Feral Jundi

     What I wanted to do here was bring up some history about Gaddafi and his use of an Islamic Legion, and his contracts with Islamic extremist mercenaries like Abu Nidal. From his desire to cleanse North Africa of all non-Arabs to his misguided wars against his neighbors and the West–this dictator has definitely been busy.

     I think what fascinated me the most was his usage of his Legionnaires in Chad, versus France’s use of their Legion and military forces.  The Islamic Legion started off alright in it’s beginnings, but later was poorly used, had low moral and was poorly organized in subsequent years. Hence why they failed in key battles towards the end.  The low moral was also a result of forcing folks to serve in this legion, and sending them to Chad to fight against a superior enemy with a better strategy.

    Now compare this to France and it’s use of it’s military forces. The French Foreign Legion played a pretty important role, but what was probably more important of a factor in defeating this Libyan enemy in Chad was the concept of the Toyota War and air domination. (pickup trucks with Milan Anti-tank missiles mounted)

    But back to the other areas of interest with Gaddafi’s Islamic Legion.  The Janjaweed was an unfortunate outcome of this legion, and of course they are famous for their genocidal activities in the Sudan.  The leaders of this group got their start in the Legion.

    The other bit of history that needs to be brought up is Gaddafi’s relationship with Abu Nidal, one of the world’s most infamous mercenaries and terrorist. He was contracted by Libya to do all sorts of awful things. Matter of fact, you could look at all of the attacks linked to Libya as contracts that Gaddafi issued to Islamist mercenaries, and they certainly did some damage. The 1986 Disco Tech Bombing and the 1988 Lockerbie Bombing come to mind, and no telling what else Libya and their buddy Abu were a part of.

     The Disco Tech Bombing is also why the US bombed Libya back in 1988.  But the really kick ass retaliation was when the US supplied missiles, Toyotas and equipment to the Chadian Army, and helped Chad to defeat Libya. Interesting history and certainly relevant to today’s events. –Matt

The Islamic Legion of Libya

Paramilitary forces of Libya

Abu Nidal’s Relationship with Gaddafi

History of the Janjaweed

This is just a parade of his current military forces. I could not find any photos of the Islamic Legion.

The Islamic Legion of Libya

The Islamic Legion (aka Islamic Pan-African Legion) was a Libyan-sponsored pan-Arab paramilitary force, created in 1972. The Legion was part of Muammar al-Gaddafi’s dream of creating the Great Islamic State of the Sahel.

Creation

Gaddafi, who had come to power in September 1969, was not only a Pan-Africanist, but an Arab cultural supremacist. His hostility to Chad’s government of President François Tombalbaye was at least partly inspired by Tombalbaye’s African and Christian background. It also led Gaddafi to drive the Toubou of Libya, who were considered ‘black’, off Fezzan and across the Chadian border. Gaddafi supported the Sudanese government of Gaafar Nimeiry, referring to it as an “Arab Nationalist Revolutionary Movement”, and even offered to merge the two countries at a meeting in late 1971. Gaddafi’s plans for the peaceful formation of an “Arab Union” were dashed when Nimeiry turned down his offer and negotiated the Addis Ababa Agreement ending the First Sudanese Civil War, fought with the black animist and Christian South. Gaddafi’s definition of “Arab” was broad, including the Tuareg of Mali and Niger, as well as the Zaghawa of Chad and Sudan.

In 1972, Gaddafi created the Islamic Legion as a tool to unify and Arabize the region. The priority of the Legion was first Chad, and then Sudan. In Darfur, a western province of Sudan, Gaddafi supported the creation of the Arab Gathering (Tajammu al-Arabi), which according to Gérard Prunier was “a militantly racist and pan-Arabist organization which stressed the ‘Arab’ character of the province.” The two organizations shared members and a source of support, and the distinction between the two is often ambiguous.

