Feral Jundi

Saturday, June 12, 2010

Strategy: The Eight Imperatives Of COIN, By General Stanley McChrystal

Filed under: Afghanistan,Strategy — Tags: , , , , — Matt @ 9:59 AM

Tuesday, June 8, 2010

Publications: Contracting In Conflicts–The Path To Reform, By John Nagl And Richard Fontaine

     Now this is a better product and I can tell they actually listened to their contributors.  So bravo to CNAS for putting together a great report.  If you look at the cast of contributors, you will also see that they took advice from guys like Doug Brooks, David Isenberg and a whole bunch of private military companies and military professionals. For the record, I was not a direct contributor, but I know some of the ideas of FJ made it out there in one way or another.

     For one, they actually brought in Article 1, Section 8 of the US Constitution as a counter to Max Weber’s definition of the state. (the Second Amendment could also be looked at as a counter as well) I was beside myself when I read this in their ‘inherently governmental’ section, and I had to read it a couple of times to make sure they actually went there.  They did and bravo to them for having the courage to challenge this sacred cow of thought.

     This kind of sets the pace for the entire publication, because CNAS and all of it’s contributors were actually making the argument for the use of contractors in war time.  It is an acknowledgement of that ‘elephant in the room’ called contractors, and it is an excellent first step towards combining private industry and government for the good of the nation and the wars it fights. To me, it has always been about unity of effort and command, and ensure private industry only helps government, not hurt it.  If we can figure out how to achieve that unity of effort and command, I think the next step is what will really be radical.

     I have argued on this blog that today’s war planners, leaders and strategists should make an effort to at least acknowledge that elephant in the room called contractors or private industry.  We are getting there and I am enthused about the process.  But to me, the next level of discourse about private industry is how do you turn that animal into a war elephant?

     To me, it is not enough to just acknowledge our existence and say ‘oh well, private industry is that big dumb animal that we all have to get used to’. That is like using a pistol to hammer nails.  I would make the argument that instead, private industry should be looked at from a strategic point of view and the question should be asked is ‘how do we use private industry to help win our wars and maintain a position of strength in the world today’?  That is the next level of discourse about this subject, and that is the kind of thinking that could possibly lead to victory in our current wars. I say this, because there is a tremendous effort taking place to actually figure out how to regulate and utilize private industry during times of war, and this paper and current legislative action is proof of that process. So once we figure out how to shoot the pistol, as opposed to using it to hammer nails, we can then start discussing how to use that pistol in warfare.

     Now on to the paper.  Below I have listed some of the issues that popped up as I was reading it. Just little things that came to mind, that could help refine the product.  Ideas are cheap, and I throw them around freely here. I have also listed some interesting portions of the paper to give the reader a taste. Be sure to check out all of the contributors, to include Allison Stanger (she provided the forward). Enjoy and let me know what you think.-Matt

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Contracting In Conflicts: The Path To Reform

By John Nagl and Richard Fontaine

06/07/2010

CNAS

In both Iraq and Afghanistan today there are more private contractors than U.S. troops on the ground. This exploding reliance on contractors costs U.S. taxpayers tens of billions of dollars and has grown with inadequate government oversight.   This report – authored by Richard Fontaine and John Nagl – details the urgent need for comprehensive reform. The United States must embark on a path of ambitious reform that will require: new laws and regulations; an expansion of the government’s contracting workforce; a coordination mechanism within the executive branch; greater scrutiny, more transparency and clearer standards for private contractors; a strategic view of the roles contractors play in American operations; and a change in culture within the government.

Download the paper here.

Link to website here.

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Thursday, May 27, 2010

History: John Coffee Hays And The Evolution Of War Fighting In The Wild West

   The other day I was reading a great little book called The Empire Of The Summer Moon, and came across some very interesting history.  For those that have read my history posts, I tend to gravitate towards tipping points in war fighting history, all with the idea of learning what led towards that tipping point. It is important to do this, so we can apply these lessons of warfare to current and future wars. That is my intent and that is what being a student of warfare is all about.

   The book itself describes the Comanches as the most feared and capable indian tribe on the frontier in early America.  These guys were masters of horse mounted warfare, and they were actually doing quite a good job of holding off the advances of the Spanish, Mexicans and French, as well as the Americans for a long time.  Back in the day, the borderlands and the plains were definitely not easy to live in. Between the Comanches and bandits, the advancement of civilization was brought to a standstill.  Enter the Texas Ranger, John Coffee Hays.

