Feral Jundi

There have been several measures of success. First, in 2010 alone, the Triton-trained Somaliland Coastguard captured, prosecuted, and jailed more than 120 pirates. Officials in Somaliland have said that pirates rarely cross into their waters from renowned pirate havens in the region due to the Coastguard’s reputation for intercepting them. Second, as a result of these measures, the World Food Program considers Berbera a safe port for the delivery and distribution of food aid destined for the region. Finally, the Coastguard has also intercepted vessels intending to conduct IUU fishing.

There are two great articles below and be sure to check them out. The first one is written by the CEO of Triton International describing their training program for the Somaliland Coastguard and the second article is more recent and describes the cost effectiveness of the program.

The thing to emphasize here is that this company is providing a much needed service, and anything that can professionalize the navies and coastguards in Somalia to do this work will only help in the overall strategy of reducing piracy.

On the other hand, the danger of professionalizing these forces is that they leave the coastguard and go on to be pirates themselves. Still, something must be done, and as long as the Somaliland paymasters keep paying the troops and keeping them happy, they will stick around.

As to the company Triton and how much business they are getting, I am not sure. Maybe some folks from the company would like to come up and talk a little about how they are doing? The below information was about as much as I could find and bravo to them for a job well done training the Somaliland Coastguard. Check it out. –Matt

Thanks to Nic for providing the photo.

Skulls and Crossroads
November 18, 2010
by Simon Jones
As the skiff approached the bulker, and moved down the flank of the vessel, the crew came to the railings and watched the men, their presence a familiar sight in the Gulf of Aden yet, unlike other skiffs the crew had seen on their regular transits through these waters, and to the crews relief and frequent reassurance, these skiffs were not an attack from pirates, rather the bulkers security escort into the port of Berbera by the Somaliland coastguard, the maritime police force from the breakaway republic in the north west corner of Somalia.
Different Recent History
Somaliland has always maintained its difference and distance from the rest of Somalia, from the colonial period of the British protectorate, brief independence in 1960 and when the attempt to unite with the rest of Somalia failed; during the bloody and destructive civil war, resulting in their withdrawal and the re-establishing of their independence in 1991.
Declaring themselves the independent Republic of Somaliland; a status that despite the total lack of international or UN recognition, has resulted in Somaliland’s 19 years of self governance, independent democratically elected leaders, their own constitution, currency and passport system. In a country that has received little or no International aid or relief support, the ability to protect your borders is essential; when you have 860 Kms of Gulf of Aden coastline, containing ruthless pirates from the neighbouring country – it’s critical.
The Coast Guard
The Somaliland coastguard was established in the first few years of the new millennium from the maritime wing of the Somaliland police service following a rise in smuggling, trafficking and piracy. Its command structure was built on Somaliland veterans of the Somali Navy. Based in the economically strategic port town of Berbera, with their coastline split into three sectors and a total of 14 Coast Guard stations located along the length of the coastline, which are manned by just under 400 Coast Guard personnel.

