Interesting testimony from Professor Stanger. Finally we are starting to see some movement towards acknowledging the existence of the LoM in DC, and it is fun to see where it goes. Although in the case with this testimony, Stanger forgot some key historical points to add to the inherently governmental debate. She sure did use the privateer analogy, but made no mention of their contribution or size of industry during the Revolutionary War or War of 1812.
Matter of fact, her entire testimony and point of view is lacking historical reference–as if contractors have no place in the history of this country. Of course that is totally wrong, and I think I have made a good case on this blog about that history. It is just troubling to me that a person of her stature and intellect would choose to ignore that stuff in such a key intellectual debate. I thought she was under oath? lol
I also wanted to post this, because much of her testimony is being quoted and used by the various critics and reporters out there covering this industry. So if everyone is rallying around her testimony, it is kind of important to read what she has to say, and give an alternative point of view to provide some balance.
What I will do is go through some of the key points and give the Feral Jundi point of view or POV. Maybe the professor can come up in the comments section and care to provide further input or explanation? Anyhoo, lets get started shall we?
Stanger Testimony: Contracting for moving security is largely a post-Cold War development, and our missions in Iraq and Afghanistan today are wholly dependent on it.
Feral Jundi POV: Actually, the history of privateers hauling colonists to the new world was the first use of armed contractors for a ‘moving security’ example. We also depended on contractors moving supplies during all of our early wars in the form of camp followers. The Pinkertons were used to protect Abraham Lincoln during the Civil War. During the Indian Wars and expansion into the West, armed security contractors were vital to the security of wagon trains, stage coaches, ranch/cattle protection, law enforcement, and scouts. “Eight civilians have received Medals of Honor including Dr. Mary Edwards Walker (the only woman to ever receive the award), one civilian scout and two civilian Naval pilots during the Civil War, and 4 civilian scouts during the Indian Campaigns (including William Cody…”Buffalo Bill”).” America has a rich history of contracting with armed security for protection or combat operations that certainly required ‘moving security’.
Stanger Testimony: Using Friedman’s minimalist definition, the use of contractors in the realms of security and justice demand the strictest scrutiny. Even under this leanest of definitions, moving security contractors are performing inherently governmental functions, since they are actively involved in defending the nation against foreign enemies.
Feral Jundi POV: Allison forgets that defending a nation against foreign enemies is the first point mentioned by Friedman, in his minimalist list, and the most important. To me, a nation’s first goal above all else is survival. To use all and any means necessary and available to defend a nation. That means using a standing army and private industry if necessary. Yet again, the historical context for this argument is the existence of Article 1, Section 8, Paragraph 11. It’s existence symbolizes our nation’s desire to uphold the right to use private industry during times of war, and the clause for granting Letters of Marque and Reprisal is right there next to the authority to Declare War. That is significant.
And from a strategist’s point of view, I want every available tool in my hands to conduct war and defeat an enemy. It is why George Washington relied upon his standing armies, his volunteer militias, as well as his privateers, and it is why we are using private industry in such a way now. It answers a need for manpower.
You could also make an argument that the Second Amendment is an essential tool for the defense of a nation. ‘A well regulated militia, being necessary to the security of a free state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms, shall not be infringed.’ So would Milton Friedman or Allison Stanger argue that the Second Amendment conflicts with what their definition of inherently governmental is or what the state should allow for the defense of a country?
Stanger Testimony: There are additional grounds for concern about the use of armed security contractors that have yet to receive appropriate attention. From a constitutional perspective, Article I, Section 8 of the US Constitution gives Congress the power to grant letters of marque and reprisal, yet armed privateers have been deployed in both Iraq and
Afghanistan without such explicit authorization.
