Feral Jundi

Thursday, July 29, 2010

Cool Stuff: Eagle Scout And Secretary Of Defense Gates Speaks At A Jamboree

     This is cool.  I remember going to AP Hill when I was a young Boy Scout for a Jamboree and it was quite the experience.  But we definitely did not have a guy like Secretary Gates speaking at our Jamboree.

    So with that said, here is the speech he gave at this year’s Jamboree. It is a fantastic speech and I agree with everything he said. All I have to say is that if you have boys in your family and you are looking for a way to prepare them for life and for being excellent citizens/leaders, I highly recommend the Scouting Program. –Matt

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Boy Scout Jamboree

As Delivered by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates,

Fort A.P. Hill, Virginia,

Wednesday, July 28, 2010

Good morning jamboree!  Do you all want to sit down?  Thank you Anthony, for that kind introduction.

It is an honor to be with you here today and to have the chance to share a few thoughts about scouting with you.  I know how much you enjoy sitting in the sun, so I won’t take too long.

First, as you know, at this moment, there are hundreds of thousands of men and women in our military all over the world – but especially in Iraq and Afghanistan – who are putting their lives on the line to defend you, your families and our freedom.  They have put their dreams aside to protect your dreams. Many of them are members of your families.  So, would every Scout who has a mom or a dad or a brother or a sister or an uncle or an aunt in the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps or Coast Guard please stand?  That’s what I figured.  Please tell your family member from me thank you for their sacrifice – and thank you and your families for supporting them.  You can sit down again.

As the introduction made clear, scouting has been a big part of my life and my family’s life.  Of course my family’s life – and our kid’s lives – have been a bit unusual, in no small part because I have had armed body guards for so much of my professional career.

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Wednesday, July 28, 2010

Industry Talk: BLISS Could Be State’s New LOGCAP, And More Clarification About WPPS

     Thanks to David Isenberg for posting this on his blog and bringing it to everyone’s attention.  I think this is some interesting information that came out of this letter between Richard Verma and Sen. Claire McCaskill. If in fact BLISS becomes the new LOGCAP for DoS, this could be a pretty sizable contract.  That’s ‘if’ they cannot bring State under the current LOGCAP.  We will see how it goes.

     But what I thought was most interesting in this letter was the clarification as to the fact that contractors will be operating this war equipment that DoD will be loaning to State. That is great, and it will be cool to see Blackhawks and MRAPs rolling out into the skies and roads of Iraq under the control of contractors.  I wonder if they will paint this equipment a different color? Like DoS blue/white/yellow? lol

    Also, will these MRAPS or Blackhawks be stripped of all the life saving electronics and communications stuff that our troops were able to use for the survival of their units?  Probably not, but who knows.  Today’s military hardware has a lot of useful stuff in it that could really come in handy for the contractors that have to operate it.

     One thing that is missing in this letter, is a question and response about the 14 security related functions that State identified, that might have to be done by contractors.  Stuff like EOD or counter mortar/rocket team operations. Or QRF/rescue stuff or other military type activities.  I say this because I have yet to see any answers as to how the DoS will treat contractors if they actually had to fire their weapons and kill enemy combatants while doing any of these 14 security related functions.  Or worse yet, what about firefights that unintentionally ended up in the deaths of civilians? Because the enemy loves to attack from population centers with the hopes of creating such an incident.

     Like I have said before, we might want the war to be over in Iraq, but the enemy could care less about our wishes. If anything, with a limited military presence and an Iraqi government and security forces still trying to establish itself, a lot can happen during the transition and drawdown. DoS must understand that the enemy has learned much from the propaganda value of such incidents like the Nisour Square incident. If they can recreate such an incident again they will gain much, and DoS and the US mission in Iraq will suffer yet again from the consequences.

     There are still many questions that come to mind, and that is will DoS support their contractors if involved in a firefight that accidently resulted in civilian deaths, or will they treat the contractor as if they were criminals?  Worse yet, will they hand these individuals over to the Iraqis, or will they insure these men are afforded the same protections and rights that the military or even diplomats would have received in similar situations? Will DoS implement rules for the use of force that are realistic and give contractors the best chance of success for the defense of personnel and property? Or will DoS even allow the proper weapons and tactics required for an effective defense (that could include borderline offensive operations), or even rescues? Stuff to think about and it will be interesting to see how this turns out. –Matt

Edit: 08/02/2011- Hat tip to Ms. Sparky on this news. Supposedly KBR was chosen for this. Check the comment below for the entire post.

