Feral Jundi

Wednesday, December 28, 2011

Industry Talk: Civilians To Guard Marine Base In Afghanistan

This is fantastic news. Check this out. In the solicitation below, they are going to use ‘Best Value Criteria’ for the selection of what company they will go with. So that means they will not be selecting companies by who is the ‘lowest priced and technically acceptable’, or what I call the lowest bidder. Outstanding news and this is exactly what I and others have been harping on for awhile now.

You don’t pick your doctor based on who is the ‘lowest priced, technically acceptable’ and it does not make sense to pick a security company like that either. In both cases, lives are at risk and at Camp Leatherneck, our Marines deserve better.

Now of course this also requires the government to do their due diligence and actually find a good company to do business with. And if they can implement key components into the contract to either keep that company in check, or have the means to get rid of them and go with a better partner, then they should exercise that option. They should also work hard and really understand the dynamics of the company and how they treat their people, once they are hiring and fielding folks. A company can talk a great game, but the proof is in the pudding. And the test is if the base security is sound and the services delivered are exactly what the contract stipulates.

The thing the government should also focus on is the happiness of the guards themselves. Are they getting paid what they were promised, is the company treating them fairly, are they paying their people on time, are they pleased with the living conditions, are they happy with their leadership, is the company giving them good weapons and kit, and is the company doing all they can to take care of their people. Because if you have a happy guard force, then they will work that much harder to keep their job and do well on that contract. Sure it is a war zone and there will be some discomfort with the assigned duties and the environment itself, but there are still a lot of areas that a company can control and do well at in order to keep their folks happy.

The government should also focus on the leadership out in the field and ask them if they are getting the support necessary from headquarters? You get some of these companies that could care less about their managers out in the field, and are horrible at supporting them when for example they are trying to discipline a contractor or get certain equipment that is vital to the mission. Like I said, headquarters should be purely focused on making sure their people on the ground in that war zone are happy and taken care of. If not, then that is when you get the high attrition rate or you have leaders and workers that slack off and could care less about doing a good job. You also have a hard time properly managing these contracts if you have folks that are constantly leaving because they hate working for the company.

The other thing about this contract that perked me up is that they will be fielding 166 guards, and those guards are all to be vetted with a secret security clearance and come from the US or Commonwealth nations. That is great, and that means you will not see a TWISS deal for this contract where Ugandans or similar contractors are guarding the facility.

This is the first such requirement recognized at a Marine Corps installation that requires a higher force-protection standard; therefore, this procurement will be restricted to the citizens of the United States, United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, or Canada (FVEY EXPAT). This procurement will contain Classified Information. Therefore, Offerors must also have a current facility clearance, have the appropriate business licenses to carry arms, and operate as a business in Afghanistan.

The other element of this contract that is interesting to me is the weapons. For this deal, contractors will be operating some serious firepower. Which is great, and that is the way it should be. It also explains why there is more of a focus on a ‘higher force-protection standard’.

Personnel will be expected to wear body armor, man security towers and be familiar with the M16A4 rifle, M4 carbine and M9 pistol, plus crew-served weapons such as the M240B heavy machine gun and M2 .50-caliber machine gun. A typical workweek will last up to 72 hours, military documents said.

I wouldn’t mind seeing some mortars or even a Carl Gustav or two thrown in there? Why not some Mk 19’s as well? I mean if you are going to give contractors M 240B’s and M2’s, then why not give them as many tools as necessary to get the job done? But if the Marines feel this appropriate for the base defense, or that maybe a military unit will be manning the bigger more lethal stuff, then that is fine.

Oh, and one more thing. I personally like the guard shift system of three shifts of eight hours. The 12 hour shift is too long and I question how sharp guards can actually be after doing 12 hour shifts for multiple months? Having worked both types of shifts, it is my opinion that the 8 hour shift is the optimum schedule for keeping a guard force happy and sharp. It also helps to have one day off a week, just so guards can disconnect from the job and just relax. It is little things like that, that will make all the difference in the world on these contracts. Either way, I am glad to see that someone is listening to reason when it comes to these contracts. –Matt

 

Civilians to guard Marine base in Afghanistan
By Dan Lamothe
Wednesday Dec 28, 2011
U.S. commanders want civilian contractors to provide military security at the Marine Corps’ largest base in Afghanistan as a planned withdrawal of U.S. forces from the war-torn country expands.
The contracted security personnel will guard Camp Leatherneck, the sprawling, 1,500-acre-plus installation that serves as the Corps’ main hub of operations in Helmand province and home to II Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward), commanded by Maj. Gen. John Toolan. To date, coalition forces have handled security at Leatherneck, but commanders have discussed using contractors for months in anticipation of a smaller Marine footprint, said Lt. Col. Riccoh Player, a Marine spokesman at Leatherneck.

