Feral Jundi

Sunday, September 5, 2010

PMC 2.0: Paying Your Local Guard Force With ‘Mobile Cash’

     This is an excellent article that discusses a very unique solution to a problem that we are dealing with in the war zones and other places throughout the world.  When companies subcontract with local guard companies for security, you often hear about how the managers screw over their guard force by skimming off the top of their pay.  They do all sorts crappy things to their people, and it can do a lot of damage to the morale of the guard force.

     The idea of mobile cash is about how the customer that pays for this guard service, can ensure that their contracted guard force is getting paid on time and in full via cell phone/text messaging.(read the article below for details) This is especially pertinent in war zones where telecom might be up and running, but not much else. Africa, Afghanistan and Iraq all have thriving telecom markets, and everyone has cell phones, and this is one more way to tap into this technology for the good of the company and mission.

     In order to maintain the edge in this market of force, and not lose folks to the enemy or a competitor, you need to make sure every last penny you are spending on these guard contracts is accounted for.  It also makes it very hard for your subcontracted field managers to take from the guards, which will also help in your market of force optimization. Anything you can do to minimize the potential for corruptive activities is a good thing.

     Now on to some ideas with this ‘mobile cash’ concept that the authors could have expanded on.  I have talked before about COIN and SMS, and this kind of cell phone payment system will make it easier to crowd source and spread messages. Some of the ideas I was thinking of is to offer bounties through the same system for any individuals that can locate wanted enemies or provide information. You could also provide bonuses to guards that participate in surveys.  How about an english learning program, which would make it a game for guards to learn english?  There are a ton of things you could ask the guards to do in order to get ‘feedback gold’ before they could collect their paycheck. I guess the point is, is just offering payment through this convenient service will be reward enough for anything you need them to do.

     The other thing that you could do with this concept for government related services, is to constantly ask police, military, and government folks to identify issues that need to be addressed within their organizations–before they collect their paycheck via phone. You don’t want to piss them off by making them go through too many hoops, but you could definitely tap into all of these ‘human sensors’ throughout the organizations, and get a feel for what is going on and collect data.

     I really like the commerce angle on this.  If this mobile cash concept makes transactions more transparent with better record keeping, then that will make banks more accountable. Especially when you have dorks like Karzai’s family in charge of the Kabul Bank, and because they keep playing games and writing checks to all their friends, that now you have a bank in trouble. (and I will pull my hair out if the US bails out this bank…pfffft) Hell, if there was a way to bypass corrupt local banks and maybe use international banks or even try a telecom bank type system?  Who knows, but either way the cell phone transaction will only add more record keeping to the whole thing.

     Now for the future.  I believe in several years, the smart phone market will catch up in these war zones.  People might joke, but locals in the cities will purchase these things because they are status symbols. The car, motorcycle, satellite dish, cellphone, and the soon to become a hit ‘smart phone’ are all status symbols that locals in these countries want to have. These devices will also be within their reach just because there will be such a large supply of them throughout the world.  The telecom industries in these countries will also do their best to keep up with this latest trend.  That is just my thoughts on the future of this stuff.

     Now imagine a local Afghan businessman with basically a computer in his pocket?  The apps, the online payment systems of international banks, the social networking, all of it, will be available to these folks in developing countries. It will be wise for us to take advantage of this new reality, and develop strategic communications plan that utilizes these devices as a means to reach out. Good article and a big hat tip to the guys at Small Wars Journal for putting it out there. –Matt

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One Cell Phone at a Time: Countering Corruption in Afghanistan

by Dan Rice and Guy Filippelli

September 2, 2010

Download the full article: One Cell Phone at a Time

American commanders are preparing for a major offensive in Afghanistan to attack one of the most formidable enemies we face in country: corruption. Despite sincere efforts to promote governance and accountability initiatives, Afghanistan has slipped from 112th to158th place on Transparency International’s global corruption index. One reason the international community has been unable to effectively tackle corruption in Afghanistan is that our own reconstruction efforts perpetuate the problem. As Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton recently acknowledged, “Corruption, frankly… is not all an Afghan problem.” Money appropriated to secure and stabilize the country is too easily siphoned and redirected as it changes hands, inevitably making its way to local powerbrokers, insurgent networks, and offshore bank accounts, rather than the individuals who need it most. One solution to this problem lies in the palm of our hands: the mighty cell phone.

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Friday, August 27, 2010

Afghanistan: Know Your Enemy–Behind Enemy Lines With The Taliban

Friday, August 6, 2010

Building Snowmobiles: Using Economic Theory To Predict Enemy Strategy?

