A command and control procedure within which the subordinate is given extensive latitude, within the framework of the intention of the individual giving the order, in carrying out his mission. The missions are to include only those restraints which are indispensable for being able to interact with others, and it must be possible to accomplish them by making use of the subordinate’s forces, resources, and the authority delegated to him. Mission-oriented command and control requires uniformity in the way of thinking, sound judgment and initiative, as well as responsible actions at all levels.- German army regulations describe Auftragstaktik, from Parameters.
Part of what makes this blog so fun and interesting is the hunt for the great idea. I don’t care where it comes from, or who came up with it–to me, it is all about logic and reason. Either the idea is sound, or it is not. It should also be able to withstand the furnace of debate and scrutiny. Hence why I post such things.
But this is a simple concept to wrap your brain around, and yet so difficult to implement in institutions like the US military or various companies. To put this much freedom of operations into the hands of a leader is pretty tough for some CEO’s or Generals to handle. And as the author presented below, the German Army during WW 2 was the victim of a officer corps that was poorly constructed. But at the tactical level, the German Army was amazing, and this concept of Auftragstaktik is a big part of that.
Anyways, I will let the reader make their own determinations based on the articles below. The first is the most modern article on the concept and a big hat tip to Jorg Muth and Thomas Ricks for getting it out there. The second article is an old one, written by a German soldier and veteran of WW 2 named Gerhard Muhm. He went into detail on how Auftragstaktik was used in the German Army at the time. The final article is a snippet from Wikipedia, which will help to simplify and focus the reader on the core concepts.
It is also important to note that Intent is a very important theme in today’s military’s. It is the idea that everyone in the unit knows the intent or the mission and what must be accomplished. Commander’s intent is another way of putting that. There is a whole study on intent at wikipedia, and it is definitely worth your while to go through it to get a feel on how important it is to the various military units of the world.
Intent is a key capability in 21st century military operations and is a vital element to facilitate subordinates initiative (U.S Army 2003, para.1-69), self-synchronisation (Alberts et al. 1999, pp.175-180) and collaboration and cooperation (Alberts and Hayes 2007,pp.109-114) amongst team members in joint operations.
Now how does this apply to private industry or even offense industry? Well interestingly enough, there is a a lot of auftragstaktik going on already with private industry. No one tells companies how they are supposed to perform static security, convoy operations, or PSD. Even within companies, you see differences in mission accomplishment between the various contracts. So that is a very positive aspect of today’s PMC’s and PSC’s. Personally, I have seen the same missions accomplished differently in a multitude of companies that I have worked for. It is what makes the industry interesting to observe and be a part of. But as a result of these variations, private industry is able to evolve and develop SOP’s that are unique and effective. We also have some cross breeding going on with SOP’s/ideas, just because contractors are taking what they learned from prior contracts and bringing that with them to the next job for mission accomplishment.
On the flip side, our Defense Industry is purely focused on the ‘defense’. Which is fine, but it does not eliminate the enemy or reduce their numbers. For that, you need to create a Offense Industry, and concepts like Auftragstaktik or company intent will be very important to the accomplishment of a contract in this type of industry. It is also important to set up an offense industry that supports the intent of the principal or the country firing up such a machine. In other words, a country that constructs a offense industry should not be involved in telling companies ‘how’ they are to accomplish the task.
A great example is Executive Outcome’s contract in Sierra Leone. Would they have been successful if SL told the company how they were to accomplish the task? I don’t think so, and that would defeat the reason for hiring such a company in the first place. You give them the intent, and let them figure out the ‘how’.
Now of course this concept is not a strategic concept as the articles have mentioned below. Which is very important to remember if a offense industry is to be created. Countries must first have a sound strategy in place, and the offense industry must be assembled in such a way to support that strategy. That is a whole different post, but I guess where I am going with this is that what makes offense industry such a powerful concept is the idea of allowing companies the freedom to innovate and figure out how to accomplish the task.
Not only that, but they also have ‘incentive’ to do well. The goal should be to give them the intent, establish rules and boundaries that insure they do not hinder the overall strategy or harm other friendly units, provide adequate incentive, and set the industry free to accomplish the task. Then adjust and modify as necessary–all based on Kaizen and having a sound learning organization. –Matt
Jörg Muth on Command Culture and Auftragstaktik In The German Military
(posted at Best Defense)
Friday, September 9, 2011
By Jörg Muth
Auftragstaktik. The word sounds cool even when mangled by an American tongue. What it means, however, has always been elusive to Americans. The problematic translation of that core German military word into “mission type orders” completely distorts its meaning. Auftragstaktik does not denote a certain style of giving orders or a certain way of phrasing them; it is a whole command philosophy.
The idea originates with Frederick the Great, who complained after more than one battle that his highly experienced regimental commanders would not dare take action on their own but too often ask back for orders and thus waste precious time.
Nearly one hundred years later the military genius Helmuth Karl Bernhard Graf von Moltke was the first to formulate the concept of Auftragstaktik. Moltke was a diligent student of Frederick’s campaigns, of military history in general and philosophy. At a time when he was not yet famous and, not yet the victor of three wars, he observed the annual General Staff war games in 1858. The paperwork and the detailed orders appalled him because he knew that in war there was no time for such nonsense. During the war game critique he decreed that “as a rule an order should contain only what the subordinate for the achievement of his goals cannot determine on his own.” Everything else was to be left to the commander on the spot.
