Feral Jundi

Friday, May 28, 2010

Technology: Vaper Wake Detection Dogs For Explosives… And COIN?

Filed under: Afghanistan,Tactics,Technology — Tags: , , , , , , — Matt @ 11:47 AM

   After reading this, I was wondering to myself if these dogs could be used to sniff out Taliban or Al Qaeda operatives in population centers?  This team of scientists have actually bred a dog to detect the scent plume of individuals, and the level of sensitivity and utility of these types of animals are only limited by the imagination of the handlers.

   Here is one way I could envision using these dogs.  Enemy combatants that think they can disappear into population centers, could technically be tracked into those population centers by teams using these dogs and tracker teams.  All teams would have to do is patrol extensively through the crowds or set up check points and use the dogs to find folks that have trace explosive scents on their body.  To be able to sniff out entire crowds, like dogs sniff cars now, would make the game of finding these guys a little easier.

   These vapor wake or VW dogs could also be used to track down the IED teams or ambush teams.  Tracker dogs could sniff the wires of the device or even the spent brass, locate the position of the team and further get a stronger scent. The tracking team would probably follow the tracks into a population center, and that is where the VW dogs come in.  Once in the population center, do a cordon of the area, and then send in the VW dog teams.  You could put them at check points, and send guys in to sniff the crowds. The basic idea is that the dogs could be used to sniff groupings of humans in order to seek out the combatant, thus taking away a prime hiding spot for today’s enemies. If the village doesn’t want to rat the guy out, the dog could also be used as leverage in the negotiations with the village leaders.

   Either way, all and any thoughts should be given to using such animals for separating the enemy from the population, as well as finding combatants with explosives on them. –Matt

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Owen

Could Owen, the Capitol Police’s Vapor Wake detection dog, be used for tracking operations in Afghanistan?

Vapor Wake Detection

The Vapor Wake Detection (VWD) Canine Team is a standard explosives detection canine team with the additional ability and training to detect carried or body-worn explosives.  The VWD canine samples the plume of air coming off a person and/or what they are carrying as the person passes through a choke point or within a crowd.  The canines can also detect an explosives vapor-wake after the person has transited an area and follow the vapor-wake to the explosive source.  The canines have been exceptionally successful in this form of detection in areas with a large congestion of pedestrian traffic without impeding traffic flow.

The canine is specifically bred and prepared its entire life to succeed at this type of work.  The puppy enters the Detector Dog Raising Program upon birth.  We engineer various environmental exposures and develop the puppy over the first 12 months of its life.  We use primarily Sporting Breeds for this activity due to the close proximity to people the canine must work.  Additionally, Sporting Breed can operate within a crowd causing less, if not any, disruption.  After the puppy, or now adult canine, completes the Detector Dog Raising Program it returns to Auburn University (AU) Canine Detection Training Center (CDTC).

The canine receives six weeks of vigorous training at the Canine Detection Training Center before a handler is assigned.  Upon the student/handler’s arrival they enter as a team into a 10-week basic explosives handler course.  Upon graduating the basic course the team receives a minimum of two additional weeks of training in their operational environment.  Continued training in the operational environment is critical to the team’s continued success.

Auburn’s College of Veterinary Medicine has several years of developing this program into what we feel is a strong and capable detection tool in the fight against terrorism.  Additionally, we’ve developed evaluation procedures/guidelines for certification which ensure the team is performing at an extremely high rate of proficiency.  Our Vapor-Wake work is copy write and patent pending.

Link to Auburn University College of Veterinary Medicine here.

Vaper Wake Video here.

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A nose for explosives

By Jordy Yager

05/25/10

It seemed like a normal morning last Wednesday as hordes of Senate staffers made their way through the Lower Senate Park to get to work by 9 a.m. But Owen, one of the U.S. Capitol Police’s newest hires, was weaving through the crowds, conducting serious undercover work.

Owen has been rigorously trained in a cutting-edge explosive-sniffing technique known as vapor wake. Owen also has a tail that wags. He is a black Labrador.

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Saturday, April 24, 2010

Afghanistan: The Taliban Fear Contractors

Filed under: Afghanistan,Industry Talk,Strategy — Tags: , , , , , , — Matt @ 1:52 AM

    The attacks “are not about armed confrontation. They are about subversion of the government,” said Terrence K. Kelly, a senior researcher at the Washington-based RAND Corporation who has studied how rebuilding efforts work in war zones. America’s strategy counts on development work to increase the legitimacy and reach of the Karzai government. With these attacks the Taliban can “turn off the delivery of services — which makes the government look bad,” he said.

