Feral Jundi

Sunday, April 18, 2010

Medical: An Extension Of Tactical Trauma Counseling Equals Training, By Angela Benedict

   Some more food for thought for those out there that are interested in mental resiliency training.  Angela has guest authored before and it is always a treat to hear what she has to say.  Feel free to make a comment here, or contact Angela direct at her Military Healing Center website.

   One thing that I keep thinking about with her articles is that it would be interesting to get her in the same room as Dave Grossman and have them chat about the subject of mental resiliency.  His website called Killology, as well as his books, are a fascinating study on the mind of warriors.-Matt

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An Extension of Tactical Trauma Counseling = Training

By Angela Benedict

Tactical Trauma Counseling is a recent ideological development that suggests military and law enforcement personnel require specialized counseling due to their specialized professions. Fortunately, the current reality is beginning to recognize that TTC is a requirement for operational effectiveness.  Beyond counseling, efforts are being made to ensure that Protector Professionals are getting a much more comprehensive training regime.  It is clear that knowing how to use a gun is not sufficient to surviving volatile situations.  Mental and emotional preparedness training is critical to wellbeing and long term career potential.

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Sunday, April 4, 2010

Afghanistan: Afghan Marksmanship Is A Fable, Bring Back The Jezailchis

     One day, after a few hours of fighting in which the Taliban had not yet hit any Marines, a corporal from Second Platoon stood upright, exposing himself above the waist and looking over a wall as bullets flew high overhead. He didn’t flinch. “What’s everybody ducking for?” he said. He cupped his hand to his mouth and shouted an expletive-laden taunt at the Taliban gunmen shooting from concealment on the opposite side of a field. The editors would never allow the corporal’s words to be printed here. But they amounted to this: You guys can’t shoot.

*****

    Thanks to Doug for bringing this to my attention. Man, did the Italian Carabinieri just show up the DynCorp police instructors or what? lol Training folks requires patience and a profound understanding of the fundamentals.  Good on the Italians for correcting the issue.  But it also highlights the importance of standardizing this contract, so you don’t have companies or even the military doing whatever they want.

    I cut that one little piece of reportage out of this first article posted below, just to get the ball rolling for this post.  Marksmanship is something contractors are teaching to Afghans, Iraqis, Ugandans, Nepalese, you name it, and there are so many issues that come up when trying to teach this life saving and essential skill to the troops.  For this post, I will highlight the Afghan issues and present the six points that Mr. Chiver’s mentioned in his excellent reportage on this topic. I am not saying these apply to all forces being trained, but for Afghanistan, this is what has been identified.  So with that said, let’s get started.

   In a prior post, I mentioned the concept of the Jezailchis Scouts (JS).  Or basically create a scout/sniper force in Afghanistan that would pride itself as being the premier Afghan tracking and killing/capture force. Something along the lines as the Selous Scouts.  A force that all Afghans would look up to and highly respect.  This force would be the go to guys for hunting humans up in the mountains, and they would have great utility (pseudo operations, sniper operations, scouting, snatch and grab, etc.).  Marksmanship and the ability to track and survive on their own, would be the hallmarks of this crew.  It would also draw from that fabled history of the Afghan being a good marksman, hence the Jezailchi reference in the name of the group.

   But as the reader will find out, Afghans on both sides of the conflict, suck at marksmanship.  Mr. Chivers boiled it down to the six areas that are contributing factors to poor marksmanship on the side of the Taliban (but could easily apply to Afghan Army or Police forces)

   Here they are.

   1. Limited knowledge of marksmanship fundamentals.

   2. A frequent reliance on automatic fire from assault rifles.

   3. The poor condition of many of those rifles.

   4. Old and mismatched ammunition that is also in poor condition.

   5. Widespread eye problems and uncorrected vision.

  6. Difficulties faced by a scattered force in organizing quality training.

   The second Chiver’s article also mentioned what happens when a enemy force can’t shoot–they adapt.  In this case, AK 47’s were used to cause reactions in patrols.  Meaning, if an ambushing force fires the weapons and the patrol of Marines runs to the closest protection that happens to be pre-rigged with IED’s, then that ambushing force could command detonate and kill the Marines that way.  So the enemy knows it sucks when it comes to shooting, so they just use the weapon as a catalyst to get our forces into traps or to delay our forces.  Nothing new, and this is a tactic used over and over again in the history of warfare.

