Feral Jundi

Friday, December 18, 2009

Publications: CNAS–Contractors in American Conflicts, by John Nagl and Richard Fontaine

Filed under: Publications,Strategy — Tags: , , , , , , — Matt @ 7:58 AM

   Ok folks, this is pretty important.  CNAS, like I have mentioned before, has the ears of the guys that advise the President on matters like this one.  As you can see, John Nagl is personally involved on this working paper, and you can read his stamp all over this thing. I have been waiting for this paper for awhile, and I am glad they are finally pulling the trigger.

   It is a quick read and the best I could come up with on this, is that CNAS is trying to make the administration feel better for using contractors in the war.  To say ‘it’s ok, we have been using them for awhile, and contractors are the way of the future’. Oh, and we are going to rebrand contractors by calling them ES&R contractors. (Blackwater, eat your heart out)

    You get the idea.  President Obama owns this ‘just war’ now and the increase in the use of contractors is under his watch.  Matter of fact, contractor use has gone up under his leadership, and in Afghanistan we outnumber the troops. Yee haw.  Finally there is a recognition of that fact over at CNAS, and this paper is proof of that.

   With that said, the administration needs ammo for the conversations they have with those who oppose the use of contractors within their party.  Especially with President Obama’s far left supporters and even his more moderate supporters. He needs us for this war, and his party needs some convincing as to the why.

   The reason why I mention the political aspects of this paper, is because the mention of Bosnia and the use of contractors there under the Clinton Administration was very much emphasized.  Nagl and company wanted the reader to know that contractors are not just a tool of the Bush administration and the Republicans.  That the Democrats have a pretty good history of using and enjoying the benefits of contractors during times of conflict as well. Or better yet, we are a tool of America and not some political party.

   So why do I like this paper?  Well it is finally a legitimization of this industry, and at the highest levels of defense think tankery.  CNAS has the ear of all the President’s men, and generals for that matter.  These guys are saying we are a necessity for the war and for future wars, and it is time to figure out how to properly use this tool of warfare called contracting.  It is about smart contracting and dealing with reality.

   Personally, I just think we need strong leadership to make the common sense/necessary decisions to square away contracting.  To demand quality service from contractors, trust but verify that service, and insure tax payer dollars are wisely spent. And then just apply Kaizen to the whole thing to make sure it remains kick ass. If you guys need more people in government to manage these contracts, then get off your ass and hire some folks to get the job done. We are in a recession right now, and I am sure you could get some more people to help out.

   Below I have also put up a few critiques of the paper. (bold is my statement, quoted chunks are CNAS)  One is about the new name CNAS came up for us–‘ES&R contractors’. It has a terrible ring to it. lol  The other is about a lack of proper historical reference–no mention of privateers or the Indian Wars. Buffalo Bill Cody was a contractor that received a Medal of Honor, and no mention of that? Wow, talk about selective history recollection? The final one is just a little bit of slam on ‘smart contracting’.  We need good leaders who know their stuff, have the courage to do what is right, and takes care of their people.  Once we have those, then we can implement smart contracting or whatever strategy you want to pursue. Overall, good stuff and I can’t wait for the final product.-Matt

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Contractors in American Conflicts: Adapting to a New Reality

Publication Type: Working Papers

Publication Date: 12/16/2009

Author(s): Richard Fontaine , John Nagl

When our nation goes to war, contractors go with it. Contractors have become an enduring feature of modern American conflicts, and the United States cannot now engage in hostilities or in reconstruction and stabilization operations without them. At their peak, there were more contractors on the ground in Iraq than American troops in uniform and there are more contractors today in Afghanistan than there are U.S. troops on the ground.However, while private security contractors (PSC) like Blackwater (now knows as Xe Services) have gotten the bulk of public and congressional attention,  they only compromise about 5 percent of all contractors in hostile environments – this working paper, which is part of the CNAS project Contracting in Conflicts , addresses the other 95 percent. That 95 percent represents the vast majority of all the tasks carried out by U.S. contractors in theater, and it has been plagued by its own set of problems – including insufficient oversight, inadequate integration into operational planning, and ambiguous legal status. In order for the United States to adapt to the key role that contractors will play in future hostilities, it must establish new policies and rules of the road.

PDF for paper here.

Edit: 12/22/2009 – CBS posted a story about this as well.