The Legion

This Islamic Legion was mostly composed of immigrants from poorer Sahelian countries, but also, according to a source, thousands of Pakistanis who had been recruited in 1981 with the false promise of civilian jobs once in Libya. Generally speaking, the Legion’s members were immigrants who had gone to Libya with no thought of fighting wars, and had been provided with inadequate military training and had sparse commitment. A French journalist, speaking of the Legion’s forces in Chad, observed that they were “foreigners, Arabs or Africans, mercenaries in spite of themselves, wretches who had come to Libya hoping for a civilian job, but found themselves signed up more or less by force to go and fight in an unknown desert.”

According to The Military Balance published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, the force was organized into one armored, one infantry, and one paratroop/commando brigade. It has been supplied with T-54 and T-55 tanks, armored personnel carriers, and EE-9 armored cars. The Legion was reported to have been committed during the fighting in Chad in 1980 and was praised by Qadhafi for its success there. However, it was believed that many of the troops who fled the Chadian attacks of March 1987 were members of the Legion.

Gaddafi dispatched legionnaires to Uganda, Palestine, Lebanon and Syria, but the Legion was to be mostly associated with the Libyan-Chadian War, where already in 1980 7,000 legionnaires participated to the second battle of N’Djamena, where its fighting record was most noted for its ineptitude. To this force Benin’s Marxist regime is said to have provided legionnaires during the 1983 offensive in Chad. At the beginning of the 1987 Libyan offensive into Chad, it maintained a force of 2,000 in Darfur. The nearly continuous cross-border raids that resulted greatly contributed to a separate ethnic conflict within Darfur that killed about 9,000 people between 1985 and 1988.

The Legion was disbanded by Gaddafi following its defeats in Chad in 1987 and the Libyan retreat from that country. But its consequences in this region can still be felt. Some of the Janjaweed leaders were among those said to have been trained in Libya, as many Darfuri followers of the Umma Party were forced in exile in the 1970s and 1980s.

The Legion was also to leave a strong impact on the Tuaregs living in Mali and Niger. A series of severe droughts had brought many young Tuaregs to migrate to Libya, where a number of them were recruited in the Legion, receiving an indoctrination that told them to reject the hereditary chiefs and to fight the governments that excluded the Tuaregs from power. After the disbandment of the Legion, these men were to return to their countries and to play an important role in the Tuareg rebellions that erupted in the two countries in 1989–90.

Afterwards

In an effort to realize Qadhafi’s vision of a united Arab military force, plans for the creation of an Arab legion have been announced from time to time. The goal, according to the Libyan press, would be to assemble an army of 1 million men and women fighters to prepare for the great Arab battle–“the battle of liberating Palestine, of toppling the reactionary regimes, of annihilating the borders, gates, and barriers between the countries of the Arab homeland, and of creating the single Arab Jamahiriya from the ocean to the gulf.” In March 1985, it was announced that the National Command of the Revolutionary Forces Command in the Arab Nation had been formed with Qadhafi at its head. A number of smaller radical Arab groups from Lebanon, Tunisia, Sudan, Iraq, the Persian Gulf states, and Jordan were represented at the inaugural meeting. Syrian Baath Party and radical Palestinian factions were also present. Each of these movements was expected to earmark 10 percent of its forces for service under the new command. As of April 1987, there was no information confirming the existence of such a militia.

Link to Wikipedia here.

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Paramilitary forces of Libya

Pan-African Legion

In about 1980, Muammar Gaddafi introduced the Islamic Pan-African Legion, a body of mercenaries recruited primarily among dissidents from Sudan, Egypt, Tunisia, Mali, and Chad. West African states with Muslim populations have also been the source of some personnel. Believed to consist of about 7,000 individuals, the force has received training from experienced Palestinian and Syrian instructors. Some of those recruited to the legion were said to have been forcibly impressed from among nationals of neighboring countries who migrated to Libya in search of work.

