OIG MERO Kabul Embassy Security Force Performance Evaluation, Sept 2010
Sunday, October 31, 2010
Sunday, October 24, 2010
Publications: Contractor Support Of USCENTCOM AOR, 3rd Quarter FY 2010
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Friday, October 8, 2010
Wednesday, September 15, 2010
Publications: The Use Of Pseudo-Operations In The AFPAK Theater, By Dr Ronald Holt
Awesome stuff and these are the topics I really dig discussing. The more we talk about this concept, the more people can start looking at the pieces and make a ‘snowmobile’ out of it. What I really like about this paper is that it talks specifically about Afghanistan and Pakistan, which will help us to focus the discussion and make it more relevant. Especially check out the comments section at Small Wars Journal for this topic. –Matt
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The Use of Pseudo-Operations in the AFPAK Theaterby Ronald Holt
September 15, 2010
Download the Full Article: The Use of Pseudo-Operations in the AFPAK Theatre
What would be the effect if we had small integrated groups of former Taliban and US Special Operators working together, masquerading as Taliban, living off the villagers as the Taliban do, and feeding USSOCOM actionable HUMINT?
This short paper is designed to be a “thought-piece” with the purpose of stimulating “out of the box” ideas. Pseudo Operations involve recruiting and training ex-insurgents to operate as insurgents and produce intelligence, cause enemy casualties, and create distrust between the local population and the insurgents. Such on the ground intelligence gives a deeper picture of enemy intentions, infiltration routes and support amongst the local population. Real- time intelligence can lay the groundwork for successful direct actions missions. Sometimes pseudo-operators will disguise themselves as members of adjacent countries’ military in order to operate in enemy sanctuaries. In this paper I will argue that Pseudo-Ops might be of use given the current situation in AFPAK and particularly in southern Afghanistan and in areas of Pakistan such as North Waziristan or even Baluchistan.
Download the Full Article: The Use of Pseudo-Operations in the AFPAK Theatre
Dr. Ronald Holt is a tenured Professor of Anthropology and Fulbright Scholar. He was the senior social scientist for Human Terrain Team AF-1 at FOB Salerno Afghanistan in 2008. Dr. Holt has done fieldwork in several Islamic countries and with Native American tribes.
Link to post at Small Wars Journal here.
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Tuesday, September 14, 2010
Publications: COMISAF’s Counterinsurgency Contracting Guidance
Here it is. Feel free to pass this around or go to the links below, and pass that around. Lots of good commonsense stuff in there. My only point to make with this publication is that prime contractors should definitely use this document as well, just so that we are all playing off the same sheet of music. –Matt
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COMISAF/CDR USFOR-A
For the Commanders, Contracting Personnel, Military Personnel, and Civilians of NATO ISAF and US Forces-Afghanistan
SUBJECT: COMISAF’s Counterinsurgency (COIN) Contracting GuidanceDownload Official Release
The scale of our contracting efforts in Afghanistan represents both an opportunity and a danger. With proper oversight, contracting can spur economic development and support the Afghan government’s and ISAF’s campaign objectives. If, however, we spend large quantities of international contracting funds quickly and with insufficient oversight, it is likely that some of those funds will unintentionally fuel corruption, finance insurgent organizations, strengthen criminal patronage networks, and undermine our efforts in Afghanistan.
In view of these points, contracting has to be “Commander’s business.” Indeed, I expect Commanders to consider the effects of our contract spending and understand who benefits from it. We must use intelligence to inform our contracting and ensure those with whom we contract work for the best interests of the Afghan people. We must be better buyers and buy from better people. Consistent with NATO and national contracting laws and regulations, we must:
Understand the role of contracting in COIN. Purchases we make for construction, goods, and services can bolster economic growth, stability, and Afghan goodwill toward their government and ISAF. Contracts with Afghan firms that procure Afghan goods and services generate employment and assist in the development of a sustainable economy. However, if we contract with powerbrokers who exclude those outside their narrow patronage networks or are perceived as funneling resources to one community at the expense of another, the effect on Afghan perceptions and our mission will be negative. Thus, we must incorporate COIN Contracting topics into training for Commanders.
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