Feral Jundi

Thursday, October 15, 2009

Strategy: Private Military Contractors and U.S. Grand Strategy, By David Isenberg

   Awesome.  This is the kind of conversation we need to have out there, and I applaud David for his work on trying to start that conversation.  And just a hint to the guys over at Small Wars Journal, or anyone else that claims to be students of this war and strategy. There are over 240,000 civilian contractors in this war, with 1,168 killed and over 37,000 injured.  Why there is no mention of PMC’s/contractors and grand strategy in the same sentence, is beyond me. We are very much a part of this war, and we do have an impact on strategy for these wars and future wars. –Matt

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Private Military Contractors and U.S. Grand Strategy

10/15/2009

The debate over whether and how to utilize private military contractors (PMC) often seems like childish name calling, e.g. “You’re a mercenary.” Such rhetoric is silly and prevents people from facing underlying realities.

What nobody wants to discuss is that the U.S. government’s huge and growing reliance on private contractors constitutes an attempt to circumvent or evade public skepticism about the United States’ self-appointed role as global policeman. The U.S. government has assumed the role of guarantor of global stability at a time when the American public is unwilling to provide the resources necessary to support this strategy. Private contractors fill the gap between geopolitical goals and public means.

As the United States relies more heavily upon military contractors it reinforces the tendency to approach global crises in a unilateral, as opposed to multilateral manner. U.S. use of PMCs is inevitable until people grasp the key point: contracting is both part of war and part of maintaining a global military hegemonic presence.

Such a policy is not without problems. As Adam Smith wrote in the Wealth of Nations about his experience of the corporations that were contracted to perform British government services — such as the East India Company, the Halliburton of its day, left him too skeptical to suggest privatization: “These companies… have in the long-run proved, universally, either burdensome or useless.”

ISBN : 978 82 7288 324 8 • Isenberg Private Military Contractors PRIO Report 1-2009.pdf

Monday, October 5, 2009

Strategy: Ten Steps to Victory in Afghanistan

Filed under: Afghanistan,Strategy — Tags: , , , — Matt @ 8:45 PM

 Break guerillas’ moral-mental-physical hold over the population, destroy their cohesion, and bring about their collapse via political initiative that demonstrates moral legitimacy and vitality of government and by relentless military operations that emphasize stealth/fast-tempo/fluidity-of-action and cohesion of overall effort.

*If you cannot realize such a political program, you might consider changing sides! -Page 108, Patterns of Conflict, Col. John Boyd

*****

     I liked this op-ed because it was short and sweet.  Each expert gave a quick rundown on what needs to happen, and it was cool to hear them reduce their thoughts on the matter to what is most important.  It is twitter-like in a way.

     With Twitter, you have 140 characters to produce something that is meaningful.  It forces you to really think about what you want to say, because you are limited.  And really, if you know the solution or solutions to the problem, and you have some conviction and passion about it, then it shouldn’t take you that long to communicate it. Less is more, less is more…..

     Either way, check out these strategies, and the rock star strategists attached to these suckers, and let me know what you think. –Matt

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10 Steps to Victory in Afghanistan

October 4, 2009

Op-Ed Contributors

Reform or Go Home

COUNTERINSURGENCY is only as good as the government it supports. NATO could do everything right — it isn’t — but will still fail unless Afghans trust their government. Without essential reform, merely making the government more efficient or extending its reach will just make things worse.

Only a legitimately elected Afghan president can enact reforms, so at the very least we need to see a genuine run-off election or an emergency national council, called a loya jirga, before winter. Once a legitimate president emerges, we need to see immediate action from him on a publicly announced reform program, developed in consultation with Afghan society and enforced by international monitors. Reforms should include firing human rights abusers and drug traffickers, establishing an independent authority to investigate citizen complaints and requiring officials to live in the districts they are responsible for (fewer than half do).

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Tuesday, July 7, 2009

Strategy: How David Beats Goliath, by Malcolm Gladwell

Filed under: Strategy — Tags: , , , , — Matt @ 5:26 AM

How David Beats Goliath

When underdogs break the rules.

by Malcolm Gladwell

May 11, 2009

A non-stop full-court press gives weak basketball teams a chance against far stronger teams. Why have so few adopted it?

When Vivek Ranadivé decided to coach his daughter Anjali’s basketball team, he settled on two principles. The first was that he would never raise his voice. This was National Junior Basketball—the Little League of basketball. The team was made up mostly of twelve-year-olds, and twelve-year-olds, he knew from experience, did not respond well to shouting. He would conduct business on the basketball court, he decided, the same way he conducted business at his software firm. He would speak calmly and softly, and convince the girls of the wisdom of his approach with appeals to reason and common sense.

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