I briefly read through this, as well as went through this summary by SWJ, and the one thing that struck me was that there was no mention of Incident Command? I have written about this in the past, and it still cracks me up that no one out there is catching on. There is already a framework and model for managing complex operations, that is consistently used with great success every summer during the fire seasons in the US. It was also used at ground zero during 9/11, the Space Shuttle crash back in 2003, and the Katrina Hurricane disaster. It is a system that is remarkably simple, yet scalable and easily understood by all. It is a command language and system that all the groups mentioned in this paper could easily understand and follow if implemented.
The question I have is why was there not one person on the panel of authors and experts, that had some kind of expertise in this department. A quick call to the National Interagency Fire Center in Boise, Idaho would have yielded some contacts. Matter of fact, if any of the authors are reading this, I have a point of contact that could help you out. He teaches the 400 series of Incident Command at NIFC, and was a Type 1 Incident Commander (kind of like a General of fire) and a Forest Management Officer.
I could be wrong, but it sounds like this think tank kind of missed the boat on this. Maybe an author could correct the record on why Incident Command wasn’t discussed or mentioned? Like I said, I want to be wrong on this, so please correct the record for me.
In my opinion, if we want to get serious about organizing complex operations, with a unified command that could join military and civilian operations, then this is the system you need. I have seen it first hand join together contractors, with federal/state resources, with multiple agencies, and with military and law enforcement even–all for fighting a complex fire operation. For fighting fires, Incident Command is the glue that joins the pieces of that effort, and it can certainly be applied to the current war effort. It deserves to be studied at the least and there is no need to reinvent the wheel. Thanks to Small Wars Journal for posting this. –Matt
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Civilian Surge: Key to Complex Operations
Posted by SWJ Editors on
February 6, 2009 3:07 PM
National Defense University’s Center for Technology and National Security Policy has just released an online report – Civilian Surge: Key to Complex Operations – by Hans Binnendijk and Patrick M. Cronin.
The United States needs to develop the capacity to conduct complex operations that require close civil-military planning and cooperation in the field. This study is comprehensive review of this national need and examines how the need can best be met.
Its main conclusion is that current efforts to build a civilian response capacity for complex operations are unfinished and that the Obama administration needs to dedicate additional attention, including new legislation and resources, to complete the task. It recommends what civilian capacity to build, how much of it is needed, and how to manage and organize it.
Here are the major findings by chapter:
Chapter 1 concludes that complex operations encompass 6 broad categories of missions, with 60 associated tasks, 48 of which in 5 categories are probably best performed by civilians. This chapter finds that 5,000 deployable, active-duty government civilians and 10,000 civilian reserves would be needed to perform these 48 tasks on a sustained basis in one large, one medium, and four small contingencies. In today’s global security environment, structuring civilian and military capabilities to meet this 1–1–4 standard is prudent. This requirement substantially exceeds current executive branch planning assumptions, which call for 2,250 active-duty civilians and 2,000 civilian reservists.
Chapter 2 finds that lead agency and lead individual approaches are inadequate to deal with complex missions involving multiple departments and agencies. It recommends the use of “empowered cross-functional teams” with sufficient authority and resources to control departmental and agency activities within the scope of specific mandates. The National Security Council’s oversight role also needs to be strengthened.
Chapter 3 concludes that DOD has adjusted well to its new, complex missions since 2003; that, in anticipation of constricting defense budgets, DOD needs to invest in high-end military capabilities; and that, as a result, DOD needs its civilian partners to build up their capacity to conduct complex operations. Recently, DOD has enhanced its authorities to deploy its own civilians, should other departments fail to deliver. DOD plans to organize and train these personnel should be more closely coordinated with similar planning by the State Department.
Chapter 4 recommends that the State Department concentrate on developing “S&R–savvy” diplomats, who should be plugged directly into “seventh-floor” executive crisis management activities. It further recommends that key interagency planning and operational functions should be moved out of the State Department to a new interagency coordinator, allowing it to more strategically target its resources for diplomatic readiness needs in underserved regions. Taken together, the findings in chapters 2 and 4 lead to the conclusion that a new, empowered cross-functional interagency team should inherit several of the functions of S/CRS.