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On July 9, 2010 this letter was sent to Sen. Claire McCaskill, from Richard D. Verma, Assistant Secretary for Legislative Affairs at DoS. (I posed the first question and answer, and the 5th question and answer. Follow the link to read the rest)

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1. Will private security contractors, including contractors under the State Department’s Worldwide Personal Protective Services contract, be operating the requested equipment, vehicles, and aircraft?

     The Department of State (DOS) does not presently maintain a cadre of qualified drivers/operators for some requested equipment, such as MRAPS, and, as such, would need to supplement current skill sets within its WPPS contract to ensure operational capability. If/when DoD provides the requested equipment, the Department will modify the relevant contracts to require that the equipment be operated and maintained by contractor personnel in accordance with manufacturer, DoD, or other applicable standards. Contract modifications will also require that contractor personnel possess the necessary qualifications and complete the requisite training to properly operate and maintain the equipment. An aircraft provided to the Department will be incorporated into an existing Department aviation support contract.

5. If the State Department’s request to use LOGCAP is denied, how does the Department plan to ensure that the next contract for life support services is as transparent, competitive, and accountable as possible?

     Should the LOGCAP [Logistics Civil Augmentation Program] be unavailable, the Department will follow Federal Acquisition Regulation competitive procedures in any separate procurement action. Due to long-acquisition lead-time involved, the Department has already initiated action to develop a competitive solicitation for the base life support requirements should it be unable to remain under the LOGCAP program. This solicitation is referred to as the Baghdad Life Support Services acquisition, or BLISS contract. If necessary, the Department could issue a Request for Proposals for the BLISS contract in a very short time.

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Baghdad Life Support Services

Solicitation Number: SAQMMA10I0009

Agency: U.S. Department of State

Office: Office of Logistics Management

Location: Acquisition Management

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Monday, July 19, 2010

Publications: CRS-DoD Contractors In Iraq And Afghanistan: Background And Analysis, July 2010

     The 2010 QDR, which runs almost 130 pages, contains little discussion on the role contractors play in military operations. The QDR has a seven page section on counterinsurgency, stability, and counterterrorism operations, including a list of ten priorities for improvement. However, the word “contractor” does not appear once in the discussion, despite the fact that contractors make up more that 50% of DOD’s workforce in Iraq and Afghanistan, including more than 13,000 armed contractors. Some analysts argue that DOD missed an opportunity to address the issue in the most recent QDR.

*****  

     I like posting these, just because they are running records of where contractors stand in this war.  But what I really like about this publication is that Mr. Schwartz has taken aim at the folks who wrote up the QDR.

     The reason why I like that, is because I have been screaming on this blog as long as I can remember that contractors must be included into the discussion on strategy for these wars.  Especially when we account for over half of the manpower in these conflicts (and probably for future conflicts).

     It still amazes me that today’s strategists and war planners do not adequately cover this stuff.  If you read the QDR, it’s like we don’t even exist.  And yet we have thousands of expats, third country nationals, and local nationals, all interacting with today’s populations and militaries in today’s wars. We are also dying and paying our toll in blood for this war–yet nothing is really mentioned about us when it comes to strategy.

     Mr. Schwartz also took the time to cut and paste some key components of today’s COIN strategy out of some manuals, and how contractors should and could intermix with that strategy.  The bottom line is that if contractors are interacting with the populations of these war zones, then they ‘must’ be aligned within the strategies of COIN. We must be on the same sheet of music as the militaries are, or we will continue to inadvertently cause problems.

     Now for a couple of critiques.  In the beginning of this publication, Mr. Schwartz actually mentioned the use of contractors during the Revolutionary War, but he made no mention of the use of privateers or of Article 1, Section 8, Paragraph 11 of the US Constitution.

     It’s odd to me that he wouldn’t, because our use of privateers is actually a fantastic example of using contractors during times of war to achieve a strategic goal.  Our privateer industry is what we had as a continental navy at that time. The damage they inflicted onto the enemy’s logistics, as well as the capture of enemy weapons and munitions were very significant components of that war. Not to mention the massive infusion of wealth into our young country from all of the commerce raiding done by this government licensed privateer force. And the Letter of Marque in the US Constitution is proof of that existence between private industry and government for ‘offensive’ operations against an enemy.  How’s that for ‘inherently governmental’? lol

