The trainers are mostly retired state troopers and other law enforcement personnel on leave from their jobs back home, and a number of officials who criticized the program questioned what those trainers have to offer Iraqi police officials who have been operating in a war zone for years.
Mr. Perito said that the State Department never developed a suitable curriculum and that instead, advisers often “end up talking about their own experiences or tell war stories and it’s not relevant.”
Retired Lt. Gen. James M. Dubik, now a senior fellow at the Institute for the Study of War, who oversaw the training of Iraqi security forces from 2007 to 2008, said, “The evidence suggests that the State Department never really engaged the Iraqis to find out what they need and what they want.”
In an effort to ‘right size’ the US mission in Iraq, and adjust to Iraq’s desire to enforce their sovereignty, we are seeing an adjustment happening. Which makes sense and is totally reasonable. It is the Iraqi’s show now, and it will be very difficult to sell them on a massive program that they think they do not need or even want.
Or, like the quote up top and what SIGIR identified in the report, that DoS should work a little harder at creating a curriculum or program that the Iraqis actually like and want more of. And that would take talking with them, and using some kind of metrics to determine what is working with the course, and what is not.(as SIGIR recommends)
Also, more work needs to be done to convince the police commanders and leaders of Iraq that courses like this actually do increase the effectiveness of their police. But that takes action, not words, and the service out in the field must be evaluated and surveys taken in order to get a feel for what is effective. That old Jundism of ‘get feedback’ comes to mind.
Another point was brought up in the article below that was interesting. And that is security for these police advisers in Iraq. With the military gone, the security these days for operations are contractors.
The Iraqis have also insisted that the training sessions be held at their own facilities, rather than American ones. But reflecting the mistrust that remains between Iraqi and American officials, the State Department’s security guards will not allow the trainers to establish set meeting times at Iraqi facilities, so as not to set a pattern for insurgents, who still sometimes infiltrate Iraq’s military and police.
So as Iraq hassles contractors, or as the Iraqis do a terrible job of securing places that these advisers might visit or the people they might train, that operations in this environment becomes very complex and dangerous. But it isn’t impossible, and security contractor will make it happen–just as long as DoS is working hard about the issue of how Iraqis treat security contractors.
If you are on this program and disagree with what was said in this NYT’s article or what was said in the SIGIR, definitely come up in the comments section and speak up. Also, if anyone at DoS wants to come up and speak about the program on this blog, by all means feel free to do so. Although DoS did make a public statement in regards to this article, and I posted that below along with the SIGIR report done last year about this program. –Matt
U.S. May Scrap Costly Efforts to Train Iraqi Police
By TIM ARANGO
May 13, 2012
In the face of spiraling costs and Iraqi officials who say they never wanted it in the first place, the State Department has slashed — and may jettison entirely by the end of the year — a multibillion-dollar police training program that was to have been the centerpiece of a hugely expanded civilian mission here.
What was originally envisioned as a training cadre of about 350 American law enforcement officers was quickly scaled back to 190 and then to 100. The latest restructuring calls for 50 advisers, but most experts and even some State Department officials say even they may be withdrawn by the end of this year.
The training effort, which began in October and has already cost $500 million, was conceived of as the largest component of a mission billed as the most ambitious American aid effort since the Marshall Plan. Instead, it has emerged as the latest high-profile example of the waning American influence here following the military withdrawal, and it reflects a costly miscalculation on the part of American officials, who did not count on the Iraqi government to assert its sovereignty so aggressively.
“I think that with the departure of the military, the Iraqis decided to say, ‘O.K., how large is the American presence here?’ ” said James F. Jeffrey, the American ambassador to Iraq, in an interview. “How large should it be? How does this equate with our sovereignty? In various areas they obviously expressed some concerns.”
