bruce Stanley as to the relationship between the cycles of war and contractor use, it makes even more sense why we should remember these lessons so we can be prepared for future conflict.

This study argues that when political leaders choose to reduce their nation’s military force structure, they may face conflicts beyond their anticipated scope and duration. Such decision-makers are left with no choice but to legalize and legitimize the use of PMCs resulting in the increased use of PMCs as a deliberate tool of foreign policy.

Or how I interpret this is that a nation wants to enjoy the peace dividend when the war ends, so they cut budgets and reduce the force to make everyone happy and recover economically. But then another war happens several years down the road, and you go to war with army you have and not the one you wish you had. So we play catch up and we use contractors to fill the gaps or assist in support–which is what happened in Iraq and Afghanistan post Cold War.

Contractors are pretty vital to that game of catch up, which is of strategic importance to this nation. So yeah, learning from past mistakes and preparing for the future is something we need to do here, and bravo to Moshe and others for making that point.  –Matt

 

Operational Contract Support: Learning From The Past And Preparing For The Future, By Moshe Schwartz

Wednesday, October 31, 2012

Publications: Contractor Support Of USCENTCOM AOR, 4th Quarter FY 2012

The interesting part of this report is that there is very little change from last quarter as far as the overall numbers. In the 3rd quarter, there were 136,901 contractors overall, and in this quarter there are 137,407. So it is an increase, but by a small margin.

The other thing that jumped up at me was that contractor numbers actually increased in Iraq. In the third quarter we saw 7,336 and in this quarter we see 9,000!

We also see some numbers for the APPF force which was supposed to replace contractors in Afghanistan. The statistic that perked me up was the amount of ‘risk management consultants’–220– that was required to watch over the 2,407 APPF folks. These risk management consultants are contractors that represent the companies, and it is just funny that with all of this attention placed on the APPF being the solution, that they still need that many ‘consultants’. lol

The other interesting statistic is the Private Security numbers, or the armed contractors in both Iraq and Afghanistan. In Iraq, there is more use of security contractors from other countries other than the US. The local national use really hasn’t changed that much.

In Afghanistan, you see an increase in US private security use. In the 3rd quarter we saw 480 US security folks, and in the 4th quarter we see an increase to 2,014! Now I am going to speculate that perhaps the reason for this, is the increase in insider attacks and an increase in using Americans to guard FOB’s. The military is wanting to hand over the security of these bases so that it can save some money and use the remaining manpower for training missions or combat support for their other operations out there. –Matt

 

Contractor Support Of USCENTCOM AOR, 4th Quarter FY 2012

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