Feral Jundi

Monday, February 21, 2011

Libya: Reports Of Gaddafi Using Mercenaries To Quell Uprising

     Interesting, but this is not very solid yet. I have been trying to find any information I could about Gaddafi’s supposed use of mercenaries to quell the current uprising there, and this is what I have found so far.  Although this is hard to verify because there is a media block there, and Gaddafi has shut down the internet in his country.

    I do know that guys like this have lots of money because of all the oil and foreign investment. There are reports of part of his military defecting because they are being ordered to attack the protestors. I don’t blame them for leaving and I wouldn’t want to bomb my own countrymen either.  Which both points bring up the question of mercenaries as a possible solution for the dictator.  Would Gaddafi hire thugs from outside of his country to do this dirty work?

     Also, it would be easy for people to confuse the evacuations of expats and oil workers with some kind of mercenary invasion force.  These PSCs are landing at airports to simple provide a secure transport for folks to get out.  From what I gather, companies like SOS International will be involved in evacuations in Libya, similar to what they did in Egypt.

    Finally, Libya is important to watch because it is an OPEC nation.  If oil workers are being evacuated, then oil facilities could be shut down or in danger of being attacked.  Not good and this will impact the oil markets.  And if Saudi Arabia fires up as another domino in this string of uprising dominoes, then stand by for a major shock to the oil market. This will only get more interesting and complex as this fire continues to rage.-Matt

Edit: 02/23/2011 – Check out the comments below. I have posted some really interesting stories that have elaborated on the history of mercenary usage in the middle east, and especially Libya. I will continue to dump stories that are relevant in the comments.

U.S. struggles with little leverage to restrain Libyan government

By Mary Beth Sheridan and Scott WilsonMonday, February 21, 2011

…..Libya’s deputy ambassador to the United Nations, who broke with Gaddafi on Monday, urged the international community to impose a no-fly zone over the country to prevent mercenaries and arms from reaching the government. But no other major power echoed the call.

Link to quote here.

——————————————————————

Libya ‘uses mercenaries’ to keep order on streets as 200 die in violent clashes

20th February 2011

….Security sources suggested the leader has hired foot soldiers from neighbouring states to maintain law and order.

Marc Ginsburg, former U.S. ambassador to Morocco told CNN: ‘First and foremost he (Gaddafi) has security support from Sudan and Pakistan and his intelligence advisers have received significant intelligence support from former KGB officials who were part of the Eastern Bloc countries such as Bulgaria, Romania and Belarus.’

Link for quote here.

—————————————————————–

Gaddafi recruits “African mercenaries” to quell protests

Saturday, 19 February 2011

Libya recruited hundreds of mercenaries from Sub-Saharan Africa to help quell a popular uprising that is threatening to unseat veteran leader Muammar Gaddafi after more than 41 years in office, witness told Al Arabiya from the eastern city of Benghazi on Sunday.The witnesses said protesters in Benghazi caught some “African mercenaries” who spoke French and who admitted that they were ordered by Muammar Gaddafi’s son, Khamis Gaddafi, to fire live ammunition at demonstrators.

The witnesses, who refused to be named for security reasons, added that they saw four airplanes carrying “African mercenaries” land in Benina International Airport near the city of Benghazi, the second largest city in the country. UK-based Libyan website www.jeel-libya.net (Libya’s generation) reported earlier that a number of airplanes carrying “African mercenaries” had landed in Mitiga military airport, 11 km east of the capital Tripoli, and they were dressed in Libyan army uniform. The website added that some of those “mercenaries” were sent to hot spots in the eastern region were deployed in Tripoli.Twenty-four people were killed during anti-government protests in the eastern city of Benghazi, a medical source and a newspaper said, after Human Rights Watch reported security forces killed at least 84 people over three days, including 35 in Benghazi on Friday.Gadhafi’s regime has been cracking down on protesters demanding he step down and implement democratic reforms following similar uprisings that led to the ouster of the leaders of Egypt and Tunisia.After regime opponents used Facebook to mobilize protests, like in neighboring Egypt, the social networking website was blocked on Saturday and Internet connections were patchy, said Internet users in Tripoli and Benghazi.Arbor Networks, a US-based tracker of online traffic, said Internet services were cut overnight.

Story here.