Feral Jundi POV: This is the key point of this whole testimony that I wanted the reader to focus in on. Allison brought it up, but it is interesting to me that she would make no recommendations for congress to actually use it? Nor did she care to elaborate on the significance of this law. That it does symbolize America’s relationship with armed security and private industry during times of war. By not bringing that history into the discussion, the commission has nothing to really build off of for an opinion on the law itself. If I were to advise congress, I would just tell them that they have had the power and right to do anything they want (and for a long time) in regards to controlling and licensing private industry during times of war. They are law makers, they have the law to do such a thing in their war fighting tool kit, and they could have actually set up the kind of legal conditions and checks and balances with private industry that this whole commission is concerned with trying to understand.
As it stands now, they allow agencies and departments within government to interpret the various laws and policies as they see fit, and of course there will be issues that come up with that kind of a system. There are too many middle men in the process, and too much confusion. If congress truly cared about controlling such an industry or applying the rule of law to the thing, all they had to do is fire up the LoM machine and flex their law making muscles.
Stanger Testimony: First, the practice blurs the line between the legitimate and illegitimate use of force, which is just what our enemies want. Al Qaeda’s operatives have no country and are private actors waging war on the United States. Terrorists may receive funding from states, but they are by definition non-state actors. If the United States can legitimately rely on non-state actors wielding weapons to protect our interests, why can’t Al Qaeda or the Taliban, especially when contractor misdeeds appear to go completely unpunished?
Feral Jundi POV: Whoa! So now us contractors are an illegitimate force? How about we are a force necessary for the defense of a nation? A nation that has a ‘history’ of using private industry to help it fight it’s wars. There is nothing illegitimate about that. I go back to the concept of doing everything in your power to win a war or defend a nation, because the survival of that nation is what is most important above all other things. Using private forces in such a way is not illegitimate in my view, and the precedence for such a thing, is located in the history of this young country.
Stanger Testimony: Second, our dependence on armed contractors in war zones is wholly at odds with our stated intention to build state capacity in Iraq and Afghanistan, so that the Afghan and Iraqi governments might one day be capable of independently providing security for their own citizens. The argument that security provided by the state is preferable to that provided by a collection of warlords is difficult to maintain when the United States itself lacks the capacity to wage war without reliance on private militias.
Feral Jundi POV: So now we are private militias? I love the loose usage of terminology here. lol Any way, this testimony briefly mentions the Cold War, but really doesn’t go into how significant it is to today’s usage of contractors. The other panelists brought it up, but Allison kind of missed the boat here.
The bottom line is that a citizenry will not pay for a massive standing army, especially when there is no justification for such a thing during times of peace(like at the end of the Cold War). But how do you answer the call for troops, when a war comes up, and there just isn’t enough of those troops? Well you can have a draft, but to most politicians, this is political suicide. Or you can do what has happened today and that is using the recruitment and training machines of the services, or utilizing retired soldiers via private industry. I personally think that the later method falls in line with the idea of using all ‘willing’ resources available to defeat an enemy, and is a far better arrangement than forcing citizens to serve. It is faster and it flexes better for the different requirements of a world wide war. It also has longevity. And Allison herself mentioned the strengths of private industry within in the body of her testimony here:
As I have argued elsewhere, it makes good sense for the government to harness the energy, efficiency, and bottom-up creativity of the private sector in as many ways as possible–up to the point where market imperatives begin to undermine the public interest.
Is it not in the public interest to win the wars their sons and daughters are fighting in, and to give the war’s strategists all the tools necessary to accomplish that task? Or is it the public’s interest to implement a draft for these wars or to pay for massive standing armies during times of peace to be ready for any size and type of war? What is practical and what is cost effective?
Stanger Testimony: Third, the extensive use of privateers overseas has had disastrous consequences for government accountability and transparency. The Commission is well acquainted with the enormous waste, fraud, and abuse that have resulted when US taxpayer money must change hands multiple times in a war zone. Further, local security contractors in Afghanistan are hired through sub-contracts, and information on sub-contracts is currently entirely unavailable to the public. The site on USAspending.gov, President Obama’s “Google for Government,” was supposed to go live over a year ago, but it remains “under construction.” Thus, we are effectively pouring taxpayer money into a black hole in Afghanistan, with no real means of knowing how well that money is likely to be spent or even who is receiving it.
