Just a heads up, John was one of Rumsfeld’s advisors. lol But he does bring up some good points to think about, and I wanted to put them out there for the FJ readership to analyze. Here is a quick run down of the rules the author came up with:
Rule 1: “Many and Small” Beats “Few and Large.”
Rule 2: Finding Matters More Than Flanking.
Rule 3: Swarming Is the New Surging.
I guess the common theme of it all, is getting smaller and more mobile, in order to defeat a smaller and more mobile enemy. I just wonder if today’s militaries are even capable of this kind of flexibility? Because if we haven’t been able to get there yet, then when will we?
Better yet, if you are reading this and would like an interesting thought to ponder, here it is. How could a PMC use this information against an enemy it was tasked with destroying? The interesting angle with PMC’s is that the company with the better strategy and tactics, will win. So if these new rules of warfare are sound, then they could be applied by an army or PMC for today’s battles, and they should come out victorious. Right?
Or are these concepts really that radical, and just a rehash of older strategy? I tend to go with this position, and today’s strategists have a tendency to just repackage old themes. The proof in the pudding is for John Arquilla to apply his rules in a war game in which the opposition is let’s say some player taking the side of Al Qaeda. Either way, it is food for thought, and I would like to hear what you guys think. –Matt
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The New Rules of War
The visionary who first saw the age of “netwar” coming warns that the U.S. military is getting it wrong all over again. Here’s his plan to make conflict cheaper, smaller, and smarter.
BY JOHN ARQUILLA
MARCH/APRIL 2010
Every day, the U.S. military spends $1.75 billion, much of it on big ships, big guns, and big battalions that are not only not needed to win the wars of the present, but are sure to be the wrong approach to waging the wars of the future.
In this, the ninth year of the first great conflict between nations and networks, America’s armed forces have failed, as militaries so often do, to adapt sufficiently to changed conditions, finding out the hard way that their enemies often remain a step ahead. The U.S. military floundered for years in Iraq, then proved itself unable to grasp the point, in both Iraq and Afghanistan, that old-school surges of ground troops do not offer enduring solutions to new-style conflicts with networked adversaries.
So it has almost always been. Given the high stakes and dangers they routinely face, militaries are inevitably reluctant to change. During World War I, the armies on the Western Front in 1915 were fighting in much the same manner as those at Waterloo in 1815, attacking in close-packed formations — despite the emergence of the machine gun and high-explosive artillery. Millions were slaughtered, year after bloody year, for a few yards of churned-up mud. It is no surprise that historian Alan Clark titled his study of the high command during this conflict The Donkeys.
Even the implications of maturing tanks, planes, and the radio waves that linked them were only partially understood by the next generation of military men. Just as their predecessors failed to grasp the lethal nature of firepower, their successors missed the rise of mechanized maneuver — save for the Germans, who figured out that blitzkrieg was possible and won some grand early victories. They would have gone on winning, but for poor high-level strategic choices such as invading Russia and declaring war on the United States. In the end, the Nazis were not so much outfought as gang-tackled.