This was a memo passed on to retired General Barry McCaffery in regards to the recent battle in Nuristan, and Thomas Ricks posted it on his blog over at Foreign Policy. For me, I read these notes and tried to envision what these guys were up against. I also read this and tried to understand what the camp defenses were, and how they faired. From the sound of it, it looks like a lot was riding on Close Air Support (CAS) in the plan. It looked like the enemy knew about how long it took for CAS to show up, and the enemy also knew that if it fought close quarters with us, that CAS could not be used. Pretty basic stuff, when it comes to guerilla warfare type tactics and it sounds like this was the method in this battle.
Our guys burned up their 7.62 fast, and their Ammo Supply Point was in the hands of the enemy early in the battle. Not good. That, and the ANA forces assigned to the COP ran off out of fear. Not good either. Luckily CAS did show up, and our troops did fight bravely and was able to kill many of the enemy. But luck is nothing to depend upon.
What gets me on this one, is what would have happened if this assault went down when the weather was crappy? Which brings me back to my original thought about depending upon CAS in your defensive plan. If anything, you must have multiple plans that stand the test of the ‘what ifs’. There should be a plan in place that should account for CAS not being able to show up.