Feral Jundi

Friday, June 25, 2010

Somalia: Al Shabab Is Gaining Strength, TFG Corruption Causes Soldier Defections

Filed under: Africa,Al Qaeda,Somalia,Strategy — Tags: , , , , , , — Matt @ 12:34 PM

     Boy, this isn’t a pretty picture.  I have mentioned in the past on why it is important to ‘pay your soldiers’ if you want them to stick around, and this is a prime example of how important that is. Al Shabab has made some moves lately that have increased their size and hold on territory.  Not good for the TFG, and not good for the west.

     I also wanted to mention that Petraeus was the one that signed off on US military covert operations in Somalia. So if we have guys there right now, then a really excellent thing they could do to stop the bleeding is to gain a foothold on the payment and management of these Somali troops.  We spent the money to train them in Ethiopia, we can certainly watch over the payment of their services in Somalia. I compare this to our handling of the HTN contracts in Afghanistan that are causing so many headaches.  We must insure there is adult supervision with this stuff.

     Or, we should just allow the TFG to crumble, and let Al Shabab to take over….  Because as it stands right now, Al Shabab has momentum and they are closing in fast.  And as they conquer and absorb these other Islamic extremist groups, the people will see this strength and bow down to this Islamic force.  How could they not, if the TFG can’t even do the simple task of paying their troops? (and that’s after we gave them the money to pay their troops with) This is basic Governance 101.

      I guess what I am saying is that Al Shabab, and in a larger sense Al Qaeda, is on the verge of a ‘win’ in Somalia. Can we afford this, and especially with what is going on in Afghanistan, or with the victory we are claiming in Iraq? Momentum is quite a thing, and if you give an enemy ground, they will now have something to promote their effectiveness with.  Hell, if we want to give General McChrystal a way to redeem himself, I say let the ‘industrial death machine of Iraq’ have a go in Somalia? Don’t put him charge of AFRICOM, but definitely put him in charge of some kind of project he can focus his talents on. Somalia needs that kind of talent and attention, or we will lose it. –Matt

Furious Soldiers storm Villa Somalia

Hizbul-Islam vanishing into Al-Shabab

U.S. Is Said to Expand Secret Actions in Mideast

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From Strategy Page

June 25, 2010

The Transitional Government (TG) is negotiating with Hizbul Islam. This Islamic radical group is the smaller rival of al Shabaab, and less radical. The more radical members of Hizbul Islam are defecting to al Shabaab, so it makes sense that the less radical ones would try to cut a deal with the TG. Otherwise, an even smaller Hizbul Islam could be crushed by al Shabaab. Meanwhile, the TG is itself threatened with fragmentation as many members of the government strive to rearrange the deal that determines which clans get how many seats in the parliament. Somalis have a hard time compromising, and prefer to fight, which is the main reason the country is such a mess. Corruption is the other big problem. This was seen recently when hundreds of government soldiers, trained by foreign instructors, demonstrated at the presidential palace for back pay. The money had been stolen by government officials, who consider a government job as a license to steal. Donor nations have a hard time convincing officials that effective government cannot survive such attitudes.

Story here.

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Hizbul-Islam vanishing into Al-Shabab

Saturday 19 June 2010

Somaliweyn – Mohammed Omar Hussein

The warriors of Hizbul-Islam one of the adversary Islamist functions in Somalia are in their hundreds joining Al-Shabab another Islamist function in Somalia, which is also extra superior than Hizbul-Islam according the areas which each group is controlling and in terms of fighters as well.

(more…)

Thursday, June 24, 2010

Building Snowmobiles: Human-flesh Search Warfare

     Sinnreich adds a psychological component. “A lot of us really know next to nothing about what’s really going on militarily in Afghanistan,” he says, “so when a schism like this opens up, we think, ‘There must be more to this.’ ” A “collective detection mentality” takes over, he says, and thousands of people start piecing together thousands of bits of information to get a bigger picture.

*****

     If anyone is wondering how I come up with this stuff, I will explain.  I will read about one interesting concept, store it away in my brain, and then when I hit some trip wire ideas that fit in with that prior concept, some ‘illumination’ occurs. In this case, I was reading about human-flesh search engines a week or so ago, and then the Rolling Stone atomic bomb of a story comes out, and I started putting two and two together.