   It is always interesting to boil down the turn around or tipping point of conflict, and Hays and his use of the Colt repeating pistol is that tipping point.  This warrior developed the methods necessary to defeat the Comanche and other tribes, and I think it is important to identify what led to this evolution in warfare.  Because up until John Hays entered the scene, Indian fighting was unorganized and not very effective.  The Comanches were the masters.

   So what contributed to John Hays and his way of fighting?  His upbringing was interesting and he came from a long line of leaders and war fighters, starting with the Revolutionary War. But ultimately, he developed a passion for fighting the indian tribes while working as a surveyor in Texas.  This is when he was first exposed to the indian way of war, and in order to continue living and working as a surveyor back then, you needed to figure out how to survive that kind of warfare. Also, surveyors hired guards to protect them on their little outings.  Those guards would later fill the ranks of the citizen army called the Texas Rangers and the ranging companies.

   Hays joined the Texas Rangers out of patriotism and a desire to defend Texas, and witnessed first hand what this kind of warfare produced. I am sure burying hundreds of victims of the Goliad Massacre left an impression on him.  The Comanches and other tribes did not take prisoners back then, and took it upon themselves to torture captives to death as well. They would burn them alive on wagon wheels, scalp them, cut them up and mutilate them, skin guys alive, etc. Mind you, the Comanche fought other tribes and did unspeakable things to each other, and they applied this same brand of warfare to the advancing white man. The Comanche also took prisoners and made them into slaves, to include white settlers.   These were some bad dudes to fight and they did not mess around.  These warriors were also incredible horsemen and could wield their bows and arrows on a horse far better than any white men. They were even considered to be pretty awesome amongst the other tribes, if that gives you an idea of the kind of fighters they were.  Most importantly, their weapons were more effective than anything Hays and his men had at that time.  For every one shot of a single shot pistol, an indian could launch six arrows from a quiver.  The indians could also move very fast with horses, and were extremely accurate with said bows and arrows.

   The Comanches also had hundreds of years of warfare behind them.  They fought other tribes and of course the Spanish and French, and these guys were definitely the Vietcong of the old west.  They could survive off the land, track anyone with amazing ability, and they could ride a horse like no other.

   So how did John Hays and the Texas Rangers step up to the challenge? They basically copied the Comanche, used indian scouts, were more pragmatic and calculated than the Comanche, had extreme courage, and most importantly–embraced new technologies.

   Not only did they copy the Comanche, but they also stole ideas from the Mexican forces and other indians they came across.  They would ride on special horses that could keep up with the Comanche horses, they would wear leathers to protect against brush, a sombrero hat to protect against the sun, and they would carry plenty of single shot revolvers, rifles, and knives.  The revolver is what is key in this story, because before the multi-shot repeating revolver came onto the scene, the Rangers were extremely limited in capability and the Comanches knew it.

   Hays also created a learning organization within his ranger company.  He would study the Comanche and figure out strategies of attacking them based on the capabilities of the rangers and past battles with the Comanche. Most importantly, he used indian scouts that had a beef with the Comanche.  These guys could track, understand the language, and otherwise be the tool necessary for understanding the Comanche and defeating them.  This is a crucial point of warfare in the wild west, and it is a factor of warfare that is important today.  Your local national interpreters are the ones that will help you to navigate the human terrain and to understand the enemy.

   The Rangers did not use bow and arrows either(except for the indian scouts in the company), just because that is a skill that takes years of development. They instead depended on muzzle loaders. I think about the long bow archers of yesteryear and how specialized they were, and how valuable they were to the various armies that used them.  The old west was no different, and I look at the Comanches as long bow archers on horseback.  Lethal and highly mobile.

   But the Rangers did develop horsemanship skills, and tried to copy the Comanche style.  They would hang off a saddle, and shoot their pistols from under the neck of the horse–all while the thing was moving!  The Rangers would train at shooting their rifle at one target, then switch to their pistol for another, all while on horseback. (old school transition drills) They also did the same things to the Comanches as the Comanche did to others.  One tactic was to stampede the enemy’s horses so they would be without mounts.

   This is an important tactic to cover, because out in the high plains, if you did not have a horse you were going to die out there.  Horses are what got you to towns or watering holes before you starved or became dehydrated.  Taking out your enemy’s horses, was like destroying the fuel and logistics trains of a tank battalion in modern warfare.

   Hays also learned about killing the tribal leaders as a strategy.  It was bad medicine when a chief was killed, and often times a Comanche war party would break their attack if the chief was killed.  So Hays would use a sharp shooter and focus on killing the chiefs.  Then he would charge the remaining war party for the ultimate in shock factor.  Boyd would have been proud of Hays.  It kind of reminds me of today’s way of breaking an ambush or of how a bayonet charge scares the crap out of a defender.