Feral Jundi POV: Man, I go back to what government should have been doing all along, and that is actually watch these companies they hire and insure there is enough supervision out there to monitor them. If we want to talk about what is ‘inherently governmental’, how about harp on the idea that if you are going to spend tax payer’s money, then at least write up a contract with private industry that makes sense, and ensure the tax payer gets a good value for that product or service. That is where the outrage should go towards, and not onto whether or not private industry can do this type of work. Allison should not have let the government off the hook here, by giving them the idea that they should just give up on the responsibility of managing this stuff.
Stanger Testimony: Fourth, the United States has no interest in seeing Afghans or Iraqis imitate our practices, let alone other foreign governments. The market for force is currently dominated by US and UK firms who often hire third party or local nationals, or sub-contract to local firms. But if it’s profitable, why shouldn’t other countries want in the
game? Medieval Europe featured extensive use of local armies and mercenaries for security, but it was hardly the most desirable set of arrangements for liberty, equality, and prosperity. Medieval Europe on a global scale would not be a world order that served American interests or values.
Feral Jundi POV: The Unites States should have in interest in learning about how to properly control and utilize private industry during times of war, because it is in our national interest to do so. Allison gives the impression here that the US and friends are the only ones that use a market of force, or have an interest in such things. From my research on the blog, I see a world that is increasingly dependent upon this market of force and using it in new and radical ways. Not because they have to, but because it makes strategic sense to them, and they make it work. A country will do everything in their power to survive and defend self, and that includes using private industry if the have to. The west cannot and will not be able to control how other nations use private industry, or their will to do so. It is impossible. If anything, it makes more sense to learn how best to use private industry as a strategic tool to win wars, because if we don’t, our enemies will learn how. To me, it ‘makes good sense for the government to harness the energy, efficiency, and bottom-up creativity of the private sector’, during times of war, and ‘harness’ is the key word here. We should not be running away from this challenge.
Stanger Testimony: Fifth, our dependence on armed contractors ultimately undercuts troop morale by sending mixed signals to our citizens in uniform, who often perform the same jobs for a fraction of the pay. Government’s embrace of armed contractors in war zones erodes the virtue of fighting for one’s country, undermining the important value of disinterested public service. It also doesn’t help that the burden of sacrifice is currently unfairly distributed and hence undemocratic. How many US households earning in excess of $250,000 a year have a son or daughter in uniform? What does it say about American values, when we actively uphold a system in which a privateer can make double or triple the money selling his labor to the highest bidder?
Feral Jundi POV: Allison is yet again playing pretty loose with the statistics here. I know contractors who have actually gone back to the military because they offer a pension, college money, medical benefits, housing for family, and they have job security. If anything, because of private industry, the military is having to compete on this market of force, and bring up their standards and pay to attract recruits. They also attract recruits that look at the military like a four year education in the combat arms, so that they can go on to work in the private industry later if they so desire. The US is able to take advantage of this dynamic, by actually incentivizing service. A concept that General George Washington believed in and it is a concept that works.
I also take issue with this idea that contractors are not patriotic because they earn a salary from war time service. Might I add that private industry pays zero money for recruitment of contractors. If anything, legions of contractors are fighting for jobs in the war zones, and this is a cost that private industry does not have to worry about. (with over 1800 contractors killed in the war, and over 40,000 wounded.) It takes a little something more internally, to want to work in a war zone, and receiving a salary is just one part of the service. Patriotism and incentive go hand in hand.
Also, I have yet to see any jobs advertises by Al Qaeda or the Taliban that has created a rush of this ‘un-patriotic’ market of force to their employ. Because they pay for contractors in their world wide war as well. The Taliban paid Faisal Shahzad $15,000 for his attack in New York City, is just one example of the enemy’s market of force.
