Furthermore, the introduction of sophisticated weapons (e.g., ATGMs, MANPADS) could radically escalate the challenges faced by U.S. forces in Afghanistan, as it did for the Soviet Union in the 1980s.
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That quote up top is the one part I really clued in on, and I have talked about this in the New Rules of War posts, as well as the Toyota Horde post. Of course Israel thinks they have a counter to these types of munitions and tactics, and it will be interesting if they can truly stop this stuff. But I am skeptical.
The thing with anti-armor is that small teams armed with smart munitions, could also be armed with the knowledge on how to properly deploy that stuff. The brain is the weapon here.
Think of it this way. For one Javelin ‘fire and forget’ missile, you could have ten distraction troops all slinging RPG’s at the vehicle. Worse yet, think of ten troops firing .50 call long guns at the anti-missile system on the tank to destroy it, and then go for the kill with the big gun. I don’t care how bad ass a counter missile system mounted on a tank is, you cannot defend against a swarm attack like this. And this is nothing new. If anyone ever cared to read all the numerous books and manuals on the various ways of using anti-armor munitions, they would know this.
Also, look at the use of Stinger missiles by mujahideen during the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan. ‘Small and many’ teams armed with smart munitions were able to destroy many helicopters and cause all sorts of problems for the Soviets.
What limits smart munitions use amongst today’s enemies, is probably a number of factors. A better accounting of who makes it, and who they are selling the stuff too. Cost is another factor. Counter-terror operations are another factor. Training is definitely a factor, and an enemy force would either need a state sponsor to bring in these kinds of resources, or hunt around for some veterans of some military who know these new systems or knows anti-armor strategy at the small unit level.
I also think EFP’s are game changers. They are cheap to make and very difficult to defeat. An enemy who knows how to properly use these things and was a student of maneuver warfare, could very well do some damage to an advancing armored column. Especially if they were able to prep the battlefield. Or get this, how about suicide EFP bombers. Guys who run up to tanks at the perfect distance and direction, and trigger the munitions themselves. Of course they would be martyred, but they would also take out a tank or APC. If you think like today’s enemies, a tactic like this is not that far fetched. Below, I posted the conclusion of the paper, but I highly recommend reading the entire thing. Enjoy. –Matt
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Military Capabilities for Hybrid War: Insights from the Israel Defense Forces in Lebanon and Gaza
By David E. Johnson
Relevance of the IDF Experience for the U.S. Army
Although the U.S. security situation is much different from that of Israel, similarities do exist.
Both nations believe they must prepare for challenges across the range of military operations.
Therefore, the following insights from recent Israeli experience have relevance for the U.S.
Army:
• The basics of combined arms fire and maneuver are necessary for successful operations
against opponents with capabilities like Hezbollah and Hamas. These hybrid opponents
create a qualitative challenge that demands combined arms fire and maneuver at lower
levels, despite their generally small-unit structures.