   First, let’s discuss what each component is and then we can discuss how they fit together, and then finish up on how to weaponize the concept (if possible).  Because if you look at what happened here, the best general that the US had, second only to Petraeus, was effectively removed from his post, all because of what was said in an article and the flash fire effects of new media.  That is one hell of an attack if you could figure out how to reproduce it.

   The first part of the concept is the human desire to want to know.  And the tools we have available to us these days, give us the ability to ‘know’ what is going on very quickly.  The news cycle and people’s ability to get that news, and how it allows us to pass it on to the next guy is mind boggling fast.  It doesn’t combust like a fire, it explodes like a bomb, and new media/social media is the facilitator for everyone who wants to know.

   For example, when the McChrystal ‘Runaway General’ news came out, I had heard about it via Facebook, Twitter, newsletters, updates via email, and my RSS reader.  I also got the news via my iPhone, which means I did not have to wait until I got home to read all of this stuff. The news exploded, and like most, I passed that news on to my network.  I then got to work on posting a blog entry about the thing, because it was a big story.  And so did thousands of other journalists, bloggers, forum participants, etc.  So analyzing the whole thing kicked in instantly as well.

   On my RSS reader, I saw multiple blog posts coming up from all over about the story.  People analyzing and giving opinions, and everyone was reading everyone else’s stuff and trying to come up with the best conclusions.  Partly because they wanted to know the real deal, and partly because they wanted to choose the right angle on the whole thing so they would not look like an ass to their readers and friends. So not only did bloggers want to ‘know’, they wanted to be the ones that looked like they ‘knew’.  All of these bloggers, to include myself, were furiously going over the material as it came out over the internet.  Our business is to know, and believe me, we were trying to do that.

   That process of wanting to know, or what the professor up top worded as ‘collective detection mentality’ is the first part to understand here. We are human, we are competitive, and knowledge is power.  When everyone is fighting to learn and know what is going on, that process creates the informational tsunami.  That information wave can also do much to force an action and create a desired outcome for whomever originally intended to create such a thing.  If you look at how President Obama and the upper command reacted to this incident, it is startling.  This didn’t happen over the course of weeks or days.  It happened virtually overnight and a top general has been removed from power.

     The second concept to look at is the idea of human-flesh search engines.  This is a concept out of China that has equally startling results. If a person is made a target by whomever on a forum, and whatever act this target did was sufficient to bring on interest and vengeance, well then you have all the elements of a human-flesh search.  People want to ‘know’ why this target did what they did, they want to ‘know’ who they are, what they are doing, where they live, and most importantly, they want to make sure the target suffers for any wrong doing.

   It is that power of wanting to ‘know’ that fuels the crowd in sort of virtual lynch mob.  A prime example of this was the whole Jax Desmond affair here on the blog and forums.  When it came out that Jax was lying about who he was, this industry reacted to it much like how the Chinese human-flesh search engines turned out.  My readers were at first picking apart the guy’s lies, which was great, but then you could see on the forums that people wanted vengeance.  Folks were posting his address, real name, etc. and doing all they could to get back at Jax.  In their minds, he deserved everything he got, and each person out there was going to contribute to his demise. My point with this is that a crowd with the desire to ‘know’, coupled with the desire for vengeance against an individual they perceive as bad, can be quite impressive to watch and certainly damaging to the intended target. As a result, the Jax Desmond name is mud in this industry, and when the crowd decided they ‘knew’ enough to act, they quickly dispensed their justice.

      Now let’s put them together, and build a snowmobile.  Could you initiate a human-flesh search attack (HSA), that could create a desired result? I think you can, but only with a multi-faceted approach, and persistence. You must identify your target, identify the element that the crowd would like to ‘know’, and really exploit the virtual mob mentality if that target has done something that would be considered immoral. Your HSA strategy should strive to mimic other incidents that showed all the hallmarks what is mentioned in these two articles, and the examples I have provided. Most importantly, persistence is key, because you cannot say for sure if your HSA will work the first time out.  It would take a constant attack from multiple angles, to be successful. It helps to throw the match in the right places though, and that is the key.  The forest fire analogy fits well with conducting HSA.  If you can keep shooting flares into pockets of unburned fuel, from across the canyon, eventually you will get one of the pockets burning and they will start the fire that you wanted to start.