2 Comments

  1. I would have added King Ramesses and his mercenary army in ancient Egypt to this list, or even the Marine's hiring of mercenaries in Libya to destroy the Barbery pirate scourge on the 'shores of tripoli'. Other than that, the author brings up a lot of specific history of their use in the middle east. Especially Libya's history.

    —————

    The Dogs of War: Mercenaries in the Middle East

    By Ishaan Tharoor Wednesday, Feb. 23, 2011

    While the protests convulsing Bahrain and Libya this past week occurred in vastly different contexts — and will likely produce very different results — both were met with conspicuously swift crackdowns. And in both cases, reports suggest the Libyan and Bahraini regimes deployed foreign fighters and mercenaries against their own citizens, lethal clashes that left scores wounded and many dead.

    Though difficult to substantiate in the current chaos, reports from eastern Libya, in particular from the city of Benghazi, claim that snipers and militiamen from sub-Saharan Africa gunned down residents on the streets. The Dubai-based al-Arabiya network says some of the guerrillas were Francophone mercenaries recruited by one of the sons of dictator Muammar Gaddafi. Qatar-based al-Jazeera detailed pamphlets circulated to mercenary recruits from Guinea and Nigeria, offering them $2,000 per day to crack down on the Libyan uprising. And, as further reports of defections from the Libyan military filter in, the cornered Gaddafi regime may turn more and more to hired guns from abroad. On television channels and Twitter, frantic rumors circulated about Gaddafi preparing for a mercenary-backed counteroffensive against his opponents.

    While the violence appears to have pushed Libya to a tipping point, protests in Bahrain slackened after a week of bloody confrontations between demonstrators and the country's security forces. Sectarian tensions underlie the unrest, with the tiny island kingdom's Sunni Muslim monarchy pitted against the country's predominantly Shi'ite population. A significant segment of the state's security personnel are Sunnis brought in from countries like Syria, Iraq, Jordan and Pakistan to buttress the ruling dynasty's authority. It's a policy that Shi'ites say is symbolic of widespread institutional discrimination in Bahrain, and it played a key role in clashes earlier this month when uncompromising — and often foreign — security forces violently dispersed protesting crowds, killing at least six.

    The popular outrage surrounding the use of these foreign soldiers in the crackdowns isn't surprising, but it's only in the past century that the armies of most of the world's nation-states have actually reflected the demographics of their countries. For centuries before, most militaries contained whole regiments of mercenaries and roving soldiers of fortune and were often staffed by officers from foreign lands. The term freelance — now a feature of journalistic lingo — still carries its original martial connotation from a time when companies of fighting men raised their blades in the service of the highest bidder.

    Foreign warriors were valued by monarchs wary of their own restive populations and the rivalries and jealousies of local nobles. The great empires of the Middle East all boasted a rank of soldiers drawn (or abducted) from abroad. The Ottomans had the janissaries, mostly young Christians from the Caucasus and the Balkans, who converted to Islam and were reared from an early age to be the Sultan's elite household troops, often forming a powerful political class of their own in various parts of the empire. Elsewhere, the Mamluks, slave warriors from Africa to Central Asia forced into service by Arab potentates, managed to rule a large stretch of the modern Middle East from Egypt to Syria for some 300 years, repulsing the invasions of European crusaders as well as the Mongol hordes.

    The most famous troupe of foreign fighters to take up arms in the Middle East was the French Foreign Legion, formed in the 19th century to be the vanguard of France's imperial adventures overseas. To this day, no outfit of mercenaries attracts the sort of admiration that the legionnaires still do, remembered as the romantic heroes of Beau Geste, a motley pan-European crew braving the wild winds and natives of the North African desert. In reality, the legionnaires, a large number of whom had criminal records, bore a fearsome reputation for violence. One recruit in the 1950s described his compatriots as "panting Dobermans, desperate to be let loose amongst a Muslim crowd which they can tear apart with the fans of their machine guns." The legionnaires were present at some of France's most traumatic defeats in Indochina and Algeria and, though they still exist, their star has dimmed with France's much diminished empire.