   But Hays and his men were always limited in their lethality by the weapons they carried. Things changed big time when Hays and his Rangers got a hold of a repeating pistol from a failing company called Colt.  Without Hays and his requirements for a weapon that could better suite his method of warfare, Colt would have arguably never existed.  The repeating pistols they originally produced were kind of junky, and no one in the military or US were at all sold on the things.  But all it took was some Rangers to use the pistols and give glowing reviews on their effectiveness in battles, and then things turned around for Colt. Colt also listened to their Texan customers, and built a better pistol for them.  Nothing sells a concept more than proof of concept and these Texas Rangers proved handily how effective this pistol was in their fight.  For a more detailed explanation of this history, please read below.

   The first real test of these revolvers, and the proof of concept of using a repeating pistol while mounted on horse happened at the Battle of Walkers Creek. This was the west’s version of the Battle of Margiano back in the 14th century. It was there that the first repeating pistol was used in warfare, and Hays and his men cleaned house so to speak.  From that point on, the Rangers were delivering victories time and time again.  They copied the Comanche tactics, they used their indian scouts to track and ‘know the enemy’, they were fearless and calculated with their assaults, and they introduced a new technology to give them the strategic edge in battle.  Sound familiar? (The German Landsknecht vs. the Swiss Guard)

   So from then on, the concept of a repeating revolver and fighting from a horse caught on.  Everyone copied this new way of warfare in the west, or at least tried to.  Cavalry units, stage coach teams, lawmen, bounty hunters, cowboys, range detectives, prospectors, mountain men, frontiersmen, etc.  If you did not have a horse and a repeating weapon, you were at a severe disadvantage against the indian way of war.  The horse allowed for speed, the repeating pistol allowed for lethality.  And as the pistol and rifles evolved into bigger calibers, better barrels, and cartridges, the lethality increased. That evolution of warfare in the west all started with John Coffee Hays and his Rangers, along with the introduction of the repeating pistol. –Matt

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John Coffee Hays

John Coffee Hays.

Jack Hays and the Colt Revolver

The Texas six-shooter was first made famous by a Ranger captain named Jack Hays. John Coffee Hays was a Tennessean, from the same county as Andrew Jackson and Sam Houston; in fact, his grandfather had sold Jackson the Hermitage estate. Hays was a born adventurer, of the type called forth by many frontiers. He went west to Texas as a surveyor, was mustered into a ranging company, and suddenly found his métier. Hays was a natural warrior. He was soon recognized as the captain of his band, and, at the age of twenty-three, he commanded the San Antonio station, the most dangerous and important Ranger post in western Texas.Jack Hays was the prototype for a certain kind of emerging American hero. He did not look like a fighting man’s hero: he was slight and slim-hipped, with a clear, rather high voice; he had lovely manners and was seen as a “perfect gentleman” by the belles of San Antonio. Hays was utterly fearless-but always within the cold, hard bounds of practicality, never foolhardy. He was not a talker, and not even a good gunman, but a born leader of partisans who by great good luck had been born in the right time and place. Hays was calm and quiet, almost preternaturally aware of his surroundings and circumstance, utterly in control of himself, and a superb psychologist, in control of all the men around him. His actions appeared incredibly daring to other men who did not have Hay’s capacity for coolly weighing odds. It is known that most of the other Ranger leaders, and hundreds of future riders, consciously tried to “be like Jack Hays”-strong, silent, practical, explosive only in action. He put an indelible stamp on the force that was soon to be formalized as the Texas Rangers. (more…)

Monday, May 24, 2010

Maritime Security: The Greater Strategic Threat Of The Jihad Corsairs Of Somalia, By Dr. Walid Phares

     I had actually linked to this article awhile back when I was discussing jihadist privateers, and Dr. Phares had actually written a similar article with a similar theme.  So I just wanted to get this article registered in the database here, for future research.

     The best part of this article to me, was the use of the arabic word for corsair or qursaan.  This is what the middle east press call the Somali pirates, and qursaan has it’s roots in the French word corsair.  So I thought that was kind of cool, but I am not sure if the ME press actually consider the Somali pirate a privateer or practitioner of legalized piracy?  Which leads me to my next point.

     It is difficult to determine if in fact piracy is becoming the tool of jihadists or not. I would think that most pirates at this point are just in it for the money, and would claim an islamist slant to their project if it would help them to get more money or support for their ventures.