   The other thing about Human-flesh Search Warfare is defending against such a thing.  Yet again, I look at the forest fire fighting analogy for the defense.  You must create fire breaks to defend crucial aspects of your forest.  Or in terms of what we are talking about here, you must protect yourself or your principle by insuring you have the appropriate defenses in place.  Having journalists from Rolling Stone hanging out with you for a couple of weeks is probably not a good idea–no buffer there.  Making wild and false claims online about your company or your personal actions, would also not be a good idea–not much buffer there either.

     But most of all, you need good intelligence that focuses on you and the enemy.  ‘Know yourself, know your enemy’ as Sun Tzu would say.  Because if you know yourself, you will know what weaknesses, immoralities, etc. that the enemy might possibly use against you in this kind of attack.  Knowing your enemy will help you to figure out their intentions towards you or folks like you, and how they like to conduct HSA. You should also stay up to date with technology and ‘knowing’ yourself. Use the same tools and resources that your enemy uses, if you want to really know what he knows. You can also try to copy your enemy’s strategy and tactics, and add one little technological or operational piece to that package to get an edge.  If your information officer, or whomever is assigned to be your virtual body guard cannot do these basic things, then you should look at firing them. Because this is something any good practitioner of strategic communications or new media should be wary of and try to understand, so they know how to best build that fire break or place the match in the right patch of fuel in the forest.

   Well, let me know what you think.  If I am missing something here, or you have something to add to this stew of ideas, I would be interested to hear what you got.(be sure to read both stories below because they are relevant to this post) –Matt

New media too speedy to outflank

China’s Cyberposse

Edit: 6/25/2010- I wanted to add one more human-flesh search warfare case to this, for further thought.  Wikileaks is an excellent example of the power of human-flesh search, and what it could do to the war effort.  Some Army Intel kid leaked the videos anonymously to Wikileaks, and that was all that was necessary to spark the human-flesh search engine. Media was linking to the videos and site, and overnight, war leaders and politicians had to deal with this.  When that came out, it exploded as well.  But if you look at Wikileaks, what was the element about it, that would attract that Army Intel kid to contribute in the first place.  That is why this is such an intriguing idea to talk about.

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New media too speedy to outflank

By John Timpane

Jun. 24, 2010

It began as a scattering of acid remarks within earshot of a Rolling Stone reporter. But – thanks in large part to Twitter, the Web, and cable news – barely two days after those remarks were disclosed, a media firestorm ended Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal’s tenure as commander of U.S. and NATO Coalition Forces in Afghanistan.

Fast, overwhelming, decisive: It’s a case study in how tightly connected 21st-century media can whip a story into a full-on tsunami, with startling consequences for individual careers and national policy.

“Rolling Stone broke the story, but it was Twitter that got the story rolling,” says Aram Sinnreich, a media professor at Rutgers University in New Brunswick, N.J. “The peer-produced social media are doing to cable-news networks what cable news did to broadcast. We’ve gone from the one-day news cycle to every hour on the hour to second by second.”

Noah Shachtman, a nonresident fellow at the Brookings Institution and a blogger at Wired magazine, says: “The fact so many of us are networked together enabled the information to spread speed-of-light fast. That turned what might have been a slower-burning flame into an instant conflagration.”

(more…)

Tuesday, June 22, 2010

Strategy: Rolling Stone’s ‘Runaway General’ Article And The Poker Game Called Afghanistan

     So far, counterinsurgency has succeeded only in creating a never-ending demand for the primary product supplied by the military: perpetual war. There is a reason that President Obama studiously avoids using the word “victory” when he talks about Afghanistan. Winning, it would seem, is not really possible. Not even with Stanley McChrystal in charge.-The last sentences of this article, (and the narrative that Rolling Stone wants the reader to accept)

*****

     This is an interesting article in many ways.  To me, I look at it from several points of view that might provide an explanation for such a thing.  I look at the article as a big commentary on the poker game called Afghanistan, with a table of politicians, a president and his administration, civilian leaders, the enemy, Karzai, the media, and General McChrystal. Each player has their own strategy in this game, and each player has a plan to win.  The stakes are political survival, the direction of the war, and the narrative in the history books and everyone is fighting for public support and opinion. So what is each player’s strategy and goals in this game?