But what I really take issue with here, is the idea that the service of contractor or soldier should be cheap. If the government wants cheap, then implement the draft and pay in water and bread. If the government wants a force that is there willingly, then that service must have ‘reward or interest’, in the words of George Washington. In other words, how much is our pound of flesh worth in this market of force that applies to both the private and public? Not to mention the fact that you also get what you pay for.
I mention this last part, because even if you bring in all of these armed security jobs into the federal government or military, you still have to be able to provide incentive to attract and keep them there. I have personally worked in the federal government, in the military, and in private industry. With each group, it was my personal choice and it was my signature on the dotted line of a contract to render my services. Each group gave me reward in the form of pay, benefits, and job security to one degree or another. Each group was able to get a piece of me, with their overall goal of filling a need that the US government had. As a participant in that process, I like that option of service, because of the choices given to me. If I was forced into that service, and there is no reward given, or a minimal reward given, then where is the incentive to do well? Most of all, what is my incentive to stay on the battlefield and fight for a country that does not recognize my value as a soldier? I think the answer to that, is with our early volunteer militias in the Revolutionary War.(who were undisciplined, and undependable)
You can also see examples today with local national soldiers in Somalia, Afghanistan, and Iraq. You must pay your soldiers well, if you want to attract a sizable standing army, and at the very least pay as much if not more than your enemy.
Stanger Testimony: A March 2010 GAO study, for example, showed that the State Department’s annual costs of using contractors for moving security in the Baghdad region was $380 million, compared to an estimated annual cost of $240 million for using Diplomatic Security to provide the same services. I know of no other study that would disagree with this comparative assessment.
Feral Jundi POV: Strange how she was able to conclude an entirely opposite conclusion than what myself or even David Isenberg came up with. The report clearly identified that overall, contractors were more cost effective to use than using DoS, and even the figure that Allison used was questioned in the report. Here is the entire summary, and the professor forgot to add the rest of the quote during this hearing. (I have highlighted the missing part of the quote that Allison used below) If this last part is included into the total, I count $402 million dollars.(240m + 162m=402m)
Summary
In Process
Our comparison of likely State Department costs versus contractor costs for four task orders and one contract awarded by the State Department for security services in Iraq showed that for three of the task orders and the contract, the cost of using State Department employees would be greater than using contractors, while the State Department’s estimated cost to use federal employees was less for the other task order. For example, using State Department employees to provide static security for the embassy in Baghdad would have cost the department approximately $858 million for 1 year compared to the approximately $78 million charged by the contractor for the same time period. In contrast, our cost comparison of the task order for providing personal security for State Department employees while in the Baghdad region–which required personnel that have security clearances–showed that for this task order, the State Department’s estimated annual cost would have been about $240 million, whereas the contractor charged approximately $380 million for 1 year. However, because the State Department does not currently have a sufficient number of trained personnel to provide security in Iraq, the department would need to recruit, hire, and train additional employees at an additional cost of $162 million. Contract requirements are a major factor in determining whether contractors or government personnel are less expensive–especially factors such as whether personnel need security clearances. However, there are other factors that may play a role in the decision of whether to perform security services with federal employees or enough federal employees than to acquire contractors. Additionally, the government could potentially be faced with incurring some administrative costs from having to take actions to reduce government personnel if they are no longer needed. When using contractors, the department also incurs administrative costs for awarding the task orders and contract and providing oversight; however, the State Department was unable to estimate these costs. Finally, some costs associated with providing Iraq security services using federal employees–such as developing new career fields, providing additional overhead, and building new housing–are difficult to quantify.
