Feral Jundi

Tuesday, July 31, 2012

Afghanistan: China’s Afghan Game Plan, By Shlomo Ben-Ami

Filed under: Afghanistan,China,Strategy — Tags: , , , , , , — Matt @ 1:08 AM

Once China’s enormous economic and security interests in Afghanistan are left without America’s military shield, the Chinese are bound to play an even larger role there, one that Afghans hope will reach “strategic levels.” China would prefer to accomplish this the Chinese way – that is, essentially through a display of soft power – or, as the Chinese government put it on the occasion of Afghan President Hamid Karzai’s official visit to Beijing in early June, through “non-traditional security areas.”
Judging by China’s behavior in other parts of the world, any military cooperation is likely to be extremely modest and cautious. China has already made it clear it will not contribute to the $4.1 billion multilateral fund to sustain Afghan national security forces.

A big hat tip to Brandon over at SOFREP for finding this article. In the past I have talked about China’s involvement in Africa and the strategic game they are playing, as well as their willingness to set up shop in war zones like Iraq or Afghanistan. They are purely focused on business, and really could care less about the people or the politics or who is in charge. All they care about is who do they have to do business with and pay in order to accomplish their goals for obtaining resources.

So why does this matter?  Because I personally would like to see the west do more to get a return on their investment after ten years of war.  The blood and treasure expended should earn western businesses a place at the front of the line when it comes to making entries into Afghanistan.

China also could care less who they do business with. Notice in the quote up top that China did not care to contribute to Afghanistan’s security forces? I wouldn’t doubt it if the Taliban and China are already making deals for a post war reality in Afghanistan.  I mean look at how China still supports the Assad government in Syria, even though they are murdering their own people.

On the other hand, the realist in me says that China is just playing a better strategic game than the west when it comes to these places. Or their game is just different, hence the ‘chess versus weiqi’ example mentioned in the beginning of the article below.   We may not like it, but I don’t see anyone making a move to counter their game?  Is our goal to get China sucked into the graveyard of empires as well? Who knows? lol

At the end of the day, China will still have to answer for their actions there. Whomever they do business with, they will be scrutinized and remembered by the people for said actions.  China will also have to have deep pocketbooks in order to keep paying off tribes/Taliban in a back and forth game of ‘pay me more or I will shut down your operations’. China will also have to deal with outside sources of shock to their schemes there–meaning they will have to be working hard to keep multiple countries in the region happy, or pay the consequence.  Interesting stuff. –Matt

 

 

China’s Afghan Game Plan
By Shlomo Ben-Ami
04 July 2012
In his latest book, On China, Henry Kissinger uses the traditional intellectual games favored by China and the West – weiqi and chess – as a way to reveal their differing attitudes toward international power politics. Chess is about total victory, a Clausewitzian battle for the “center of gravity” and the eventual elimination of the enemy, whereas weiqi is a quest for relative advantage through a strategy of encirclement that avoids direct conflict.
This cultural contrast is a useful guide to the way that China manages its current competition with the West. China’s Afghan policy is a case in point, but it also is a formidable challenge to the weiqi way. As the United States prepares to withdraw its troops from the country, China must deal with an uncertain post-war scenario.
Afghanistan is of vital strategic interest to China, yet it never crossed its leaders’ minds to defend those interests through war. A vital security zone to China’s west, Afghanistan is also an important corridor through which it can secure its interests in Pakistan (a traditional ally in China’s competition with India), and ensure its access to vital natural resources in the region. Moreover, China’s already restless Muslim-majority province of Xinjiang, which borders on Afghanistan, might be dangerously affected by a Taliban takeover there, or by the country’s dismemberment.

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Friday, June 29, 2012

Strategy: William Lind On How The Taliban Mastered The Operational Art Of Modern Warfare

Filed under: Afghanistan,Strategy — Tags: , , , , , — Matt @ 3:22 AM

Excellent little article and it is always cool to check out what William Lind has to say. If you are familiar with the term ‘4th Generation Warfare‘, then you would know that Lind was one of the originators of the concept. So in the world of strategy and warfare, I tend to listen to what guys like this have to say. (read the paper here)

As far as I can tell, the reception of this article is kind of luke warm. Meaning it is debatable, and the guys over at Zen Pundit did a pretty good job of pointing out where Lind was short.