According to the Military Balance published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, the force was organized into one armored, one infantry, and one paratroop/commando brigade. It has been supplied with T-54 and T-55 tanks, armored personnel carriers, and EE-9 armored cars. The Islamic Pan-African Legion was reported to have been committed during the fighting in Chad in 1980 and was praised by Gaddafi for its success there. However, it was believed that many of the troops who fled the Chadian attacks of March 1987 were members of the Legion.

Islamic Arab Legion

In an effort to realize Gaddafi’s vision of a united Arab military force, plans for the creation of an Islamic Arab Legion have been announced from time to time. The goal, according to the Libyan press, would be to assemble an army of one million men and women fighters to prepare for the great Arab battle–“the battle of liberating Palestine, of toppling the reactionary regimes, of annihilating the borders, gates, and barriers between the countries of the Arab homeland, and of creating the single Arab Jamahiriya from the ocean to the gulf.” In March 1985, it was announced that the National Command of the Revolutionary Forces Command in the Arab Nation had been formed with Qadhafi at its head. A number of smaller radical Arab groups from Lebanon, Tunisia, Sudan, Iraq, the Persian Gulf states, and Jordan were represented at the inaugural meeting. Syrian Baath Party and radical Palestinian factions were also present. Each of these movements was expected to earmark 10 percent of its forces for service under the new command. As of April 1987, there was no information confirming the existence of such a militia.

People’s Militia

The mission of the 45,000 People’s Militia was territorial defense, and it was to function under the leadership of local military commanders. Qadhafi contended that it was the People’s Militia that met the Egyptian incursions during the border clash of 1977, although the Egyptians insisted that their successful raids had been contested by regular army units. The militia forces are not known to have faced any other test that would permit an appraisal of their performance in home defense or as auxiliaries to the regular army. There was some evidence that local commanders had not responded energetically to their responsibility for training and supervising militia units. Militia units reportedly were generously equipped with arms, transport, and uniforms. In November 1985, it was announced that the first contingent of “armed people” trained as paratroopers had made a demonstration drop.

Link to wikipedia here.

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Abu Nidal’s Relationship with Gaddafi

Libya’s Muammar al-Gaddafi shared with Abu Nidal a “dangerous combination of an inferiority complex mixed with the belief that he was a man of great destiny”, according to The Sunday Times.

Abu Nidal had started his move from Syria to Libya in the summer of 1986. He was persona non grata in Syria as a result of his operations, and particularly his involvement in the Hindawi affair, which had brought embarrassment and danger to the Syrian government. He would also repeatedly take credit for operations he had nothing to do with, adding to Syria’s unease. Seale writes that he claimed responsibility for the Provisional IRA’s attempted assassination of Margaret Thatcher in the Brighton hotel bombing in October 1984. He did the same in March 1986 when the PFLP assassinated Zafir al-Masri, the mayor of Nablus. When the Space Shuttle Challenger exploded in 1986, he published a congratulatory note in his magazine and ordered sweets to be distributed to the ANO membership, leading new recruits to suppose he had had a hand in it.

His move to Libya was completed by March 1987. Settling in Tripoli, Abu Nidal and Libya’s leader, Muammar al-Gaddafi, allegedly became great friends, Gaddafi sharing what The Sunday Times called “Abu Nidal’s dangerous combination of an inferiority complex mixed with the belief that he was a man of great destiny”. It was a relationship that Gaddafi and Abu Nidal both made good use of. Abu Nidal had a steady sponsor, while Gaddafi had a mercenary in place for any operations Libyan intelligence could not carry out directly.