“It is clear that war is not a mere act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political activity by other means.” Karl Von Clauswitz

“What is of supreme importance in war is to attack the enemy’s strategy.” – Sun Tzu

     First off, I want to mention that this post is the product of one of my reader’s ‘a ha’ moments.  What really makes this cool is that this reader is a fan of the ‘building snowmobiles’ posts on FJ and this was him putting together these random pieces and creating something out of all of it.  He had attended a college course years back that covered economic theory, he is well read on the war and a veteran of the war in Afghanistan, he had read Feral Jundi and knew how fun analysis and synthesis can be, and then finally stumbled on some recent news about the war and Taliban strategy, and put it all together. And this is me trying to assemble the thing based on his instructions, and I am thoroughly enjoying myself.

     Simply put, this is about using economic theory as a potential tool to predict enemy strategies, so you can defeat those strategies.  Because like Sun Tzu says, it ‘is of supreme importance to attack the enemy’s strategy’. Of course I am not going to go all out and say you can predict with 100 percent certainty what your enemy will do. Still, the closer you can get the better, and these are potential tools you can use for predictive analysis.

    In this exercise, we will use Afghanistan and the current war against the Taliban there. At this time, we are also using a counter-insurgency strategy.  The Taliban are considered the insurgents in this case, and they too are using a insurgency type strategy.  Both strategies are heavily influenced by gaining the support of the population. Famous counter-insurgent David Galula had this to say about counterinsurgency:

The aim of the war is to gain the support of the population Galula proposes four “laws” for counterinsurgency:

1.The aim of the war is to gain the support of the population rather than control of territory.

2.Most of the population will be neutral in the conflict; support of the masses can be obtained with the help of an active friendly minority.

3.Support of the population may be lost. The population must be efficiently protected to allow it to cooperate without fear of retribution by the opposite party.

4.Order enforcement should be done progressively by removing or driving away armed opponents, then gaining support of the population, and eventually strengthening positions by building infrastructure and setting long-term relationships with the population. This must be done area by area, using a pacified territory as a basis of operation to conquer a neighbouring area.

Galula contends that:

A victory [in a counterinsurgency] is not the destruction in a given area of the insurgent’s forces and his political organization. … A victory is that plus the permanent isolation of the insurgent from the population, isolation not enforced upon the population, but maintained by and with the population. … In conventional warfare, strength is assessed according to military or other tangible criteria, such as the number of divisions, the position they hold, the industrial resources, etc. In revolutionary warfare, strength must be assessed by the extent of support from the population as measured in terms of political organization at the grass roots. The counterinsurgent reaches a position of strength when his power is embedded in a political organization issuing from, and firmly supported by, the population. 

   I wanted to put this out there first as one of the main definitions of COIN, so we have somewhere to start.(most strategies are population-centric)  In this war, we are basically fighting for the support of the people, and you could easily say that this is politics with guns.  You could also say that both sides of this conflict are selling to the population that they are a better idea and friend than the other guy.  The Taliban use their methods to achieve population support, and we use ours. In other words, we are in the business of politics in this war. We are trying to win votes or popularity, and like politicians, we are finding all and any way to win as many votes as possible.

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Monday, July 19, 2010

Publications: CRS-DoD Contractors In Iraq And Afghanistan: Background And Analysis, July 2010

     The 2010 QDR, which runs almost 130 pages, contains little discussion on the role contractors play in military operations. The QDR has a seven page section on counterinsurgency, stability, and counterterrorism operations, including a list of ten priorities for improvement. However, the word “contractor” does not appear once in the discussion, despite the fact that contractors make up more that 50% of DOD’s workforce in Iraq and Afghanistan, including more than 13,000 armed contractors. Some analysts argue that DOD missed an opportunity to address the issue in the most recent QDR.

*****  

     I like posting these, just because they are running records of where contractors stand in this war.  But what I really like about this publication is that Mr. Schwartz has taken aim at the folks who wrote up the QDR.

     The reason why I like that, is because I have been screaming on this blog as long as I can remember that contractors must be included into the discussion on strategy for these wars.  Especially when we account for over half of the manpower in these conflicts (and probably for future conflicts).

     It still amazes me that today’s strategists and war planners do not adequately cover this stuff.  If you read the QDR, it’s like we don’t even exist.  And yet we have thousands of expats, third country nationals, and local nationals, all interacting with today’s populations and militaries in today’s wars. We are also dying and paying our toll in blood for this war–yet nothing is really mentioned about us when it comes to strategy.