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Monday, December 14, 2009

Strategy: The Five Elements of the Letter of Marque and Reprisal

Filed under: Legal News,Strategy — Tags: , , , , — Matt @ 8:03 AM

   This is unique.  This is the first website that I have found, that actually listed various LoMs from all over the world and from different time periods, and has reduced the LoM to these five basic elements.  So if anyone is interested, follow the link below, and you can check out what the various countries set up. It lists France, Holland, Britain, America, and Spain as just a few.

   Now if I could get a hold of the LoM that we issued to the Airship Resolute during World War Two, then that would be really cool. I imagine it is in some congressional archives deal, and maybe that will be a future post.

   The Resolute was a Goodyear ship as well, and did advertisements after the war.  If there are any documentarians out there, this would be a very unique subject to work on and present.  There is nothing out there that talks about it, to include any serious wikipedia stuff, and I think it would be a fascinating subject if tied into a modern day usage of the LoM. –Matt

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The Five Elements of the Letter of Marque and Reprisal

Letters of marque and reprisal are commissions or warrants issued to someone to commit what would otherwise be acts of piracy. They will normally contain the following first three elements, unless they imply or refer to a declaration of war to define the enemies, and may optionally contain the remainder:

1. Names person, authorizes him to pass beyond borders with forces under his command.

2. Specifies nationality of targets for action.

3. Authorizes seizure or destruction of assets or personnel of target nationality.

4. Describes offense for which commission is issued as reprisal.

5. Restriction on time, manner, place, or amount of reprisal.

*****

American Letter of Marque, 1812

The Letter below is an example of an American letter of marque of an actual privateering commission issued by the government of the United States to the schooner Patapsco during the War of 1812.

JAMES MADISON, President of the United States of America.

TO ALL WHO SHALL THESE PRESENTS, GREETING:BE IT KNOWN, That in pursuance of an Act of Congress passed on the eighteenth day of June one thousand eight hundred and twelve, I have commissioned, and by these presents do commission, the private armed Schooner called the Patapsco of the burthen of 159 tons, or thereabouts, owned by Andrew Clopper, Levi Hollingsworth, Amos A. Williams and Henry Fulford of the City of Baltimore mounting 6 carriage guns, and navigated by 40 men, hereby authorizing James M. Mortimer Captain,

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Tuesday, December 8, 2009

Strategy: How the Taliban Take a Village, and How We Can Take it Back

Filed under: Afghanistan,Strategy — Matt @ 7:27 AM

   This is a simple matter of understanding the Taliban strategy, and the best way to counter it.  I highly suggest reading Maj. Jim Gant’s paper on his Tribal Engagement Teams TET concept, and then reading these three articles and posts below about what the Taliban are actually doing in Afghanistan.

   My personal opinion is that this TET plan will be a necessity as we force all the Taliban out of the main population centers, and they run for the hills.  The insurgent will always attack weakness with strength, and if we don’t care about these villages and tribes up in the hills, well then that will be the target of the insurgent.  And in their case, they will go where we cannot or will not go.  Geography, distance, manpower, money are all things that stops the government and the coalition forces from being everywhere at once.  Geography is what separates these small villages and tribes from the government.  The Taliban will only help to add to that separation by insuring that they are the nodes of influence out there in the hinter lands.  Will our surge of troops be able to protect those villages in a country the size of Texas, and completely divided up by rough terrain? Or would a smaller operation like the TET program do a better job?

   I think if we want to be successful in the war effort there, then use the troops to secure the population centers and create a safe haven for those local populations.  But use the TET game plan for the various tribes located in the backwoods. It makes sense, and is more cost effective.  The goal should be to be to take back the villages or help out those that need it, install the nodes of influence necessary to keep the tribes and villages on our side, and hunt the ‘Big T’ or hard core Taliban like dogs and keep them off balance, confused, and fearing for their lives.

   That last sentence is important to me, and should be important to this strategy.  Protecting the populations center should not all be just defense.  Offense is necessary too, and these TET programs will provide some excellent intelligence and some excellent recruits for future offensive operations.  We must empower the tribes to not only defend themselves from these Big T schmucks, but teach them how to keep these guys on the run.  The Jezailchis Scouts is one concept that Cannoneer #4 and myself have been talking about for a bit, and it is worth a look.  Because not only must we teach the tribes to defend self, we must also teach them how to hunt and eradicate a mutual enemy. It would be the gift that would keep giving, long after we have left Afghanistan and that tribe.