However, I think Lind errs in ascribing too much credit to the Taliban here. A much simpler explanation is that the usually illiterate ANA soldier is a product of the same xenophobic cultural and religious environment that created the Taliban, the Haqqanis, vicious Islamist goons like Gulbuddin Hekmatyar or the Afghan tribesmen who slaughtered the retreating garrison of Lord Elphinstone in 1841.

While the Taliban have infiltrators, it remains that many of the “Green on Blue” killings are just as easily explained by personal grievances, zealous religious bigotry, indiscipline, mistreatment by American advisers or Afghan superiors and sudden jihad syndrome. While it is impolitic to emphasize it, Afghan betrayal and murder of foreign allies (generally seen as “occupiers”) is something of a longstanding historical pattern. The Taliban capitalize on it politically but they are not responsible for all of it.

Although I must say that the Taliban have still held out the last ten years, and they are still fighting.  They are also doing all they can to exert influence on the people, hanging out in the shadows and dropping violent hints that as soon as the foreigners are gone that all of those that supported them will be paying the price. That, and the Taliban are doing all they can to show how inept the Afghan government is.(and the government is doing a great job on it’s own of doing that-lol)

But back to this tactic of green on blue. It is a good tactic if the Taliban are able to get individuals into those positions. They either have to ‘turn’ a police or military officer or infiltrate the unit with one of their own. That can be difficult but it is possible.

You also have moles or use pseudo operators to create chaos as well. They can gain valuable intelligence on the enemy or the supporters of the enemy, and give plenty of information to Taliban planners.

The Taliban are also conducting suicide assaults wearing police and military uniforms.  Anything that would create a hesitation amongst the responding forces, or create chaos and confusion during the attack. The end result is very visual and has impact, even if they are not successful. Those attacks show their dedication to the cause (willing to die for it), it shows that they can strike anywhere and the police and military are not able to protect everyone, and it is a reminder to all for when the ‘foreigners’ leave that this is what is in store for everyone.

So maybe Lind should have expanded on all of the little things that the Taliban are doing and have done over the years, that have contributed to their survivability against such a formidable western foe?  They are today’s fourth generation warfare ‘fighters’, much like Al Qaeda or even the cartels in Mexico are. They are small forces that have found ways to combat large forces in the modern era, and survive. In some cases flourish…. So how do you defeat these guys?

Personally, I always default to mimicry strategy for this stuff, just because in the history of warfare, that seems to be what has worked. That you copy what your enemy is doing or what the competition is doing, and add that one little thing to give you the edge over your opponent.

To apply Kaizen to that strategy, and constantly attempt to find weakness in your strategy and plans before the enemy, all so you can modify it and make it better. (destruction and creation–fight dogma Boyd style) You are also looking for weaknesses in your enemy and their strategy, and constantly looking for advantage.

It also takes innovation, and not just adaptation to find that novelty that will give you the edge in the fight. I know many smart folks out there are seeking just that, and I know I am constantly exploring ideas in regards to this interesting and complex problem. I highly depend upon the feedback of the readership here and the knowledge that is out there to help me ‘build my own snowmobiles’, and I am optimistic about the process. It is also a fun thought experiment, to put yourself in the strategist’ or general’s chair, and find your own solutions to defeating these enemies. Check it out and let me know what you think? –Matt

 

Unfriendly Fire
Posted By William S. Lind
June 27, 2012
The greatest intellectual challenge in Fourth Generation war—war against opponents that are not states—is how to fight it at the operational level. NATO in Afghanistan, like the Soviets three decades ago, has been unable to solve that riddle. But the Taliban appears to have done so.
The operational level of war lies between strategy and tactics. While great commanders have always thought and fought at the operational level, the concept was not formally recognized until the 19th century. As usual, it was the Prussian army that led the way. Some historians think the operational level may have been formalized by Field Marshal von Moltke himself in the Franco-Prussian war as a way to keep Bismarck out of his business. (“Yes, my dear Bismarck, you are in charge of strategy, but you simply must not interfere in operational matters.”)
The U.S. Army did not officially recognize the operational level of war until 1982, but the tsarist Russian army and later the Soviets picked up on it. By 1944-45, the Red Army was as competent at what they called “operational art” as the Wehrmacht. That was never true of the Western allies.