    USAID insists it will not scale back its work in Afghanistan because of the attacks, according to Rebecca Black, the agency’s deputy mission director for Afghanistan.

*****

    Break guerillas’ moral-mental-physical hold over the population, destroy their cohesion, and bring about their collapse via political initiative that demonstrates moral legitimacy and vitality of government and by relentless military operations that emphasize stealth/fast-tempo/fluidity-of-action and cohesion of overall effort.

     *If you cannot realize such a political program, you might consider changing sides! -Page 108, Patterns of Conflict, Col. John Boyd

*****

   They must fear us, if they feel it is necessary to attack us. They know that we are out in the towns of Afghanistan, connecting with the people, and winning them over with jobs and support.  And when we say we are doing this in the name of the Afghan government, and people see the fruits of this labor, well then that makes the government look good.  Happy people, happy government, and sad sad sad Taliban. lol  It also makes the Taliban’s shadow government sad, because now they have to contend with the goodwill the contractors are spreading.

   So what does this mean?  From a strategist point of view, and from a COIN point of view, my people (contractors) are actually connecting with the Afghans and making an impact.  We are the civilian face of the war effort, and the Taliban fear us. They must, if they are purposely trying to attack us–I thought we didn’t matter?

   It also means that we should be doing more of it.  If the Taliban fear what we are doing, then I say increase the effort and further support the various programs that we are involved with out there. Focus on the programs that make the Afghan government look good, and makes the Taliban shadow government look frivolous and pathetic. Keep connecting with the people and providing them with jobs and purpose.

   Now on to another factor of these attacks.  Because the US and ISAF militaries are so hung up on living on the big box FOBs and commuting to work, the Taliban and their shadow government is pushing around the population and terrorizing them into doing what they want.  That is what shadow governments do–they undermine the current government with the idea of making them look illegitimate or ineffectual.  That shadow government will do everything it can to either win over the population, or impose their will on the population.  In order to stop that shadow government, you need to provide a ‘big stick’ in the area that will put the smack down on these guys. You also have to be better at influencing the people than the shadow government. It also helps that the current government is legitimate and not corrupt in the eyes of the people.

   And that is a big problem.  Crazy Karzai and his clown posse is not helping things at all, and in turn, the people have no respect for the government. It will also hurt the troops and police morale, both of the Afghans and of the Coalition.  No one likes working for a loser.

   Ideally, if you can’t change Karzai’s tune, then he should be voted out by the people. Unfortunately, Karzai is rigging the voting booths, and that simple act of screwing with the electoral process is to me the one area that needs to be fixed.  Why would people vote to change out a leader, if they cannot trust that their vote is being counted?  If we are in this war for the long haul, the goal should be to clamp down on election fraud and use every bit of muscle we can to ensure that it is fair. In fact, we should be planning for the next election, and learn from past efforts of worthless elections. We can also use a big stick to beat down this shadow government in the meantime.

   We must get the troops out into the population centers. (FOBs equals few and large, COP’s equals many and small-New Rules of War)  Do it Ramadi style, and convoy right into the worst parts of these towns and cities, and move right on in with a well supported platoon or company. Pick a city block, pay the owners of the block and homes really well, and then walk the beat like a cop.  The image the people should have, is a troop presence, mixed with an Afghan police presence, all with the expressed desire of protecting the people and pushing out this shadow government and enemy forces.  This would be the big stick in these areas, and with this kind of presence, they could also protect the various contractors out there that are trying to get aid out to the people. Clear, hold, build.

    We must protect and serve the people, and to do that, we need to get out there and live where they live.  Or troops can continue to commute to their job site, and protect the people when it is convenient.  Meanwhile, the contractors outside the wire, will continue to be the focus of the Taliban, and the Taliban shadow government will continue to do what they want. Ideally, we must have sound leadership in the Afghan government as well or something the people can respect. Boyd made a point on emphasizing this as well. (see quote up top)

   I would also like to say that I am not alone in this thinking.  Tim from Free Range International has an excellent post on the same subject and I highly recommend his blog to further your research on the matter.-Matt

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Attacks against contractors surging in Afghanistan

By NOOR KHAN and TIM SULLIVAN

April 24, 2010

KANDAHAR, Afghanistan — The message, very often, is sent with bloodshed.

A suicide bombing last week on a fortified Kandahar guesthouse shared by Western contracting companies killed four Afghans and injured several Americans. An Afghan engineer was shot dead in March as he helped inspect a school not far from the Pakistan border. An Afghan woman who worked for a U.S.-based consulting firm was shot by motorbike-riding gunmen as she headed home in this southern city.