     Mr. Schwartz also took the time to cut and paste some key components of today’s COIN strategy out of some manuals, and how contractors should and could intermix with that strategy.  The bottom line is that if contractors are interacting with the populations of these war zones, then they ‘must’ be aligned within the strategies of COIN. We must be on the same sheet of music as the militaries are, or we will continue to inadvertently cause problems.

     Now for a couple of critiques.  In the beginning of this publication, Mr. Schwartz actually mentioned the use of contractors during the Revolutionary War, but he made no mention of the use of privateers or of Article 1, Section 8, Paragraph 11 of the US Constitution.

     It’s odd to me that he wouldn’t, because our use of privateers is actually a fantastic example of using contractors during times of war to achieve a strategic goal.  Our privateer industry is what we had as a continental navy at that time. The damage they inflicted onto the enemy’s logistics, as well as the capture of enemy weapons and munitions were very significant components of that war. Not to mention the massive infusion of wealth into our young country from all of the commerce raiding done by this government licensed privateer force. And the Letter of Marque in the US Constitution is proof of that existence between private industry and government for ‘offensive’ operations against an enemy.  How’s that for ‘inherently governmental’? lol

     The only other critique that is missing is a combination of DoS’s and other’s numbers into a report like this. I know the DoD doesn’t want to mix with those ‘others’, but it gets kind of old for us to continue to see separate reports all the time. I say combine all of them to save a little money and time, and let’s see every last contractor be counted.  I would also like to see the deaths and injuries of all, and get that stuff on one nice (and complete) report for everyone to analyze and reference. Something to think about for all of you analysts out there who keep throwing this stuff together. –Matt

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Department of Defense Contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan: Background and Analysis 

Moshe Schwartz

Specialist in Defense Acquisition

July 2, 2010

Summary

The Department of Defense (DOD) increasingly relies upon contractors to support operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, which has resulted in a DOD workforce that has 19% more contractor personnel (207,600) than uniformed personnel (175,000). Contractors make up 54% of DOD’s workforce in Iraq and Afghanistan. The critical role contractors play in supporting such military operations and the billions of dollars spent by DOD on these services requires operational forces to effectively manage contractors during contingency operations. Lack of sufficient contract management can delay or even prevent troops from receiving needed support and can also result in wasteful spending. Some analysts believethat poor contract management has also played a role in abuses and crimes committed by certain contractors against local nationals, which may have undermined U.S. counterinsurgency efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan.

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Monday, June 28, 2010

Strategy: Secrets From Inside The Obama War Room

Filed under: Afghanistan,Strategy — Tags: , , , , , , , — Matt @ 2:01 PM

     I know this is a little old, but it is totally relevant to today’s discussion about the future of Afghanistan.  As you read through this story, you come to understand why McChrystal or any other military leader in this war might be frustrated.  I said this before, and I will say this again.  There is not a general out there that thinks that declaring a withdrawal date is a good idea in the context of winning wars.  This administration is set on July 2011, and General Petraeus has made his promises to that administration that he could finish this in that time frame. It is a promise he will have to break in my view.

     Most of all, the Taliban love this date, and it is a countdown to their victory. The enemy will certainly pour it on as this date gets closer, and I just don’t see how this is helpful for any kind of plans with Afghanistan. Or the Taliban will just sit and wait, and then pour it on as soon as we leave. It just makes no strategic sense.

     Petraeus has a lot of work to do in turning around the war. There is alleviating the fears that Karzai has with this date, there is letting our troops fight the way they see fit and allowing them to win battles, there is dealing with Pakistan and ensuring they continue their fight, there is the training of the ANA and police so they can take control of the country, and all of this is dependent on changing that stupid date for withdrawal. Or Petraeus can keep his promise of defeat and go down with the ship. Only time will tell, and the clock is ticking. –Matt

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Secrets From Inside the Obama War Room

by Jonathan Alter

May 15, 2010

The first of 10 “AFPAK” meetings came on Sept. 13, when the president gathered 16 advisers in the Situation Room in the basement of the White House. This was to be the most methodical national-security decision in a generation. Deputy national-security adviser Tom Donilon had commissioned research that backed up an astonishing historical truth: neither the Vietnam War nor the Iraq War featured any key meetings where all the issues and assumptions were discussed by policymakers. In both cases the United States was sucked into war inch by inch.

The Obama administration was determined to change that. “For the past eight years, whatever the military asked for, they got,” Obama explained later. “My job was to slow things down.” The president had something precious in modern crisis management: time. “I had to put up with the ‘dithering’ arguments from Dick Cheney or others,” Obama said. “But as long as I wasn’t shaken by the political chatter, I had the time to work through all these issues and ask a bunch of tough questions and force people to sharpen their pencils until we arrived at the best possible solution.”

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