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Thursday, April 26, 2012

Publications: Selective Privatization Of Security: Why American Strategic Leaders Choose To Substitute PSC’s For National Military Forces, By Bruce Stanley

Filed under: Industry Talk,Publications,Strategy — Tags: , , , , , — Matt @ 12:21 PM

This study argues that when political leaders chose to reduce their nation’s military force structure, they may face conflicts beyond their anticipated scope and duration. Such decision- makers are left with no choice but to legalize and legitimize the use of PMCs resulting in the increased use of PMCs as a deliberate tool of foreign policy.

A big hat tip to David Isenberg for finding this paper and posting his commentary about it. What makes this so significant is that the author of the paper is actually using qualitative and quantitative analysis to prove exactly what the reason is for the rise of the use of private security contractors. It is this kind of analysis that can be pointed to as ’empirical’ evidence for what is really going on with this industry. Here is what David had to say about the paper:

Considering how many times over years I have critiqued the private military and security (PMSC) industry for making claims without providing evidence to back it up, it is always noteworthy to find that rare person who tries to fill that empirical evidence gap.

Absolutely. This is important stuff, and especially for those that are policy makers in government. It is also important information that companies can use for strategic business planning.

I also really enjoyed the use of economic theory in this paper. In essence, this model of dissertation is pretty close to what I would use for something like Offense Industry.  It is also interesting to point out that the author did come across some speed bumps when it came to incomplete data.

To be accurate in analysis, you need good data. Because the US government didn’t record as well as they could of, all of the contractors involved with this war and what they did, that studies like this one can suffer a little. The author pointed this out, but he was able to come to some interesting conclusions.