    Meanwhile, a handful of British mercenaries in the Middle East left a far more indelible legacy, with none of the glory attached to the French Foreign Legion. The oil-rich Gulf states eagerly snapped up former British soldiers to help defend their kingdoms from the advances of socialists and other insurgents, often with London's tacit backing if not direct consent. In the 1960s, Qatar's feared chief of police was Ronald Cochrane, an ex-cop from Glasgow who assumed the name Mohammad Mahdi. Other British soldiers made their way into guerrilla campaigns from Malaya to Angola, enmeshed often in tangled proxy conflicts spawned by the Cold War. One English mercenary, a man identified by a 1972 television crew as Major Ray Barker-Scofield, described his patch of turf in a remote corner of Oman where he was fighting guerrillas on behalf of the government as "the last place in the world where an Englishman is still called a sahib" — in other words, his gig as a mercenary reminded him of the good old days of the British Empire.

    But, especially in the Gulf, these mercenaries played a vital role in setting up the often repressive security states that now exist. The most notorious of these hired officials was Ian Henderson, a former colonial officer who spent years trying to stamp out Kenya's Mau Mau uprising and later became chief of Bahrain's secret police for over three decades until his retirement in 1998. For his alleged involvement in the torture of a host of leftist and Islamist dissidents, Henderson earned the sobriquet "the Butcher of Bahrain."

    According to the Guardian, Henderson's successor is a Jordanian, an appointment in keeping with the ruling dynasty's habit of hiring Sunni expatriates as its protectors. Many are reportedly also Pakistanis from the troubled desert region of Baluchistan, happy to sign up with the promise of greater pay. In an earlier era, Pakistani troops trained the armies of a number of Arab states — in the 1960s, Pakistanis were the first to serve as pilots in the Royal Saudi Air Force, while thousands of Pakistani soldiers patrolled the Saudi border with Israel and Jordan. Their training and expertise, in part the legacy of British colonial rule, proved useful to regimes in the Gulf. Further west in Libya, many of the officers who ousted the country's Western-backed monarchy in 1952 received instruction in schools first set up by the British; one particularly charismatic and ambitious officer had finished his military education in Britain itself. His name was Muammar Gaddafi.
    http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,205

    Comment by headjundi — Wednesday, February 23, 2011 @ 2:21 AM

  2. Can African Mercenaries Save the Libyan Regime?

    Andrew McGregor

    February 23, 2011

    In recent days there have been reports that the Libyan regime of

    Mu'ammar al-Qaddafi has resorted to the use of foreign mercenaries to

    slaughter unarmed civilians protesting over four decades of rule by

    Qaddafi and his family. The Libyan government has been clear from the

    start that protestors could expect a "violent" response from the regime

    (al-Zahf al-Akhdar [Tripoli], February 19). Mu'ammar Qaddafi's son,

    Sa'if al-Islam al-Qaddafi, warned viewers of Libyan state TV: "We will

    fight to the last man and woman and bullet" (al-Sayda TV, February 20).

    Khaled al-Ga'aeem, the under secretary of the Libyan Foreign Ministry,

    told al-Jazeera interviewers there was no truth to the reports of

    mercenaries: "I am ready – not only to resign from my post – but also

    set myself on fire in the Green Square – if it is confirmed that there

    were mercenaries from African states coming by planes" (al-Jazeera,

    February 22). However, citing his own reports from inside the country,

    the Libyan ambassador to India, Ali al-Essawi, has confirmed the use of

    African mercenaries and the defection of units of Libya's military in

    response to their deployment (Reuters, February 22). In New York,

    defecting Libyan Deputy Ambassador Ibrahim Dabbashi called on "African

    nations" to stop sending mercenaries to defend the Qaddafi regime (New

    York Times, February 21).

    The Libyan Origins of the Modern Jihad

    Libya has turned to African fighters in the past. When a massive Italian

    army arrived on the Libyan coast in 1911 with the intention of seizing

    the Ottoman provinces of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica for a new Roman

    Empire, they were met by a small but determined force drawn from all

    quarters of the Ottoman Empire. [1]

    Though Ottoman soldiers were busy with wars in the Balkans and rebellion

    in Yemen, the defense of Libya became a popular cause in the army, with

    volunteers from across the empire crossing through the Italian blockade

    with the help of local people in neighboring Tunisia and Egypt. These

    volunteers, who included Enver Bey (a leading member of the "Young

    Turks") and Mustafa Kemal (the founder of modern secular Turkey after

    the First World War), were largely motivated by patriotism or religion.