Seale reports that Libya brought out the worst in Abu Nidal. Whereas before he had been dictatorial, in Libya, he became a tyrant. He would not allow members to socialize with each other; all meetings between members had to be reported to him, the prohibition applying to even the most senior members. An unreported meeting could mean death. He ordered all passports to be handed over to him. No one was allowed to travel without his permission. Ordinary members were not allowed to have a telephone; the leadership were allowed to make local calls only. Anyone traveling overseas had to stay away from duty-free stores. Even the purchase of a bar of chocolate at an airport could lead to trouble. Seale writes that the pettiness was Abu Nidal’s way of consolidating his power through humiliation. His members did not know where he lived, knew nothing about his daily life. If he wanted to entertain a guest, he would commandeer the home of another member, whose wife was expected to cook and serve the meal at short notice.

It was while Abu Nidal was living in Libya that, according to Abu Bakr, Abdullah Senussi told Abu Nidal to supply a bomb. Libyan intelligence would arrange for it to be placed on a flight, as yet more retaliation for the American raids in 1986. Abu Bakr told Al Hayatt that the flight that was chosen was Pan Am Flight 103, which exploded over Lockerbie, Scotland, on December 21, 1988, an attack for which a former head of security for Libyan Arab Airlines was later convicted. Abu Nidal himself said of Lockerbie, “We do have some involvement in this matter, but if anyone so much as mentions it, I will kill him with my own hands!” Seale writes that this was nonsense. One of Abu Nidal’s associates told him, “If an American soldier tripped in some corner of the globe, Abu Nidal would instantly claim it as his own work.”

Link to wikipedia here.

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History of the Janjaweed

The Janjaweed are armed partisans drawn from Arab tribes that became notorious for massacre, rape, forced displacement and torture in 1990 and from 2001-2005. The Janjaweed first appeared in 1988 after Chadian President Hissène Habré, backed by France and the United States, defeated the Libyan army, thereby ending Col. Muammar al-Gaddafi’s territorial designs on Chad. Libya’s Chadian protégé, Acheickh Ibn Omer Saeed, retreated with his partisan forces to Darfur, where they were hosted by Sheikh Musa Hilal, the newly-elevated chief of the Mahamid Rizeigat Arab tribes of north Darfur. Hilal’s tribesmen had earlier smuggled Libyan weapons to Ibn Omer’s forces. A French-Chadian incursion destroyed Ibn Omer’s camp, but his weapons remained with his Mahamid hosts.

Throughout the 1990s, the Janjaweed were Arab partisans, tolerated by the Sudan Government, who pursued local agendas of controlling land. The majority of Darfur’s Arabs, the Baggara confederation, began their presence in the war over grazing territory, and remain involved. In 1999-2000, faced with threats of insurgencies in Western and Northern Darfur, Khartoum’s security armed the Janjaweed forces.

Janjaweed are omnipresent. They are seen in marketplaces and within walking distance of refugee camps.

When the insurgency escalated in February 2003, spearheaded by the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army, and the Justice and Equality Movement, the Sudanese Government responded by using the Janjaweed as its main counter-insurgency force. Protracting the forces to attack and recover the rebel held areas of Darfur, the Janjaweed conducted a campaign targeting rebels in the region of Darfur. The U.S. State Department and others in 2004 named leading Janjaweed commanders including Musa Hilal as suspected genocide criminals. By early 2006, many Janjaweed had been absorbed into the Sudan Armed Forces including the Popular Defense Forces and Border Guards. Meanwhile, the Janjaweed expanded to include some Arab tribes in eastern Darfur, not historically associated with the original Janjaweed. Chadian Arabs were also increasingly active in seeking to reestablish a political base in Chad, as part of the Unified Forces for a Democratic Change (FUC) coalition.

By October 2007, only the United States’ government had declared the Janjaweed killings in Darfur to be genocide, since they had killed an estimated 200,000-400,000 civilians over the previous three years.The UN Security Council called for the Janjaweed to be disarmed. On July 14, 2008 the prosecutor of the International Criminal Court filed genocide charges against Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir, accusing him of masterminding attempts to wipe out African tribes in Darfur with a campaign of murder, rape and deportation using the Janjaweed tribes.

Link to wikipedia here.