     A couple weeks back, I posted some stuff about islamists falsely claiming to take over pirate towns to get rid of piracy. In fact they were just trying to gain control over ports so they can make money off of the secondary businesses related to piracy.  Someone has to tax these pirates, or feed them, or use them for arms and soldier shipments, or provide a place for the wary pirate to sleep.

    But it is hard to determine if these Jihadist are actually investing in piracy ventures, or directing attacks in a strategic sense.  It would not be that much of a stretch for them to do so, and that is why it is important to keep this kind of stuff in the back of our heads when looking at piracy in the modern age.

     The other thing I was thinking about the other day, is what is the Islamic version of the Letter of Marque?  Is it the Fatwa or would you call this Ghazawat? Interesting stuff. –Matt

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The Greater Strategic Threat of the Jihad Corsairs of Somalia

by Walid Phares, Ph.D.Published 21 Apr 09

Most of the media discussion about piracy in the Gulf of Aden has drifted understandably towards the sensational part of the story: how are the Pirates able to roam the Ocean? Is paying them ransom a better option than to engage them militarily? Last but not least, will a military intervention against the Pirates worsen the situation; will it lead to a massive escalation in Somalia and a Vietnam like quagmire for many years to come?

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Tuesday, May 18, 2010

Afghanistan: Taliban Shadow Government Strikes In Marja

     “The Taliban are everywhere, they are like scorpions under every stone, and they are stinging all those who get assistance or help the government and the Americans,” Mr. Rahman, the farmer, said.

*****

     You know, sometimes the best way to understand Afghanistan, is to look at it from the eyes of the farmer on the ground that is wedged in between this fight between the Afghan/Coalition and the Taliban. And honestly, I don’t blame these farmers and their families for packing up and leaving out of fear for their lives. I can also see why they are probably mad, confused, and have no respect at all for the Afghan government and the Coalition.

     The bottom line is that the Taliban are the home team, they are everywhere and they are all whispering into the ears of Afghans everywhere. They are telling them that when the coalition leaves, anyone that supported them or the Afghan government, is going to get their throats slit. They are also telling them that time is on the Taliban’s side–‘the coalition has the watches, but the Taliban have the time’.

     The Taliban are also doing their best to show that they are a better government for the people, than the Afghan government, and they are doing it in classic mafia style. It’s a shadow government, and they are doing anything they can to either win support, or get that support out of fear and intimidation.

     So let’s go back to how we turn this around. There is no such thing as one solution or just one thing that will fix it all. It is my belief that you have to attack problems from multiple angles, and learn from mistakes to create the better solution. So having a learning organization is important, if in fact we want to find the right solution for a specific problem. It is what John Nagl identified as one of the reasons why we lost in Vietnam, and it is a lesson that should be applied today if we want to win in Afghanistan. So are we learning from mistakes and do we have learning organizations all focused on ways to defeat this shadow government, while at the same time elevating the legitimacy of the current Afghan government? Are we learning new ways of separating the Taliban from the population, or are we stuck in old ways that just don’t work? Most of all, are we listening to customer (locals) feedback and doing all we can to win their support, or are we standing around and just allowing the Taliban to do whatever the hell they want in places like Marja?

     And in true Feral Jundi fashion, I don’t just criticize, I also like to suggest solutions. The first solution I want to offer, is that we should assign squads to each farm, blocks of houses, or small cities. Tim has mentioned this on his blog, and the one thing that puts a cramp in the style of mafias, is a police or military that shows presence and hinders bad guy business on that particular patch of soil. In other words, we need to own Marja and in a big way. It’s like the ships that keep getting hijacked in the Gulf of Aden. You put security details on the ships, then pirates will have a tougher time of attacking it. Navy patrols do not stop pirates alone, and having well armed security professionals on the boat is insurance that the boat is protected if the patrols fail. We should be treating towns and farms in Afghanistan, like we should be treating ships in the Gulf of Aden. (I say should, because we are still not there completely–but close)

     I also think that if there is not enough soldiers to do this, well then contract the thing out. If contractors can protect FOBs, we can protect small towns, farms, etc. This is not rocket science, and to me, it is purely a numbers game. Determine the needs in manpower, put it out for bid, and treat it just like TWISS or the CMC program that the Army Corps of Engineers put on. Instead of defending bases, we could instead be defending Farms and Ranches. (hint)

     So on top of implementing sufficient defenses for these locals and showing presence to crimp the style of the Taliban shadow government/mafia, we should also be doing all we can to cause chaos within the ranks of the Taliban. I keep coming back to pseudo-operations as the best way to do that, along with relying on tips from the locals. But with pseudo-operations, the Taliban would really become paranoid, much like organized crime gets all paranoid by snitches or undercover cops posing as criminals within their organization. We should be doing all we can to insert ‘scorpions’ of our own into the Taliban machine, to share that space under the rock and get within their OODA loop. The Taliban needs some paranoia and confusion within their ranks, and the less centralized the Taliban are, the better it is for us. This would be labeled under ‘finding is better than flanking’. Hell, I would even call this tactic, ‘finding and flanking all rolled up into one big burrito of chaos’. lol Hey, the Taliban are conducting their own version of pseudo-operations every time they put on a police or soldier uniform and attack the Afghan government and/or people, we should be doing it too.