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Sunday, December 11, 2011

Industry Talk: Afghanistan’s Karzai Extends Private Security Closure Deadline

Filed under: Afghanistan,Industry Talk — Tags: , , , — Matt @ 9:23 AM

Boy, isn’t this a crack up? This was such big news within the industry when it first came out. But it looks like reality has hit and it is just not feasible for them to put together this ‘replacement force’ in time. Well….. I guess we will revisit this deadline in September of 2013. –Matt

 

Afghanistan’s Karzai extends private security closure deadline
11 Dec 2011
By Mirwais Harooni
Afghan President Hamid Karzai scrapped on Sunday a March 2012 deadline he had set for the closure of private security firms, giving them until September 2013 to operate in the country.
Karzai, a frequent critic of private security companies, has previously set dates for the cessation of their work in Afghanistan, but each time the deadline has been extended.
He did not say why he was giving the firms an extra 18 months, but the second half of this year has seen some of the bloodiest attacks on civilians and soldiers in the past decade.
“We give permission for them (to carry on working) for one and a half years more, and one and a half years later (in September 2013) our minister … will close them all,” Karzai said.
Karzai, speaking at an anti-corruption event in the capital Kabul, said the prevalence of security contractors weakened the state by providing many of the services that the public sector otherwise would.
“Another reason why the Afghan government is not able to tackle corruption is a parallel administration to the Afghan government,” he said.

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Thursday, November 3, 2011

Publications: Contractor Support Of USCENTCOM AOR, 4th Quarter FY 2011

The big news here is that there are 52,700 DoD contractors in Iraq, which represents a 19% decrease from the 3rd quarter of this year. They predict that there will be around 14,000 to 15,000 DoD and DoS contractors through FY 2012.

For Afghanistan, there are currently 101,800 DoD contractors and this represents a 9.3% increase from the 3rd quarter of this year. Local nationals make up 49.8% of the DoD contractor workforce. –Matt

 

Contractor Support Of USCENTCOM AOR, 4th Quarter FY 2011

Tuesday, November 1, 2011

Industry Talk: Report Details Problems For The PSC Replacing ‘Afghan Public Protection Force’

Asked if he would be forced to end contracts if the situation was not resolved, one development company official said, “Absolutely.”
“We apply what we call the son and daughter standard,” said the official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity in order to avoid alienating American and Afghan government officials. “Would we send our sons and daughters out there to do this work, and the answer is no.”

Boy, who couldn’t see this one coming? lol Of course Afghanistan is not able to put together this Afghan Public Protection Force.  As you all remember, this was the force that was supposed to replace private security forces in Afghanistan.

As that quote up top hints at, this APPF concept is not exactly giving all of the aid and development groups the confidence they require in order to send ‘their sons and daughters’ to Afghanistan. I wouldn’t trust my life in the hands of such a force, even if half of this report is true. This quote below is what perked me up:

The assessment makes it clear that much work needs to be done. Of 166 “essential” criteria to determine if the government was able to recruit, train and sustain the guard force, less than a third could be fully met, the assessment found. Sixty-three of the measurements could not be met at all.

Really?  So here is my suggestion. Private industry is really the only solution here, and the Afghans need to face reality, or everyone is going to pack up and leave. And that is a lot of money and projects just going out the door.

My suggestion is to implement a license and bonded PSC system. Streamline the licensing process, and tell the companies to put their money where their mouth is if they want to operate.  If they violate the contract, then they are fined via the surety bond. If they violate the terms of the license, then suspend the license. If they break a law, then prosecute those individuals. But the point is, find a way to work with private industry and do not try to re-invent the wheel. Let the various aid and development groups in country choose what licensed security they want, and focus on managing and regulating that. –Matt

 

Report Details Problems for Afghan Security Force Plan
By RAY RIVERA
November 1, 2011
KABUL, Afghanistan — President Hamid Karzai’s plan to disband private security companies that protect billions of dollars worth of aid projects and replace them with government forces is fraught with problems and unlikely to meet the president’s March deadline to complete the transition, according to a six-month assessment of the program.
The assessment, conducted by NATO and the Afghan Interior Ministry, outlines dozens of issues that have slowed the development of the new security force and raises questions about the government’s capacity to carry out and sustain the program and others as international aid money and military support dwindle in coming years.
The report, a copy of which was obtained by The New York Times, comes as international development companies are becoming increasingly worried about the security of their workers, many of whom are Afghans.