     Well, let’s break it down.  The first up is Rolling Stone.  For them the pot in this poker game is a sensational story and a further narrative of the war as being lost.  That COIN sucks and General McChrystal is a ‘Runaway General’, or uncontrollable. Any way they can show a division between all the crucial leadership running the war, is good for their goal of ending the war. Rolling Stone is also a supporter of the Obama administration, but they also do not support the war in Afghanistan.  So to them, showing a failed war and putting all the blame on an out of control general helps to insulate their guy in office.  To show support for the administration, while at the same time protesting the war by making it the product of that insane guy in charge called General McChrystal.

     The next player to discuss is the President and all of his men.  They need a win in Afghanistan, but they have also painted themselves into a corner with the July 2011 date for withdrawal.  They did this to appease their political base, and this date and the coming election is going to effect all of their decision making on the wartime strategy there.  There is also historical context, and Obama does not want this to be his Vietnam.  No standing President wants that, and every President looks at a war under their watch as how it will look in the history books. So the coming election and history are the two factors pressing this administration.  Not to mention that he also has the economy and the BP spill in the Gulf as two negatives.  He needs a win in one or two of these areas, because coming into re-election with all of those ‘losers’ will definitely hurt him.

     Then there is the civilian leadership like Eikenberry, the U.S. ambassador. Of course there would be friction between him and McChrystal, and especially after McChrystal was his subordinate at one point, and especially after he was not chosen as the viceroy in Afghanistan.  Plus DoD gets way more money than DoS when it comes to budget and resources, and you have that clash.  But there is one part of this story that clued me into the history narrative of this war. When Eikenberry leaked the cable to the New York Times about how pathetic Karzai and the war strategy was, this was a way to seal their place in history books as a ‘I told you so’.  McChrystal and gang referred to it as Eikenberry ‘covering his flank for the history books’.  Anyone see the pattern here?

     The politicians mentioned in the article all have the same goal as the President, and that is political survival.  To understand the mind of a politician, all you have to do is think in terms of votes and re-election.  Whatever it takes to stay in office and rally their base.  So the anti-war politicians whose base is anti-war, only benefit if the war strategy fails.  The pro-war politicians whose base is pro-war, only benefit if the war strategy works.  That is the two sides of this political battle, and each side will latch on to anything that will give them an advantage with rallying their base. As it stands now, Obama has declared the war in Afghanistan as the ‘Just War’, so I imagine that the anti-war politicians really don’t see Obama as a tool to use for rallying their base.  But if they can split Obama from his ‘just war’ view, and get him to not support the war effort or accept that it is lost, then they would benefit.  That is their prize, and going back to the Rolling Stone prize, you can see who benefits from whom.

     The pro-war politicians will rally around the general that will insure success.  They need a winner to rally around.  So if they supported McChrystal and now an article like this is circulating a perception that he is out of control, or worse yet, helps to create a divide between all parties involved, then they will not benefit.  You need a team who has a unified command and a unity of effort, and this article gives the impression that this is not happening.  There is also the issue of Article 88 which prohibits officers from using ‘contemptuous words’ about the president and his staff. Pro-war politicians at this point look at this story as a threat to their chosen winner, and ultimately a threat to winning the war.  But the narrative of the story points to a divided team, and these pro-war politicians need to address this in order appease their base.

     The pro-war politicians could do two things.  They could rally around the general, and especially if the administration and others accept his apology (and not fire him), or they could call for his head and get someone new in there that will work better as a team. In other words, if the General is looked at as the guy who is stronger than the President after the dust settles, because he thumbed his nose at him and his staff and they have not fired him, then he might be a guy they could rally around.  Especially coming into election, and especially if the President is not popular in the polls. But they also need a guy that can seal the deal, and they really need a guy that the troops on the ground support.  Because most of the base of pro-war politicians, are military and military families who all care about winning this thing.

     Karzai is at the table as well, and success to him is just hanging on to power and collecting as much money as he can from the war effort.  He will support anyone that will continue his good deal, and McChrystal is the guy–kind of.  Or at least that is the arrangement that the general has set up.  The general is working with Karzai and doing what is necessary to control him and work with him. Kind of like a SF operator working with a village chief.  He has to, because there is no alternative. Karzai also knows that if the Taliban come into power, he is out, so if he wants to survive politically and even physically, he needs a strong general and western partner to insure that survival.