     Another point I wanted to make, is that we should also be looking more at honey pot strategies in order to lure out these ‘scorpions’. I read a great story the other day in the Stars and Stripes about a unit who is tasked with finding IED’s in Afghanistan, and they are doing a great job of it. The reason why they are doing a good job, is presence on the roads, becoming a better learning organization because of it, and looking at the roads as honey pots that draw in the enemy so they can kill them. If you give a unit the freedom to think up the solutions necessary to not only find IED’s but to actually go after the planters of IED’s and make the lives of those bomb farmers a living hell, well then now we are talking success. Matter of fact, I would take it one step further. I would provide a financial incentive to units that are able to find IED’s. Make it a game where finding the things and the makers/planters have value. If the Taliban want to make the roads a battleground, then we need to destroy them on that battleground. We also need to dominate the other battleground called people. And hey, if we actually got off the roads and hung out at the farms and villages for awhile, well then that would kind of throw a wrench into the whole IED game.

     Finally, why are we not growing food for the troops in Afghanistan itself? We can also grow fennel seed and make biodiesel. (A million dollars per soldier for a year, is waaaaay too much money to spend on this stuff, and we can do better) We can partner with these farmers to grow that food and biodiesel, and create an entire industry out of supporting the troops through agriculture. We can also grow the stuff on the FOBs, and secure food stocks that way too. Of course we will still have to ship in food, but when it is harvest season there is no reason why we shouldn’t take advantage of that. We have been there 9 years, and we are still shipping in food and fuel from other places and that makes things way to expensive-both in lives lost on convoys, and in money terms. The more we can become self sufficient in Afghanistan, the better. We will also interact with and come to depend upon the people, and create real partnerships that will give a true return on investment.

    The other thing to think about is what message does that send to the local farmer, when we ship in tomatoes from somewhere else? It pisses off farmers in the US when we ship in tomatoes from somewhere else and not go local, why wouldn’t it irk local Afghan farmers? To develop a food production plan/strategy (agro-strategy) to feed all of these troops for all of these years, would have been smart and cost effective. It would have also invigorated the local farms of Afghanistan, and given them something to grow other than poppy for the Taliban. It would have also given farmers something to export when we all leave, and the money made off of exports could have brought in money to the Afghan government and people for the rebuild of their country. Not to mention turning Afghanistan into the biodiesel capital of Central Asia by growing their own fuel.(ambitious, I know) We still have a chance to get them going on this path, and agro-strategy and people protection should be top priorities in Marja and in Afghanistan. –Matt

Edit: 5/19/2010 – Check out this excellent article from Strategy Page on how the war on IED’s is going in Afghanistan.

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Taliban Hold Sway in Area Taken by U.S., Farmers Say

By CARLOTTA GALL

May 16, 2010

LASHKAR GAH, Afghanistan — Farmers from the district of Marja, which since February has been the focus of the largest American-led military operation in Afghanistan, are fleeing the area, saying that the Taliban are terrorizing the population and that American troops cannot protect the civilians.

The departure of the farmers is one of the most telling indications that Taliban fighters have found a way to resume their insurgency, three months after thousands of troops invaded this Taliban stronghold in the opening foray of a campaign to take control of southern Afghanistan. Militants have been infiltrating back into the area and the prospect of months of more fighting is undermining public morale, residents and officials said.

As the coalition prepares for the next major offensive in the southern city of Kandahar, the uneasy standoff in Marja, where neither the American Marines nor the Taliban have gained the upper hand and clashes occur daily, provides a stark lesson in the challenges of eliminating a patient and deeply rooted insurgency.

Over 150 families have fled Marja in the last two weeks, according to the Afghan Red Crescent Society in the provincial capital, Lashkar Gah.

Marja residents arriving here last week, many looking bleak and shell-shocked, said civilians had been trapped by the fighting, running a gantlet of mines laid by insurgents and firefights around government and coalition positions. The pervasive Taliban presence forbids them from having any contact with or taking assistance from the government or coalition forces.

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