In testimony the other day before the House Armed Services Committee, Adm. Eric Olson, the head of U.S. Special Operations Command had a lot of interesting things to say about the current state of USSOCOM. I thought this particular section was the most eye catching. Is anyone else thinking what I am thinking? lol –Matt
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ADMIRAL ERIC T. OLSON
COMMANDER
UNITED STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND
Introduction and History
Mr. Chairman and distinguished Members of the Committee, thank you for this opportunity to report on the state of the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM)…….
Service Enabling Capabilities
Demand for special operations forces is on the increase; yet, by their very nature, Special Operations Forces are limited in size and scope. I am already on record as stating that SOF cannot grow more than three-to-five percent per year in those key units and capabilities that must be developed within our own organizational structures and training pipelines. This growth rate will not meet the already obvious appetite for the effects of SOF in forward operating areas.
The solution, beyond the necessary continued steady and disciplined growth of specific special operations capabilities, is to mitigate the demand on SOF by developing and sustaining supporting capabilities within the Services that are beyond their organic needs, and can therefore be used in direct support of special operations commanders. This will enhance the impact of forward-deployed SOF without placing additional demand on SOF’s own limited enabling units. The enabling capabilities that must be provided in greater number by the Services include mobility, aerial sensors, field medics, remote logistics, engineering planners, construction, intelligence, regional specialists, interpreters/translators, communications, dog teams, close air support specialists, security forces and others that permit SOF operators to focus more directly on their missions. Assigned at the unit or detachment level to support joint SOF commanders away from main bases, the effects of such a combined force can be impressive.
Our goal is balance: first, to have sufficient organic SOF-peculiar enablers to permit rapid response to operational crises; and second, to have enabling capabilities assigned in direct support of SOF for longer term sustainment and expansion of the operation. We are and will be dependent upon our Service partners for key force enablers. The non-availability of these force enablers has become our most vexing issue in the operational environment. Another growing challenge, especially as we begin a responsible general purpose force drawdown in Iraq, is base operating support and personnel security for SOF remaining in dangerous areas after the larger force departs, as SOF cannot provide for itself.
Read the rest of the testimony Here.