Chapter 5 suggests that USAID should be the operational agency charged with training and equipping civilians for complex missions. This will require doubling its personnel strength and endowing it with new authorities akin to those associated in the past with the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and new funding to reimburse other agencies that provide personnel for overseas deployment. USAID also will need to undergo a significant cultural change. To promote that change, and to reflect its new mission, USAID might be renamed the Agency for Development and Reconstruction (USADR). The reconstituted USAID/USADR might have two basic divisions, one for each major function.
Chapter 6 demonstrates that domestic civilian agencies and the Intelligence Community have significant skills that would prove most useful to the successful completion of a complex operation. But overcoming bureaucratic, structural, and cultural barriers of domestic agencies may require special legislation. Domestic civilian agencies should be given a statutory mission to participate in overseas complex operations, just as many of them now have with respect to domestic contingencies, as well as modest budget increases to tie their new responsibilities into existing capacity deployment programs. The Intelligence Community is preoccupied with counterterrorism operations, and additional assets are needed to enable greater contributions to complex operations.
Chapter 7 notes that the use of contractors in U.S. military operations has been a constructive factor since the Revolutionary War. But the ratio of contractors to military personnel is at an all-time high, with the consequence that Federal departments and agencies are losing core competencies, contractors are not well supervised, and cost efficiencies may be less than estimated. The chapter recommends dropping the presumption that favors outsourcing civilian tasks in complex operations, instead increasing the government civilian workforce in some agencies and improving contractor oversight.
Chapter 8 assesses how the Federal Government might organize itself to educate and train the many civilians needed for future complex missions. Efforts to provide this education were initiated in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review but have stalled, in part because the demand for new educational programs has not been fully articulated or resourced and is resisted by those departments and agencies in which education has little traditional support. This chapter recommends that the incoming administration direct efforts to define and develop the learning elements of the emerging national security operations. This will require dedication and a commitment to resourcing across the executive branch and will call for the establishment of a new academic entity for this purpose, possibly at National Defense University.
Chapter 9 estimates the total cost of the required civilian capacity discussed in the first eight chapters to be about $2 billion annually. Some of these costs are already embedded in current executive branch budget requests. New approaches, such as a combined national security budget presentation, may be needed to enhance congressional support for these funds.
Chapter 10 discusses how the needed civilian capacity should connect to its military counterpart in an overseas operation. It concludes that important efforts at civil-military integration and cooperation have taken place within the confines of the military, but that these do not address the fundamental problem of the absence of civilian infrastructure to lead U.S. efforts during complex operations. The chapter recommends the creation of new regional Ambassadors’ Councils, surge capacity to absorb interagency influx at key Embassies, and easier civilian access to military transportation and materiel during a crisis.
Chapter 11 reminds us that homeland security events, such as the response to Hurricane Katrina and management of the consequences of a major terrorist attack, are also complex operations that require collaboration and skill sets similar to those needed in overseas operations. DOD will likely never be the lead agency in the homeland, given constitutional and legal constraints. Issues of state sovereignty and the unique relationship between a governor and a state’s National Guard—in other than Title 10 status—preclude a traditional command and control relationship, even within the uniformed community. Add Federal/state/local/tribal, and even private-sector entities to the mix, and complexity goes off the chart. Nonetheless, the synergies between homeland and overseas complex operations need better development to take full advantage of the similarities.
Chapter 12 notes that overseas complex operations are seldom undertaken by the United States alone, and that the civilian capacities of other nations should be harnessed at an early stage. Key international institutions include the United Nations, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the European Union, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund. Recent experience in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan indicates that coordination among these institutions has been inadequate, and that a “comprehensive approach” is needed. NATO is seeking to develop such a comprehensive approach with the European Union, but Turkey and Cyprus tend to veto such cooperation within their respective organizations, to the detriment of ongoing operations. A major effort is needed to address this problem.
Chapter 13 reminds readers that connecting with nongovernmental organizations and a broad representation of local actors is critical to success in complex operations. In fact, unless we are able to engage effectively with indigenous populations, we cannot achieve the political, social, and economic goals for which the military was committed in the first place. This chapter highlights six key steps to promote engagement with local actors. Success may depend on early engagement and planning, enabled by open communications networks with maximum sharing of unclassified information with civilians, an area that needs more emphasis.
Civilian Surge: Key to Complex Operations – Full Report by CTNSP.