     What the Jezailchis Scouts would look like will be another post. Think of them as a combination of well trained snipers, with excellent man tracking and scouting skills. You could also form them up, much like the Selous Scouts formed up their teams, and use these scouts in similar ways. (collecting information as undercover Taliban, etc.) These guys would be the best hunters and the pride and joy of the tribes.  The Jezailchis Scouts would be a killing mechanism, that would be designed to keep doing it’s thing naturally and efficiently, well after everyone is gone.  It would be good for us, good for Afghanistan, good for the tribes and hellish for the Taliban and Al Qaeda. –Matt

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On War #325: How the Taliban Take a Village (Lind/Sexton)

William S. LindDecember 7, 2009

EDITOR’S NOTE: The following is a guest column, written by a reserve NCO with Special Forces, Mark Sexton. It is based on his personal observations in Afghanistan. It represents his analysis only, not any position taken by DOD, the U.S. Army, or any other agency of the U.S. government. In my opinion, it represents exactly the sort of intelligence analysis we need but seldom get.

How the Taliban Take a Village

A current method used by Taliban in Afghanistan to gain control of an area deemed of strategic interest to the Taliban leadership operating from safe havens in Pakistan or within Afghanistan is to identify and target villages to subvert. The Taliban have recognized the necessity to operate with the cooperation of local population with the modus operandi being to gain their cooperation through indoctrination (preferred) or coercion (when necessary).

VILLAGE NODES OF INFLUENCE

For a non-Afghan or foreigner to understand how the Taliban can subvert a village, we can use a simple social structure model to identify the key nodes of influence within a typical Afghan village. A village can be divided into three areas that most affect how daily life is lived. These areas generally fall under political and administrative, religious, and security. These three areas can be considered key nodes of influence in every Afghan village. Of the three nodes the one that is the most visible to outsiders is that of the Malik and village elders. The Malik and village elders represent the political aspects of the village. A second key node of influence is the Imam. The Imam represents the religious node of influence within a village. A third Local node of influence is the individuals and system of security found within a village. Security is traditionally conducted by the men of each individual village. If one of the parts or nodes of influence is controlled by either the Taliban or the Afghan government in each village, then they heavily influence or control villages and the area.

TALIBAN CONTROL OF VILLAGE NODES

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Sunday, November 29, 2009

Strategy: Privateering and National Defense, by Larry Sechrest

Filed under: Al Qaeda,Maritime Security,Strategy — Tags: , , , , , — Matt @ 7:15 AM

“Every possible encouragement should be given to privateering in time of war.” -Thomas Jefferson

*****

    I am telling you, this is an interesting paper to read if you can find the time.  If you are a big Ayn Rand fan or a Mises Institute fan, then you will enjoy this.  Even if you aren’t into that stuff, I still think you will like this treatment of the subject.

    It is basically all about privateering and how it could be used for national defense. To basically use free market forces to defeat an enemy.  The reason why this is not being implemented, even though the mechanism is still in place in the constitution is that big government and it’s military is really not down with sharing the stage with private industry. Although if you look at the evolution of the industry the last eight years or so, you could make the case that we are sharing the stage.  Either way…..

     Larry has pointed out that private industry is certainly capable of doing extreme damage to an enemy, if given an opportunity. And as you can see with his final commentary on the subject, the professor thought it would have been a good tool to use against Usama Bin Laden and Al Qaeda. I wonder if we could have got him by now, if we would have set up a system like this to go after his merry gang of miscreants?-Matt

Edit: 11/30/2009- Mr. Lozzi has made a comment on the article Larry Sechrest wrote to correct the record.  You can find this quote in the comments section and I will post it here in the edit.

*****

From Edward Lozzi & Associates:

Although there was a group of Fortune 500 Companies who raised over a billion dollars to finance mercenaries to kill Bin Laden within weeks after 911, and 2 years before Bush sent in U.S. troops, something needs to be made clear to your readers. The article from Seacrest in 2001( repeted on your site) implies that myself and my company raised these funds. U.S. News & World Report broke the story. But it is not the case that we raides-or help raise the funds. In fact our public relations firm was only brought in to consult on spreading the quest and to liason with the media- we were retained by the cooperating Fortune 500 companies who remained secret fearing more planes crashing into their corporate offices in New York and Los Angeles. There was intent fear of this happening for almost a year. Thank you.