They are currently the only functioning and active coastguard in Somalia, despite attempts by the neighbouring state of Puntland to raise their own much needed service and the collective state governments (Somaliland, Puntland, Galmudug) and the Transitional Federal Government in Mogadishu continuing to request funding from the International Community.
Indeed, the requirement for effective measures to counter the piracy in Somalia has put Somaliland and the other Somali States at somewhat of a crossroads; having met the International Community’s requirement for joint cooperation and support for the recent UNPOS Kampala Process the progress for their development has now started to gain momentum and the relevant funding to enable the development of programmes relating to Judicial, Prisons and other linked programmes has now started. is, of course, is excellent news for Somaliland as indeed it is for the other Somali States, and places the Somaliland Coastguard in an excellent position to work with, assist and mentor the other Somali States to a high standard of training and operational effectiveness. Their current training and operational development programme, has been designed and is being implemented by Triton International Ltd, as part of their partnership contract to Train and Operationally Mentor the coastguard, improve their capability and develop their ongoing operational commitment to anti-piracy and waterborne patrolling and response, which has resulted in more than 120 pirates being captured, prosecuted and jailed in 2010 alone. The funding for the development of Somalia’s Coastal Monitoring capability will be initially limited to Land based development, due to the concern by the International Community that any vessels provided to the Somali Coastguards (including Somaliland) could be used by Pirates for their own operations. Given the current situation with Piracy in both Puntland (Eyl) and Galmudug (Hobyo & Harardhere) this may not be an unreasonable concern, however Somaliland has no indigenous Piracy, does not have suspicions of Piracy/Government links and has a proven waterborne patrolling requirement for both Coastal Defence and the protection of the Port of Berbera.
Unique Position and Role
The unique situation with Somaliland derives from their 19 years of separation from the rest of Somalia, their previous colonial links to Britain (as opposed to the Colonial Italian influence in Somalia) and the independent development of their own economy and constitution. This has resulted in their commitment to Coastal Security and a very active Anti-Piracy policy, with the Coastguard as the practical enforcers; indeed the recent incidents of the Coastguard interdiction of Pirates as they either transit through Somaliland Territorial Waters to conduct attacks or as they are returning towards Puntland waters, has led to exchanges of fire and the denial of access to Pirates intent on using Somaliland Coastal towns in the disputed region of Saanag to hold captured Vessels, whilst negotiating ransom payment.
Port of Berbera
The Coastguard’s main Headquarters are located in Berbera, next to the Ministry of Finance & Customs building, adjacent to the Port complex and the hub of the shipping trade in Somaliland. The Port is both ISPS Code Compliant and maintains a strong working relationship with the Coastguard and their partners Triton. The Port’s primary business is Livestock import and export, with Container, wet and dry cargo and general white goods movement, for Somaliland and Ethiopia, ensuring the Port never rests.
The World Food programme has now started to deliver Aid through Berbera for Ethiopia, Somaliland, Puntland and Central Somalia. This has helped to maintain the flow of aid to the region and takes significant pressure off Djibouti, as the main point of delivery. Currently, the delivery of WFP Food Aid to Puntland has been marred by the recent kidnapping of five truck drivers of delivery convoys, by Puntland Pirates and the theft of the Aid Cargo. Negotiations with the Pirates by Local Elders and the Families have so far yielded little success in securing their release.
Capability Development
In order to maintain their capability, the Coastguard operates a number of small fast patrol boats, which have Deck Mounted Vladimirov KPV Heavy Machine Guns, which fire 14.5x114mm BZT – Armour-piercing incendiary tracer full metal jacket round with a steel core. These are used for inshore and coastal patrols and the pursuit of Pirates. The maintenance of discipline and operational training is a key component to the coastguards effectiveness and the development of a 12 week basic training course, with further specialised training modules for communications, medical, maritime law, observation & monitoring, tactical maritime operations, vessel maintenance and leadership, will ensure this continues.
The Future
Full implementation of these courses remains dependent on the availability of funding to develop the coastguard capability. Given the increasing concern of the current land based Somali terrorists (Al Shabaab; Hizbol Islam and elements of Al Qaeda) utilising the maritime domain for resupply, manning and attacks, increased impetus is required to ensure the coastguard can be trained and equipped to counter such an increasing threat, in addition to the range of piracy, smuggling and illegal activities it currently combats.