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Friday, March 26, 2010

Afghanistan: Protecting Telecom Should Be A Priority, And How Private Industry Can Help

Filed under: Afghanistan,PMC 2.0,Technology — Tags: , , , , , , , , , — Matt @ 3:43 AM

   I have read both of these stories below and I am in absolute disbelief that we are allowing this to happen?  Protecting cell towers and telecommunications in Afghanistan should be a wartime priority.  For COIN or counter-terrorism operations, this is your connection to the people, and to not protect that connection is just stupid.  Who the hell is in charge, and why are they allowing the Taliban to do this?

   So with that said, if today’s military strategists and war planners cannot do the job of protecting this stuff, then my suggestion is to contract it out.  Private industry could totally protect each and every cell tower, and entire contract vehicles could be set up to do such a thing. You could actually set it up for world-wide telecommunications protection services (WTPS), just because cell towers and phones will be vital to the war effort in those places as well. Both the troops and civilian contractors use cell phones for operations, as well as the civilian populations for their commerce and day to day rebuilding activities of their towns and cities.  To allow the Taliban or anyone to shut that down or mess with it, is just dumb.

     I can’t stress enough on how important this stuff is, and I am floored that it is not a priority in the war.  It’s right up there with logistics.  Because more than likely, the tips that will come in and lead to the capture of high value terrorists (like Bin Laden), will come via a cellphone call or text message from a pissed off villager.  You allow that to shut down and you have just effectively shot yourself in the foot.

   Anyway, private industry will step up if the military doesn’t want to take this on. Hell, DoS or DoD could take charge of this…… that’s if anyone cares. –Matt

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Afghan Cell Carriers Follow Taliban Rules

by Alex Sundby

March 26, 2010

Afghanistan’s cell phone companies and the Taliban have formed a kind of detente in the southern and eastern parts of the wartorn country. The phone companies shut down their cell towers at night, preventing local residents from discreetly calling coalition military tip lines. In exchange, Taliban militants don’t target the costly cell towers with explosives.

It’s a part of day-to-day life The Wall Street Journal explores at length. The deal between the phone companies and the Taliban isn’t a secret to the Afghan government with the country’s communications minister telling the newspaper, “We understand that in some areas, unfortunately, there is no other way … We don’t have security to protect the towers.”

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Aviation: DynCorp Flies AU Peacekeepers To Somalia

Filed under: Aviation,Somalia — Tags: , , , , — Matt @ 12:35 AM

     “The military stalemate is less a reflection of opposition strength than of the weakness of the Transitional Federal Government. Despite infusions of foreign training and assistance, government security forces remain ineffective, disorganized and corrupt,” the report stated. “The government owes its survival to the small African Union peace support operation, AMISOM, rather than to its own troops.” 

*****

   Bravo to DynCorp for contributing to the survival of the TFG, and I am sure NATO is happy as well.  As you can see with the article, Uganda is very important to the AU mission and without these forces, Mogadishu would fall into the hands of extremists.

   On the other hand, we are yet again supporting a weak government in their fight against determined islamic extremists.  When are we going to pick a winner for once, or back a government that has a spine and the ability to make things happen out there?  Because now we are in a position where the AU will probably be doing all of the fighting to protect the TFG in Mogadishu, because the government military forces are so disorganized and pathetic. Nor is there any concerted effort to really protect or win over the people, and that is how the extremists win.

   Let’s look at this another way.  We are fighting the same kind of fight against the Taliban in Afghanistan.  The West has the most modern military in the world, with all of these resources at it’s disposal, and we are still going at it after all of these years.  It is only the last couple years where we have really started to kick in the whole COIN emphasis on operations, and retool for that fight.

    Now look at Somalia, with it’s lack of a strong government or organized army. It is at a severe disadvantage when combating an islamic extremist enemy who is using the same tactics and strategy as it’s partner networks throughout the world. I know we have this aversion to ‘Americanizing’ the war in Somalia.  But if you look at all the pieces, you kind of wonder if Somalia even has a chance? And to a larger extent, are we ready for Somalia to be conquered by the enemy and deal with the propaganda value of such a victory? –Matt

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U.S. contractor flies AU peacekeepers to Somalia

State department says U.S. has no plans to increase military’s role

By John VandiverMarch 23, 2010

STUTTGART, Germany — U.S.-contracted flights, working under the NATO banner, ferried some 1,700 Ugandan troops into Mogadishu, Somalia, last week in response to an African Union request for transportation support, alliance officials said in a news release.