    To the surprise of the Turkish officers and the astonishment of the

    Italian generals, Libyan tribesmen suddenly began riding into the

    Turkish camps to offer their services. As the call for jihad spread

    south, fighters began to arrive from the Tubu tribes of Tibesti and the

    Tuareg tribes of the Fezzan. The dark-skinned Tubus would later be

    forced out of Libya into Chad by al-Qaddafi for being inconsistent with

    Qaddafi's vision of a purely Arab nation after a member of Libya's

    former royal family attempted to recruit Tubu mercenaries for use

    against Qaddafi in the early 1970s. [2] The Tuareg of Libya were

    ethnically "reclassified" from Berbers to Arabs.

    Many fighters from the African interior had few connections with the

    Ottomans, but arrived to repel the infidel invaders from a sense of

    religious obligation, thus setting an example for later jihadis who

    would travel to the battlegrounds of Chechnya, Afghanistan and Iraq

    under a similar sense of obligation.

    The Islamic Legion

    Qaddafi also turned to a quasi-mercenary force to further his ambitions

    in Africa in the early days of his rule. The Islamic Legion (al-Failaka

    al-Islamiya) was a force of largely unwilling mercenaries recruited and

    deployed by Qaddafi to further his territorial ambitions in the African

    interior and advance the cause of Arab supremacy. Formed in 1972, the

    Islamic Legion was drawn mostly from young men from Sahelian countries

    who had migrated to Libya in search of work. Many were effectively

    "press-ganged" into service with the Legion. Though the organization

    worked closely with the Tajammu al-Arabi (Arab Gathering) to advance

    Arab supremacy in the Sahel and Sudan, the Legion was usually dominated

    by Tuareg and Zaghawa recruits despite neither group having any Arab

    heritage.

    The Legion was deployed in the frontlines of a series of wars with Chad

    (supported by French Foreign Legion forces) in the 1980s. The Legion was

    disbanded in 1987 after Libya's final defeat in these clashes, but the

    ongoing depredations of Darfur's Arab Janjaweed have their origins in

    the Qaddafi-backed Tajammu al-Arabi. Many of the Tuareg who launched

    rebellions in Mali and Niger in the 1990s received their military

    training in the Islamic Legion.

    Mercenaries to the Rescue

    The current employment of mercenaries to do the "dirty work" usually

    assigned to Libya's paramilitary security police speaks volumes about

    the regime's rapidly dwindling faith in the willingness of state

    security forces to "fight to the last man" in defense of the regime.

    While the evidence of such recruitment is growing through video footage

    finding its way out of Libya, it is still impossible to tell in what

    numbers these mercenaries have arrived. Unconfirmed reports suggest the

    mercenaries arrived on a number of separate flights to both the Tripoli

    and Benghazi military airports, perhaps indicating a number of different

    recruitment sites (al-Arabiya, February 19; Jeel-Libya.net, February

    19). The recruitment appears to have been undertaken quickly, either

    without the knowledge of the intelligence agencies and security services

    of their countries of origin, or with the full knowledge and approval of

    their originating states. Through a combination of largesse, aggressive

    diplomacy and military support (in the form of training, presidential

    protection units and stockpiles of old Soviet armaments), Qaddafi

    remains an influential figure in many parts of West Africa.

    A number of mercenaries appear to have paid a high cost for their

    intervention in the Libyan uprising. Video has emerged of a number of

    slain "mercenaries" lying on the street or stretched out across a

    truck's hood for display. [3]

    Possible national origins for the mercenaries include:

    * Chad: Chadian mercenaries have been active in the Central African

    Republic for many years. There are also a large number of

    anti-government Chadian guerrillas who have recently found themselves

    unemployed after a peace treaty between N'djamena and Khartoum resulted

    in their expulsion from bases in Darfur. Many of these gunmen refused

    offers of repatriation to Chad, leaving them without work. Tensions

    between Chad and Libya eased after the International Court of Justice

    awarded the disputed Aouzou Strip to Chad in 1994. Since then, Chad's

    President Idriss Déby has cooperated with the Libyan leader on a number

    of initiatives and agreements. Déby has been away from Chad throughout

    most of the Libyan crisis, following a state visit to China with

    meetings in Nouakchott and Abidjan (AFP, February 21).

    * French-Speaking Sub-Saharan Africa: Tunisians, Nigeriens and

    Guineans are among those mercenaries who have been captured, some still

    bearing identification documents.