At a time where millions of dollars are spent daily on maintaining an international naval presence in the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean and the international community seek solutions for the support and engagement of legittimate Somali governance, Somaliland continues to remain isolated and unrecognised in its status or the legittimate contribution it continues to make towards the reduction of piracy and the prevention of maritime terrorism. Less than three naval vessels have visited the port of Berbera and despite frequent liaison and cooperation attempts, no Somaliland Coastguard is working aboard any naval vessel as a liaison, or linguist/interpreter. Nor are the Coastguard Law Enforcement Officers used to assistance with the arrest and communication with Pirates, the preservation of evidence, statement collation or intelligence recovery/collation.
All these requirements can be provided by a trained Somaliland Coastguard. The partnership with Triton has generated a definitive Training Development and Operational Mentoring programme, which, if supported, can not only improve the coastguard, but is strategically placed to significantly contribute towards the instigation of a Somali-wide Coastal Monitoring Force that could be a key asset in the reduction and possibly, removal of Piracy from the waters around Somalia.
Article by Simon Jones, C.E.O. of  Triton International
Story here.
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An Industry-Based Approach to Maritime Security in West Africa
Posted on 13/01/2012
by N.R. Jenzen-Jones
This piece was written in October 2011. It first appeared in the Journal of International Peace Operations (JIPO) volume 7, number 4. You can find it here.
The sharp rise in piracy in West Africa, particularly in the Gulf of Guinea, has featured prominently in recent news. Piracy as a whole is costing global trade an estimated $12 billion (USD) a year, with the primary target being the oil industry – a key sector of the West African economy – which threatens the strategic interests of the United States, EU, and China.
There are other issues, along with piracy, that are prevalent in the Gulf of Guinea. Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated (IUU) fishing in the waters of West Africa has been referred to as the ‘worst in the world’, with London-based MRAG Limited estimating illegal catches to be 40% higher than reported legal catches. The smuggling of people, arms, and narcotics is also a significant issue in the West African maritime domain. On top of these issues, a plethora of local and transnational criminal and terrorist organisations are connected either directly or tangentially to piracy in West Africa. Chief amongst them are Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), Hamas, Hezbollah, Boko Haram, and the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND).
The Atlantic Council’s November 2010 report on ‘Security and Stability in the West African Maritime Domain’ highlights the role maritime security issues play in determining the region’s overall level of stability; “Central to West Africa’s high levels of insecurity and instability is the criminal exploitation of its expansive, largely ungoverned maritime domain.” In particular, the security of the West African maritime domain is key in ensuring:
•    The unimpeded flow of oil from the Gulf of Guinea and the security of energy related infrastructure and assets;
•    The safe and efficient flow of vessels, cargo, and people bound to or from foreign ports;
•    The absence of a safehaven for transnational terrorist and criminal organisations;
•    Political development, sustainable economic growth, and enduring stability in the region as a deterrent to state failure, humanitarian crisis, human rights abuses, and violent extremism.
The convergence of so many security threats within West Africa, and particularly in the maritime realm, requires a multi-faceted, long-term approach. To counter these threats, capacity building operations conducted by private security companies could provide a robust, enduring solution. Such operations would complement, rather than compete with, existing strategies implemented by local governments, foreign governments, and private industry.
Piracy in West Africa has been on the rise since mid-2009, and has spiked sharply over the course of this year. The UN Security Council has recently voiced its concern over the increase, noting an intention to deploy a United Nations assessment team to the region to “examine the situation and explore possible options for United Nations support”. Some analysts have pointed to the widely-publicised success of Somali pirates, and suggested this has directly influenced pirates in the Gulf of Guinea. However, reports have indicated that attacks in West African waters have also tended to be more violent than those off the Horn of Africa, and that many robberies likely go unreported due to the high frequency of illegal oil bunkering in the Niger Delta. The recent increase in frequency and severity of attacks has prompted the Lloyd’s Market Association Joint War Committee to raise the threat level of Nigeria, Benin, and neighbouring waters to the same category as the waters off the Horn of Africa.
