This story popped up on a few of my radars, and Scott sent me a copy as well. As you might guess, I am always interested in hearing the critiques of this industry and the support of this industry. So this article in the magazine Foreign Policy was a good little support piece.
One thing I want to add to this, that I think the author was kind of lacking on though, was the amount of security contractors in this war, and the numerous companies doing all sorts of interesting things out there. Here on FJ, I have mentioned a few. Like the CMD(CMC) program, where security contractors protect an entire camp and munitions dump, while UXO workers demolish old munitions. Security contractors do everything from guarding UXO to convoy operations between all of the bases to supply camps and transport people. These camps were completely run and operated by civilians, and they worked. The only military management, if you could call it that, were Army Corps of Engineer guys. These camps would usually have one or two of these folk to watch everything. But other than that, these camps were completely civilian operated and protected. I brought up this example with other authors out there, and it continues to be ignored. This mission helped to remove thousands of tons of old explosives in Iraq, and at a cost to contractor lives. It deserves a mention at the least.
The GRD program in Iraq was another massive program that involved convoy protection services, and DOD contractors(guys got killed doing this as well). And currently there are solicitations for the same kind of convoy protection services contracts in Afghanistan, as there were in Iraq. The programs that this author spoke of, are the TWISS(DoD) and the WPPS(DoS) program. He gives only a partial picture, and the New America Foundation put the number of security contractors at over 12,000 if we are to look at the entire war effort. 230,000 plus was the figure for civilian contractors in total(that is KBR type folk, as well as the meat eater types).
Overall, I enjoyed the article because at least it was someone willing to challenge this mindset that we are ‘a bad thing’ for this country. I also believe that with a little effort on the part of the DoD and DoS, the quality of these contracts could be monitored and managed effectively. That would require leadership and actually putting in the necessary manpower to manage all the thousands of contractors out there.
The author also mentioned a key component of why it is so important to keep tabs on contractors:
Finally, the bodyguard mentality won’t go away with the security company contracts; it must be changed from the top. Behind the highly publicized incidents were not “rogue mercenaries” but professionals dedicated to the mission — protecting the principal at all costs. “At all costs” means just that; costs to the locals, to the broader counterinsurgency effort, and to relations with the host government are irrelevant. For a bodyguard, this is the only measure of effectiveness, and it won’t go away just because the bodyguard works for the government.
DoS and DoD need to remember to include us when they talk about Strategic Communications and Unity of Effort. Of course our actions impact the overall counterinsurgency effort, and none of us in the industry want to hurt that effort. So going back to leadership and effectively managing contractors, you can see that it is not only an important thing for accounting purposes, but it is also important for the war effort. We can get there, it’s just the client needs to start talking more about how to effectively manage the ‘elephant in the room’ called contractors. And like the author pointed out, just getting rid of us is not the most practical or even reasonable answer to these issues. I say do like Pete Blaber said for solving complex problems. Saturate, incubate, and illuminate and accomplish that mission.-Matt
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In defense of security contractors
By Col. Mark Cancian (USMCR Ret.)
01/08/2009
Like them or hate them, we still need private security contractors
In criticizing the use of contractors in Iraq, some observers cite Blackwater as the tip of the contractor iceberg. It’s a fair analogy, but it deserves to be taken a step further. As with an iceberg, you may be able to shave some off the tip, but hacking away at the body is pointless.
Much discussion about contractors arises from confusion over who they are. With all the attention paid to Blackwater, many suppose that all contractors are gun-toting bodyguards. Current figures indicate that there are about 265,000 contractors in Iraq – 55 percent of whom are Iraqis and another 30 percent of whom come from third countries like the Philippines. The number of Americans (and Europeans) is relatively small. Ninety five percent work in reconstruction and logistics, with a few others in misc support roles like translation.
Actual security contractors number perhaps only 10,000. Most protect facilities inside major bases and never go outside the wire. These security guards are generally from third countries – for example, Salvadorans guard the USAID compound in the Green Zone. Their function consists of screening personnel entering these facilities by checking ID cards. This group has essentially never fired a shot in anger.
What’s the point in replacing these security contractors? They have volunteered for the work, are doing a fine job, and cause no problems. Further, the military is already fully employed and lacks the personnel to replace them. (A further complication is that many security contractors work for the State Department, and the Defense Department is reluctant to divert scarce and highly trained personnel to protect diplomats.)
Blackwater (and its cousins Triple Canopy, DynCorp, and Aegis) together employ about 2,000 armed personnel. These constitute the groups that go outside the wire and have caused the widely publicized incidents. Their numbers are small enough that they could be replaced, in the near term, by military and, in the longer term, by State Department security specialists.
There are good policy reasons for doing this. But it would be no panacea.
Blackwater and other outfits like it are highly professional. Blackwater, for example, prides itself on never having lost a principal. Replacing them with ordinary grunts won’t do — only the best will be adequate. Private security contractors are less expensive than government employees with their massive benefits, large infrastructure, and need for a rotation base. So costs would go up. (Hint to budgeters — many of these costs can be hidden to make the cost of conversion look less expensive.)
Finally, the bodyguard mentality won’t go away with the security company contracts; it must be changed from the top. Behind the highly publicized incidents were not “rogue mercenaries” but professionals dedicated to the mission — protecting the principal at all costs. “At all costs” means just that; costs to the locals, to the broader counterinsurgency effort, and to relations with the host government are irrelevant. For a bodyguard, this is the only measure of effectiveness, and it won’t go away just because the bodyguard works for the government.
So don’t read too much into the trials of Blackwater contractors this week. We won’t be getting rid of private security contractors anytime soon — and for good reason.
Colonel Mark F. Cancian (USMCR Ret.) received his BA and MBA from Harvard University. From 2006-2007 he was assistant chief of staff for assessment at the Marine headquarters in Anbar Province, Iraq. As a military officer and civilian official in Washington, he has worked on force structure, acquisition, and manpower issues.
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