   But going back to the marksmanship thing, I personally think that this is a weakness that would should be exploiting.  We exploit it by creating some good ol fashion kick ass Afghan shooters, coupled with Coalition snipers and marksmanship mentors. We also have the coalition bring in weapon systems that can reach out and touch someone, and has optics. I continue to read reports that this last part is happening, and that is good.  We should be picking these guys off from across the canyons or at distances that the Taliban cannot engage at.

   That brings up the other point of the article.  The two weapons systems that the Taliban are able to actually hit people with, are the PKMs and sniper rifles (with trained snipers using them).  The PKMs makes sense, because a machine gunner can adjust fire easily, and concentrate fire better and at distance.  It is the only weapon system that suits the capabilities and limitations of the kind of fighters using it. (please refer to the six points up top)

   Now for the Afghan Army and Police, there are a few things we could do to bring them up to speed quickly.  Giving them eyeglasses would be a start. lol  Also, some accountability must be shown for the quality and functionality of all weapons and ammo issued.

   Some ideas off the top of my head would be to modify the AK or the issued M-16 to only shoot semi-auto.  It would force these guys to shoot one shot at a time, as opposed to the spray and pray technique.  The other thing that could be done, is to put reflex sites on these weapons–stuff that is AK tough and does not require batteries. That way, you have a weapon that is Fisher Price simple for the Afghans to use, and they won’t be able to use it like a fire hose. If the weapon is better suited to the user, then the other aspect of teaching marksmanship fundamentals will go a lot easier. There should also be an effort to cull the best of the best from these groups, and get them in marksmanship focused group like the JS or whatever special forces that has been created.

   Finally, marksmanship could be promoted in Afghan society once again.  Competitions could be held, cash or goats could be issued as prizes, and competent Afghan shooters could be identified and approached for recruitment into the JS or Army. Hunters could be rewarded for meat collected, or hide or whatever, and they could be approached as well.  Hunters throughout the world are all the same, and I am sure there are plenty in Afghanistan who are very good at it and enjoy the sport.  You just have to develop an outlet to attract these guys.  Even in the Army and Police, I am sure there are those who could really shine with marksmanship if they had an outlet for such a thing. Especially if marksmanship billets paid more–you would definitely increase the interest in such a thing. Stuff to think about, and thanks to Mr. Chivers for some excellent information on the matter. –Matt

Edit: 04/11/2020 Here is the next article Mr. Chivers wrote about Afghan Army and Police marksmanship. Awesome.

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Jezail

The Gang That Couldn’t Shoot Straight

Six billion dollars later, the Afghan National Police can’t begin to do their jobs right—never mind relieve American forces.

By T. Christian Miller, Mark Hosenball, and Ron Moreau

Mar 29, 2010

(Only a portion of the article is posted, and follow the link to read the entire thing)

At Kabul’s police training center, a team of 35 Italian carabinieri recently arrived to supplement DynCorp’s efforts. Before the Italians showed up at the end of January for a one-year tour, the recruits were posting miserable scores on the firing range. But the Italians soon discovered that poor marksmanship wasn’t the only reason: the sights of the AK-47 and M-16 rifles the recruits were using were badly out of line. “We zeroed all their weapons,” says Lt. Rolando Tommasini. “It’s a very important thing, but no one had done this in the past. I don’t know why.”

The Italians also had a different way of teaching the recruits to shoot. DynCorp’s instructors started their firearms training with 20-round clips at 50 meters; the recruits couldn’t be sure at first if they were even hitting the target. Instead the carabinieri started them off with just three bullets each and a target only seven meters away. The recruits would shoot, check the target, and be issued three more rounds. When they began gaining confidence, the distance was gradually increased to 15, then 30, and then 50 meters. On a recent day on the firing range only one of 73 recruits failed the shooting test. The Italians say that’s a huge improvement…..

Story here.

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Afghan Marksmen — Forget the Fables

By C.J. CHIVERS

March 26, 2010

The recent Marine operations in and near Marja brought into sharp relief a fact that contradicts much of what people think they know about the Afghan war. It is this: Forget the fables. The current ranks of Afghan fighters are crowded with poor marksmen.