Well, in final, I think it is great that Allison brought up Article 1, Section 8 and tried to inject that idea into the minds of the congressmen and women of the commission. It is also in the permanent record, for future discourse on what is inherently governmental. I think I have given an adequate counter to the idea that moving security is some how inherently governmental. And you know, I don’t even like the term inherently governmental, because it is counter-productive. It is a term that works during peacetime but during wartime, the number one priority of a nation should be to win wars and survive. If private industry offers a product or service that will help us to win that war, then we should most definitely use it and be grateful that we have such a thing. Those are my thoughts on the matter. –Matt
——————————————————————
Russell Leng ’60 Professor of International Politics and Economics
Director, Rohatyn Center for International Affairs
Middlebury College
At a Hearing on “Are Private Security Contractors Performing Inherently Governmental Functions?”
Before the Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan
June 18, 2010
Co-Chairs and Commissioners, it is an honor and privilege to be invited to share
thoughts with you here today. As Co-Chair Shays has emphasized, “There’s a vigorous
debate in policy circles whether or to what extent security can or should be contracted out
in combat zones…As we saw in 2007 at Nisur Square in Baghdad, when private security
guards killed or wounded 34 Iraqi civilians, contractor incidents can have a direct and
devastating effect on United States objectives and public support for our presence. At the
same time, properly managed contractors can reduce the strain on U.S. military
personnel.”
With the drawdown of American forces in Iraq just on the horizon and the
continuing struggle in Afghanistan, it is an appropriate time to review our current
wartime contracting practices, many of which were adopted for reasons of expediency in
the heat of the moment and may not serve American interests in the long term. I wish to
make two major arguments here today. First, to the question posed by this hearing’s title,
armed security contractors have been performing inherently governmental functions in
Iraq and Afghanistan. Second, Congress should ban the use of armed contractors for
moving security in combat zones (including remotely located trigger-pullers for drone
flights) and instead use direct hire employees. If the USG is going to engage actively in
countries where the lives of its personnel are at risk, this means we will need to build up
our in-house capacity to staff those missions appropriately.
The Commission is already familiar with the many different types of contractors
deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan. Our concern here today is with a subset of that much
larger force, security contractors, who are, by definition, armed. Armed security
contractors can be further divided into two main categories, static security (guarding a
particular location, such as an embassy or camp) and moving security (guarding
personnel or convoys as they pursue work in different locations). Contractors providing
static security do not venture out on missions. Those providing moving security often
perform jobs indistinguishable from those of uniformed personnel and are most likely to
wind up using their weapons. The use of contractors to guard US embassies is a practice
that began in the 1980s and has been a longstanding source of employment for local
nationals. Contracting for moving security is largely a post-Cold War development, and
our missions in Iraq and Afghanistan today are wholly dependent on it.
As I have argued elsewhere, it makes good sense for the government to harness
the energy, efficiency, and bottom-up creativity of the private sector in as many ways as
possible–up to the point where market imperatives begin to undermine the public
interest.1 We have reached such a tipping point in Iraq and Afghanistan. As many
witnesses before me have testified, Iraq and Afghanistan are our first two contractors’
wars. Even at the height of the Vietnam War, contractors comprised just 14% of the
American presence on the ground in Southeast Asia. Today, contractors outnumber
uniformed personnel on the ground in both Iraq and Afghanistan, and in the simplest of
terms, armed security contractors enable us to wage two wars simultaneously while
avoiding the necessity of a draft.
Are armed security contractors currently performing inherently governmental
functions in these conflict zones? While there is a general consensus that there are
activities so intrinsic to the nature of government that they should not be contracted out,
there is little agreement on what those activities are. Both OMB and Congress have
repeatedly focused attention on the topic of inherently governmental functions, but to
date have refrained from providing specific guidelines as to what particular activities
must never be outsourced. Restricting the focus to those contractors able to deploy lethal
force makes it easier to render a judgment. A leading advocate of minimal government,
Milton Friedman, maintained, “The basic functions of government are to defend the
nation against foreign enemies, to prevent coercion of some individuals by others within
the country, to provide a means of deciding on our rules, and to adjudicate disputes.”2
Using Friedman’s minimalist definition, the use of contractors in the realms of security
and justice demand the strictest scrutiny. Even under this leanest of definitions, moving
security contractors are performing inherently governmental functions, since they are
actively involved in defending the nation against foreign enemies.