Summary
This dissertation was framed around the question of why there has been a rapid growth in the reliance on the private security industry in US foreign policy in the past two decades. More importantly this dissertation sought to demonstrate: first, that the use of private security contractors by the United States is not a new phenomenon; second, that the recent increased use of private security as an instrument of military policy or foreign policy may in fact be a consequence of deliberate policy decisions of successive presidential administrations; and third, that the security environment in the target state of an intervention is a factor that results in an increase of private security contractors. The goal of this dissertation was to move beyond most of the extant literature which describes the phenomenon, and develop theory that helps explains why there has been a rapid growth in the reliance on the private security industry.
This study argues that when political leaders chose to reduce their nation’s military force structure, they may face conflicts beyond their anticipated scope and duration. Such decision- makers are left with no choice but to legalize and legitimize the use of PMCs resulting in the increased use of PMCs as a deliberate tool of foreign policy. Using “supply-demand” theory as the theoretical approach, this dissertation built upon the three key influences emphasized first by Singer (2003) and then by others: the decreasing supply of national troops, decreasing national defense budgets, and the rising demand from global conflicts and humanitarian emergencies.
As the previous chapters demonstrate the basic theory and thus insights from the descriptive literature have value, however they failed to provide a fully exhaustive explanation of this important phenomenon. The additional elements added to the relatively spare theory resulted in a more convincing explanation of the increased use of PMCs. In sum, this study added precision to our understanding of the causes of the increased use of PMCs.
This chapter examines the findings of my dissertation, a few methodological problems, and suggests some areas for further research. The next section presents the theoretical discussion and empirical findings and conclusions from the qualitative and quantitative section. The section that follows provides a few suggestions on how to improve the research design. The final section offers a few policy prescriptions and areas for further research.
Findings
This study asserted that the private security industry fills vacuums created when the US government does not have the means or the will to fully provide domestic and international security. To understand the broader context of the private security industry’s relationship to mature democracies this dissertation focused initially on five hypotheses:
H1: When military outlays decrease there is an increase in the use of private security.
H2: When the size of a national military decreases there is an increase in the use of private military security.
H3: When the number of a military disputes, military engagements and militarized conflicts increases there is an increase in the use of private security internationally.
H4: When the duration of a military conflict increases there is an increase in the use of private security.
H5: When there is a decrease in bureaucratic controls and regulations there is an increase in the use of private security.
Three additional hypotheses were added to this study upon completion of the case studies. They are:
H6: When there is a force cap placed on the size of the military force there is an increase in the use of private security.
H7: When there is no host nation supporting the intervention there is an increase in the use of private security.
H8: When the security environment is non-permissive there is an increase in private security.
Using a mixed methods approach, the hypotheses were tested using both a qualitative and quantitative approach. The qualitative approached relied on the case method, using a series of structure focused questions to compare the outcome of three historical cases where the US used private contractors. As a result, the controlled comparison helped identify the outcome of the dependent variable, private contractors, and provided a historical explanation of private contractors in relation to a set of independent variables. In this instance, structured, focused comparison helped to tease out exactly how supply, demand and other pressures help to stimulate the rise of PMCs.
The quantitative approach relied on a statistical method, using interrupted time series to examine the use of private contractors by the US from 1950 to 2010. The quantitative component analyzed a larger time period and increased the generalizability of the findings. It also provided insight on the relative explanatory weight of different causal influences.
The findings of this research demonstrates that the three key influences asserted in the extant literature the decreasing supply of national troops, decreasing national defense budgets, and the rising demand from global conflicts and humanitarian emergencies are very important to understanding the rise of the private security industry in the past two decades. Yet as this dissertation shows the nature of the security environment in the target state and the reduction (or elimination) of bureaucratic controls in the acting state are also important to explaining the increased reliance of the private security industry. Two other variables that were prevalent in the case studies that may be a factor in the increased reliance on private contractors: limitations on the number of troops committed to an intervention, and the duration of the intervention.

So that is is pretty interesting. A company can literally look at the current situation and say that if their country decreases the size of their military force, the size of that military’s budget decreases, and there is a dramatic increase in conflict/emergencies, that the demand for force will more than likely point towards the use of PMSC’s. And you can see that going on throughout the world as we speak.

But the thing that I look at is the strategic uses of PMSC’s. I have always argued that this industry is a strategic asset, and not a liability–regardless of the few hiccups this industry has had over the years. We are what made the concept of an ‘All Volunteer Force’ work. Here is the quote that grabbed my attention.

Policy Implications
State policy makers may be able to use the results of this study to inform decisions on military budgeting, structure, or civil-military relations. As the worldwide economic crisis continues, policy makers faced with budget choices will look to reduce their military expenditures and possibly their military force structure. However, if they are faced with foreign policy problems requiring military intervention, then it should not be surprising if they substitute national military forces for private security forces. It is likely that more state policy makers may move towards the legalization of private security companies. Thus, the trend towards legalization leads toward further legitimization of the use of private security contractors. The US has certainly set the example in the past twenty years for other nations to follow.

This legalization process is the one thing that I am always on the look out.  The Letter of Marque is probably the most significant legal mechanism out there for authorizing companies to wage war in the name of the state.

As to current legalization processes, I would have to say that it has been slow and tedious. But we are seeing movement, and the Commission on Wartime Contracting is a prime example of that effort. I point to the recent legislation that members of this commission put forth–which helps to further legitimize this industry.

As the industry is further legitimized by lawmakers seeking better controls over it, then the comfort in using such a force for foreign policy increases.  Most of all, it allows this nation to enjoy their ‘peace dividend’ at the end of wars, but at the same time have a mechanism in place that can support a call up of force for whatever emergency or conflict that may come up.