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Sunday, October 30, 2011

Aviation: Contract Aircraft, Non-military Aircraft Losses In Iraq And Afghanistan Wars

What I wanted to do here is put together a list of all of the contract aviation losses in both wars. Thanks to wikipedia, it was easy to organize this and put it all together. If anyone has information they would like to add, or if you see some missing aircraft losses in this post, let me know in the comments.

Also, if you follow the links, they will take you to the overall aviation losses in these wars. In Iraq, the Kiowa Helicopter and the Apache really took a hit. Lots of crashes and combat losses there. But they were also heavily used.

In Afghanistan, I would have thought there would be more losses on both the military and civilian side. The CH 47 was the top aircraft that crashed or was shot down. The Blackhawk was right behind this aircraft. Although this war is not over, and these numbers could reach Iraq levels in a few years.

The big one in Afghanistan is the necessary power to get up to those elevations, and the CH 47 is a work horse for that. Hence why this was the top aircraft that crashed, because it gets the most use.

The total losses for military and civilian aircraft in the Iraq war was 133 rotary wing (with 43 lost to hostile fire) and 24 fixed wing losses (with 2 to hostile fire, and 2 to friendly fire).

In Afghanistan, it is 103 rotary wing (with 17 lost to hostile fire) and 23 fixed wing (with 1 lost to hostile fire on ground).

With those statistics, you get a good idea as to what the real danger is of flight in the war zones. The enemy is certainly a threat, but the environment/pilot error/equipment failure is what causes the majority of these crashes.

Also, it would be great to see our military or some think tank go through all of these accidents and combat losses, and find out if there is a better aircraft that could have been used for these types of missions. Sometimes the best aircraft is not necessarily the most expensive or fancier aircraft, but the one that can perform the job in the worst kind of conditions specific to that region or war zone. A hellfire missile fired from a Cessna Caravan, is no different than a hellfire missile fired from an Apache helicopter.

I guess my point is, are we using the correct aircraft with the best survivability and capability for the job that is required? We lost a lot of Kiowas, Apaches, CH 47’s, and Blackhawks in this war, and you wonder if there are aircraft that could have been better suited for these missions?

The other thing to think about is legacy aircraft for these countries when we leave. Both Iraq and Afghanistan are purchasing and using Cessna Caravans, and that is a great multipurpose aircraft that they could use. It is also cheap to keep running and pretty dependable. But once we give these countries the really expensive aircraft to operate and maintain, then how do we expect them to be able to afford using these things? And even with our own operations and the state of the US economy, we should be considering all options for aircraft, based on the requirements of the mission. It is not against the law to be more cost effective in war, and I have to think that there are cheaper options for some of the stuff we are doing in these conflicts. –Matt

 

Contract aircraft, non-military aircraft losses in the Iraq War
2009
July 17, 2009 – An MD-530F contracted to Xe (formerly Blackwater) crashes at Butler Range outside Baghdad. Two pilots died. The cause was not known.
2008
November 13, 2008 – An Antonov An-12 crashes after takeoff from Al Asad Air Base, killing all 7 crew members. Six members of the crew and one passenger died, three of them were Russians. The crew also consisted of a Belarusian, two Ukrainians and an Indian citizen.
2007
March 7, 2007 – A privately-contracted Mil Mi-8 helicopter from the Republic of Georgia crashes due to technical failures, injuring its three Ukrainian crewmembers, and several Iraqi passengers.
January 31, 2007 – A Blackwater USA Bell 412 helicopter is shot down under fire near Karma during a flight between Al Hillah and Baghdad. A US military helicopter rescues the passengers and crew.
January 23, 2007 – A Blackwater USA MD 530F helicopter is shot down by hostile fire in Baghdad. All of the 5 man crew are killed in the incident, likely executed after surviving the crash. The remaining survivor was also killed under unclear circumstances, when another Blackwater helicopter descended to the crash site.
January 9, 2007 – A Moldovan Antonov An-26 crashes near Balad in the 2007 Balad aircraft crash, killing 34 of the 35 on board.
2005
May 30, 2005 – A Comp Air 7SL aircraft with the Iraqi Air Force crashes in eastern Iraq, killing four Americans and an Iraqi on board.
April 21, 2005 – A Bulgarian Mil Mi-8 is shot down north of Baghdad, killing the 11 civilians on board, including six American contractors, three Bulgarian pilots, one of them is executed shortly after the crash, and two Fijian guards.
Link to Wikipedia here.
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Contract aircraft, non-military aircraft losses in Afghanistan War
2011
July 6, 2011: IL-76 cargo plane, registered 4K-AZ55, was destroyed in an accident near Bagram Air Base, Afghanistan. The plane is said to have flown into the side of a mountain at about 12,500 feet (3,800 meters).The transport plane carried a total of 18 tons of cargo for the NATO-led forces at Bagram Air Base.

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