Edward Lozzi, President Edward Lozzi & Associates Beverly Hills

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Privateering and National Defense: Naval Warfare for Private Profit

September 1, 2001

Larry J. Sechrest

Abstract: The claim that all legitimate defense functions can and must be privately supplied flies in the face of certain economic doctrines that are almost universally accepted. Almost all economists declare that national defense is a “public good” that will be provided in sub-optimal quantities—or not provided at all—by private, profit-seeking firms. The purpose of this paper is to challenge just that sort of statement. The attack on national defense as a public good which must be provided by the state will be two-pronged. One part, the briefer of the two, will raise theoretical questions about public goods in general and national defense in particular. The second part will be devoted to a detailed survey of privateering, a form of naval warfare conducted by privately-owned ships which lasted from the twelfth century to the nineteenth century. What privateers were, how they operated, the legal customs that grew up around them, how effective they were, how profitable they were, and why they disappeared will all be addressed. The common employment of privateers during wartime will be offered as empirical evidence that defense need not be monopolized by the state.

 Download PDF File of the Full Paper

Larry J. Sechrest is a Research Fellow at The Independent Institute in Oakland, California, and a professor of economics at Sul Ross State University. (Larry also passed away in 2008)

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Let Privateers Troll for Bin Laden

September 30, 2001

Larry J. Sechrest

In the wake of the Sept. 11th attacks, a group of American businessmen has decided to enlist the profit motive to bring the perpetrators to justice. Headed by Edward Lozzi of Beverly Hills, California, the group intends to offer a bounty of $1 billion—that’s billion with a “b”—to any private citizens who will capture Osama bin Laden and his associates, dead or alive.Paying private citizens to achieve military objectives seems novel but is hardly untried.

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Tuesday, November 24, 2009

Funny Stuff: ‘Take Off Your Burqas, Come Out and Fight Us Like Men’, by Capt. Peterson

Filed under: Afghanistan,Funny Stuff,Quotes,Strategy — Tags: , , , , , — Matt @ 12:19 AM

     I love it.  If these miscreants lack the discipline to fall for such a simple thing, then we should be trash talking all over the country.  If these guys are so proud and idiotic as to break their silence and cover to answer to something like this, then we should be implementing Operation Trash Talk on the highest order.  Hell, the DoD could start a blog or wiki called ‘Combat Trash Talk’, and it would be filled with daily insults that guys could use to draw out the enemy for a fight.  We could even implement a rating system for what insult was the most effective, or resulted in the most enemy contacts. Too funny. –Matt

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In Afghanistan, Apache Troop makes the battle come to them

By Jon R. Anderson, Stars and StripesTuesday, August 3, 2004

FORWARD OPERATING BASE TIGER, Afghanistan — Frustrated that Taliban fighters were making themselves scarce, cavalry commander Capt. Brian Peterson ordered his psychological operations detachment to find a way to get the enemy onto the battlefield.

Their solution: shame. The soldiers drove into the mountainous region of southern Afghanistan near Tarin Kowt, a known Taliban stronghold, and blared through Humvee-mounted loudspeakers a simple message.

“Take off your burqas,” Afghan interpreters shouted, referring to the head-to-toe powder blue shrouds Taliban leaders once forced all women in the country to wear. “Come out and fight us like men.”

Peterson, commander of the 25th Infantry Division’s Hawaii-based 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry Regiment’s Apache Troop, had heard of Special Forces units using similar schoolyard tactics to dishonor local insurgents into a fight and figured it couldn’t hurt to try.

He knew Taliban fighters were out there. Local villagers were being threatened to stay away from U.N. voter registration efforts for the country’s Oct. 9 presidential elections.

It didn’t take long to get an answer to Peterson’s cantankerous call to arms. Within hours, an angry ambush was unleashed, a heavy fusillade of automatic weapons fire raining down from two sides as his patrol moved through a steep valley.

“The bullets were zinging within a few inches of my head, I could actually feel their heat,” said .50-caliber machine gunner Spc. Michael Plummer, 25, from Klamath Falls, Ore.

He was astounded. After four months in Afghanistan, this was Apache Troop’s first contact with the enemy.

“I couldn’t believe they were actually shooting at us,” said Plummer.

Pushing his patrol of Humvees through the ambush kill zone, Peterson turned his men around and charged back into the fray.

“We weren’t going to run from those punks,” said Peterson. “We chased them up the mountain.”

After a 45-minute gunfight, four Afghan guerrillas lay dead and another four were captured.

None of Peterson’s men were injured.

“We’re pretty sure we got more, but they carry their dead away,” said Peterson.

It’s hard to tell how many escaped, he said, adding “they can run, but they’ll only die tired.”

Story here.

 

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