The use of the ICoC and the standardization process that is currently going on throughout the world is another example. Efforts like this will further legitimize the use of private security and will help to increase it’s use. Even with the current grey areas of legal use, we are seeing the maritime security industry grow at an incredible pace. Armed guards on boats is definitely another example of this increased use of private security.

As for actual strategy, sometimes private force is the better option. It gives politicians the ability to quietly buildup or draw down for a conflict. Private forces fill in the gaps as the use of force is debated, depending on the current political environment. Meaning one day, a President might have a specific strategy for a conflict that a nation is involved with, and then within a month when that President is voted out of office by a President with a different strategy, then that military must be able to flex with that.  Private security is what allows for that flexibility.  Likewise, PMSC’s have been used by two Presidents of different parties, both with different strategies, and in multiple wars over the last ten years. Obviously someone likes us. lol

In fact, we have actually reached a point in the war where there were more contractors than military force in places like Afghanistan. Or that contractors became the primary force representing US interest in places like Iraq.

In closing, it is amazing to me that we have this massive officer corps for the military, numerous think tanks, and plenty of military colleges that all focus on the use of ‘military force’.  And yet, private force is making this much of an impact on the way we do business? Does anyone else see the imbalance here? Where are the think tanks dedicated to the use of PMSC’s?  Where are the PMSC colleges and universities? What institutions other than the military or business schools produce the future leadership of ‘private security and military companies’?

It is also odd to me that there are so few voices talking about this.  I can count on my hand, the number of blogs or journalists that purely focus on PMSC’s. It is nice to enjoy a niche like this as a blogger. But for how significant this industry is, and how fast it has grown, I would have thought that more folks would have come into the mix to analyze and synthesize about this industry. Interesting stuff, and it really makes you think. A big hat tip to Bruce Stanley for the work he put into this! –Matt

Link to paper here.

Monday, April 23, 2012

Afghanistan: New Pact–US Ready To Defend Afghanistan For At Least A Decade After 2014 Drawdown

Filed under: Afghanistan,Industry Talk,Strategy — Tags: , , — Matt @ 11:51 AM

“If the Taliban are back in the political process, being imposed on us, the Afghan people will definitely resist, paving the way for another war to happen,” Zia Massoud told Reuters in an interview at his home in Kabul.

“If the Taliban want peace, we are ready to make peace, but if they want to fight, there will be a fight. That’s it. If you coddle them, give them a political address and other gains, they will never be ready for any talks,” he said. -Daily Outlook Afghanistan, January 21 2012

There are two deals with this that are of importance. Afghanistan is a strategic position for the US to keep tabs on Al Qaeda/Taliban in Pakistan. So having some type of presence in Afghanistan helps in that goal.

The second deal is that as troops pull out, the Taliban will increase their attacks and you will begin to see the strengths and weaknesses of the Afghan government rear their ugly head. Not that we haven’t seen this already, but when the Afghans are up against an enemy that has been fighting a professional military like the west, I tend to think that the Afghan army and police will have some issues. So having some kind of presence in Afghanistan as this new dynamic unfolds will be crucial.

With that last part, my attention is on the latest formation of Afghans whom have come together to show solidarity against the Taliban and an Afghan government that shows weakness in the face of the Taliban. This group is called The National Front, or what is basically the new Northern Alliance. One of the members of this new Northern Alliance crew is Ahmad Zia Massoud, the brother of the late Afghan ‘Lion of Panjshir’– Ahmad Sha Massoud.

Why is this important?  Because I think in a world where the Taliban are surging and causing a lot of pain, the weak leaders will crumble, and the strong leaders will rise to the top and meet the challenge of opposing the Taliban. My hopes are that Karzai crumbles, and goes back into his hole where he belongs, and the National Front grows a leader that can stick it to the Taliban and get Afghanistan on the right path.  Here is what the Asia Times had to say about the National Front.