    * English-Speaking Sub-Saharan Africa: Some of the mercenaries are

    reported to speak English (Radio France Internationale, February 20).

    Reports from Ghana indicate Ghanaians are being offered as much as $2500

    per day to defend the Qaddafi regime. Advertisements for mercenaries

    have also begun to appear in Nigerian newspapers (Ghana Web, February 22).

    The Libyan Army

    In his televised address to the Libyan people, Mu'ammar's son, Sa'if

    al-Islam al-Qaddafi, told Libyans: "The army will play a big role [in

    defending the regime], it is not the army of Tunisia or Egypt. It will

    support Qaddafi to the last minute" (al-Sayda (Libyan State TV),

    February 20; Quryna.com, February 21).

    Bereft of real threats to its territory, whose security is guaranteed

    both by the strategic importance of Libya's ample oil reserves and

    Mu'ammar Qaddafi's considerable (if somewhat baffling) status in the

    African Union, Libya's "Guide" has been able to indulge in periodic

    purges of his officer corps while keeping most elements of his armed

    forces under-armed and short of ammunition. The exception to this is the

    32nd Brigade, popularly known as the "Khamis Brigade" after its leader,

    Khamis Abu Minyar al-Qaddafi, one of Mu'ammar Qaddafi's seven sons.

    Khamis is a graduate of the Libyan Military Academy in Tripoli and

    received further training in Moscow at the Frunze Military Academy and

    the General Staff Academy of the Russian Armed Forces. The Brigade under

    his command typically receives better arms, equipment and salaries than

    the rest of the army and serves as a kind of Praetorian Guard to defend

    the regime. Brigade members have been active in trying to repress the

    demonstrations.

    The Khamis Brigade was supplied with the British-made Bowman tactical

    communications and data system in a $165 million deal with General

    Dynamics UK, though the equipment has been modified through the removal

    of U.S. technology in the system (Defense News, May 8, 2008). [5] The

    Khamis Brigade has also taken part in joint exercises with the Algerian

    military (JANA [Tripoli], December 1, 2007).

    Since Libya reconciled with the UK in 2008, the latter has become a

    major supplier of military gear, and even military training, though

    London has now revoked arms export licenses to Libya (Guardian, February

    19). Units of the Special Air Service (SAS) have been involved in

    training Libyan Special Forces, unpopular duty for SAS veterans who were

    involved in a deadly decades-long struggle with the Libyan-armed Irish

    Republican Army (Telegraph, September 11, 2009). A December 2010 U.S.

    embassy cable released by Wikileaks also shows interest from Khamis

    al-Qaddafi and Sa'if al-Islam al-Qaddafi in obtaining U.S. made military

    equipment, including helicopters and parts for armored vehicles. [6]

    Aside from the Khamis Brigade, most of the rest of the military has

    access only to obsolete Soviet-era equipment after enduring years of

    sanctions. This situation is not necessarily regarded as unfavorable by

    the regime, as it diminishes the chance rebel officers could mount their

    own coup similar to Colonel Qaddafi's 1969 military takeover. Officers

    are subject to frequent transfers to prevent them from developing

    personal ties of loyalty with any one command. Though the senior ranks

    of the military are dominated by the "Guide's" own Qadhadfa tribe,

    rivalries within the officer corps tend to be encouraged rather than

    discouraged to prevent an atmosphere of cooperation that could possibly

    lead to the creation of a junta.

    Another son and prominent military figure is Colonel Mutassim

    al-Qaddafi. Mutassim received his training at the Cairo Military Academy

    before being given command of an elite unit in the Libyan army, where he

    gained a reputation for indiscipline and erratic behavior. At one point

    he was forced to take refuge in Egypt after reportedly marching on his

    father's residence at the Bab al-Azizya barracks in Tripoli with

    detachments of his artillery. In 2002 he returned to Libya, where he was

    forgiven and promoted to Colonel (Jeune Afrique, May 19, 2010). In

    January 2007, Mutassim was made head of the National Security Council

    (Jeune Afrique, February 7, 2009).

    Yet another son, Colonel Sa'adi Mu'ammar al-Qaddafi, took to local radio

    on February 19 to announce he had arrived in Benghazi to direct

    operations there (apparently after the resignation of Benghazi-based

    Colonel Abd al-Fatah Yunis), but little has been heard of him since (AP,

    February 19). First Lieutenant Hannibal Mu'ammar al-Qaddafi is a member

    of the military, but seems to play a minor role in comparison to his

    brothers.