Section 5 of the Federal Activities Inventory Reform Act, Public Law 105-70
defines inherently governmental functions in potentially broader terms as “a function that
is so intimately related to the public interest as to require performance by Federal
Government employees.” The Office of Federal Procurement Policy is expected to issue
further guidance on this definition by late summer/early fall of this year. Yet even
without that additional guidance, it seems clear that taking up arms to defend the interests
of the United States, whether remotely pulling triggers on drone flights or to guard
government personnel as they travel in war zones would seem to constitute active
involvement in defending the nation against foreign enemies, hence clearing Milton
Friedman’s minimalist inherently governmental threshold.
There are additional grounds for concern about the use of armed security
contractors that have yet to receive appropriate attention. From a constitutional
perspective, Article I, Section 8 of the US Constitution gives Congress the power to grant
letters of marque and reprisal, yet armed privateers have been deployed in both Iraq and
Afghanistan without such explicit authorization. From a legal perspective, armed security
contractors in conflict zones still operate in a grey area, which makes it difficult to
prosecute abuses when they occur. The Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA)
provides a constitutionally sound basis for trying contractors, but the scope of its
jurisdiction is ambiguous. The Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) is easier to
apply, but its application to civilians is constitutionally questionable. The status of armed
contractors under international law is unclear, and their status under foreign law still
more confusing, varying entirely from country to country.3 The murky legal status of
privateers hired by the USG and deployed overseas in part helps explain why it is
possible for firms whose employees have committed clear abuses and behaved in the
most undiplomatic fashion to continue to have their contracts renewed in Washington.
Lest I be misunderstood, I must emphasize that the current use of armed security
contractors is wholly well-intentioned, a matter of necessity rather than choice. The State
Department and Department of Defense continue to utilize them, despite all the negative
press, because an all-volunteer force leaves us severely understaffed for meeting US
objectives in Iraq and Afghanistan simultaneously. State and DOD should therefore not
be blamed for their reliance on armed contractors; with an all-volunteer force and an
under-resourced civilian capability, they are doing the best job with the resources
currently available of delivering what Congress and the President have explicitly and
implicitly asked them to do. But understanding how we arrived at our present
predicament renders our current practices neither desirable nor sustainable. Our short-
sighted and growing reliance on armed contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan compromises
long term US interests in at least six different ways.
First, the practice blurs the line between the legitimate and illegitimate use of
force, which is just what our enemies want. Al Qaeda’s operatives have no country and
are private actors waging war on the United States. Terrorists may receive funding from
states, but they are by definition non-state actors. If the United States can legitimately
rely on non-state actors wielding weapons to protect our interests, why can’t Al Qaeda or
the Taliban, especially when contractor misdeeds appear to go completely unpunished?
Second, our dependence on armed contractors in war zones is wholly at odds with
our stated intention to build state capacity in Iraq and Afghanistan, so that the Afghan and
Iraqi governments might one day be capable of independently providing security for their
own citizens. The argument that security provided by the state is preferable to that
provided by a collection of warlords is difficult to maintain when the United States itself
lacks the capacity to wage war without reliance on private militias. The Afghan First
strategy aims to hire local nationals to provide private security, and it has been wildly
successful; at least 90% of private security contractors in Afghanistan today are
Afghans.4 But in empowering these local privateers, we are in turn empowering regional
warlords—precisely the opposite of building up Afghanistan’s capacity to secure its own
territory without massive infusions of US taxpayer money.5 Since guns for hire never
pledge enduring allegiance to a particular country, our rented allies today may very well
become our enemies tomorrow. The local militias whose creation we have encouraged
will also be a destabilizing future presence for the security of the AfPak region.