The troop movements were made as government officials in the Somali capital are preparing to launch a military offensive to reclaim parts of the city from al-Shabaab — an extremist group with al-Qaida links.

The airlift, which ran from March 5 through March 16, was conducted by the U.S.-contracted DynCorp International. In addition to shuttling troops into Somalia, the airlift also flew 850 Ugandan troops out of Mogadishu, NATO said.

Tensions have been on the rise in Mogadishu as the fragile Somali transitional government has been unable to turn the tide against Islamic extremist groups that seek to seize control of the country and impose a harsh form of Sharia law. And as AU forces dig in for the upcoming fight, a March 10 report by the U.N. Monitoring Group of Somalia raises questions about whether Somalia’s weak security forces and dysfunctional government are capable of achieving any significant gains.

(more…)

Wednesday, January 27, 2010

Publications: Pseudo Operations And COIN: Lessons From Other Countries, By Dr. Lawrence E. Cline

Filed under: Al Qaeda,Cool Stuff,Publications — Tags: , , , , , , , — Matt @ 12:21 PM

   If you have the time, check out this excellent paper.  I loved it, because this is the kind of stuff that we need to be doing more of in this war. All it takes is one guy that we can use to deeply penetrate into Osama Bin Laden’s network or some drug cartel, and we could effectively dismantle those operations.

   Dr. Cline gave a big mention to the Selous Scouts in this treatment of the subject, and brought up numerous other groups that had conducted pseudo operations in their wars.

   Towards the end of the article, he builds a snowmobile out of all of this data from all of these other countries, and puts together a pretty good ‘lessons learned’ of how to do pseudo operations correctly:

1. Money counts.

2. The alternative to cooperation can be dire.

3. Coordination is critical.

4. Breaking guerrilla communications systems is a key tool.

5. Effectiveness of pseudo operations depends in large part on

the effectiveness of response forces.

6. The role of “turned” guerrillas is critical.

   The two big components of turning enemy combatants it seems, is money and leveraging the choice of harsh incarceration or execution. That, and treating the captives really well in the beginning and having a really well planned system of turning these folks. It is quite clear though, that pseudo operations can be effective, and they are not impossible to do. It ain’t easy either, because if it was, everyone would be doing it successfully.

   One of the things that is working against the US for pseudo operations, is that we detain terrorists with no chance of execution. There is nothing scary at all about our detention, despite what the media might have the public believe .  If anything, terrorists want to go to Gitmo, so they can conduct propaganda campaigns for their cause while in detention.  They love the idea that they can continue to live and wage jihad from a cell. The paradox though, is that they want to be martyred, so execution would be cool with them as well. So right there is one factor working against us for doing pseudo operations. Still, I think there are other incentives that we could use in order to turn these guys, and we should leave no stone unturned with a pseudo operation strategy.

   Finally, the one theme that repeated throughout the paper, is that pseudo forces should focus primarily on information collection.  When you involve them in more kinetic stuff, that tends to muck up everything.  So whatever turned guerrillas or terrorists you use, it would probably be best to use them just to collect information and have a very flexible and quick reaction force to work off of that information. And to figure out a means of not accidently killing good guys or screwing up the pseudo operator’s operation. Lot’s to think about, but I really think this is the kind of stuff we need to do more of.

   Now to put my industry hat on.  Could a PMC offer these type of services?  If a company was able to claim some kind of speciality in turning guerillas and terrorists, that is the kind of service that would really give states an advantage in their wars. Hell, I know non-states are already doing this kind of thing, and you see examples of it everywhere in this war. But if a company had a proprietary method for turning folks within the framework of international law, and within the laws of that host/contracting country, you could probably name your price. Especially if you were able to produce results. –Matt

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Pseudo Operations and Counterinsurgency: Lessons from Other Countries

June 2005

Authored by Dr. Lawrence E. Cline

SUMMARY

Pseudo operations, in which government forces and guerrilla defectors portray themselves as insurgent units, have been a very successful technique used in several counterinsurgency campaigns. Pseudo teams have provided critical human intelligence and other support to these operations.

These operations, although of considerable value, also have raised a number of concerns. Their use in offensive missions and psychological operations campaigns has, at times, been counterproductive. In general, their main value has been as human intelligence collectors, particularly for long-term background intelligence or for identifying guerrilla groups that then are assaulted by conventional forces. Care must be taken in running these operations both to avoid going too far in acting like guerrillas, and in resisting becoming involved in human rights abuses.

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