    As the military's chief-of-staff and minister of defense, Major-General

    Abu Bakr Yunis Jaber was, until recently, one of the most powerful men

    in Libya. However, he appears to have been detained by Qaddafi after

    refusing to carry out orders for brutal repression of protesters in

    Libya's cities (al-Hurra, February 21). Major Abdel-Moneim al-Huni,

    Libya's most recent representative to the Arab League, issued a

    statement on February 22 on behalf of the "Leadership Council of the

    Libyan Revolution," demanding that General Abu Bakr Yunis be released to

    lead an interim government. Apparently intending to emulate the Egyptian

    model, al-Huni also appealed to serving officers and troops to abandon

    the regime: "You who know the honor of military service, I urge you to

    uproot this regime and take over power in order to end the bloodshed and

    maintain Libya's strategic interests and the unity of its land and

    people." He further described the use of mercenaries as the regime

    "signing its own death certificate" (Ahram Online, February 22).

    Qaddafi relies heavily on two generals from his own tribe, Sayed Qaddaf

    Eddam and Ahmed Qaddaf Eddam. Sayed is the military head of Cyrenaica,

    which has come largely under the control of protesters, while Ahmed is

    the "Guide's" point-man on Egyptian issues. Aside from Qaddafi and

    General Abu Bakr, Generals Mustapha Kharoubi and Khouildi Hamidi are the

    last active members of the 12-man 1969 Revolutionary Council, though

    both have been reduced to performing ceremonial roles.

    A Question of Loyalty

    Experiments in Green Book-inspired Jamahiriyah ("popular state")

    governance and unification with other Arab/African regimes may have

    worked against the development of a national identity. Loyalty to the

    Qaddafis also appears to be shallow; in eastern Libya the police are

    reported to have helped apprehend a number of mercenaries, while senior

    military officers are reported to have resigned in Benghazi and Sirte

    (France24.com, February 21).

    There have been many reports of low-paid conscripts and even their

    officers joining the ranks of the protesters in Benghazi, Darna and

    elsewhere (Telegraph, February 20). While the al-Fadhil Brigade in

    Benghazi appears to have gone over to the protestors after their

    headquarters was set on fire, there are reports that the al-Sibyl

    Brigade continues to be loyal (al-Jazeera, February 20). Benghazi police

    are reported to have defected to the protestors after witnessing the

    methods of the mercenaries (AP, February 21).

    Officials in Malta were surprised by two Libyan Air Force colonels who

    flew their Mirage F1 warplanes from Libya's Okba Ben Nafi airbase to

    Malta. The pilots said they flew low to evade radar detection and

    decided to come to Malta rather than carry out orders to bomb civilians.

    The Maltese military was also reported to be monitoring a Libyan warship

    said to be carrying defecting Libyan officers (Times of Malta, February

    21, February 22).

    Conclusion

    Though some Libyans might have been persuaded to desist by the regime's

    warnings of disaster and promises of imminent decentralization,

    organizational restructuring and the dismissal of many state officials,

    the introduction of mercenaries with orders to kill in the streets of

    Libya's cities seems likely to be the last straw before the collapse of

    the Qaddafi regime. Mercenaries from all quarters have frequently found

    work defending unpopular African regimes, but at best they have usually

    only prolonged the inevitable, their very presence an indication that a

    regime rules only through force rather than popular consensus,

    regardless of protests to the contrary.

    Ironically, it was Qaddafi himself who warned a gathering of Libyan

    security officials in Tripoli in 2004 to beware of infiltration efforts

    by "mercenaries, lunatics, infidels and people who pose a threat to

    security" (Great Jamahiriyah TV, April 14, 2004).

    Notes:

    1. See GF Abbott, The Holy War in Tripoli, 1912, pp.79-80.

    2. See J. Millard Burr and Robert O. Collins, Darfur: The Long Road to

    Disaster, Princeton N.J., 2008, p. 84.

    3. . ;
    http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EMwbg2Db5L4&featur….

    4. .

    5.
    .

    Comment by headjundi — Wednesday, February 23, 2011 @ 4:13 AM

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