“This is the first time that the leadership of the Tajik, Uzbek and Hazara communities [of Afghanistan] has come to a common line of thinking … In essence, the Northern Alliance is being resuscitated as a political entity. … As the Northern Alliance groups see it, Pakistani strategy is to wait out the period between now and 2014 – the date set for the US troop withdrawal – and then regroup the Taliban and make a bid to capture power in Kabul. Their strong show of unity in Berlin suggests that they will not roll over and give way to an exclusive US-Taliban-Pakistan settlement being imposed on their nation.”

So in my view, having some troops/contractors on hand to help train Afghan forces, and bide our time until ‘real’ Afghan leadership surfaces, could make for a good little alternate plan, on top of dealing with threats in Pakistan.

Kind of a repeat of 2001 where SF units were able to help the Northern Alliance deliver crushing blows to the Taliban.  In that case, Afghans truly feared and hated the Taliban, and were fighting them with a sense of purpose. I mean look at what the Taliban did to the Hazaras back in 1998?

On August 8, 1998 the Taliban launched an attack on Mazar-i Sharif. Of 1500 defenders only 100 survived the engagement. Once in control the Taliban began to kill people indiscriminately. At first shooting people in the street, they soon began to target Hazaras. Women were raped, and thousands of people were locked in containers and left to suffocate. This ethnic cleansing left an estimated 5,000 to 6,000 dead.

Now of course the Hazaras have done all they can to get back at the Taliban, but my point here is that there is some bad blood between the members of the National Front and the Taliban. These guys do not plan on living under Taliban rule–or under a government that appeases the Taliban.

I also think that common Afghans, many of whom are Pashtun, might have no problem with the Taliban. That is a nice attitude to have, seeing how the west has kept the Taliban from imposing their rule on the people. But if the Taliban do take over, look out. The people can kiss goodbye what little freedoms they enjoyed, and the Taliban will take them back into medieval times.  Pulling out the majority of troops and letting Afghans deal with this new potential reality might be a good thing. It would force people to re-evaluate what they really want–oppression or freedom?

There are other reasons to being in Afghanistan, like having an eye on Iran. But dealing with Al Qaeda/Taliban in Pakistan and being in position to support (if they need it) a new National Front as it forms are the ones that stand out to me.

As to the contracts in the future? One thing is for sure. If you sell Afghanistan military hardware, then you need the support/mentors/trainers to help them with that stuff. Also, all of those reconstruction contracts and investors looking to do business in Afghanistan will still need protection or advisers to help them navigate that place. (especially as the APPF falters) Also, diplomatic missions will continue to be important, hence WPS will still be in place. Then of course getting all of that equipment out of Afghanistan will be crucial as well. Here is a quote about how much money will be spent there in the future.

The U.S. pledged in the agreement to continue to fund Afghan security forces after 2014. It does not say how much money this will involve, but says it should be enough to support the force. U.S. officials have said they expect to pay about $4 billion a year to fund Afghan forces, but the funding would have to be approved by Congress.

On a side note with the equipment in theater, I am wondering how much we will leave versus how much will be taken out?  It is extremely expensive to get stuff into and out of Afghanistan, and perhaps we might see a lot more equipment just handed over to the Afghans? Compare that to Iraq and the massive operation to get equipment out of there.  Who knows, but I do know that contractors will be crucial to that effort.

In essence, what you are seeing in Iraq now, will probably repeat itself in Afghanistan.  So contractors will have utility in one shape or another in Afghanistan to make the transition go smoothly and support the continuing efforts. –Matt

 

Ahmad Zia Massoud.

 

Afghan-US pact: US ready to defend Afghanistan for at least a decade after 2014 drawdown
April 23, 2012
Washington has pledged in a newly agreed strategic pact to help defend Afghanistan militarily for at least a decade after the country formally takes control of its own security, an Afghan official said Monday.
The draft agreement signed on Sunday also says the U.S. will only take such actions with Afghan agreement. The United States also pledged it will not launch attacks on other countries from Afghan soil, according to sections of the accord read out in parliament by Afghan National Security Adviser Rangin Dadfar Spanta.
Afghan officials had previously said that they would not allow their country to be used to launch drone attacks into Pakistan or other neighboring countries after the deadline for most foreign forces to withdraw by the end of 2014.
“Considering that stability in Afghanistan would be stability for Central Asia and South Asia, the United States emphasizes that any kind of interference in Afghan affairs would be a matter of concern for the United States,” he said, quoting from the Dari language version of the agreement.