This simple statement is at odds with an oft-repeated legend of modern conflict, in which Afghan men are described, in clichés and accounts from yesteryear, as natural gunmen and accomplished shots. Everyone who has even faintly followed the history of war in Central Asia has heard the tales of Afghan men whose familiarity with firearms is such a part of their life experience that they can pick up most any weapon and immediately put it to effective work. The most exaggerated accounts are cartoonish, including tales of Afghan riflemen whose bullets can strike a lone sapling (I’ve even heard “blade of grass”) a hilltop away.Without getting into an argument with the ghost of Rudyard Kipling, who was one of the early voices popularizing the wonders of Afghan riflery, an update is in order. This is because the sum of these descriptions does not match what is commonly observed in firefights today. These days, the opposite is more often the case. Poor marksmanship, even abysmally poor marksmanship, is a consistent trait among Afghan men. The description applies to Taliban and Afghan government units alike.

Over the years that Tyler Hicks and I have worked in Afghanistan’s remote and hostile corners, we have been alongside Afghan, American and European infantrymen in many firefights and ambushes. These fights have involved a wide set of tactical circumstances, ranges, elevations, and light and weather conditions. Some skirmishes were brief and simple. Others were long and complex, involving as many as a few hundred fighters on both sides. One result has been consistent. We have almost always observed that a large proportion of Afghan fire, both incoming and outgoing, is undisciplined and errant, often wildly so. Afghans, like most anyone else with a modicum of exposure to infantry weapons, might be able to figure out how to make any firearm fire. But hitting what they are aiming at, assuming they are aiming at all? That’s another matter.

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Friday, March 26, 2010

Training: EDCD And Mental Resiliency Training For High Stress Operations

   This is a project that Angela and company have been working on, and I wanted to get the word out about it.  I like the concept and think that this is the kind of stuff that will allow anyone in this field, or any high risk field, to continue working and effectively dealing with mental trauma when it happens.

    EDCD gives you the tools necessary to deal with the tough stuff.  Things like deploying to disaster zones like Haiti where thousands of people have been killed, surviving IED’s and ambushes in wars like Iraq or Afghanistan, or having co-workers killed or wounded in these war zones. The idea of having the tools necessary to work through these traumatic events, or even help others who have gone through these traumatic events, is something that should be in everyone’s mental kit, and there just isn’t a lot out there that goes over this stuff. The modern militaries of the west have attempted to provide these tools of coping to the troops, but for private industry, there isn’t anything.  And we have talked about that here before and Angela has wrote some great stuff about the subject.

   Also, if you look at cases like Fitzsimmons, or with some of the suicides this industry has experienced, resiliency training might be something the companies could look at.  At least have something set up to direct contractors too if you have some contracts that put people in high stress positions.  The military is constantly trying to reach out to their soldiers in order to put a stop to any mental suffering out there.  Wars and disasters can mess up a brain pretty good sometimes, and civilian contractors are experiencing some of the same war time traumas as soldiers.  Yet there is nothing being done to deal with that fact.

   Now for a disclosure. I have never been through this course and I have not read any feedback about it. So I cannot give it the thumbs up or down.  But what I would like to do is promote it and get the readership to think about this stuff.  If you have gone through the course, I would love to hear your thoughts on the matter in the comments section.  I am sure Angela will pop up too if anyone has any questions.  –Matt

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Dear Colleague,

Resiliency has become a buzz word for all of us working within security and safety professions.

TRAINING personnel to adapt and prepare for high stress operations is a priority within all sectors.

EDCD TRAINING will help your teams to achieve higher levels of operational effectiveness.  What is EDCD?

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Tuesday, March 9, 2010

Training: Maritime Academy To Offer Field Training On The Use Of Small Arms

   This is cool, and thanks to David for sending me this link.  Now what would really be cool, is to use your GI Bill for this training.  Also, if you follow the link to the academy, there are other interesting courses and licenses that you can get that relate to maritime security and boat work.