     The Taliban are also at this table, and their strategy is simple. Keep terrorizing the population/government and just survive long enough to make it to this withdrawal date of July 2011. This date is all they need to win, because all they have to do is pour it on while everyone leaves. And as long as the people perceive the west as weak and unable to defeat the Taliban, they will give in to the Taliban.

     Finally there is General McChrystal.  Personally, I think this article was a way to test the political resolve of those at the top.  If they fired him, then McChrystal can fade away from the war and not be attached to it’s ‘perceived’ demise.  The whole ‘history book effect’ comes into play here as well.

     If they accept his apology and keep the guy where he is at, then that means they are saying ‘we did not like what you said, but we need a win in this war’. It is the same reasoning for contracting with Xe for security work–they might not like them, but they are the best, and for wars, you need the best of the best to win. So in essence, McChrystal was probing the defenses of these leaders at the ‘poker table’, to see what their position is on his command and the strategy.(calling their bluff or trying to determine their cards in the game) If you look at his history in war and life, you can see that this is exactly how he operates. He is testing them. Because an acceptance of the general’s apology, is also an acceptance of the fact that he ‘is the best man’ for the job.  The general needs that acceptance in order to go after what he really needs for a victory in Afghanistan, and that is time.

     I really think all of this boils down to one thing, and that is that stupid withdrawal date of July 2011. If COIN takes as long as most of the experts claim it takes, then attaching a time frame to the current strategy is stupid.  The general knows this, and this was a huge debate with the Iraq war. During that time, it was debated furiously during the presidential debates and between the pro-war and anti-war crowds. With Iraq, the narrative was ‘get out now’ versus ‘leave based on success and results’. The latter is what we went with, and that is what worked.

     A withdrawal should only be based on victory, a retreat is what happens when you lose.  I personally think this article was McChrystal saying ‘if you want me in charge of this war effort, you must give me time and the flexibility to win’. Because as it stands now, to seal any kind of a victory in Afghanistan by July of next year is impossible. I think most observers would say so as well, and this article symbolizes the very battle between all parties who have a stake in this war and the pressing issue of time. Each player in this game looks at time as a leverage for their specific goals in this game. Each player is also looking at their place in the history books and their political survival.

     There are plenty of angles to this war, and I am sure I am missing a few in this discussion. Below I posted a few pieces of the article that were interesting to me. Anyway, check out the entire article and  let me know what you think. Things are changing pretty quickly and it will be interesting to see how this unfolds over the days and weeks. –Matt

Edit: 6/23/2010 – And he is replaced by General Petraeus.  Wow, and all because of an article from Rolling Stone. He played his cards, he lost, and now there is a new player at the table.

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The Runaway General

By Michael Hastings

July 2010

(Pieces of the article are posted below–all curse words edited)

Today, as McChrystal gears up for an offensive in southern Afghanistan, the prospects for any kind of success look bleak. In June, the death toll for U.S. troops passed 1,000, and the number of IEDs has doubled. Spending hundreds of billions of dollars on the fifth-poorest country on earth has failed to win over the civilian population, whose attitude toward U.S. troops ranges from intensely wary to openly hostile. The biggest military operation of the year – a ferocious offensive that began in February to retake the southern town of Marja – continues to drag on, prompting McChrystal himself to refer to it as a “bleeding ulcer.” In June, Afghanistan officially outpaced Vietnam as the longest war in American history – and Obama has quietly begun to back away from the deadline he set for withdrawing U.S. troops in July of next year. The president finds himself stuck in something even more insane than a quagmire: a quagmire he knowingly walked into, even though it’s precisely the kind of gigantic, mind-numbing, multigenerational nation-building project he explicitly said he didn’t want.

(more…)

Monday, June 21, 2010

Afghanistan: U.S. Eager To Replicate Afghan Villager’s Successful Revolt Against Taliban

Filed under: Afghanistan,Strategy — Tags: , , , , — Matt @ 1:55 PM

     Conversations with Gizab leaders and Special Forces officers suggest that there was no single proximate cause. The uprising appears to have been the result of a combination of Taliban overreaching, U.S. encouragement and local resentment.