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Monday, January 16, 2012

Crime: Politics And The Drug War In Latin America

Filed under: Crime,Strategy — Tags: , , , , , , , — Matt @ 10:46 PM

In South America, the balloon effect has coincided with another phenomenon: The rise of a generation of populist leaders who view U.S. antidrug efforts as a version of the “Yankee imperialism” they disdain.
Both Venezuela’s Mr. Chavez and Bolivia’s Mr. Morales built support among mostly poor populations as staunchly anti-U.S. leaders. They describe the drug war as a facade for a strategy to control the region’s politics and natural resources, especially oil.
Mr. Chavez and other leaders say they are fighting drug trafficking. But in Venezuela, thwarting U.S. drug efforts appears to be a cause for promotion. In 2008, the U.S. declared Venezuelan Gen. Henry Rangel Silva a drug “kingpin.” This month, Mr. Chavez named Gen. Rangel defense minister.

Imagine this. Several large coca producing countries have leaders that were elected based on their ‘support for coca farming’, and one country elects leaders that were financed and influenced by drug cartels. And then you have multiple countries that dislike the US and try to interpret the drug war to their people as some form of ‘Yankee Imperialism’.  That to me is like the perfect alignment of events to create not just Narco States, but Narco Coalitions. The combining of states that produce the drugs with states that distribute them, all with the intent of pushing those drugs into the US and world and lining the pockets of politicians and cartels. It sounds like a premise in some crazy far out crime/war movie, all wrapped up with ‘world domination’. lol

Except in this case, it is a very plausible scenario and parts of it have already come true. In the articles below, they discuss how vulnerable Mexico’s political process is to cartel influence. The second one talks about how both Peru and Bolivia have seen a huge increase in coca production, all because they have leaders who were elected based on their pro-coca farming views. Ecuador and Venezuela gets a mention because they are all about supporting the drug trade as well. So chalk those countries as lost to the narcos….

As for Mexico, who knows if Calderon can keep his presidency? The cartels are doing all they can to work against him and his party at the local levels, and they are easily using the rules of insurgency to do so. From assassination, to bribes, to kidnapping, to voter intimidation, etc. The cartels are also using media and any other angle to get the public to reject Calderon’s war against the cartels.

Finally, the thing that I am most interested in is how will the US and the rest of the world react to such a Narco Coalition, if Mexico falls? What is the strategy to counter these narco insurgencies, and what does victory or defeat look like in the context of a drug war like this? –Matt

 

Bolivian President Evo Morales, holding coca leaves in 2009, built a political movement by demonstrating against the drug police. He has named coca growers to law-enforcement posts -- including drug czar.

Mexico’s 2012 vote is vulnerable to narco threat
12/21/2011
“We cannot allow organized crime to decide at the ballot box,” said Josefina Vazquez Mota, a leading contender to be the 2012 presidential candidate of the National Action Party (PAN), which ended 71 years of PRI-party rule with Vicente Fox’s election in 2000.
Mexican presidents are limited to one six-year term, and the PAN held on to power in 2006 with Calderon’s narrow win over leftist challenger Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador, who will top the ticket for the Democratic Revolutionary Party, or PRD, again in 2012.
This time around, analysts expect PAN candidates to be hobbled by public dissatisfaction with Calderon’s military offensive against the drug cartels. At least 50,000 people have been killed since he took office in December 2006, and gangland violence has spread misery to parts of the country that were previously considered safe.
Outdated election laws
Calderon has angered rival lawmakers by suggesting that a presidential victory by PRI candidate Enrique Pena Nieto would represent a capitulation to the criminals. But many Mexicans seem nostalgic for the relative tranquility of life under the PRI, whose network of patronage and corruption once kept organized crime in check.

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