   The other significance in this, is that CMADEL, along with other maritime academies, are now starting to focus on this stuff.  I think it is a sign of the times, and this focus on teaching crews to use something a little more substantial than water cannons, starts with teaching weapons handling during the education process. Although like the Captain said in the earlier article I posted, if vetting is an issue on these boats, then you will still need professionals that you can trust to do this work.  But some armed crew members on a boat, is better than no armed crew members on a boat, and this is a good step in the right direction. If any of the readers have other academy links to training similar to this, feel free to post away in the comments section. Especially if you have any educational stuff that can be paid for by the GI Bill. –Matt

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Maritime Academy to offer field training on use of small arms

Times-Herald staff report

03/08/2010

California Maritime Academy’s Department of Extended Learning is a three-day practical field training course on appropriate use of small arms on government-chartered and commercial vessels worldwide.

The certified small arms training course will be held March 22-24 and April 13-15 on the Vallejo campus, with range instruction in Richmond.

The new course is focused on the specialized challenges of deploying small arms in the maritime environment, Dean of Extended Learning James Burns said.

Class participants must either have a Transport Workers Identification Card (TWIC), a current U.S. Coast Guard MMD/License or be a certified peace officer, and must have no felony convictions.

The $1,500 cost includes use of weapons, targets and training aids. Another $300 is needed to cover ammunition. Upon completion, participants receive a certification form DD 2760 and 2.4 continuing education credits from the University.

For more information visit www.maritime-education.com or call (707) 654-1157.

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Wednesday, February 17, 2010

Industry Talk: DynCorp International Awarded Mentoring And Training Contract In Afghanistan

   Boy, that is 275 more jobs for contractors out there, not to mention the support crew required to run the thing, and that is great news. It will not be great news, if the service given sucks.  So if anyone at DC headquarters is reading this, please do not cut corners on implementing this contract, and definitely take care of your people.  The Afghani MoD deserves better, the US taxpayer deserves a good value for their dollar, and your IC’s definitely deserve all the support and assistance that you can give them. You have a real opportunity with each and every contract you win, to promote all that is good with your company by delivering a quality service or product.

   Every time a company wins a contract in this war, I continue to think back about what Eeben Barlow mentioned with his company. DynCorp should be thankful for every contract it wins, and certainly show it’s gratitude by delivering on it’s promises and giving a quality service. Here is the quote from Eeben’s blog:

Question- Why was EO (Executive Outcomes) so successful and what makes EO so different from today’s PMCs? 

Eeben Barlow- My answers were that EO had to earn its contracts as it did not have any government-backing from SA – as you know today’s PMCs are mainly government-backed. Secondly, EO was contracted to win wars in as short a period as possible at the least cost.

    Most of all, you guys should be applying Kaizen to all aspects of your operations, and never just assume that everything is going peachy.  Get some shared reality Mr. Ballhaus, and see for yourself what is going on out there.  I would also suggest getting some ‘mystery employee’ action going on, so you can further explore the efficiencies and inefficiencies of your company, and correct what you can. Or you can actually reach out to your contractors, and listen to what they have to say.  People will support, what they help to create, and the company needs to make that first step in order to get that feedback.  Just some ideas. –Matt

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DynCorp International Awarded Mentoring and Training Contract in Afghanistan

February 17, 2010

FALLS CHURCH, Va.–The U.S. Army Research, Development and Engineering Command (RDECOM) has awarded DynCorp International (NYSE:DCP) a $232.4 million cost-plus-fixed fee contract to assist the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) and NATO Training Mission (NTM) by providing mentors and trainers to develop the Afghanistan Ministry of Defense (MOD.) This new contract has a 2-year base period valued at $157.8 million, including a 60-day Phase-In period to full performance. The total potential contract value is $232.4 million if the one year option period is exercised.

“We are honored to have this opportunity to contribute to the security transition in Afghanistan”

Under this Afghanistan Ministry of Defense Program Support contract, DynCorp International will provide dedicated in-depth mentoring, training, subject matter expertise, and programmatic support to CSTC-A staff and the Afghanistan MOD. The program supports development of organizational capacity and capability to assist Afghanistan MOD and Afghan National Army (ANA) forces in assuming full responsibility for their own security needs. DynCorp International will provide an estimated 275 qualified personnel to support the CSTC-A staff across numerous functional areas.

“We are honored to have this opportunity to contribute to the security transition in Afghanistan,” said DynCorp International President and CEO William L. Ballhaus. “This new contract builds on our extensive in-country experience training and advising the Afghan National Police, as we support the U.S. government’s efforts to bring security and stability to Afghanistan.”

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