     “We’re looking for the patterns,” said a State Department official in southern Afghanistan. “If we can find it, we’ll be on the verge of a breakthrough.”

*****

     I really liked this article for several reasons. For one, good for Lalay for taking matter into his own hands and rallying the village for the defense. The second part I like, is the strategy development aspect of this article. They are trying to see the patterns that led up to Lalay taking matters into his own hands, and the keys to success of a tribal defense force like this.

     So let’s look at some of the factors of success which I keyed in on, and also what is required to replicate this. (in my opinion at least)

     The first is motivation. There must be motivation within the village to rise up against the Taliban. You also need a leader who has the motivation to rise up, and manage the revolt. So motivation is important. And consequence do to inaction is also important. These guys had both.

You also need a leader who has the will or resolve to do this. Not everyone can be a Lalay–someone that folks look up to and think of as a strong leader. This guy has to be someone that people respect and identify with. And that ‘Lalay’ needs to be pissed off enough to act. Which goes back to motivation. The Taliban pissed off Lalay by wanting the money that the government gave Lalay for the loss of his family, due to a Taliban IED. That would piss me off too. But acting on that anger, and putting action to words takes a special kind of individual.

     Notice also that Lalay executed three prisoners. Culturally speaking, this was acceptable to them and at that time. This shows the kind of resolve Lalay has, and how much hatred he has for the Taliban. Acts like that may be be repulsive to the west, but in Afghanistan, that is an act of someone with determination and little regard for an enemy that has little regard for him. It also shows that Lalay has the strength necessary to kill the bad guy–no weakness there, and a village in dire straights needs a leader who has that strength. And notice in the article that folks are flocking to his program of village defense. Of course we would like him to not kill prisoners, and I don’t condone that here. I am just saying that the act itself is something he felt he had to do in order to get the respect(from the village, from the Taliban) necessary to do what he had to do. To him, showing compassion (weakness) was not part of the game plan.

     It kind of reminds me of the old west movies, where a town is held captive by some bad people, and no one has the courage to step up. And then some contract sheriff comes into town, or some stranger on a pale horse, and motivates the people to do something about it (of course after the pale rider has that motivation to do so). Meanwhile, that individual shows great resolve in defeating those bad people. And usually in those movies, that leader had to be more ruthless and effective than those bad guys. In the case of Lalay, he was that stranger riding into town on the horse. He was that guy that said ‘follow me’.

     Now the next point is where I can inject some common sense free market warfare principles into this conversation, that the military planners and strategists continue to miss or forget. You must provide reward or interest, much like General George Washington provided such things to his troops in order to maintain a standing army(or village defense force). If you want to make this the most popular team to be on, then pay them accordingly and give them the weapons and training necessary to do the job. I cannot emphasize this enough. Pay them more than the Taliban offers, and pay them enough to be competitive with the military or police.

     If that won’t work, then provide a bounty system for the endeavor. Put a price on the heads of Taliban that are wanted by the government. It worked in the wild west, and it could work in Afghanistan if set up properly. The point with all of this is there must be incentive. Because without incentive, a volunteer force will eventually dissolve because they have more important things to do like take care of their family, farm, etc. Stuff to think about, and I think any effort dedicated to understanding the dynamics of this event is time well spent.

     Finally, I have to inject another point into this discussion that is not talked about. If the Taliban are giving up to Lalay, then Lalay is in a prime position to set up pseudo-operations, and use those former enemy combatants to find even more of these booger eaters. If Lalay declared that if these former Taliban want redemption in the village, that they ‘must do this one thing’ for the village, then this might be a way to turn some of these guys. These former Taliban would be outstanding tools to use for really screwing up their former employers. That is how you find out who the shadow government is, what they are up to and where they are at. We could be making awesome matrixes off of this information, and doing some heavy duty damage. You could also find out who is sympathetic to the Taliban in these villages, all because you have turned Taliban who can walk the walk, and talk the talk. No acting really required there, and turning these guys and using Lalay for that process should be considered. –Matt

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U.S. eager to replicate Afghan villagers’ successful revolt against Taliban

By Rajiv ChandrasekaranMonday, June 21, 2010

GIZAB, AFGHANISTAN — The revolt of the Gizab Good Guys began with a clandestine 2 a.m. meeting. By sunrise, 15 angry villagers had set up checkpoints on the main road and captured their first prisoners. In the following hours, their ranks swelled with dozens of rifle-toting neighbors eager to join.