On the other side of the continent, naval forces from around the globe have been deployed to the Gulf of Aden / Horn of Africa in order to deter pirates, and protect international shipping from attacks. Whilst there have been admirable results from these programs, there are also some notable shortcomings. With the number of merchant ships requiring protection vastly outstripping the assets deployed in theatre, there exists a simple problem – these warships cannot be everywhere they are required at once. Against an asymmetric threat such as piracy, deploying warships in large enough numbers to counter all pirate vessels is simply not cost effective. For example, the cost of the US counter-piracy operation, represented predominantly by the presence of US Navy assets in Combined Task Force 151 and in NATO’s Operation Ocean Shield, is approximately $64 million per year. Then there are the expenses of other NATO countries, the EU, China, India, and other nations involved to consider. Such expenditure seems excessive for the results achieved.
The role that private security companies can play in protecting ships at sea has been well-documented, and the very high success rate of such is widely known. The value of well-trained, appropriately employed armed contractors cannot be understated; such guard forces are now provided by a number of companies, and can provide a significant deterrent and defence capability to ships’ Masters. Moreover, such an embarked guard force can provide a high level of protection, available at all times, for a reasonable economic outlay. Armed guards do occasionally run into trouble, however. More importantly, as has been widely noted, piracy is a problem that starts ashore.
One model that has shown a promising cost-benefit ratio is capacity building operations. An example of such is Triton International Ltd’s training of the Somaliland Coastguard. Since 2009, Triton has been involved with developing and implementing both training and operations plans for the Coastguard, providing the region of 3.5 million people with a broad spectrum maritime capability, unique within Somalia. To this end, Triton developed a 12-week basic training course for the Coastguard, as well as specialised modules on tactical maritime operations, maritime law, and vessel maintenance. Based out of the ISPS Code-compliant port of Berbera, the Somaliland Coastguard has delivered significant security progress with limited funding and materiel. The Coastguard operates small, fast patrol boats equipped with deck-mounted 14.5mm KPV heavy machine guns.
There have been several measures of success. First, in 2010 alone, the Triton-trained Somaliland Coastguard captured, prosecuted, and jailed more than 120 pirates. Officials in Somaliland have said that pirates rarely cross into their waters from renowned pirate havens in the region due to the Coastguard’s reputation for intercepting them. Second, as a result of these measures, the World Food Program considers Berbera a safe port for the delivery and distribution of food aid destined for the region. Finally, the Coastguard has also intercepted vessels intending to conduct IUU fishing.
The Triton model is cost-effective and efficient, serving as a good example of an “expandable platform”. That is, the Somaliland Coastguard model, if extrapolated to assist some of the smaller, under-patrolled nations in the Gulf of Guinea, could provide these states with the capability to begin countering maritime threats in the region. Many of these smaller nations in need of maritime security assistance have short coastlines, and would require only minimal investment to establish a relatively effective patrol force. For example, Togo’s coastline is a mere 56km long, Benin’s 121km, and Liberia’s 579km. By comparison, Somaliland has a 740km coastline.  Capacity building programs can also gain access to areas – namely the littoral and coastal zones – where foreign defence assets may not otherwise be welcome. By partnering with the host nations or communities in areas of concern, the international community is able to increase its awareness of the threats at hand, and to determine how best to respond to these. Funding sources for such a program could be diverse, ranging from local governments or foreign governments, to shipping companies, international bodies, NGOs, or cultural diasporas.
Private industry is in a unique position to be able to deliver such programs at a reasonable cost, and without placing further demand on the already-strained naval assets of many nations with strategic interests in West Africa, particularly the US. Such capacity building models have distinct national security benefits for foreign powers; the deployment of navel assets required to keep vessels and key infrastructure secure is expensive and inefficient in many scenarios. Capacity building models allow for the development of increased maritime security capabilities that are essential to protecting not only local, but foreign interests. This is especially true when you look at the energy security threats presented by pirates as well as local and transnational criminal and terrorist groups in the Gulf of Guinea.
Capacity building programs represent a very real, scalable approach to countering the numerous maritime threats present in the Gulf of Guinea. Challenges certainly exist, but similar challenges in other regions have been mitigated cost-effectively through an industry-based approach. Such programs are eminently compatible with existing strategies of foreign government-led capacity building, such as the United States’ Africa Partnership Station (APS) program, with local initiatives to bolster maritime security forces, and with the existing private sector practice of deploying armed guards on merchant vessels. With a broad-spectrum approach to the problem, such complementary strategies provide the region with interconnected layers of security in order to deal with maritime threats as comprehensively as possible, and in a cost-effective way.
Story here.