     The only other critique that is missing is a combination of DoS’s and other’s numbers into a report like this. I know the DoD doesn’t want to mix with those ‘others’, but it gets kind of old for us to continue to see separate reports all the time. I say combine all of them to save a little money and time, and let’s see every last contractor be counted.  I would also like to see the deaths and injuries of all, and get that stuff on one nice (and complete) report for everyone to analyze and reference. Something to think about for all of you analysts out there who keep throwing this stuff together. –Matt

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Department of Defense Contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan: Background and Analysis 

Moshe Schwartz

Specialist in Defense Acquisition

July 2, 2010

Summary

The Department of Defense (DOD) increasingly relies upon contractors to support operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, which has resulted in a DOD workforce that has 19% more contractor personnel (207,600) than uniformed personnel (175,000). Contractors make up 54% of DOD’s workforce in Iraq and Afghanistan. The critical role contractors play in supporting such military operations and the billions of dollars spent by DOD on these services requires operational forces to effectively manage contractors during contingency operations. Lack of sufficient contract management can delay or even prevent troops from receiving needed support and can also result in wasteful spending. Some analysts believethat poor contract management has also played a role in abuses and crimes committed by certain contractors against local nationals, which may have undermined U.S. counterinsurgency efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan.

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Friday, May 28, 2010

Publications: Contractor Support Of U.S. Operations In USCENTCOM AOR, Iraq, And Afghanistan-As Of May 2010

   Boy, if these guys wanted to do something really smart, they would publish this stuff on Scribd.  Then guys like me could put the report up on the blog and folks can quickly scan through it here.  Or make your graphics into JPEGs or something. Help me, to help you get the word out is all.

   So with this report, there was really no surprises.  Increases of contractors in Afghanistan, and a slight decrease in contractors in Iraq. That and we are still at a quarter million strong overseas, and that is pretty impressive given all the talk about trying to get rid of us.(not to mention the contractors with other agencies/departments) It looks to me like we are still pretty important to the war effort, regardless of whatever party in control at the White House.

    One thing to point out is this number does not include contractors working for other agencies. That number is probably pretty big as well.  Now if they can only keep track of how many of us have died or have been wounded in the war. Because as it stands, that effort has been pathetic and entirely disrespectful to the those that gave all.

     Also, check out the rest of the publication by following the links below if you want.  They mention the typical stuff they have promised to do year after year, when it comes to regulating contractors. Talk is cheap, and I sometimes wonder if government purposely wants to do a poor job or purposely chooses not to do the very things they keep saying they need to do? You have plenty of reports, plenty of studies, plenty of expert testimony and recommendations as to what needs to happen.  Now do it and quit talking about it. Pffffft. –Matt

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Contractor Support of U.S. Operations in USCENTCOM AOR, Iraq, and Afghanistan-as of May 2010

This update reports DoD contractor personnel numbers in theater and outlines DoD efforts to improve management of contractors accompanying U.S. forces.  It covers DoD contractor personnel deployed in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) area of responsibility (AOR).

Ending 2nd quarter FY 2010, USCENTCOM reported approximately 250,335 contractor personnel working for the DoD in the USCENTCOM AOR.

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Saturday, February 27, 2010

Industry Talk: DoD Takes Over Afghan Police Training After IG Cites DoS Failures

   Late last year, I brought this story up during the time that DynCorp was protesting the whole deal.  Now it is official that DoD is taking over the project. Which is probably good, because of how much infantry related activities are involved with war time policing. That, and getting the training standardized so that police forces could be more utilitarian.  The standardization process will also allow for more accurate assessments of the program, and more input from folks who are all implementing the same training.  That means a more efficient learning organization, which is good. –Matt

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DoD takes over Afghan Police training after IG cites State Dept. failures

By Lisa M. NovakThursday, February 25, 2010

NAPLES, Italy — The Defense Department is taking over training of the Afghan National Police because State Department-hired trainers failed to keep pace with the growing instability in Afghanistan or address the security needs of the civilian population, according to a joint State and DOD Inspector General report released late last week.

“The ANP training program that is in place does not provide the ANP with the necessary skills to successfully fight the insurgency, and therefore, hampers the ability of DOD to fulfill its role in the emerging national strategy,” according to the report.

The report, initiated by members of the Senate Appropriations Committee last year, said the State Department failed on a number of fronts, mainly in its ability to provide training that adequately reflected the security needs of the country.

A Clinton administration-era directive gave the State Department responsibility for training civilian police forces around the world. Under that directive, the DOD transferred $1.04 billion to the State Department’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs to support training programs for the ANP.

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