Gunfights erupted and a panicked request for help was sent to the nearest U.S. troops, but the residents of this mountain-ringed hamlet in southern Afghanistan held their ground. By sundown, they managed to pull off a most unusual feat: They kicked out the Taliban.

“We had enough of their oppression,” Lalay, the one-named shopkeeper who organized the uprising, said in recounting the late April battle. “So we decided to fight back.”

U.S. diplomats and military officials view the rebellion as a milestone in the nearly nine-year-long war. For the first time in this phase of the conflict, ordinary Afghans in the violence-racked south have risen on their own to reclaim territory under insurgent control.

Sunday, June 20, 2010

War Art: A Man With A Heart For Stone

     “I can’t understand why people do what they do just from looking in their eyes, but when I see what they make I see different creative views,” said Wagner. “Everybody has a different opinion of how life is, and you can see that when someone is given a piece of stone and turns it into a unit crest, a shot glass, or even just a ball.”

*****

     The reasons why I keep coming back to art on this blog is not only do I enjoy the art itself, but I have a profound respect for the process and inspiration needed to make that piece of art.  It requires analysis and synthesis, and it is a great ‘building snowmobiles’ exercise.

     One of my favorite examples of artists/strategists was Myamoto Musashi.  He was a big fan of art and for good reason.  For problem solving or developing unique strategies, you need a brain that can look at situations from different angles and find multiple solutions.  It takes creativity and the ability to really bend and mix the concepts to come up with unique solutions, much like an artist does on a canvas or with marble.

     Of course you need to know yourself and your enemy, but if your enemy has that same mindset, you must have something a little different in your strategy to gain the upper hand. Getting inside his OODA loop is important too, but what if your enemy is aware of OODA as well? The real winner in this fight, is the one that is able to take all strategies and all inputs, and create a winning strategy that is more effective that your enemy’s. It is something to think about when trying to figure out how a ‘John Boyd’ could defeat a ‘John Boyd’. Having a creative mind is just one factor of many that will help you to get there.

     On a side note, it is also interesting to go back to the patterns of battlefield innovation that I keep seeing. (here, and here)  Where the dominate combatant’s strategy is copied by the weaker combatant’s strategy, and then the weaker combatant adds something to that newly adopted strategy to make it even more effective.  A technological advantage could be one addition, or a multitude of little changes, all born from a different point of view, all from a creative mind. Borrowing brilliance seems to be a good way to go, just like artists get inspired by other artists. Interesting stuff and bravo to Charles Wagner for producing some beautiful marble work. –Matt

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Charles Wagner, a native of Rainier, Wash., explains the process of carving the 2nd Infantry Division shield into the emblem of 3rd Stryker Brigade Combat Team, 2nd ID. Wagner worked during his down time for almost a month to create the marble carving, which he will present to the brigade at the end of their deployment.

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A Man With a Heart for Stone

Story by Pvt. Zach Zuber

June 19, 2010

DIYALA, Iraq — It all started with grief in 2004-05 timeframe. Three Soldiers lost their lives, and a U.S. civilian contractor, who had befriended them, was left with a loss. Charles Wagner, a mechanic for General Dynamic Land Systems, was working in Mosul, Iraq, at the time and had to find a way to deal with his pain.

In an effort to relieve the pain felt from the passing of his friends, Wagner began shaping marble stones into crests, crosses and hearts. Since that time, he has created many works of art to escape from the stress that comes during deployment.

“This started out as a way to displace myself from what’s going on over here, working during off hours to focus on other things,” said Wagner, a native of Rainier, Wash.

Wagner said he lost three Soldiers on one mission, and he created hearts, crucifixes, and lancers for each of the parents as a way to connect to them.

During that first tour, in 2004-05, he carved a full-size lancer for 1st Stryker Brigade Combat Team, 25th Infantry Division. Then, during the 2006-07 tour with 3rd SBCT, 2nd ID, he created a replica of the Indian-head shield that represents 2nd Infantry Division. When he traveled with the Arrowhead Brigade to Iraq last August, he received the request to make the 3rd Stryker Brigade crest, which includes the 2nd ID shield on top of an arrowhead, with the number three located above the shield.

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