Third, the extensive use of privateers overseas has had disastrous consequences
for government accountability and transparency. The Commission is well acquainted
with the enormous waste, fraud, and abuse that have resulted when US taxpayer money
must change hands multiple times in a war zone. Further, local security contractors in
Afghanistan are hired through sub-contracts, and information on sub-contracts is
currently entirely unavailable to the public. The site on USAspending.gov, President
Obama’s “Google for Government,” was supposed to go live over a year ago, but it
remains “under construction.” Thus, we are effectively pouring taxpayer money into a
black hole in Afghanistan, with no real means of knowing how well that money is likely
to be spent or even who is receiving it.6
Fourth, the United States has no interest in seeing Afghans or Iraqis imitate our
practices, let alone other foreign governments. The market for force is currently
dominated by US and UK firms who often hire third party or local nationals, or sub-
contract to local firms. But if it’s profitable, why shouldn’t other countries want in the
game? Medieval Europe featured extensive use of local armies and mercenaries for
security, but it was hardly the most desirable set of arrangements for liberty, equality, and
prosperity. Medieval Europe on a global scale would not be a world order that served
American interests or values.
Fifth, our dependence on armed contractors ultimately undercuts troop morale by
sending mixed signals to our citizens in uniform, who often perform the same jobs for a
fraction of the pay. Government’s embrace of armed contractors in war zones erodes the
virtue of fighting for one’s country, undermining the important value of disinterested
public service. It also doesn’t help that the burden of sacrifice is currently unfairly
distributed and hence undemocratic. How many US households earning in excess of
$250,000 a year have a son or daughter in uniform? What does it say about American
values, when we actively uphold a system in which a privateer can make double or triple
the money selling his labor to the highest bidder?
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, our dependence on armed security
contractors has fueled an overly ambitious international agenda. Without privateers, we
would need a draft to wage war in Iraq and Afghanistan, which would transform the
politics of both conflicts. Avoiding a draft might sound like a plus, but surely war should
ultimately be a matter of national sacrifice and honor, not profits and consumption. We
degrade ourselves and strengthen our enemies by treating lethal force as something to be
casually bought and sold.
There is one thing Congress could do that would immediately disrupt this vicious
circle: ban the use of moving armed security contractors in war zones, with the practice to
be phased out incrementally, so that it does not leave our civilian and military forces
short-handed and compromised.
Looking to the future and returning to the inherently governmental, how should
we view private security contractor deployment beyond Iraq and Afghanistan? There are
many different ways to estimate the relative costs of contracting for a service versus
providing it in-house, and those estimates can be a matter for argument, but one fact
seems indisputable; hiring moving security is vastly more expensive than relying on our
own arms. A March 2010 GAO study, for example, showed that the State Department’s
annual costs of using contractors for moving security in the Baghdad region was $380
million, compared to an estimated annual cost of $240 million for using Diplomatic
Security to provide the same services.7 I know of no other study that would disagree with
this comparative assessment. From a relative cost perspective alone, therefore, there are
compelling reasons to in-source moving security at the earliest opportunity. Factoring in
the non-monetary costs of having contractors perform inherently governmental functions,
the case grows only all the more compelling.
In a world where the principal threats to American security come from non-state
actors rather than hostile states, the United States is likely to continue to have a presence
in dangerous environments where additional security will be required. Exhibit A of this
reality is Iraq after the drawdown of American forces, just a few months down the road.
The likelihood of returning to the past, when the standard American response to any
violent attack on US government personnel or property was to close down the embassy
and evacuate all employees, is very small. I have argued that Congress should ban the
use of moving security contractors in war zones, the change phased in gradually so as not
to jeopardize our missions in Afghanistan and Iraq through precipitous action. Looking
beyond Iraq and Afghanistan, they should also consider banning their use more generally.
A strong case can be made that moving security personnel should always be in a direct
governmental or military chain of command, not a contractual one.
Thank you for your attention and I welcome your questions.
Download testimony here.